Crutchley v. Purvis et al

Filing 58

ORDER denying 48 Motion for Reconsideration. Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 6/21/2012. (nbp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION

ADAM WADE CRUTCHLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 7:10-CV-81 (HL)

ANTHONY HEATH, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Adam Wade Crutchley’s Motion for
Reconsideration. (Doc. 48.) In his Motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider
its Order adopting the recommendation of the Magistrate and denying Plaintiff’s
Motion for a Default Judgment. (Doc. 42.) For the reasons stated below, the
Motion is denied.
In December 2010, Defendants were sent waiver of service forms, which
they promptly signed and returned. (Docs. 24-27.) However, Defendants failed to
file an Answer to the Complaint or a Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss within the
sixty day deadline. Thus, on March 16, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default
Judgment based on Defendants’ failure to defend. (Doc. 30.) In response to the
Motion for Default, Defendants filed a Motion to Open Default. (Doc. 34.) In their
Motion, Defendants admitted that Defendants Heath and Carter discussed the
case and each mistakenly believed that the other would assume responsibility for

notifying the county attorney for Berrien County about the lawsuit. The county
attorney was never notified of the lawsuit, and thus, the Complaint went
unanswered.
In his Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Thomas Q. Langstaff
acknowledged that Defendants were admittedly late in responding to the
Complaint, but he noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) provides that
“[t]he court may set aside an entry of default for good cause.” Magistrate Judge
Langstaff found that there was good cause for setting aside the default. This
Court adopted the Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Langstaff in an Order
on November 7, 2011, and it is this Order that Plaintiff asks the Court to
reconsider.
Local Rule 7.6 provides that “[m]otions for reconsideration shall not be filed
as a matter of routine practice.” M.D. Ga., L.R. 7.6. Instead, the “purpose of a
motion for reconsideration is to correct the manifest errors of law or fact or to
present newly discovered evidence.” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th
Cir. 2007). Motions for reconsideration are typically granted when there is “(1) an
intervening change in controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence, and (3)
the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice.” Id. “[A] motion for
reconsideration does not provide an opportunity to simply reargue the issue the
Court has once determined.” Rufus v. Chapman, 2011 WL 4434535, at *1 (M.D.
Ga. Sept. 22, 2011) (citing Pennamon v. United Bank, 2009 WL 2355816, at *1
(M.D. Ga. July 28, 2009)).
2

In this case, Plaintiff does not show a change in the law, new evidence, or
the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice. Instead, Plaintiff simply
reiterates his same arguments from his original Motion for Default, which was
denied by the Court. He states that Defendants did not file an answer in the
appropriate amount of time, and thus, they should be considered in default.1 The
Court considered this argument when Plaintiff submitted his original Motion for
Default and found that the argument had no merit. Plaintiff has not presented any
new evidence or law to the Court that changes its original analysis. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED, this 21st day of June, 2012.

s/ Hugh Lawson
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
ebr

1

Along with his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff submitted a brief addressing
his allegations of malicious intent, medical indifference, and medical malpractice.
(Doc. 48-1.) These allegations are not relevant to the Court’s consideration of the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Default,
and the Court finds it unnecessary to address these arguments at this time.
3