Iguana, LLC v. Lanham et al
Filing
277
ORDER granting 263 Motion to Dismiss. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 3/9/2012. (CGC)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
IGUANA, LLC,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
RANDALL J. LANHAM,
*
Defendant.
CASE NO. 7:08-CV-9 (CDL)
*
O R D E R
This action has been whittled down to claims against one
remaining
Defendant,
Randall
Lanham
(“Randall”),
who
is
presently in default but who opposes entry of default judgment
against him based upon lack of personal jurisdiction.
For the
following reasons, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction
over Randall, and therefore, his motion to dismiss (ECF No. 263)
is granted.
BACKGROUND
This
action
initially
arose
from
a
letter
that
Charles
Calkins, a North Carolina attorney, wrote to Plaintiff Iguana,
LLC (“Iguana”) on behalf of his client, Paul Lanham.
The letter
accused Iguana of willfully infringing U.S. Reissue Patent No.
35,571.
Defendant
Randall,
a
California
attorney
who
also
represents Paul Lanham, forwarded the letter to David Cobb, the
president
and
CEO
of
an
Alabama
company
that
licensed
the
patent.
Cobb
forwarded
the
letter
to
several
of
Iguana’s
suppliers, including a key supplier in North Carolina.
Iguana
contends that it was harmed as a result of the letter being sent
to the North Carolina supplier.
Randall
for
defamation,
conspiracy.
Randall
tortious
did
Complaint, and the Clerk
entry
of
a
default
Iguana asserts claims against
not
interference
answer
Iguana’s
and
Second
entered his default.
judgment
against
common
law
Amended
Iguana seeks
Randall,
but
Randall
contends that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over
him and filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).
Because
Randall
is
in
default,
it
is
undisputed
for
purposes of this motion that Randall and others asked Calkins to
write the infringement letter.
It is undisputed that Randall
sent the infringement letter from California to Cobb in Alabama.
It is also undisputed that Cobb drove to Georgia and mailed the
infringement
Carolina.
letter
to
one
of
Iguana’s
suppliers
in
North
Iguana contends that these actions caused harm to
Iguana in Georgia.
It is undisputed that Randall is a resident of California.
Randall
submitted
a
declaration
stating
that
he
has
never
maintained an office or other place of business in Georgia,
never advertised or solicited business in Georgia, never sought
or received a permit or license to do business in Georgia, never
2
paid
taxes
in
Georgia,
never
owned
or
leased
property
in
Georgia, never had a bank account in Georgia, never provided
legal services to Paul Lanham in Georgia, and never sent any
letters or made any communications in Georgia.
Mot. to Dismiss
Attach. 2, R. Lanham Decl. ¶¶ 3-9, ECF No. 263-2.
Iguana
pointed
the
Court
to
evidence
listed as one of the incorporators of a
called Amnisos Corporation.
that
Georgia
Randall
was
corporation
Pl.’s Supplemental Br. in Opp’n to
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 3, Articles of Incorporation, ECF No.
268-3 at 2.
There is no evidence regarding the extent to which
Amnisos Corporation transacted business in Georgia, and there is
no evidence that Randall ever participated in any business the
corporation transacted within Georgia.
Rather, the evidence is
that Randall was not involved in forming the Georgia Amnisos
Corporation, was not aware of the Georgia Amnisos Corporation,
and was not involved “in any manner” in the Georgia Amnisos
Corporation.
E.g., Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss
Attach 2, Everett Decl. ¶¶ 11-13, ECF No. 271-2.
DISCUSSION
For Randall to be subject to personal jurisdiction in this
Court, “the exercise of jurisdiction must (1) be appropriate
under the [Georgia] long-arm statute and (2) not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.”
Diamond
Crystal
3
Brands,
Inc.
v.
