WILLIS et al v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY et al

Filing 79

ORDER GRANTING 74 Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Conditional Certification and for the Issuance of Court-Supervised Notice. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC T TREADWELL on 9/26/2024. (kat)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
CHERALE WILLIS, on Behalf of
Herself and All Others
Similarly Situated, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INSURANCE COMPANY
d/b/a GEICO, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:23-cv-430 (MTT)

ORDER
Plaintiffs Cherale Willis, Sandy Colbert, Tiffaney Peacock, Caral Taylor, and
Amalia Benvenutti bring this consolidated action 1 against Defendants GEICO General
Insurance Company and Government Employees Insurance Company (collectively,
“GEICO”), on behalf of themselves and similarly situated employees, to recover unpaid
wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). Doc. 70. They allege GEICO
failed to pay them and similarly situated employees for all time worked, including time in
excess of 40 hours a workweek, in violation of the FLSA. 2 Id. ¶ 3. Over 500 opt-in
plaintiffs have filed notices of consent to participate in this case. The plaintiffs now

On May 30, 2024, the Court consolidated Benvenutti v. Government Employees Ins. Co. d/b/a GEICO et
al., No. 5:22-cv-00182-MTT (M.D. Ga.), with this case because of the substantial overlap in the parties,
issues, and relief sought. Doc. 63. The plaintiffs have since filed a consolidated complaint superseding
the operative complaints and proposing a single consolidated collective action definition. Doc. 70. For a
full statement of the procedural history of this case, see the Court’s consolidation order (Doc. 63).
1

Plaintiff Amalia Benvenutti also asserts a retaliation claim, alleging she faced retaliation after
complaining about GEICO's alleged unlawful pay practices. Doc. 70 ¶¶ 94-101.

2

move for conditional certification of a collective action and for court-ordered notice to
potential opt-in plaintiffs who have not yet received notice pursuant to FLSA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b). Doc. 74. For the following reasons, that motion (Doc. 74) is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The plaintiffs and other “similarly situated employees” are current and former
GEICO employees who handled communications with “and/or” related to GEICO
customers and were assigned to work for and/or were managed out of GEICO’s Macon,
Georgia call center at any time since March 1, 2020. 3 Doc. 70 ¶¶ 2, 84. Job titles held
by these employees include, but are not limited to, Claims Service Representative,
Salvage Specialist, Retention Representative, ERS Dispatcher, ERS Representative,
Glass Representative, Internet ERS/Glass Representative, and Claims Specialist. 4 Id.
¶ 39. GEICO pays these employees hourly, and their primary responsibilities include
handling communications with GEICO customers and addressing issues related to
existing policies, policy services, claims, billing, and other customer service matters. Id.
¶¶ 40-41, 46.

3

GEICO refers to these employees as “Associates.” Docs. 59 at 2 n.1; 76 at 5.

Job Responsibilities: According to the plaintiffs, these employees all handle various types of
communications with GEICO customers, including:
4

•
•
•

In-bound telephone calls
Out-bound telephone calls
Electronic communications submitted through GEICO's website (www.geico.com) and/or
the GEICO Mobile application

Doc. 70 ¶¶ 40-41. The plaintiffs allege these communications are aimed at providing assistance to
customers regarding existing policies, policy services and offerings (such as roadside assistance),
changes to policies, claims, billing issues, and other related matters.

