Mann et al v. Donald et al

Filing 68

ORDER denying 40 Motion to Certify Class; adopting Report and Recommendations re 62 Report and Recommendations.Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 2/4/2010. (nbp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA V AL D O S T A DIVISION P IP HENG, et al., : : P l a i n t if f s , : : v. : : : C O M M IS S IO N E R JAMES DONALD, : e t al., : : D e fe n d a n ts . : : ______________________________

C iv il Action No. 7:08-CV-5 (HL)

ORDER C u rre n tly pending before the Court is the Recommendation of United States M a g is tra te Judge G. Mallon Faircloth, entered on December 30, 2009 (Doc. 62), in w h ic h he recommends that Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification be denied. Plaintiffs h a ve filed an objection to the Recommendation (Doc. 63). After de novo consideration o f the portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made, the Court accepts th e Recommendation and denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Doc. 40). A. BACKGROUND P la in tiffs allege that they were beaten while incarcerated at Valdosta State P ris o n ("VSP") and that the beatings were covered up. In their initial complaint, P la in tiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. In an o r d e r entered on March 25, 2009 (Doc. 42), however, the Court adopted Magistrate J u d g e Richard L. Hodge's recommendation that the motion to dismiss filed by

Defendants as to Plaintiffs' prayers for injunctive relief be granted. Thus, the only c la im s for relief remaining are claims for compensatory and punitive damages.1 T h is case has a long and tortuous procedural history. Numerous parties have b e e n dismissed and added. Presently, the Plaintiffs in the case are Pip Heng, Ronny N . Askew, Ellis Keel, Michael A. W a lk e r, George C. Haskell, Andrew Hart, and Joseph A la n Greene.2 The current Defendants are James Donald, Rick Jacobs, Sarah Draper, S h a ro n Lewis, W a rd e n Hart, Deputy W a rd e n McLaughlin, Albert Jones, Lt. Maine, O ffic e r Powers, Officer Howell, Officer Brown, Officer Yancey, Officer Cannon, Officer S c h n a k e , Officer Smith, Officer Ratliff, Officer Lucas, Officer Proctor, Officer Glynn, O ffic e r Jackson, Officer W illia m s , Lt. W a d e ll, and Lt. Riddall.3 According to the case d o c k e t, service has not been perfected on Officer Lucas, Officer Proctor, Officer Glynn, O ffic e r Jackson, Officer W illia m s , Lt. W a d e ll, or Lt. Riddall, the new defendants named in Plaintiffs' second amended complaint.4

Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on January 20, 2010 which requests the same injunctive relief previously addressed by Defendants' motion to dismiss. The injunctive relief claims still fail for the reasons set forth in the March 25, 2009 Recommendation, which was adopted by the Court. Astaniel Jarvis Mann, Elijah Adcock, Rickie Lee Fox, Daniel Fincher, and Shedrick D. Ross were dismissed as plaintiffs on Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 33, adopted at Doc. 42). Captain Morris, Officer Sain, Officer Grainger, Sergeant Bond, Officer Page, Officer Daniel, Officer Bates, Officer John Doe No. 1, and Officer John Doe No. 2 were dismissed as defendants on Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 33, adopted at Doc. 42). In the second amended complaint, Plaintiffs list Officer Powell, Officer Snake, and Officer Radcliff as Defendants. As previously established through the numerous filings in this case, the correct names for these officers are Powers, Schnake, and Ratliff. Counsel for Plaintiffs is directed to correct the case caption and all future pleadings. 2
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B.

PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS AND PROPOSED CLASS Plaintiffs allege that there is a pattern and practice of beatings by CERT Team

o ffic e rs at VSP and other Georgia prisons. According to Plaintiffs, CERT Team officers "d e a l out premeditated violence as a form of institutional control and physically beat re s tra in e d inmates as summary punishment." (Doc. 1, p. 21; Doc. 64, p. 21). Plaintiffs a lle g e that the Defendant CERT Team officers and Defendant Maine have engaged in a pattern and practice of beating inmates at VSP, and that Defendants Hart and M c L a u g h lin have condoned and been deliberately indifferent to the beatings. W h ile P la in tiffs also make excessive force allegations against certain correctional officers e m p lo ye d at VSP, they interestingly never allege in their latest complaint that the c o rre c tio n a l officers engaged in the pattern and practice of beating inmates. Finally, P la in tiffs allege that Defendants Donald, Jacobs, Draper, Jones, and Lewis have been d e lib e ra te ly indifferent to the beatings at VSP and other prisons and have worked to c o ve r up the beatings. P la in tiffs seek to represent a Rule 23 class that they describe as: A ll past and present inmates at the Valdosta State Prison a n d at other Georgia prisons who have been subjected to or m a y be subjected to excessive force, summary punishment, o r premeditated violence by being beaten while restrained by C E R T Team Officers at Valdosta State Prison and by CERT T e a m Officers at other Georgia prisons in violation of the

The Clerk is also directed to correct the names of these Defendants on the docket to reflect their correct names. Finally, counsel for Defendants are directed to provide the Court with each Defendant's full name as part of their next filing. 3