Food
Movers
Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
not
grant
courts
in
“[T]he Georgia long-arm statute does
Georgia
personal
jurisdiction
coextensive with procedural due process.”
that
is
Id. at 1259; accord
Amerireach.com, LLC v. Walker, 290 Ga. 261, 268, 719 S.E.2d 489,
495 (2011) (noting that O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(3) “does not confer
jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by constitutional
due process” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Instead, the
Court “must apply the specific limitations and requirements of
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 literally and must engage in a statutory
examination
that
is
independent
of,
and
distinct
from,
the
constitutional analysis to ensure that both, separate prongs of
the
jurisdictional
inquiry
are
satisfied.”
Diamond
Crystal
Brands, 593 F.3d at 1263.
The Georgia long-arm statute provides, in relevant part:
A
court
of
this
state
may
exercise
personal
jurisdiction over any nonresident . . . as to a cause
of action arising from any of the acts, omissions,
ownership, use, or possession enumerated in this Code
section, in the same manner as if he or she were a
resident of this state, if in person or through an
agent, he or she:
(1) Transacts any business within this state;
(2) Commits a tortious act or omission within this
state, except as to a cause of action for defamation
of character arising from the act;
(3) Commits a tortious injury in this state caused by
an act or omission outside this state if the tortfeasor regularly does or solicits business, or engages
in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
4
substantial revenue from goods used
services rendered in this state; [or]
(4) Owns, uses, or possesses
situated within this state[.]
or
any
consumed
real
or
property
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1)-(4).
Iguana does not assert that Randall committed a tortious
act or omission within Georgia or that Randall owns, uses or
possesses real property in Georgia, so there is no basis for
personal jurisdiction over Randall under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(2)
or (4).
Iguana also does not assert that the Court has personal
jurisdiction
over
Randall
pursuant
to
O.C.G.A. §
9-10-91(3),
presumably because there is no evidence that Randall “regularly
does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods
used
or
consumed
or
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(3).
exclusively
on
services
Rather,
O.C.G.A. §
rendered
Iguana’s
9-10-91(1)—the
in
[Georgia].”
argument
focuses
“transacts
any
business” subsection.
Iguana
appears
to
contend
that
Randall
“transacted
business” within Georgia by seeking the infringement letter from
a North Carolina attorney and transmitting it from California to
Alabama, which ultimately caused harm in Georgia.
appears
to
transacted
argue
business
that
in
Randall
Georgia
should
because
be
Iguana also
deemed
his
to
alleged
have
co-
conspirator, Cobb, an Alabama resident who did not challenge
5
personal
letter
jurisdiction
to
Finally,
Iguana’s
Iguana
in
this
North
appears
Court,
mailed
Carolina
to
assert
the
supplier
that
infringement
from
Randall
Georgia.
“transacted
business” within Georgia by virtue of his involvement in Amnisos
Corporation.
The Court addresses each argument in turn.
Jurisdiction exists on the basis of transacting business in
Georgia “if (1) the nonresident defendant has purposefully done
some act or consummated some transaction in this state, (2) if
the cause of action arises from or is connected with such act or
transaction, and (3) if the exercise of jurisdiction by the
courts of this state does not offend traditional fairness and
substantial justice.”
Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves, 279 Ga.
App. 515, 517-18, 631 S.E.2d 734, 737 (2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted.
“The initial two prongs of the jurisdictional
test are used to determine whether defendant has established the
minimum contacts necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction.”
Id.
at
omitted).
518,
631
S.E.2d
at
737
(internal
quotation
marks
“The application of (the minimum contacts) rule will
vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity,
but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.”
Id. (internal quotation
marks
evidence
omitted).
Here,
there
is
6
no
that
Randall
purposefully
did
any
Georgia
that
is
evidence
is
that
act
or
connected
he
consummated
with
consulted
this
with
a
any
transaction
action.
North
Rather,
Carolina
in
the
lawyer
regarding an infringement letter and then sent a copy of that
letter
from
Therefore,
business”
his
the
in
office
Court
Georgia
in
California
cannot
within
find
the
to
that
meaning
Cobb
in
Randall
of
Alabama.
