GREER v. NEEL et al

Filing 14

ORDER DENYING 6 Motion for Preliminary Injunction and DISMISSING without prejudice Plaintiff's claims. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 12/19/2017. (tlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
EUGENE WILLIAM GREER,
Plaintiff,
VS.
Chief of Security BRIAN NEEL;
Major LAURA FLETCHER;
Captain D. YOUNG;
Lieutenant MARCUS MORRIS;
Sergeant YOLANDA PARKS;
Sergeant BAKER;
Sergeant GAY;
Corrections Officer BROOKS;
TWO UNKNOWN OFFICERS
IN BUILDING E;
Unit Manager WILLIAMS;
Corrections Officer DAVIS,
Defendants.1
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CIVIL No: 5:17-CV-259-MTT

ORDER
Plaintiff was incarcerated at Riverbend Correctional Facility in Milledgeville,
Georgia when he filed his original complaint on July 7, 2017. ECF Nos. 1 at 1; 13 at 3-5.
While still incarcerated at Riverbend, Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction on July
20, 2017. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff was then transferred to Wheeler Correctional Facility in

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Plaintiff’s list of defendants has changed with every amended complaint. ECF Nos. 1, 8, 9. He
was, therefore, ordered to tell the Court exactly who he seeks to sue in this action. ECF No. 12.
In response, Plaintiff provided the names of ten defendants and two “unknown” defendants. ECF
No. 13 at 4. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to list all of these individuals as defendants in this
action.

Alamo, Georgia. ECF No. 7. Following this transfer, he filed two amended complaints.
ECF Nos. 8, 9. Plaintiff was then transferred to Washington State Prison in Davisboro,
Georgia. ECF No. 11.
An amended complaint generally takes the place of or supersedes the original
complaint. Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1305 n.1 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Fritz v.
Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 676 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982)). But, it
was not clear if Plaintiff wanted his last amended complaint to supersede the previous two
complaints. Also, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Plaintiff’s
various complaints and attachments were neither short nor plain. Therefore, Plaintiff was
ordered to file an amended complaint that would take the place of and supersede all of the
previous complaints that he had filed. ECF No. 12. Plaintiff has now filed this amended
complaint. ECF No. 13.
Plaintiff also sought leave to proceed without prepayment of the required filing fee.
ECF No. 2. On November 30, 2017, the United States Magistrate Judge granted his
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 12.
I.

Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction “due to his safety . . . at Riverbend

Correctional [Facility].” ECF No. 6 at 1. He alleged the conditions of confinement at
Riverbend posed a threat to his health. Id. He also stated that he may be subjected to
gang violence at Riverbend because he was labeled a “snitch” following a May 5, 2017
assault. Id.
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Plaintiff is no longer confined at Riverbend. “[A]n inmate’s clam for injunctive . .
. relief in a section 1983 action fails to present a case or controversy once the inmate has
been transferred. Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
(citing Dudley v. Stewart, 724 F.2d 1493, 1494-95 (11th Cir. 1984)). Injunctive relief is a
prospective remedy that is meant to prevent future injuries. Plaintiff will suffer no future
injuries at Riverbend Correctional Facility because he is no longer confined there. Thus,
Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief to protect him from the allegedly illegal
conditions of confinement and future gang violence at Riverbend is DENIED AS
MOOT.2
II.

Preliminary Screening of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
A.

Standard of Review

In accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the district courts
are obligated to conduct a preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who
seeks redress from a government entity, official, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
Screening is also required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when the plaintiff is proceeding IFP.
Both statutes apply in this case, and the standard of review is the same. When conducting
a preliminary screening, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as
true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d
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The Court realizes that Plaintiff, in his latest amended complaint, alleges that prison officials at
Washington State Prison, where he is currently confined, have failed to protect him from violent
inmates. ECF No. 13 at 5. But, Plaintiff moved for injunctive relief against officials at
Riverbend Correctional Facility prior to his transfer to Washington State Prison. The claims
against officials at Washington State Prison are being dismissed without prejudice. Should
Plaintiff so desire, he can file a new action against officials at Washington State Prison and move
for injunctive relief against those officials in that suit.
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1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003). Pro se pleadings, like the one in this case, are “‘held to a
less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
construed.’” Boxer X, 437 F.3d at 1110 (quoting Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1160). Still, the
Court must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b).
“A claim is frivolous only if it ‘lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.’”
Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The Court may dismiss claims that are based on “‘indisputably
meritless legal’” theories and “‘claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.’”
Id. (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not
include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint
“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot “merely
create[] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(first alteration in original). In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id.
at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for relief under §1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or
omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a
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statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting
under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995).
If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in
support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich,
340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003).
B.

Plaintiff’s Claims

As stated above, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Riverbend Correctional Facility when
he filed this action. ECF Nos. 1 at 1; 13 at 3-5. He states that on April 18, 2017,
Lieutenant Marcus Morris moved him to the “lifers cellhouse.”

ECF No. 13 at 5.

