Waters v. Georgia Department of Corrections et al

Filing 36

ORDER adopting Report and Recommendations re 34 Report and Recommendations; denying 15 Motion to Dismiss; granting 26 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 9/12/2011. (nbp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
WILLIE WATERS,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
TED PHILBIN; WILLIAM DANFORTH;
:
CALVIN ORR; CORRECTIONS OFFICER :
CONLEY,
:
:
Defendant.
:
___________________________________

Civil Case No.
7:10-cv-105 (HL)

ORDER
Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Thomas Langstaff’s Report and
Recommendation on Defendants Danforth, Philbin, and Orr’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 15), Defendant Conley’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 26), and
Plaintiff’s Demand for Jury Trial (Doc. 29). The Magistrate Judge recommended
that the Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and the Demand for Jury Trial
be denied. As neither party objected to these recommendations, they are
approved and adopted as Order of the Court.
The Magistrate Judge also recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be
denied, and Defendants Danforth, Philbin, and Orr filed a timely objection. After a
de novo review of the record, the Court finds that the recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge should be approved and adopted as the Order of the Court.

Defendants Danforth, Philbin, and Orr object to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation on two grounds. First, Defendants argue that the Magistrate
Judge considered facts not included in the complaint in recommending the denial
of the Motion to Dismiss. Second, Defendants contend that if the Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted in favor of Defendant Conley, then the Motion to
Dismiss should likewise be granted in their favor.
Defendants’ first reason for objection is based on the Magistrate Judge’s
decision to allow Plaintiff’s accusations in his Response to the Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19) to supplement his original Complaint (Doc. 2). The
Magistrate Judge allowed this liberal construction of Plaintiff’s allegations based
on the well-established principle of leniency, which allows pro se litigants greater
flexibility with the standards for pleadings. McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 113
(1993). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal quotations omitted). The Court has previously
recognized that this policy “provides pro se laypersons with certain benefits while
navigating the often-difficult legal labyrinth, [and] also provides Federal courts the
ability to relax certain procedural rules when dealing with pro se parties, all in the
interests of justice.” Jones v. Nicholson, No. 1:07-cv-16 (WLS), 2011 WL
2160918, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Jun. 1, 2011).
Defendants’ object to the application of the leniency principle in this case,
arguing that leniency should not extend so far as to allow Plaintiff’s Response to
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the Motion to Dismiss to assert new allegations not found in the Complaint.
However, this Court has previously allowed a pro se plaintiff’s response and
supplemental brief to add on to the plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at *3. Additionally, the
policies advocated by this Court supporting the pro se leniency principle are
implicated in this case. As the Magistrate Judge noted, “had Plaintiff proceeded
in this action with the assistance of counsel, the facts contained in the Plaintiff’s
Response to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss would probably have been
included in Plaintiff’s Complaint.” (Doc. 34, p. 4). Thus, the Court will apply the
pro se leniency principle and allow Plaintiff’s Response to the Motion to Dismiss
to supplement Plaintiff’s Complaint.
The second reason for the objection is Defendants’ argument that if
Defendant Conley’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, then Defendants
Danforth, Philbin, and Orr ‘s Motion to Dismiss should necessarily be granted as
well. Defendants Danforth, Philbin, and Orr contend that the factual allegations
and legal claims against all of the named Defendants are the same, and
therefore, the outcome of the motions should be the same. However, Defendants
fail to recognize the factual distinction drawn by Plaintiff in the Complaint.
Plaintiff’s allegations assert that Conley provided a lighter to Plaintiff’s cellmate to
enable him to smoke. Further, Plaintiff alleges that Conley occasionally smoked
inside the jail. However, Plaintiff never claims that Defendant Conley was aware
of any medical symptoms he was experiencing.

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On the other hand, Plaintiff accuses Defendants Danforth, Philbin, and Orr
of knowing about Plaintiff’s medical condition and refusing to provide assistance.
For example, Plaintiff contends that he “contact[ed] and notif[ied] Defendant
Danforth about the smoke-related problems and kept requesting for said cell
assignment and transfer,” yet Defendant Danforth allegedly did not respond.
(Doc. 2, p. 11). Plaintiff also alleges that he submitted numerous complaints and
notifications to Defendants Danforth, Philbin, and Orr about his smoke-related
problems, but Defendants were unresponsive. (Doc. 2, p. 12-13). According to
Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendants Danforth, Philbin, and Orr were aware of
Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, while Defendant Conley did not know of
Plaintiff’s medical condition. Therefore, Defendant Conley cannot be liable for
deliberate indifference, but Defendants Danforth, Philbin, and Orr may still be
responsible.
Defendants’ objections to the report and recommendation have been
considered, but are not persuasive. Thus, the Report and Recommendation of
the Magistrate Judge shall be approved and adopted as Order of the Court.
SO ORDERED, this 12th day of September, 2011.

s/ Hugh Lawson
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
ebr

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