United States Constitution, laws and treaties, and the G e o rg ia Constitution and laws. (D o c . 40-2, pp. 2-3). A short review of the Plaintiffs' individual allegations is in order. Plaintiff Heng a lle g e s that Defendants Ratliff, Cannon, Yancey, Powers, Brown, Howell, and Smith k ic k e d , beat, and choked him in the shower area at VSP while he was handcuffed. He a ls o contends that Defendant Cannon told the nurse on duty in medical not to write d o w n Plaintiff Heng's injuries so as to cover up the beating, and that he was put into is o la tio n without medical attention and was prevented from using the telephone. P la in tiff Heng alleges that the actions of the named Defendant CERT Team officers w e re condoned by Defendants Maine, Hart, and McLaughlin. Plaintiff Heng alleges that h e suffered rib and chest, neck, head and other injuries, including trunk and upper back b ru is e s and abrasions, and swollen black eyes because of Defendants' actions. He a ls o claims to suffer from continued physical injuries, pain, mental anguish, and posttra u m a tic stress. P la in tiff Askew alleges that he was taken to the shower area of the lockdown unit a t VSP and punched, kicked, and stomped in the face, head, and body while re s tra in e d . W h ile Plaintiff Askew states that he was beaten by "Defendant CERT Team O ffic e rs ," he does not identify which CERT Team officers participated in the alleged b e a tin g . Plaintiff Askew alleges that the actions of the unnamed Defendant CERT T e a m officers were condoned by Defendants Maine, Hart, and McLaughlin. He alleges th a t he suffered and is still suffering from injuries from the beating, and that he 4

continues to suffer mental anguish, chronic injuries, headaches, neck pain, and back p a in . P la in tiff Keel alleges that after he attempted to hide under his bed from D e fe n d a n ts Maine, Powers, Howell, and Smith, who entered his cell because he was k ic k in g his cell door in order to get medical attention, one of the CERT Team officers g ra b b e d his leg and pulled him from under the bunk. Plaintiff Keel alleges that D e fe n d a n t Maine sat on his upper thighs, Defendant Howell twisted his arm, and O ffic e r Powers kicked and stomped his back and side. He further alleges that D e fe n d a n t Smith placed his knee into Plaintiff Keel's neck while the other CERT Team o ffic e rs assaulted him, and that he was punched in the stomach several times. Plaintiff K e e l states that he was threatened by Defendant Smith not to tell the nurse what h a p p e n e d , and was further threatened by Defendants Smith and Maine. Plaintiff Keel s ta te s that the alleged beating resulted in multiple bruises, contusions, and a broken rib . These alleged events took place at VSP. P la in tif f W a lk e r alleges that while he was at VSP, he was assaulted by D e fe n d a n ts Maine, Ratliff, Howell, and Brown. He alleges that Defendant Maine g ra b b e d him by the throat and choked him and slammed his head against a window, th a t Defendant Ratliff and Howell slammed him to the floor, Defendant Brown hit him in the head with a baton after he was chained, and that while Defendants Maine and H o w e ll held his legs, Defendant Ratliff punched him in the face and then Defendant

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Maine hit him on the head with a walkie-talkie until he passed out. Plaintiff W a lk e r a lle g e s that he had a cut on his head that required twenty-two staples to close. P la in tiff Haskell alleges that he was beaten at VSP on three separate occasions. F irs t, he claims that while handcuffed, Defendant Riddall knocked him to the ground, s a t on him, and slammed his head into the sidewalk. Next, Plaintiff Haskell alleges that w h ile walking to his dorm, he was beaten by two unnamed CERT Team officers, who s u b s e q u e n tly handcuffed him and took him to segregation where they slammed his h e a d into the wall. Finally, Plaintiff Haskell alleges that while he was asleep, three u n n a m e d CERT Team officers entered his room, picked him up, removed him from his ro o m , ran his head into a gate, and took him to the shower area and choked him until h e blacked out. Plaintiff Hart alleges that Defendants Proctor and Lucas took him to a sally port a t VSP, where they pushed him to the floor and beat him in the head with their walkieta lk ie s . Plaintiff Hart contends that he was restrained and escorted to the J-2 shower a re a , where Defendants W a d e ll, Glynn, Jackson, Lucas, and Proctor then allegedly re p e a te d ly punched and kicked Plaintiff Hart's body, face, and back. P la in t iff Greene alleges that he was escorted to a VSP shower by Defendant W illia m s while handcuffed. He contends that Defendant Williams pushed him into the w a ll and struck Plaintiff Greene with his fist in the back of Plaintiff Greene's head. The b lo w allegedly caused Plaintiff Greene's forehead to slam into the wall, causing him to b e c o m e dizzy and nauseated.

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C.

