Mann et al v. Donald et al
Filing
162
ORDER granting 116 Motion to Sever; finding as moot 116 Motion to Bifurcate; granting 117 Motion to Sever; granting 118 Motion to Sever; denying 127 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 131 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 133 Motion for Summary Judgment; adopting 153 Report and Recommendations; adopting 154 Report and Recommendations; adopting 155 Report and Recommendations. Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 3/14/2012. (nbp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
PIP HENG,
RONNY N. ASKEW,
MICHAEL A. WALKER, and
GEORGE C. HASKELL JR.,
Civil Action 7:08-CV-5 (HL)
Plaintiffs,
v.
LIEUTENANT SHERMAN MAINE,
OFFICER JAMIE POWERS,
OFFICER JESSE HOWELL,
OFFICER TERRY BROWN,
OFFICER ANDRE YANCEY,
OFFICER JOSEPH SCHNAKE,
OFFICER RODNEY SMITH,
OFFICER WILLIE RATLIFF, and
LIEUTENANT DOUGLASS RIDALL,
Defendants.
ORDER
This case is before the Court on a number of motions and recommendations.
The Court will address each one separately below.
I.
Defendant Rodney Smith’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
127)/Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Langstaff (Doc. 153)
Magistrate Judge Thomas Q. Langstaff has recommended that the Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 127) filed by Defendant Rodney Smith be denied. Plaintiff
Heng contends that Defendant Smith used excessive force against him in violation of
his Eighth Amendment Rights. Defendant Smith has filed an objection to the
Recommendation. The Court has made a de novo review of the Recommendation.
The only objection that merits further discussion relates to qualified immunity.
The Court does not read the Recommendation to mean that qualified immunity
was denied to Defendant Smith because qualified immunity is never available in an
excessive force case, which is what Defendant Smith argues in his objection. The
Court reads the Recommendation to mean that qualified immunity is not available
under the facts of this particular case, and the Court agrees.
“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages
unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the
challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, --- U.S. ---, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court may address these prongs in either
order. Id.
The Eighth Amendment governs prison officials’ use of force against inmates
and prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 327, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986). In determining whether a prison official’s use
of force was excessive, the court must examine “whether force was applied in a
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992). Relevant
factors include “the need for the application of force, the relationship between the
2
need and the amount of force that was used, and the extent of injury inflicted.”
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted).
To overcome a qualified immunity defense at summary judgment, the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, must “make out a
violation of a constitutional right,” and “the right at issue [must have been] ‘clearly
established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808 (2009). The use of force maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm has been clearly established to be a violation of the
Constitution. See Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus,
the question is whether Plaintiff Heng showed a violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights. As detailed in Judge Langstaff’s Recommendation, viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff Heng, there is a question of fact as to whether
Defendant Smith violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. This means that Defendant
Smith is not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim at the
summary judgment stage of the case. Thus, Defendant Smith’s objection is
overruled.1
1
While Plaintiffs included the Recommendation filed at Document 153 in their omnibus
objection to the Recommendations, the Court assumes inclusion of Document 153 was in
error as Judge Langstaff found in favor of Plaintiff Heng in that Recommendation.
3
II.
Defendant Willie Ratliff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
131)/Recommendations of Magistrate Judge Langstaff (Docs. 154)
Judge Langstaff has recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 131) filed by Defendant Willie Ratliff as to Plaintiff Walker’s claims be granted.
Plaintiff Walker has filed an objection to the Recommendation. The Court has made
a de novo review of the Recommendation.
The question before the Court is whether Plaintiff Walker’s excessive force
claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994). The
United States Supreme Court held in Heck that:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed
on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A
claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction
or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not
cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 486-87 (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff Walker alleges that on May 14, 2007, Defendant Ratliff and others
assaulted him without provocation and continued to beat him after he was placed in
handcuffs. Defendant Ratliff contends Plaintiff Walker instigated the confrontation by
striking an officer in the face. Plaintiff Walker was eventually convicted of two counts
4
of felony obstruction of a correctional officer arising out of the events on May 14,
2007.
