SUGGS v. WARD et al

Filing 14

ORDER ADOPTING 13 Report and Recommendations; DENYING as moot 8 Motion for TRO. This action is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. Ordered by CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE MARC T TREADWELL on 3/27/2024. (kat)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
STEPHON SUGGS,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNIT MANAGER WARD, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:23-cv-383 (MTT)

ORDER
Plaintiff Stephon Suggs, a prisoner incarcerated at Telfair State Prison, filed this
pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Doc. 1. On November 8, 2023, Suggs was ordered to
file a recast complaint within fourteen days using the Court’s standard form and was
warned that the failure to fully and timely comply with the Court’s orders and instructions
could result in the dismissal of this action. Doc. 5. Fourteen days passed and nothing
was filed. Thus, Suggs was ordered to show cause why this action should not be
dismissed for failure to comply with the Court’s orders. Doc. 6. In response, Suggs
filed various miscellaneous documents. First, Suggs filed an affidavit seeking—among
other things—appointment of a special master and a three-judge panel, a meeting with
a United States Marshal and a Georgia Bureau of Investigations agent, return of
missing property, and another copy of the Court’s standard form(s). 1 Doc. 7. Suggs
next moved for a temporary restraining order directing defendants to provide him

Suggs also asserted his innocence of the crimes for which he is imprisoned and complained about the
conditions of his confinement. Doc. 7.
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adequate medical care and to refrain from retaliating against him. Docs. 8; 8-1. Last,
Suggs moved for an extension of time to recast his complaint, in part, because he
needed another copy of the Court’s standard form. Doc. 9. The Court mailed Suggs
another copy of the Court’s standard form on December 27, 2023, and granted the
extension on December 28, 2023. On January 23, 2024, Suggs again moved for an
extension, which the Court granted. Docs. 10; 11. But Suggs never filed a recast
complaint. 2 Accordingly, United States Magistrate Judge Charles Weigle recommends
dismissing this action without prejudice for failure to comply with the Court’s orders and
instructions and for failure to prosecute. Doc. 13. The Magistrate Judge also
recommends denying Suggs’s motion for injunctive relief as moot. Id.
There are no objections. Accordingly, the Court reviews the Recommendation
for clear error pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). After review, the Court accepts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. The
Recommendation (Doc. 13) is ADOPTED and made the Order of the Court. As
previously warned, the failure to comply with the Court’s orders and instructions is
grounds for dismissing this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Brown v. Tallahassee
Police Dep't, 205 F. App'x 802, 802 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The court may dismiss an action
sua sponte under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute or failure to obey a court order.”
(citing Lopez v. Aransas Cty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1978)). 3

The Court’s order (Doc. 11) granting Suggs’s second motion for an extension of time (Doc. 10) was
returned to the Court as undeliverable and was marked with a notation indicating Suggs “refused to sign
for and accept this letter.” Doc. 12.
2

The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered
prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981).
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This action is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice, 4 and Suggs’s motion for injunctive
relief (Doc. 8) is DENIED as MOOT.
SO ORDERED, this 27th day of March, 2024.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Dismissal without prejudice is generally appropriate under Rule 41(b) where a plaintiff has failed to
comply with a court order, “‘especially where the litigant has been forewarned.’” Owens v. Pinellas Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 331 F. App’x 654, 655 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837
(11th Cir. 1989)). Here, Suggs’s complaint brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and all constitutional
claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury
actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought.” McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173
(11th Cir. 2008). Georgia has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See O.C.G.A. §
9-3-33. Consequently, some of Suggs’s claims are likely now barred. Based on the facts of this case,
however, the Court finds both a clear record of delay and that lesser sanctions would be inadequate. See
Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Co-op. of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 102-03 (11th Cir. 1989).
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