SMITH v. SAMPSON et al

Filing 93

ORDER DENYING 92 Motion for Reconsideration re 88 Order and 89 Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC T TREADWELL on 9/24/2024. (kat)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
LAWRENCE R. SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
Warden GREGORY SAMPSON, et. al.
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:22-CV-170 (MTT)

ORDER
Plaintiff Lawrence Smith moves the Court for reconsideration of its Order (Doc.
88) and Judgment (Doc. 89) entered for the defendants Green, Sampson, Mimms, and
Banks. Doc. 134.
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.6, “Motions for Reconsideration shall not be filed as a
matter of routine practice.” M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.6. Indeed, “reconsideration of a previous
order is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly.” Bingham v. Nelson, 2010
WL 339806 at *1 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). It “is appropriate only if the movant demonstrates (1) that there has been an
intervening change in the law, (2) that new evidence has been discovered which was
not previously available to the parties in the exercise of due diligence, or (3) that the
court made a clear error of law.” Id. “In order to demonstrate clear error, the party
moving for reconsideration must do more than simply restate his prior arguments, and
any arguments which the party inadvertently failed to raise earlier are deemed waived.”
McCoy v. Macon Water Authority, 966 F. Supp. 1209, 1222-23 (M.D. Ga. 1997).

Smith raises two arguments regarding the Court’s determination that he failed to
exhaust his claim against Green: 1) the Court improperly concluded that he waived his
right to argue that his supplemental complaint cured his exhaustion, and 2) the Court
did not apply the proper authority when analyzing whether he had exhausted his
administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Doc. 92 at 2,
5. Smith does not object to the Court’s conclusion that Sampson, Mimms, and Banks
are entitled to qualified immunity.
First, Smith is correct that, in his response to the defendants’ statement of
material facts, he alleged “[h]owever, Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint cures the
exhaustion issues.” Doc. 66 at ¶ 46. Thus, he did not waive that argument, but the
Court’s ruling did not turn on waiver. Rather, the Court considered Smith’s argument
that his supplemental complaint cured his failure to exhaust and denied it on the merits.
Doc. 88 at 2.
Second, Smith argues that the Court should have analyzed whether his
supplemental complaint cured his exhaustion issues under Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199
(2007), rather than relying on Eleventh Circuit precedent. Doc. 92 at 5. In Jones, the
Supreme Court discussed the applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the
pleading requirements of the PLRA and stated that “courts should generally not depart
from the usual practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis of
perceived policy concerns.” 549 U.S. at 212. The Ninth Circuit in Jackson v. Fong, 870
F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2017), relied on Jones to conclude that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d)
allows exhaustion issues to be cured by an amended complaint. Smith argues that the
Court should follow the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Jackson. Doc. 92 at 5.

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Smith has not shown a clear error of law by the Court. First, while the Supreme
Court’s decision in Jones is binding on the Court, Jones does not support Smith’s
conclusion. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. While Jones emphasized the deference owed to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court did not address whether a supplemental
complaint can cure exhaustion issues. Id. Further, Jackson is not binding on the Court,
and the Eleventh Circuit held in Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 981 (11th Cir. 2000),
that post-filing facts alleged in a supplemental complaint cannot satisfy PLRA
requirements that must be met before a claim is brought. Harris addressed Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(d) and concluded that while Rule 15(d) allows a party to supplement a defective
pleading, “that rule does not and cannot overrule a substantive requirement or
restriction contained in a statute.” Id. at 983; See Smith v. Terry, 491 F. App’x 81, 83
(11th Cir. 2012) (“The only facts pertinent to determining whether a prisoner has
satisfied the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement are those that existed when he filed his
original complaint.”). The Court is bound by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Harris.
Smith has shown no clear error of law.
Because Smith has failed to show that the Court made a clear error in its
previous Order and Judgment (Docs. 88; 89), his motion for reconsideration (Doc. 92) is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 24th day of September, 2024.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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