2

The plaintiffs claim GEICO implemented a common policy, as part of a transition
to remote work in March 2020, of paying these employees only for the time they are
logged into a CISCO software application called "Finesse," which tracks their time
handling communications with and/or related to GEICO customers. 5 Id. ¶¶ 45-55.
Employees are required to log into Finesse at the start of their scheduled shift and log
out at the end, even if they do not actually use the software to communicate with
customers. 6 Docs. 70 ¶¶ 50-52; 77 at 2-3, 5-7. The time recorded in Finesse is then
entered into another system called Workday, which GEICO uses for payroll purposes.
Docs. 40-5 ¶ 9; 77 at 2-3. The plaintiffs claim employees are instructed to ensure that
the time they enter into Workday reflects the time they were logged into Finesse. Docs.
40-5 ¶ 9; 77 at 5-6. Any time not captured in Finesse or not specifically approved by a
supervisor is allegedly not considered work time for pay purposes. See, e.g., Doc. 40-5
¶¶ 7-12. Thus, the plaintiffs are not paid for work activities performed before logging in,
after logging out, and during downtime because of technical issues. Doc. 70 ¶¶ 65-81.
Pre-Shift Activities. The plaintiffs allege that they are required to perform
necessary pre-shift tasks before logging into Finesse. Id. ¶ 64. These tasks include
booting up their computers and completing a multi-step login process to access

5 Even if Finesse is, as GEICO claims (Doc. 76 at 9), not a traditional timekeeping tool, the plaintiffs
contend, with evidentiary support, that GEICO effectively uses it as such, by compensating employees
only for the time they are logged into the system. Doc. 70 ¶¶ 45-55.

The plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees have various job titles, and their positions have
slightly different responsibilities and require varying levels of interaction with Finesse. Docs. 76 at 11; 761. For example, Service Representatives may use Finesse more extensively to handle customer
interactions, while ERS Representatives and Salvage Representatives use Finesse for other purposes,
such as managing roadside service requests or processing claims-related paperwork. According to
GEICO, some of the positions identified by the plaintiffs use different software applications to handle
communications with customers. Doc. 76 at 11.
6

3

GEICO’s internal systems and tools required for their duties. Id. ¶¶ 56-61. They also
include activities such as:
•

Connecting to GEICO’s network;

•

Opening, loading, and logging into numerous programs and applications;

•

Reviewing Outlook emails and Webex messages with updates related to
their work; and

•

Logging into Finesse.

Id. The plaintiffs allege that these tasks are essential to their job functions, but because
they are performed before logging into Finesse, the time spent on them is not
compensated. Id. ¶¶ 62-67.
Post-Shift Activities. The plaintiffs allege that after logging out of Finesse at the
end of their shifts, they are required to perform additional work-related tasks, including
completing customer documentation, closing various software programs, and shutting
down their computers. Id. ¶¶ 68, 72-74. They also claim that they perform unpaid tasks
such as updating notes or documentation, reading and responding to additional emails
or Webex messages from management, and answering correspondence they did not
respond to during their shifts. Id. ¶¶ 68, 72. Like pre-shift tasks, these post-shift
activities are not compensated because they occur after logging out of Finesse. Id. ¶
73.
Technical Downtime. The plaintiffs claim they are not compensated when
technical issues prevent them from being logged into Finesse. Id. ¶¶ 75-78. For
example, if technical issues prevent employees from logging into Finesse or kick them
off Finesse, they are not compensated for the downtime, even though they remain
4

available and on call. Id. If employees experience downtime, the plaintiffs claim they
are required to make up the time by working past the end of their scheduled shift time
(effectively off-the-clock) or by having the downtime deducted from their accrued paid
leave or vacation time. Id. ¶ 78. Additionally, the plaintiffs claim employees are
expected to work to resolve the issue and regularly update their supervisors during
downtime. Id. ¶ 77.
Based on these allegations, the plaintiffs claim that they and similarly situated
employees often work more than 40 hours a workweek without being compensated for
all hours worked. Id. ¶¶ 80-81.
B. Procedural History
This consolidated action stems from two related FLSA collective actions against
the same defendants. See Doc. 63. The first action, Benvenutti v. Government
Employees Ins. Co. d/b/a GEICO et al., No. 5:22-cv-00182-MTT (M.D. Ga.), was filed
by former claims service representative Amalia Benvenutti who alleged that GEICO’s
reliance on Finesse resulted in widespread failure to compensate her and similarly
situated service representatives for all time worked in violation of the FLSA (Doc. 35).
On April 26, 2023, the Court conditionally certified Benvenutti as a collective action and
ordered notice to be sent to “All current and former Service Representatives who
worked for GEICO and were managed out of the GEICO Macon, Georgia call center at
any time since March 1, 2020.” Doc. 63 at 3; see Benvenutti, No. 5:22-cv-182-MTT,
Doc. 39 at 10. GEICO was ordered to produce a notice list with contact information for
the individuals who met this definition. Id.