According to Plaintiff, on May 5, 2017 he witnessed the following violence: “a known
gang . . . jumpin[g] on all inmates in the lifers cellhouse”; five inmates . . . beat[ing] up all
gay inmates in the lifer[s] cellhouse”; and “one inmate . . . getting beat up in the middle of
the day room.” Id. As all of this occurred, his roommate, who is a gang member, hit him
in the back of the head. Id. Plaintiff complains that Major Fletcher and Captain Young
escorted him “to segregation without any medical attention.” Id. Plaintiff provides no
other information about his injuries. Plaintiff states he wrote a statement about the attack
and expressed fear for his safety. Id. It is not clear to whom he gave this statement or to
whom he expressed his fears.
Plaintiff alleges Lieutenant Marcus Morris authorized his transfer back to the
general population and Sergeant Yolanda Parks escorted him to the F-C Dorm on May 16
2017. Id. Plaintiff states he was threatened by a known gang member and labelled a
snitch. Id. Plaintiff reported the threat to Sergeant Gay, who told him to ignore it. Id.
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Plaintiff states he took himself back to segregation because he feared for his safety. He
explains that on June 22, 2017, he saw a doctor “for [the] assault that happen[ed] on” May
5, 2017. Id. Plaintiff provides no information about the medical treatment received, or
any diagnosis or prognosis given.
On July 27, 2017, Plaintiff was transferred to Wheeler Correctional Facility in
Alamo, Georgia. ECF No. 7. On October 6, 2017, Plaintiff notified the Court that he had
been transferred to Washington State Prison in Davisboro, Georgia. ECF No. 11.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was “attack[ed] again at
Washington State Prison” on November 3, 2017. ECF No. 13 at 5. Plaintiff states that he
is a “medium security” inmate and Unit Manager Williams and Corrections Officer Davis
put a violent “close security” inmate in the cell with him. Id. It is unclear what injuries
Plaintiff sustained in this assault.
C.

Analysis
1.

Defendants not linked to allegations

In the November 30, 2017 Order to File Amended Complaint, the United States
Magistrate Judge told Plaintiff that he
must list each defendant that he wishes to sue in the heading of the
complaint. In the body of the complaint, Plaintiff must tell the Court
exactly why he has named each defendant. In other words, tell the Court
exactly what action each defendant took, or failed to take, that violated
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
ECF No. 12 at 3.
In his heading of his amended complaint, Plaintiff listed nine named
defendants and “two unknown officers in the ‘E’ Building [at] the time of the assuilt
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(sic).” ECF No. 13 at 1. Question 12 on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 form asked Plaintiff
to list the name, official position, and place of employment of each defendant.
ECF No. 13 at 4. In response, Plaintiff listed ten named defendants and two
unknown officers. ECF No. 13 at 4. In the Statement of Claim, Plaintiff makes
allegations against seven defendants: (1) Lieutenant Marcus Morris, (2) Major
Laura Fletcher, (3) Captain D. Young, (4) Sergeant Yolanda Parks, (5) Sergeant
Gay, (6) Unit Manager Williams, and (7) Corrections Officers Davis. ECF No. 13
at 5. Plaintiff fails to mention Chief of Security Brian Neel, Sergeant Baker,
Corrections Officer Brooks, and the two unknown officers in his Statement of
Claim.
A district court properly dismisses defendants when a prisoner, other than
naming the defendants in the caption of the complaint, fails to state any allegations
that connect the defendants with the alleged constitutional violation. Douglas v.
Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Pamel Corp. v. P.R. Highway
Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1980)). Plaintiff has failed to connect Chief of
Security Brian Neel, Sergeant Baker, Corrections Officer Brooks, and the two
unknown officers with any of his alleged constitutional violation.

These

defendants should, therefore, be dismissed without prejudice.
2.

Unknown Officers

The two unknown officers are subject to dismissal for an additional reason. Not
only does the Court not know what they did, or did not do, to violate Plaintiff’s rights, the
Court has no way of identifying the officers. Plaintiff describes these two individuals as
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“two unknown officers in ‘E’ building [at] the time of the assuilt (sic).” ECF No. 13 at 4.
The Court does not know if Plaintiff is referring to the assault that occurred on May 5, 2017
in the “lifers cellhouse” at Riverbend Correctional Facility, or the November 3, 2017
assault that occurred somewhere at Washington State Prison, or some other assault. “As a
general matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court. [The Court has]
created a limited exception to this rule when the plaintiff’s description of the defendant is
so specific as to be ‘at the very worst, surplusage.’” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734,
738 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 1992)).
In other words, the plaintiff’s description of the defendant must be specific and adequate
enough to allow the defendant to be served with process. Dean, 951 F.2d at 1216
(citations omitted). In the present case, the Court has no idea who the unknown officers
are, where they are located, what they did, or what they failed to do. There is no way to
serve these individuals. The two unknown officers should, therefore, be dismissed without
prejudice.
3.