Plaintiff Walker was convicted under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b), which provides:
Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or
opposes any law enforcement officer, prison guard,
correctional officer, probation supervisor, parole
supervisor, or conservation ranger in the lawful discharge
of his official duties by offering or doing violence to the
person of such officer or legally authorized person is guilty
of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished
by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five
years.
O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b).
Judge Langstaff was correct that Plaintiff Walker’s claims are barred by Heck.
Allowing Plaintiff Walker to prove his version of the events of May 14, 2007 would
directly undermine his conviction for obstructing a correctional officer, and are
therefore Heck-barred.2 Plaintiff Walker’s objection is overruled.
III.
Defendants Maine, Howell, Brown, Ridall, Yancey, and Schnake’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. 133)/Recommendation of Magistrate Judge
Thomas Q. Langstaff (Doc. 155)
Judge Langstaff has recommended that summary judgment be granted in
Defendants Maine, Howell, and Brown’s favor on Plaintiff Walker’s claims against
them. He has also recommended that summary judgment be granted in Defendant
2
The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs’ res judicata and collateral
estoppel arguments contained in the objection are inapposite, as neither of those
5
Maine’s favor on Plaintiff Heng’s and Plaintiff Askew’s claims against him. Finally,
Judge Langstaff recommends that Defendant Ridall’s summary judgment motion as
to Plaintiff Haskell’s claims be denied.
Plaintiffs have filed an objection to the two recommendations to grant
summary judgment. Defendant Ridall has filed an objection to the recommendation
to deny his summary judgment motion. The Court has made a de novo review of the
Recommendation and will address each objection separately.
First, as discussed above, Plaintiff Walker’s claims are barred by Heck v.
Humphrey. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Defendants Maine, Howell, and
Brown is appropriate as to Plaintiff Walker’s claims against them.
Second, the Court agrees with Judge Langstaff that summary judgment in
Defendant Maine’s favor is appropriate on Plaintiff Heng’s and Plaintiff Askew’s
claims against him. Plaintiffs have in no way established any supervisory liability on
the part of Defendant Maine.
This leaves Judge Langstaff’s recommendation to deny summary judgment to
Defendant Ridall. The remaining claim against Defendant Ridall is alleged by Plaintiff
Haskell, who contends Defendant Ridall used excessive force against him on March
5, 2008 at Valdosta State Prison. In support of his summary judgment motion,
Defendant Ridall submitted a videotape that depicts the events immediately following
defenses were ever raised. The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ contention that Heck
6
the alleged use of force incident on March 5, 2008. Defendant Ridall contends that
the videotape contradicts Plaintiff Haskell’s version of the events, and therefore
Plaintiff Haskell’s account of the events must be rejected.
Plaintiff Haskell’s version of the events is as follows. After he reported an
alleged theft, Defendant Ridall and two other officers came to his dorm. The officers
wrestled Plaintiff Haskell to the ground, put handcuffs on him, and escorted him from
the dorm. After leaving the dorm, the officers pushed Plaintiff Haskell face down on
the sidewalk. The fall caused Plaintiff Haskell’s lip to burst open and bleed. He also
sustained cuts and bruises on his arms, legs, knees, and face, all of which were
bleeding. He had blood on his pants, and the front, sleeves, and shoulders of his
shirt. There were holes in his pants and shirt. Defendant Ridall then stomped on the
back of Plaintiff Haskell’s neck with steel-toed boots for five to ten minutes straight
while another officer sat on Plaintiff Haskell’s back. Plaintiff Haskell was then picked
up off the ground, placed on his feet, and walked toward segregation. His wrists
were bleeding. Plaintiff Haskell could hardly walk, but was pushed forward by an
officer and told to hurry up. The officer then pushed Plaintiff Haskell’s head into a
gate at the segregation unit, which caused more bleeding. When the group arrived at
the segregation unit, Plaintiff Haskell was placed in the shower. He tapped on the
door and asked to see the nurse. Defendant Ridall opened the door, told Plaintiff
does not apply.