5

Numerous employees—with and without “Service Representative” in their job
titles—were not on GEICO’s notice list, yet they filed notices of consent to participate
anyway because they understood themselves to be Service Representatives and many
of them worked in GEICO’s centralized service department. 7 Doc. 63 at 4; see
Benvenutti, No. 5:22-cv-182-MTT, Docs. 114 at 5; 115 at 2. “Internet Service
Representatives,” for instance, were included on the notice list but “Emergency
Roadside Service (ERS) Representatives” were not. Doc. 63 at 4. Even some Internet
Service Representatives were omitted from the list without explanation. Doc. 63 at 4 &
n. 3, 4; see Benvenutti, No. 5:22-cv-182-MTT, Docs. 115 at 2; 117 at 4 n.4.
Consequently, on October 26, 2023, Plaintiffs Cherale Willis, Sandy Colbert, and
Tiffaney Peacock, filed a second, related action based on the same alleged unlawful
pay practice alleged in Benvenutti. Willis et al., v. Government Employees Ins. Co.
d/b/a GEICO et al., No. 5:23-cv-430-MTT (M.D. Ga.), Doc. 1. On December 13, 2023,
the plaintiffs amended their complaint as of right and added Caral Taylor as a named
plaintiff. Doc. 33. They alleged that the plaintiffs in the second action were similarly
situated to the plaintiffs in Benvenutti but were employed “in at least one hourly-paid job
position that GEICO d[id] not consider to be within the category of ‘Service
Representatives,’” for whom the Court ordered notice. Id. ¶¶ 1, 40, 45, 49, 51-55, 7477. Thus, they sought to certify a separate collective of employees assigned to the
Macon call center who handled communications with customers and worked in an
hourly-paid position other than “Service Representative” as defined in Benvenutti.

7 When asked why these individuals were omitted from the notice list, GEICO claimed that they were not
within the category of “Service Representatives” for whom the Court ordered notice. Doc. 63 at 4; see
Benvenutti, No. 5:22-cv-182-MTT, Docs. 114-2; 114-3; 115 at 2-3.

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Docs. 1; 33 ¶¶ 33, 80. In short, the plaintiffs were trying to capture similarly situated
employees who were not on GEICO’s notice list.
On December 27, 2023, GEICO moved to dismiss Willis as duplicative of
Benvenutti, arguing that the parties, issues, and relief sought were substantially the
same in both cases because the four named plaintiffs in Willis and at least seventeen
opt-in plaintiffs were also plaintiffs in Benvenutti. Doc. 37. The Court denied GEICO’s
motion to dismiss and consolidated Benvenutti with Willis because both actions sought
to recover unpaid overtime wages under the FLSA on behalf of hourly paid employees
assigned to GEICO’s Macon call center who use Finesse and handle communications
with GEICO customers. Doc. 63 at 9. The Court also ordered the parties to address
whether there should be a single collective action definition to simplify the case moving
forward. Id.
The parties agreed that there should be a single collective if the consolidated
case were to proceed. 8 Doc. 68. On June 21, 2024, the Court ordered the plaintiffs to
file a consolidated complaint superseding the respective complaints and containing a
single consolidated collective action definition. Doc. 69. The plaintiffs have since filed
their consolidated complaint. Doc. 70. They now request authorization to notify
similarly situated employees of their right to join this lawsuit and move to conditionally
certify a collective action defined as:

Although GEICO argued that the plaintiffs’ allegations were not suitable for collective action treatment
under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), GEICO stated that it would not oppose a request “to amend the [operative]
complaint for purposes of including the following” consolidated definition: “All current and former hourlypaid GEICO employees who have handled communications with GEICO customers and/or
communications related to GEICO customers through the Finesse and/or Salesforce platforms and were
managed out of GEICO’s Macon, Georgia call center at any time since March 1, 2020.” Doc. 68 at 2.
8

7

All current and former hourly-paid GEICO employees who have handled
communications with GEICO customers and/or communications related to
GEICO customers and were assigned to work for and/or were managed out
of GEICO’s Macon, Georgia call center at any time since March 1, 2020,
regardless of job title.
Docs. 70 ¶ 84; 74 at 2-3. They also request that the Court:
(1) order GEICO to produce a list of all Putative Notice Opt-In Plaintiffs,
including names, last known mailing addresses, last known email
addresses, and last known telephone numbers within fourteen (14) days of
the Court’s ruling;
(2) approve Plaintiffs’ proposed Notice of Pending Fair Labor Standards Act
Lawsuit (“Notice”) (Doc. 74-1) and Consent to Become Party Plaintiff
(“Consent Form”) (Doc. 74-2);
(3) authorize Plaintiffs to send their proposed Notice and Consent Form to
Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs via U.S. Mail (along with a prepaid return envelope
addressed to Plaintiff’s counsel) and email; and,
(4) require that Consent Forms to join this action be postmarked or
otherwise received by Plaintiffs’ counsel within ninety (90) days of the date
notice is sent.
Doc. 74 at 3. In response, GEICO argues the plaintiffs’ motion for conditional
certification should be denied. Doc. 76.
II. STANDARD
The FLSA requires covered employers to pay overtime compensation for each
hour that non-exempt employees work in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 206, 207, 213. Section 216(b) provides these employees a right of action against
their employers for violations of FLSA’s overtime provisions. Under § 216(b), these
employees may sue individually or bring a collective action on behalf of themselves and
other "similarly situated" employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). However, in a
prospective collective action brought under § 216(b), potential plaintiffs must
affirmatively opt into the action by filing their written consent with the court. Hipp v.
8

Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1216 (11th Cir. 2001). And “[t]he decision to
create an opt-in class under § 216(b) … remains soundly within the discretion of the
district court.” Id. at 1219. 9
The Eleventh Circuit has endorsed a two-stage approach to certification of FLSA
collective actions: the “notice stage” and the “decertification stage.” 10 Id. At the “notice
stage,” which is relevant here, the Court determines “whether notice of the action should
be given to potential class members.” Id. at 1218 (citation omitted). In making this
determination, the Court must ask whether there are other employees who desire to opt
in and whether those employees are similarly situated with respect to their job
requirements and pay provisions. Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233,
1259 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Dybach v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 942 F.2d 1562, 156768 (11th Cir. 1991)). The plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating a reasonable basis
for the claim that there are other similarly situated employees who desire to opt into the
litigation. Haynes v. Singer Co., Inc., 696 F.2d 884, 887 (11th Cir. 1983). Because the
Court usually relies only on the pleadings and any affidavits submitted by the parties, “a
fairly lenient standard” is applied, which “typically results in conditional certification of a
representative class.” Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). If the class is conditionally certified, “putative class members are given notice

While “Hipp involved a collective action … under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., that statute incorporates FLSA’s collective action” provision. Morgan v. Family
Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1259 n.37 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Thus, Hipp “applies in both contexts.” Id.
9

10 But as the Eleventh Circuit in Mickles v. Country Club Inc. emphasized, this approach is merely a
suggestion for district courts “to better manage § 216 cases.” 887 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2018)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court finds the suggested approach appropriate to apply here
for the reasons discussed below.