The May 5, 2017 assault at Riverbend Correctional Facility

Plaintiff asserts he is making a “failure to protect” claim. ECF No. 13 at 1. Prison
officials do have a duty to protect inmates from violence at the hands of other inmates.
Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). “‘A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when a
substantial risk of serious harm, of which the official is subjectively aware, exists and the
official does not respond reasonably to the risk.’” Id. (quoting Caldwell v. Warden, FCI
Talladega, 748 F.3 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014)). “It is not, however, every injury
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suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into constitutional liability
for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

Instead, “the plaintiff must show: (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’
deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) a causal connection between the defendants’
conduct and the Eighth Amendment violation.” Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1301 (citation
omitted).
Plaintiff “has failed to plausibly allege that a substantial risk of serious harm existed
prior to” the events on May 5, 2017. Id. Plaintiff does not allege any attacks or assaults
occurred prior to May 5, 2017. See Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1302 (finding that a single attack
alone is not sufficient to show a substantial risk of serious harm). In relation to the second
element, Plaintiff does not allege (1) any defendant “‘actually (subjectively) kn[ew] that an
inmate [faced] a substantial risk of serious harm’”; or that any defendant “‘disregard[ed]
that known risk by failing to respond to it in an (objectively) reasonable manner.’”
Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1099. (quoting Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d 611,
617 (11th Cir. 2007)).

Having failed to allege sufficient facts to show a plausible

substantial risk and deliberate indifference to that risk, Plaintiff also fails to show any
causal connection between the he defendants’ actions (or inactions) and any Eighth
Amendment violations.
It is unclear if Plaintiff also seeks to make an Eighth Amendment failure to provide
medical care claim in relation to the May 5, 2017 assault. Prison officials’ deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment. But,
the “prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
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indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Deliberate indifference has three elements “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious
harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.”
McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999).
All Plaintiff states is that after the May 5, 2017 assault, he was taken to “segregation
without medical attention.” ECF No. 13 at 5. Plaintiff fails to provide the Court with any
information about the extent of his injuries, why he thinks immediate medical attention
was necessary, or how the lack of immediate medical care exacerbated his injuries or
condition. In other words, Plaintiff has completely failed to provide any information
tending to show that prison officials knew Plaintiff faced a risk of serious harm if he did not
get immediate medical care and that officials disregarded the risk. He has, therefore,
failed to state a clam for relief.
4.

The November 3, 2017 assault at Washington State Prison

When Plaintiff filed his latest amended complaint, he was housed at Washington
State Prison. ECF No. 13 at 1, 5. Plaintiff alleges that although he is classified as
“medium security,” Corrections Officer Davis and Unit Manager Williams put inmate
Genoa Reed, who is classified as “close security,” in the cell with him. ECF No. 13 at 5.
Plaintiff states that Reed attacked him. Id.
Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim regarding the November 3, 2017 assault fails for
the same reasons as his claim regarding the May 5, 2017 assault failed. Plaintiff has not
sufficiently alleged that a substantial risk of serious harm existed at Washington State
Prison prior to the November 3, 2017 assault. Also, he has failed to allege that any
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defendant had subjective knowledge of the substantial risk and failed to act reasonably.
See Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1302; Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1099. His claim should, therefore, be
dismissed without prejudice.
There are two additional reasons to dismiss without prejudice the failure to protect
claim that arose at Washington State Prison. First, Plaintiff could not have exhausted his
administrative remedies regarding the November 3, 2017 assault before he filed his
original complaint on July 7, 2017.

ECF No. 1. It is irrelevant if Plaintiff was able to

exhaust available administrative remedies before he filed the December 11, 2017 amended
complaint. ECF No. 13. “The only facts pertinent to determining whether a prisoner has
satisfied the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement are those that existed when he filed his
original complaint.” Smith v. Terry, 491 F. App’x 81, 83 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(citations omitted) (finding exhaustion must happen before original complaint is filed and
exhaustion defect cannot be cured by exhausting prior to filing an amended complaint).
When it is clear on the face of the complaint, such as here, that Plaintiff did not exhaust
prior to filing his original complaint, the action can be dismissed without prejudice. Jones
v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215-16 (2007); Anderson v. Donald, 261 F. App’x 254, 256 (11th
Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915A and 1915(e) because it appeared on the face of the complaint that plaintiff had not
exhausted his administrative remedies).
Second, the Court fails to see how the Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim
asserted against Unit Manager Williams and Corrections Officer Davis at Washington
State Prison is related to the Eight Amendment failure to protect and failure to provide
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medical care claims asserted against the defendants at Riverbend Correctional Facility.
While a plaintiff may generally raise unrelated claims against a single defendant, he “may
join multiple defendants in a single action only if the right to relief asserted against them
arises ‘out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,’
and if ‘any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.’”
Smith v. Owens, 625 F. App’x 924, 928 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)). It
does not appear that the claims arising at Washington State Prison are sufficiently related
under Rule 20 to be joined in a single complaint with claims arising six months previously
at Riverbend Correctional Facility.
The Court is dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice. Therefore,
Plaintiff is not barred from refiling this action. Absent some connection between the
claims that arose at Riverbend and those that arose at Washington State Prison, however,
Plaintiff should file separate complaints to assert the claims.
III.

Conclusion
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 6, is DENIED and his

Eighth Amendment failure to protect and failure to provide medical treatment claims are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED this 19th day of December, 2017.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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