WANGNAR v. BAKER, et al
Filing
9
ORDER DISMISSING without prejudice Plaintiff's case. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 11/27/2018. (kat)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
PEIR WANGNAR,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARCUS BAKER, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 5:18-CV-90-MTT
ORDER
On March 12, 2018, Plaintiff Peir Wangnar filed his initial complaint, moved to
proceed in forma pauperis, and moved for appointment of counsel. Docs. 1; 2; 3. On
April 26, 2018, the Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel and
granted his motion to proceed IFP. Docs. 5; 6. In the order granting the Plaintiff’s
motion to proceed IFP, the Court noted that the majority of the Plaintiff’s complaint was
either nonsensical or inadequate to support his claims. Doc. 5 at 3. But, because the
Plaintiff was proceeding pro se, the Court allowed the Plaintiff to amend his complaint to
coherently state a claim for relief. Id. The Court underscored that the Plaintiff “should
include only facts and allegations that support his claims and should refrain from
including irrelevant material.” Id. On May 9, 2018, the Plaintiff timely filed his amended
complaint and submitted a letter to the Court supplementing his amendment. Docs. 7;
8.
As discussed in the previous order, the Court shall dismiss a case proceeding
IFP if, at any time, the Court determines that the action (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2)
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A
complaint is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Clearly baseless allegations include those which
are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33
(1992). Dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is governed by the
same standard as a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 1
Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). Because the Plaintiff is
proceeding pro se, however, his “pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Boxer X v.
Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Here, while the Plaintiff claims that “best efforts are made in the amended
submission to narrow down the scope, to cut distractions, [and] to address the doubts in
the . . . orders,” it is clear the amended complaint includes much of the same
nonsensical, fanciful, and delusional allegations raised in the initial complaint. Doc. 7 at
1; compare Doc. 1, with Doc. 8. The following is representative of the Plaintiff’s
allegations:
1
To avoid dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain specific factual matter
to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “At the motion to dismiss stage, all wellpleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir.2006)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While a complaint does not need detailed factual
allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, the entitlement to relief “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555.
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•
“On 03/29/2016, around 5:30 a.m., I, the Plaintiff, Peir Wangnar, a former USDA
Tech, was ambushed at Atlanta Airport Port of Entry by two US CBP Atlanta
Officers, luggage (one big checked-in bag; one carry-on bag containing variety of
electronics: laptop, [etc.]) were searched.” Doc. 8 at 18.
•
The Plaintiff claims he was accused of, and wrongfully arrested and prosecuted
for, stalking the USDA and being an imminent danger. Docs. 7 at 1, 2; 8 at 5-6.
•
The Plaintiff believes these actions against him were “masterminded,
orchestrated, and initiated by Bibb Sheriff’s Office.” Doc. 7 at 2. According to the
Plaintiff, someone from the USDA “must have talked, met with the Bibb Authority,
demonstrated touchingly how she was personally victimized” because the
Plaintiff sent multiple grievance emails and post cards protesting “the evil doings”
at the USDA Agriculture Research Service lab. Doc. 8 at 6, 19-20.
•
One of these emails reads: “Dear Hon. Commander of Fed. Employees, Mr.
Obama, would you confer with your very Hon. USDA Secretary Tom Vilsak in
private small talks . . . is tiny bit human decency needed in running a Noncombatant Fed Agency? How the Heck is this desperate Victoria No Secret
Performer . . . enshrining her superior to be poohed junk into Fed Biosafety at
this Pathology Lab . . .?” Id. at 21. Attached to that email is a picture of what
appears to be the Biosafety Fridge and, though difficult to see, an arrow pointing
to what the Plaintiff alleges was the “Master Bully’s to be poohed out Junk” (her
lunch). Id.
•
Finally, to somehow make his point that the Defendants “must have known” they
violated his rights, the Plaintiff alludes to public figures: “Under the color of law,
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may the Defendants have known: Even the most notorious blood sucker, Kim
Jong-Un, wearing a lab coat (the Tech who told Kim what to do can be shot on
the spot)—giving a damn to Science, when visiting his Biochem facility,” and the
Defendants must have known that “[t]he most powerful, the Supreme Genius
Trump can simply send his SS to chain superior Genius Bannon . . . .” Id. at 910.
These allegations, on their face, are, as the Eleventh Circuit described similar
claims brought by another plaintiff, “irrational and wholly incredible.” Gary v. United
States Gov’t, 540 F. App’x 916, 918 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Denton, 504 U.S. at 33
(explaining that “a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged
rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”). That conclusion is further
supported when considering that in another case before this Court the United States
Department of Agriculture moved for a temporary restraining order against the Plaintiff.
United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Wangnar, 7:12-cv-51, Doc. 1 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2012).
In that motion, which was granted, the USDA states that on April 6, 2012, after the
Plaintiff’s employment was terminated by the Agricultural Research Service (“ARS”), the
Plaintiff came into the ARS office in Tifton, Georgia and “declared his intention to kill
himself by shooting and burning.” Id. These acts led to the Plaintiff’s arrest and
physical removal by local authorities. Id. In his amended complaint, the Plaintiff
mentions the 2012 incident; however, he claims that the “Rampant Bullying Endorsers
caused [that] incident,” much like how he now claims the Bibb County Sheriff’s Office
caused the airport “ambush” and his wrongful arrest and prosecution for stalking the
USDA and being an imminent danger to himself and others. Doc. 8 at 19.
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Thus, having reviewed the Plaintiff’s amended complaint and letter, the Court
finds the Plaintiff’s allegations are factually frivolous and fail to state a claim for relief.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s case is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). 2
SO ORDERED, this 27th day of November, 2018.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2
It appears the statute of limitations may have run or is about to run regarding the Plaintiff’s claims.
“Where a dismissal without prejudice has the effect of precooling the plaintiff from re-filing his claim due to
the running of the statute of limitations, it is tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice.” Stephenson v.
Doe, 554 F. App’x 835, 837 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1482 n.15 (11th
Cir. 1993)). While the Court is dismissing without prejudice, a dismissal with prejudice would be
appropriate in this case because “a clear record of delay or willful misconduct exists, and . . . lesser
sanctions are inadequate to correct such conduct.” Stephenson, 554 F. App’x at 837 (citations omitted).
The Plaintiff was advised of the inadequacies of his allegations and granted an opportunity to amend
those claims; however, he still failed to state a claim for relief. See Docs. 5; 7; 8; see also Friedlander v.
Nims, 755 F.2d 810, 813 (11th Cir. 1985) (dismissal with prejudice not an abuse of discretion when court
gave plaintiff one chance to amend and told him “the deficiency in the complaint and how it could be
remedied”). Thus, any additional amendments would be futile. See Gary v. U.S. Gov’t, 540 F. App’x 916,
918 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007)) (holding the district
court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint as frivolous and not affording plaintiff
an opportunity to amend her complaint because any amendment would have been futile). Accordingly,
the Court dismisses the Plaintiff’s initial and amended complaints as frivolous.
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