9

and the opportunity” to opt into the action, and “[t]he action proceeds as a
representative action throughout discovery.” Id.
The second stage of the certification process “is typically precipitated by a motion
for ‘decertification’ by the defendant usually filed after discovery is largely complete and
the matter is ready for trial.” Id. Because at this stage the court has a more extensive
and detailed factual record, the standard to show substantial similarity “is less lenient,
and the plaintiff bears a heavier burden.” Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1261 (citations omitted).
If the Court determines at the second stage that the class representatives (original
plaintiffs) and the opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated, the collective action proceeds to
trial on the merits. Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218 (quotation marks and citation omitted). If
they are not similarly situated, generally the collective action becomes decertified, the
opt-in plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice, and the original plaintiffs proceed to trial
on their individual claims. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
The plaintiffs seek conditional certification of their claims and request
authorization to notify similarly situated employees of their right to join this lawsuit.
Docs. 70 ¶ 84; 74. They argue that GEICO's common policy and practice of not paying
them for all hours worked binds them and similarly situated employees together and
makes their claims suitable for collective action treatment under the FLSA. Docs. 74;
74-3 at 1-2. GEICO opposes the motion arguing (1) the Court should not apply the twostep process for collective action certification; (2) the plaintiffs have not shown a
common unlawful policy or practice related to compensating Associates through
Finesse; (3) even under a lenient analysis the plaintiffs fail to “engage” with GEICO's

10

evidence and thus have not demonstrated they are similarly situated to other
employees; and (4) the plaintiffs’ proposed collective action definition is overly broad
and unmanageable. Doc. 76 at 5-8.
GEICO argues that the Court should follow the approach in Swales v. KLLM
Transport Services, 985 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2021), instead of the two-step process for
collective action certification. Doc. 76 at 13. In Swales, the Fifth Circuit instructed
district courts to rigorously assess whether potential plaintiffs are "similarly situated" by
considering all available evidence at the outset, rather than relying on a two-step
certification process. 11 Swales, 985 F.3d at 442-43. GEICO’s push for a rigorous
analysis is a bit odd, because GEICO’s evidence is consistent with the plaintiffs’
relevant allegations. Docs. 76-3—76-14. Declarations submitted by GEICO confirm
that the first and last task for employees covered by this lawsuit is logging in and
logging out of Finesse, even if they do not use Finesse throughout their shifts or to
communicate with customers. See, e.g., Docs. 76-7 ¶ 14; 76-9 ¶¶ 3-6; 76-10 ¶¶ 13, 16;
76-12 ¶¶ 13, 18; 76-13 ¶¶ 12-13, 16.
The real issue, as GEICO understandably argues, is not whether employees are
similarly situated but rather whether activities not recorded by Finesse are “integral and
indispensable.” See Llorca v. Sheriff, Collier Cnty., Fla., 893 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir.
2018) (holding preliminary and postliminary activities are compensable under the FLSA
only if they are both integral and indispensable to the employee’s principal activities).
The resolution of that issue requires a more developed record. Id. (“The inquiry is fact-

This includes determining whether differences in job duties, defenses, or pay structures exist that would
prevent collective action treatment. Swales, 985 F.3d at 442-43.
11

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intensive and not amenable to bright-line rules.”). Because discovery is not complete,
the Court applies the approved two-step process for collective action certification in
order to efficiently manage this FLSA litigation. See Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d
945, 952-53 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he lenient [two-step] standard … may be most useful
when making a certification decision early in the litigation before discovery has been
completed.”).
GEICO’s remaining arguments either misconstrue the plaintiffs’ allegations or
prematurely raises issues that should be addressed after discovery has been
completed. 12 See Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218; see also Pares v. Kendall Lakes Auto., LLC,
2013 WL 3279803, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 27, 2013). Thus, in deciding whether to grant
conditional certification, the Court will focus on whether other similarly situated
employees wish to participate in this litigation and addresses GEICO’s arguments
where appropriate. See Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1258.
A. Interested Employees
To maintain a collective action under the FLSA, plaintiffs must demonstrate that
there are other employees who desire to participate. Sizemore v. Grayhawk Homes
Inc., 2018 WL 1997539, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 2018) (quoting Kubiak v. S.W. Cowboy,
Inc., 2014 WL 2625181, at *8 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2014)). Here, over 500 opt-in
plaintiffs have demonstrated their interest in participating in this litigation by filing written
consents with the Court. This is more than enough to satisfy the plaintiffs' "fairly lenient