7
Haskell to shut up, grabbed Plaintiff Haskell by the throat, pushed him against the
back of the shower causing Plaintiff Haskell to hit the showerhead, and choked
Plaintiff Haskell until he blacked out. Plaintiff Haskell woke up on the shower floor
and another officer escorted him to a cell. Plaintiff Haskell asked the officer to call
medical, but the officer said he would not call anyone. Plaintiff Haskell was still in
handcuffs. After Plaintiff Haskell was placed in a cell, he banged on the door trying to
get someone to come to him. Defendant Ridall came to the cell and shoved Plaintiff
Haskell’s head against the wall. Defendant Ridall said he would not get a nurse, and
left Plaintiff Haskell in the cell, still handcuffed. Plaintiff Haskell was seen in medical
the following day, where he received stitches in his lip and knee.
Defendant Ridall acknowledges that the video camera was not called for until
after Plaintiff Haskell was removed from the dorm and was being taken to the
segregation unit. Thus it is possible that any use of force as alleged by Plaintiff
Haskell occurred before the taping started. The Court has reviewed the videotape
submitted by Defendant Ridall and agrees with Judge Langstaff that the videotape
does not unequivocally contradict Plaintiff Haskell’s version of the facts and require
judgment in Defendant Ridall’s favor. The Court agrees with Defendant Ridall that
there are definite discrepancies between Plaintiff Haskell’s prior testimony and what
is shown on the videotape, but does not believe judgment in Defendant Ridall’s favor
is appropriate at this time. Counsel for Defendant Ridall will be allowed to impeach
Plaintiff Haskell at trial as allowed by law. Defendant Ridall’s objection is overruled.
8
IV.
Defendants Maine, Howell, Brown, Yancey, Schnake, and Ridall’s Motion
to Sever or, in the Alternative, Motion for Separate Trials and Motion to
Bifurcate (Doc. 116)/Defendant Ratliff’s Motion to Sever or, in the
Alternative, Motion for Separate Trials (Doc. 117)/Defendant Smith’s
Motion to Sever or, in the Alternative, Motion for Separate Trials
(Doc. 118)
Defendants have moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 to sever
Plaintiffs’ claims into separate actions. Defendants have moved in the alternative
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 for separate trials.3
Rule 21, which governs severances, provides in part that “[t]he court may also
sever any claim against a party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. Under Rule 42, a court may order
a separate trial of any claim or issue “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to
expedite and economize.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b). Motions for severance and motions
for separate trial are distinct and should be treated as such. McDaniel v. AnheuserBusch, Inc., 987 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1993). “Separate trials of claims originally
sued upon together usually will result in the entry of one judgment, but severed
claims become entirely independent actions to be tried, and judgment entered
thereon, independently.” 9A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE
§ 2387 (3d ed. 2011).
The same factors are considered when ruling on a motion for severance and a
motion for separate trials. The factors are: (1) whether the claims arise out of the
3
The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that the motions are untimely.
9
same transaction or occurrence; (2) whether the claims present some common
questions of law or fact; (3) whether settlement of the claims or judicial economy
would be facilitated; (4) whether prejudice would be avoided if severance were
granted; and (5) whether different witnesses and documentary proof are required for
the separate claims. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 293
F.Supp.2d 854, 862 (C.D. Ill. 2003); Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 37
F.Supp.2d 556, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
After consideration of the summary judgment motions, the following claims
remain pending:
Plaintiff Heng’s excessive force claim against Defendants
Powers, Howell, Brown, Yancey, Smith, and Ratliff
Plaintiff Askew’s excessive force claim against Defendants
Powers, Howell, Brown, Yancey, and Schnake
Plaintiff Haskell’s March 2008 excessive force claim
against Defendant Ridall
The Court finds that severance of the remaining claims is appropriate. The
only commonality in the claims is that the Plaintiffs were housed at Valdosta State
Prison when the alleged excessive uses of force occurred. The alleged beatings
involve different time periods, involve different factual circumstances, and involve
different evidence. While there are some common questions of law running through
the three claims, those questions should be addressed separately based on the
unique facts presented in each case. The Court believes there is a real risk of
10
prejudice to the Defendants if the Plaintiffs’ claims are presented in one trial, as the
jury may impute liability to a defendant based on events in which he was not
involved.
