B& F System, Inc. v. LeBlanc et al

Filing 202

ORDER denying 198 Motion for Reconsideration; granting in part and denying in part 199 Motion for Reconsideration. Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 10/25/2011. (nbp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
THE B & F SYSTEM, INC.,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 7:07-CV-192 (HL)

v.
LLOYD J. LEBLANC JR., et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
This case is before the Court on the parties’ Motions for Reconsideration
(Docs. 198-199) of the Court’s order entered on September 14, 2011, granting, in
part, and denying, in part, the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.
Local Rule 7.6 provides that “[m]otions for reconsideration shall not be filed as
a matter of routine practice.” M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.6. Instead, the “purpose of a motion for
reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence.” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007). Courts
generally grant motions for reconsideration when there is “(1) an intervening change
in controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence, and (3) the need to correct
clear error or manifest injustice.” Id. “[A] motion for reconsideration does not provide
an opportunity to simply reargue the issue the Court has once determined.”
Pennamon v. United Bank, 2009 WL 2355816, at *1 (M.D. Ga. July 28, 2009)
(quoting Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1340
(M.D. Fla. 2003)).

The Court has closely reviewed both Motions and the responses to the same.
After much consideration, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration
(Doc. 198). The Court grants, in part, and denies, in part, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Doc. 199).
Lloyd LeBlanc and Maxam Wholesale of Atlanta, Inc. (“MWA”) asserted a
breach of contract counterclaim against Plaintiff based on alleged breaches of the
Maxam Independent Distributorship Agreement (“MIDA”). In its summary judgment
order, the Court found that MWA does not have standing to bring a breach of
contract claim against Plaintiff because MWA was not a party to the MIDA, the MIDA
had never been assigned to MWA, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that
the MIDA was intended to benefit MWA, which is required for a third party to enforce
the provisions of a contract. (Doc. 197, p. 81).
Lloyd and MWA also asserted a wrongful termination of contract counterclaim
and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing counterclaim, both based
on the MIDA. Both of these claims survived Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion.
Plaintiff has now requested in its Motion for Reconsideration that the Court find MWA
does not have standing to bring these contract-related counterclaims either. The
Court agrees with Plaintiff that MWA cannot assert these counterclaims for the same
reason it cannot assert the breach of contract counterclaim. Thus, Lloyd alone will be

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allowed to present the First Counterclaim - Wrongful Termination of Contract - and
the Third Counterclaim - Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing - at
the trial of this case.
This case will be tried during the Court’s January trial term in Valdosta,
Georgia. The first day of the term has been moved to January 17, 2011. A pretrial
conference is scheduled for December 21, 2011 at 9:30 a.m. in Macon, Georgia. A
separate order outlining the parties’ responsibilities prior to the pretrial conference
will be entered shortly. The Court intends to proceed at trial as previously outlined in
the summary judgment order (Doc. 197, pp. 87-88), as modified by this Order, so the
parties should be prepared for a bifurcated trial.

SO ORDERED, this the 25th day of October, 2011.

s/ Hugh Lawson
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE

mbh

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