12 Because the plaintiffs submitted declarations alleging that supervisors directed them to mis-record their
hours in Workday based on the time they were logged into Finesse, GEICO argues that the plaintiffs rely
on a "rogue manager" theory and fail to establish a common pay policy or practice. Doc. 76 at 9-10, 1719. But any deviation from GEICO policy by individual managers should be addressed after discovery
has been completed because GEICO has submitted evidence supporting some of the plaintiffs’ relevant
allegations related to the use of Finesse. See, e.g., Docs. 76-3 ¶¶ 13, 15; 76-7 ¶¶ 13-16 (unsigned).

12

burden" to show other employees are interested in joining the suit. See Albert v. HGS
Colibrium, 2017 WL 1682528, at 3 (N.D. Ga. May 3, 2007) (concluding because two
individuals had opted into the litigation, “[t]his shows that former employees seek to be
members of a collective action, and the desire to opt-in criteria is met.”).
B. Similarly Situated Employees
Next, the plaintiffs must establish that they and potential opt-in plaintiffs are
similarly situated. To be "similarly situated," the “plaintiffs may show either (1) that their
job positions and duties are similar to those positions held by the putative class
members … or (2) that plaintiffs and the putative class members were all subject to the
same unified policy, plan, or scheme that forms the basis of the alleged FLSA violation.”
Eyo v. Ace High Marketing, LLC, 2020 WL 8224928, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 23, 2020)
(citing Hipp., 252 F.3d at 1217); see also Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1096
(11th Cir. 1996).
Here, the plaintiffs have met their burden to show that they are similarly situated
by presenting evidence that putative members of the collective are all subject to the
same alleged unlawful compensation practice and policy. 13 First, the Court rejects
GEICO's argument that the plaintiffs have not shown a common unlawful policy. Doc.

13

The evidence supporting the plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification includes:
•
•
•
•
•

Declarations from Cherale Willis, Sandy Colbert, and Caral Taylor (Docs. 40-5; 40-6; 40-7);
Declarations from Jessica Burbank, Lakimberlee Crawford, and Stacey Day (Docs. 40-8; 409; 40-10);
Declarations from Judith Adams, Miyata Finley, Karianne Lawrence, and Rissiah Sanders
(Benvenutti, No. 5:22-cv-182-MTT, at Docs. 29-4; 29-5; 29-6; 29-7);
Deposition testimony of Amalia Benvenutti (Benvenutti, No. 5:22-cv-182-MTT, at Doc. 29-3),
Lisa Peterson, and Mary Lee Irby (Docs. 77-1; 77-2) and
An email dated January 19, 2024 from a GEICO supervisor detailing GEICO’s policies and
practices regarding call center employees start and sign-out times for pay purposes (Doc. 4010 at 7-9).

