SCHILLI TRANSPORTATION SERVICES INC v. PJ ENTERPRISE LLC

Filing 46

ORDER denying 40 Motion for Protective Order. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE TILMAN E SELF, III on 5/1/2020 (TES)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
SCHILLI TRANSPORTATION
SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
5:18-cv-00197-TES

PJ ENTERPRISE LLC.,
Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

Defendant has filed a Motion for Protective Order [Doc. 40] seeking to protect
“sensitive” information revealed in response to discovery "by restricting its disclosure
and/or use to solely that necessary to collect on a debt." [Id. at pp. 1—2]. Plaintiff argues
that Defendant has waived any opportunity to seek protection for documents that it
voluntarily produced, without any mention of restriction. [Doc. 44 at pp. 2—4].
Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to demonstrate good cause for a
protective order and failed to include certification demonstrating that defense counsel
conferred with Plaintiff in good faith in an attempt to resolve the discovery dispute
prior to filing its motion. [Id. at pp. 4—5]. Because the Court agrees that Defendant has
not demonstrated good cause for a protective order, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.

DISCUSSION
On February 26, 2020, Defendant served documents and information on Plaintiff,
as ordered by the Court, in response to discovery. Defendant’s discovery response
contained “business contacts, customer lists, financial information, bank statements,
financial transactions, and other proprietary customer lists, trade secrets or other
confidential business information.” [Doc. 40 at p. 1].
The Court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 26(c)(1)(G), the Court can enter a protective order
“requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way.”
The party seeking a protective order must demonstrate a showing of good cause,
which “contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished
from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323,
1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d
1304, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that it was necessary for the district court to conclude
that the request for a protective order was not supported by good cause in order to
resolve the matter). Good cause “generally signifies a sound basis or legitimate need to
take judicial action” after balancing the interests involved. In re Alexander Grant & Co.
Litigation, 820 F.2d 352, 356 (11th Cir. 1987). “[W]hether good cause exists for a
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protective order is a factual matter to be decided by the nature and character of the
information in question.” Chicago Tribune, 263 F.3d at 1315.
Defendant seeks to protect the information “to prevent agents, employees or
other individuals who might seek to use it to undermine relationships with current
customers by soliciting business or business contacts.”1 [Doc. 40 at p. 2]. Defendant
argues that a protective order is warranted because a serious risk arises from the
volume of customer and business contacts provided and “the fact that an employee or
former employee of Plaintiff used to work for or closely with Defendant.” [Id. at p. 4].
However, such vague and conclusory arguments are far from the particulars and
specifics necessary to show good cause. Defendant’s proffered reasons simply do not
meet the requisite legal standard. Accordingly, this Court will not issue a protective
order.
SO ORDERED, this 1st day of May, 2020.
s/ Tilman E. Self, III
TILMAN E. SELF, III, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

At an earlier hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, Defendant unequivocally testified under oath that
he was no longer conducting business. See [Doc. 34 at p. 2]; see also [Doc. 45, p. 5 (“Defendant is not
currently conducting business and does not have ‘current customers’ in the sense that Plaintiff construes
that phrase”)]. The Court finds it difficult to understand how and why the Defendant needs to protect the
records of a business that no longer operates and clearly isn’t presently using any of the information it
seeks to restrict. Defendant also failed to identify the employee of Plaintiff or the specific manner in
which this unidentified employee could use the information to harm Defendant. Again, the Defendant
was required to point out specific facts to support his motion, not rely on vague and unsupported
arguments.
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