V.
CONCLUSION
The Court accepts and adopts the Recommendation (Doc. 153) to deny
Defendant Rodney Smith’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 127). The Court
accepts and adopts the Recommendation (Doc. 154) to grant Defendant Willie
Ratliff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 131) as to Plaintiff Walker’s claims
only. The Court accepts and adopts the Recommendation (Doc. 155) to grant, in
part, and deny, in part, Defendants Maine, Howell, Brown, Ridall, Yancey, and
Schnake’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 133). Summary judgment is granted
in favor of Defendants Maine, Howell, and Brown on Plaintiff Walker’s claims against
them. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant Maine on Plaintiff Heng’s
and Plaintiff Askew’s claims against him. Summary judgment in Defendant Ridall’s
favor as to Plaintiff Haskell’s claims is denied. Plaintiff Walker’s claims are dismissed
in their entirety without prejudice. Defendant Maine is dismissed from the case.
The Motions to Sever filed by Defendants Howell, Brown, Yancey, Schnake,
and Ridall (Doc. 116), Defendant Ratliff (Doc. 117), and Defendant Smith (Doc. 118)
are granted. The alternative request for separate trials is moot.
11
The claims asserted by Plaintiff Heng against Defendants Powers, Howell,
Brown, Yancey, Smith, and Ratliff are severed from this civil action pursuant to Rule
21. The Clerk of Court is directed to open a new separate civil action file for the case
of Pip Heng v. Jamie Powers, Jesse Howell, Terry Brown, Andre Yancey, Rodney
Smith, and Willie Ratliff, which should be assigned to the undersigned. Pleadings
that were filed prior to this severance need not be re-filed, but all future filings must
be made in the new civil action. However, because Defendant Powers is currently in
bankruptcy, the new civil action will be stayed until he is discharged from bankruptcy.
It would not be in the interest of judicial economy to try the case against Defendants
Howell, Brown, Yancey, Smith, and Ratliff now and against Defendant Powers later.
Counsel for Defendant Powers is to notify the Court immediately upon the
termination of his bankruptcy case.
The claims asserted by Plaintiff Askew against Defendants Powers, Howell,
Brown, Yancey, and Schnake are also severed from this civil action pursuant to Rule
21. The Clerk of Court is directed to open a new separate civil action file for the case
of Ronny N. Askew v. Jamie Powers, Jesse Howell, Terry Brown, Andre Yancey,
and Joseph Schnake, which should be assigned to the undersigned. Pleadings that
were filed prior to this severance need not be re-filed, but all future filings must be
made in the new civil action. This new civil action must also be stayed because of
Defendant Powers’ bankruptcy.
12
The claims asserted by Plaintiff Haskell against Defendant Ridall will remain in
Civil Action 7:08-CV-5. That case will go to trial in July of 2012. Additional
information about the trial and pretrial conference will be sent out in the near future.
In light of his previous filings, the Court believes it necessary to notify Plaintiffs’
counsel now that he will not be allowed to “put the system on trial.” The trial will be
restricted to the specific excessive force claim relating to Plaintiff Haskell and
Defendant Ridall. The Court will not allow speeches or argument or testimony about
what may have taken place at other prisons.
SO ORDERED, this the 14th day of March, 2012.
s/ Hugh Lawson
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
mbh
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?