13

76 at 14-13. The plaintiffs are all compensated on an hourly basis and claim they are
paid only for the number of hours they are logged into Finesse. Doc. 70 ¶¶ 51-55.
Because Finesse does not account for all time employees spend performing necessary
pre-shift and post-shift activities, such as logging into computer systems, reading and
responding to emails, and handling technical issues, the plaintiffs claim they are not
compensated for all hours worked, including overtime, in violation of the FLSA. Id. ¶¶
45-55, 65-81. In support of these allegations, the plaintiffs provide sworn testimony and
declarations from thirteen individuals, 14 detailing the similar paid and unpaid work tasks
they are required to perform and the impact of GEICO's alleged policies. See, e.g.,
Docs. 40-5 ¶¶ 7-12; 40-6 ¶¶ 7-12; 40-7 ¶¶ 8-13; 40-8 ¶¶ 8-13; 40-9 ¶¶ 7-12; 40-10 ¶¶ 712; see also note 13 supra. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to show that members of
the collective share similar job requirements and are subject to the same alleged
unlawful compensation practice and policy.
Second, GEICO's argument regarding individualized issues does not preclude
conditional certification. Doc. 76 at 10-11, 22-23. GEICO emphasizes the differences in
potential opt-in plaintiffs’ job roles, duties, software applications, and remote work
locations, arguing that these differences make the plaintiffs not similarly situated. 15 Id.
Minor variations in job roles or requirements, however, do not automatically defeat the

GEICO claims these declarations are cookie-cutter in nature, and do not provide detailed evidence of a
common unlawful policy or practice. Doc. 76 at 6, 20. However, these declarations state that they are
based on personal knowledge and describe common policies and practices that result in unpaid work
time. See, e.g., Docs. 40-5—40-10. Consistency, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory lore notwithstanding, can
be a virtue.
14

15 To be clear, this action is limited to employees based out of GEICO’s Macon, Georgia call center. Doc.
70 at 1-2, ¶¶ 2, 38, 84. The fact that some employees may work remotely does not change that. See
Doc. 76 at 23.

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requirement that plaintiffs be similarly situated. Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1217 (quoting
Grayson, 79 F.3d at 1096). The focus is on whether the employees are subject to
similar unlawful practices, not whether their job functions are identical. Id. Here, the
plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence that the practice of tying compensation to
Finesse was applied uniformly to hourly-paid employees handling customer
communications at the Macon call center, regardless of their specific job titles. 16
Declarations from both GEICO and the plaintiffs confirm that potential collective action
members are required to log in and out of Finesse at the beginning and end of their
shifts, even if they do not use Finesse to communicate with customers. See Docs. 76-5
¶¶ 5, 12; 76-9 ¶¶ 3, 5-6; 76-10 ¶¶ 7-8, 13, 15-16; 76-12 ¶¶ 13, 15-16, 18; 76-13 ¶ 12-17.
Thus, the fact that different employees used Finesse for different purposes does not
negate the commonality of the alleged unlawful practice.
In sum, the plaintiffs have met the lenient standard for conditional certification by
providing detailed allegations and supporting declarations. This evidence is sufficient to
engage GEICO’s evidence and demonstrates that other employees wish to opt-in and
are similarly situated.
C. Collective Action Definition, Contact Information, Notice, and Scheduling
Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs’ proposed collective action definition is a little too
broad—it could include anyone who uses a phone or encounters digital or written
communications with customers. Doc. 70 ¶ 84. But GEICO’s proposed definition is a
Service Representatives and ERS Representatives both say they are required to boot up their
computers, launch software, and complete necessary pre-shift tasks before logging into Finesse. Docs.
40-7 ¶¶ 3, 8, 14-15; 40-10 ¶¶ 3, 7, 12-14; 76-5 ¶¶ 5, 12, 17; 76-8 ¶¶ 8-10. Employees in other roles, such
as Salvage Representatives, also provide testimony that they are required to perform post-shift tasks
after logging out of Finesse but are not compensated for this time. Docs. 40-7 ¶¶ 3, 8, 14-15; 76-10 ¶¶ 67, 12-13, 16; 76-12 ¶¶ 13, 16-19; 76-13 ¶¶ 12-17.
16

