KAUFMAN v. RIVER EDGE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CENTER et al

Filing 28

ORDER OF DISMISSAL. This action is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. Ordered by CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE MARC T TREADWELL on 4/23/2024. (kat)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
HEATHER KAUFMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
RIVER EDGE BEHAVIORAL
HEALTH CENTER, et al.,
Defendants.
__________________

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:23-cv-11 (MTT)

ORDER
Plaintiff Heather Kaufman filed this action, stemming from her alleged rape by
another patient while committed to River Edge Behavioral Health Center, against
Defendant River Edge Behavioral Health Center and Defendant River Edge Foundation.
Doc. 1-2. On February 12, 2024, the Court granted plaintiff counsel’s motion to
withdraw and ordered the plaintiff to advise the Court in writing no later than March 4,
2024, whether she plans to proceed pro se. Doc. 26. Nothing was filed. Thus, the
Court ordered Kaufman, no later than March 19, 2024, to show cause why this action
should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute and comply with the
Court’s Order. Doc. 27. Both orders warned Kaufman that the failure to fully and timely
comply with the Court’s orders and instructions could result in the dismissal of this
action. Docs. 26; 27. The time for compliance has again passed without a response
from Kaufman. As previously warned, the failure to comply with the Court’s orders and

instructions is grounds for dismissing this case. 1 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Brown v.
Tallahassee Police Dep't, 205 F. App'x 802, 802 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The court may
dismiss an action sua sponte under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute or failure to obey
a court order.” (citing Lopez v. Aransas Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th
Cir. 1978)). Accordingly, this action is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. 2

SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of April, 2024.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered
prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981).
1

Dismissal without prejudice is generally appropriate under Rule 41(b) where a plaintiff has failed to
comply with a court order, “‘especially where the litigant has been forewarned.’” Owens v. Pinellas Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 331 F. App’x 654, 655 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837
(11th Cir. 1989)). Here, Kaufman’s complaint brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and all constitutional
claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury
actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought.” McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173
(11th Cir. 2008). Georgia has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See O.C.G.A. §
9-3-33. Consequently, Kaufman’s claims are likely now barred. Based on the facts of this case,
however, the Court finds both a clear record of delay or willful contempt and that lesser sanctions would
be inadequate. See Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Co-op. of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 102-03 (11th Cir. 1989).
2

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