ANALYSIS "F o r a district court to certify a class action, the named plaintiffs must have

s ta n d in g , and the putative class must meet each of the requirements specified in F e d e ra l Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), as well as at least one of the requirements set fo rth in Rule 23(b)." Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. d e n ie d , 543 U.S. 1081, 125 S.Ct. 877 (2005). Rule 23(a) requires a showing that the c la s s is so numerous that joinder is impracticable, common questions of law or fact pre d o m in a te , typicality in the claims or defenses, and fair and adequate representation. F e d . R. Civ. P. 23(a). M a g is tra te Judge Faircloth found that Plaintiffs did not have standing to obtain in ju n c tive relief. As previously noted, however, Plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief was p re vio u s ly dismissed, so no further discussion regarding the standing issue is n e c e s s a ry. T h e Magistrate Judge then determined that Plaintiffs did not meet any of the R u le 23(a) requirements. The Court agrees that Plaintiffs do not meet the commonality a n d typicality requirements.5

To qualify for class certification, all four Rule 23(a) requirements must be met. As Plaintiffs have not met two of the Rule 23(a) requirements, it is not necessary for the Court to address the numerosity or fair and adequate representation requirements. The Court will state, however, that it doubts proposed class counsel has the ability to handle the claims of the proposed class. Proposed class counsel's position is not helped by the fact that he has yet to identify any of the class actions he has supposedly litigated successfully, and that he continues to claim that he has litigated over fifty excessive force cases successfully, even though the results of those cases as shown on the dockets of the district courts in this state clearly contradict that assertion. 7

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"[T]he commonality requirement measures the extent to which all members of a putative class have similar claims." Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 714 (11th Cir. 2 0 0 4 ) , overruled on other grounds by Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 126 S .C t. 1195 (2006)). The commonality requirement requires that a class action involve is s u e s that are susceptible to class-wide proof. Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 811 (1 1 th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs contend in their objection that they share a common question o f law and fact in that all have been and are continuing to be subjected to beatings w h ile restrained at VSP and other Georgia prisons, and that they were u n c o n s titu tio n a lly required to be incarcerated in inhumane conditions and were u n c o n s titu tio n a lly subjected to beatings at VSP and other Georgia prisons where the b e a tin g s were sought to be covered up. They also argue that their allegation c h a lle n g in g Defendants' action in "issuing system wide beating gloves used for b e a tin g s of inmates and a system wide policy of covering up the unconstitutional b e a tin g s " provides commonality. (Doc. 63, pp. 15-16). "T yp ic a lity measures whether a sufficient nexus exists between the claims of the n a m e d representatives and those of the class at large." W o o d e n v. Bd. of Regents of U n iv. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1287 (11th Cir. 2001). "A class representative must p o s s e s s the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members in order to be typical under Rule 23(a)(3)." Murray, 244 F.3d at 811 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs s ta te in their objection that as with the commonality requirement, their allegation about D e fe n d a n ts ' action in issuing system-wide beating gloves for the beating of inmates

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and having a policy of covering up the beatings satisfies the typicality requirement. (D o c . 63, pp. 15-16). It is worth noting that the arguments about commonality and typicality set forth in Plaintiffs' objection are the exact same arguments they made in their motion to certify c la s s , down to the same missing punctuation and misspellings. The Court suspects that P la in tiffs ' counsel simply copied these two sections from his original motion and pasted th e m into the objection. He does not provide any argument or state the grounds upon w h ic h he contends the Magistrate Judge erred. In any event, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the commonality a n d typicality requirements cannot be met here. An Eighth Amendment excessive use o f force claim requires a very fact-intensive analysis. W h e th e r the use of force violates a n inmate's constitutional rights "ultimately turns on whether force was applied in a g o o d faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the ve ry purpose of causing harm." Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2 0 0 7 ) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under this standard, the court m u s t look at "the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need a n d the amount of force that was used, and the extent of injury inflicted." W h it le y v. A lb e rs , 475 U.S. 312, 321, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085 (1986) (citation omitted). Also relevant a re such factors as "the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as re a s o n a b ly perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to th e m , and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response." Id. Further,

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the court must give a "wide range of deference to prison officials acting to preserve d is c ip lin e and security," including when considering "[d]ecisions made at the scene of a disturbance." Cockrell, 510 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1 5 3 3 (11th Cir. 1990)). There are also individual defenses that the court must consider o n a case-by-case basis, such as qualified immunity and vicarious or supervisory li a b i l i t y . Excessive use of force claims do not lend themselves to class actions. The E le ve n th Circuit has specifically held that excessive force actions "are especially u n s u ite d to class disposition." Kerr v. City of W e s t Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546, 15575 8 (11th Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs' claims arise from individual discrete acts of alleged m is c o n d u c t. Eighth Amendment law requires the separate examination of the facts of e a c h class member's claim, along with an individualized determination of liability. In a d d itio n , a separate damages trial will be required for every class member. Class c e rtific a tio n in this case will not serve to promote judicial economy or efficiency. The C o u rt finds that class certification is not proper. D. CONCLUSION T h e Recommendation (Doc. 62) is adopted and made the order of this Court.6 P la in tiffs ' objection is overruled. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Doc. 40) is d e n ie d .

A court may hold an evidentiary hearing prior to granting or denying a motion for class certification, but one is not required. See Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1099 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court does not believe a hearing is necessary in this case. 10

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SO ORDERED, this the 2 n d day of February, 2010. s / Hugh Lawson HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE

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