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little too narrow—it could exclude some employees required to use Finesse. Doc. 68 at
2. The most practical, user-friendly description of the similarly situated employee is
perhaps found in the plaintiffs’ reply brief: “Plaintiffs seek to represent all of the Maconbased, hourly-paid GEICO employees who in everyday language are described as
customer service representatives.” Doc. 77 at 2 (emphasis added). In other words,
those employees who provide substantive assistance to customers, not just anyone
who talks on the phone. Because the plaintiffs filed Willis to capture employees
excluded from GEICO’s Benvenutti notice list, and GEICO argued Willis was duplicative
of Benvenutti, that tends to illustrate that the parties’ practical understanding of service
representatives is essentially the same.
Taking all of that into account, the plaintiffs’ proposed collective action definition
is revised as follows:
All current and former hourly-paid GEICO employees who have handled
communications with GEICO customers and/or communications related to
GEICO customers and were assigned to work for and/or were managed out
of GEICO’s Macon, Georgia call center at any time since March 1, 2020,
and whose primary job responsibilities include handling
communications with GEICO customers and addressing issues
related to existing policies, policy services, claims, billing, or similar
customer service matters, regardless of job title.
The evidence thus far is that all employees who perform these functions use Finesse.
Should that change, the parties can propose modification of the collective action
definition. 17 The plaintiffs shall revise the proposed notice (Doc. 74-1) and proposed
consent form (Doc. 74-2) attached to their motion accordingly.

In its proposed definition, GEICO references the use of “Finesse” and “Salesforce Platforms,” but, as
far as the Court can tell, Salesforce has been referenced only three times and is not relevant to the
plaintiffs’ allegations. Docs. 76 at 7; 76-9 ¶ 3; 76-11 ¶3. Again, that may change.
17

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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification (Doc.
74) is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. The Court CONDITIONALLY CERTIFIES this case as a collective action and
authorizes Plaintiffs to send notice, in accordance with this Order, to the following
individuals who were not sent notice in the Benvenutti action:
All current and former hourly-paid GEICO employees who were assigned
to work for and/or were managed out of GEICO’s Macon, Georgia call
center at any time since March 1, 2020, and whose primary job
responsibilities include handling communications with GEICO customers
and addressing issues related to existing policies, policy services, claims,
billing, or similar customer service matters, regardless of job title.
2. Within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this Order, Defendants Government
Employees Insurance Company d/b/a GEICO and GEICO General Insurance Company
d/b/a GEICO (collectively “GEICO”) SHALL provide counsel for Plaintiffs with the
names, last known mailing addresses, last known email addresses, and last known
telephone numbers of all individuals identified in Paragraph 1.
3. The Notice and Consent Form, attached to Plaintiffs’ Motion as Exhibit 1 (Doc.
74-1) and Exhibit 2 (Doc. 74-2), respectively, are hereby AUTHORIZED for distribution
to all individuals identified in Paragraph 1—subject to the revisions made by the Court.
4. Plaintiffs’ counsel, or a third-party designated by Plaintiffs’ Counsel, SHALL
distribute, via U.S. Mail and email, the Court-authorized Notice and Consent Form to the
individuals identified in Paragraph 1. Each Notice sent by U.S. Mail SHALL be
accompanied by a prepaid, pre-addressed return envelope. No other material shall
accompany the Notice. Plaintiffs’ Counsel SHALL use their best efforts to mail and
email all Notices on the same day so as to establish a single date of mailing. Plaintiffs’
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counsel SHALL bear all costs associated with distributing the Notice and accompanying
material in this manner but shall be entitled to petition the Court for a recovery of such
costs.
5. No later than seven (7) days after the Notice has been sent via U.S. Mail and
email, counsel for Plaintiffs SHALL file with the Court a notice certifying that the Notice
has been sent consistent with this Order and identifying the date of mailing.
6. Plaintiffs’ counsel SHALL promptly file all returned Consent Forms upon
receipt. All Consent Forms shall be postmarked, faxed, emailed, or otherwise received
by Plaintiffs’ counsel no later than ninety (90) days from the date of mailing in order to
be deemed timely.
SO ORDERED, this 26th day of September, 2024.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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