“transacted
O.C.G.A. §
9-10-
91(1).
Iguana
also
jurisdiction,
transacted
appears
arguing
business
to
that
in
invoke
a
Randall
Georgia
“conspiracy
should
because
be
theory”
deemed
his
of
to
have
alleged
co-
conspirator, Cobb, an Alabama resident who did not challenge
personal jurisdiction in Georgia, mailed the infringement letter
to Iguana’s North Carolina supplier from Georgia.
In general,
“under the theory of conspiracy jurisdiction, the in-state acts
of a resident co-conspirator may be imputed to a nonresident coconspirator so as to satisfy the specific contact requirements
of
the
Georgia
Long
Arm
Statute.”
Hyperdynamics
Corp.
v.
Southridge Capital Mgmt., LLC, 305 Ga. App. 283, 294, 699 S.E.2d
456, 466 (2010) (emphasis added).
Georgia courts have “rejected
a ‘conspiracy theory’ of jurisdiction where the plaintiff tried
to
rely
process.”
on
imputed
acts
to
bypass
the
requirements
of
due
Rudo v. Stubbs, 221 Ga. App. 702, 703, 472 S.E.2d
515, 517 (1996).
“Due process requires, of course, that the
7
non-resident defendant have taken action purposefully directed
toward the forum state, such that he reasonably should have
anticipated being haled into court there.”
Id.
Here, there is
no evidence that Randall took action purposefully directed at
Georgia
when
he
mailed
the
infringement
letter
to
Alabama.
There is no evidence that Randall knew that Alabama resident
Cobb would drive to Georgia to mail the infringement letter to
North
Carolina.
Iguana
pointed
to
no
authority
adopting
a
conspiracy theory of jurisdiction based on a single in-state act
of
a
nonresident
co-conspirator
whose
in-state
act
was
not
reasonably foreseeable by the other nonresident co-conspirator.
The Court declines to apply such a theory here.
Finally, Iguana appears to assert that Randall “transacted
business” within Georgia by virtue of his involvement in Amnisos
Corporation.
“As the Supreme Court of the United States has
held, jurisdiction over a corporate employee or officer ‘does
not
automatically
corporation[.]’”
follow
from
Amerireach.com,
jurisdiction
LLC,
290
Ga.
over
at
266,
the
719
S.E.2d at 494 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 780 n.13 (1984)).
“are
not
to
be
judged
activities” in Georgia.
783, 790 (1984)).
Randall’s contacts with Georgia
according
to
[Amnisos
Corporation’s]
Id. (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S.
Rather, “[e]ach defendant’s contacts with the
forum State must be assessed individually.”
8
Calder, 465 U.S. at
790.
The evidence establishes that Randall was listed as one of
the incorporators of Amnisos Corporation, a Georgia corporation.
However,
the
evidence
also
establishes
that
Randall
was
not
involved in forming the Georgia Amnisos Corporation, was not
aware of the Georgia Amnisos Corporation, and was not involved
“in any manner” in the Georgia Amnisos Corporation.
Decl. ¶¶ 11-13.
Everett
Moreover, there is no evidence that Amnisos
Corporation was in any way involved in the acts giving rise to
this action.
Georgia
For these reasons, Randall’s involvement in the
Amnisos
Corporation
does
not
give
rise
to
personal
jurisdiction over Randall.
For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that Randall
has established that he is not subject to personal jurisdiction
in Georgia.
Accordingly, his motion to dismiss is granted.
CONCLUSION
As discussed above, the Court concludes that it may not
exercise personal jurisdiction over Randall, and his motion to
dismiss (ECF No. 263) is therefore granted.
resolves
the
only
remaining
claim
in
This dismissal
this
action,
thus
authorizing the Clerk to close this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 9th day of March, 2012.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9
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