Winters et al v. City of Valdosta, Georgia et al

Filing 20

ORDER granting 8 Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 5/9/2011. (nbp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
TIMOTHY WINTERS and CHRISTOPHER
PETERS,
Plaintiffs,

Civil Action 7:11-CV-22 (HL)

v.
THE CITY OF VALDOSTA, GEORGIA,
JOHN J. FRETTI, Mayor, JAMES
WRIGHT, Councilman, DEIDRA A.
WHITE, Councilwoman, JOSEPH
“SONNY” VICKERS, Councilman, ALVIN
PAYTON JR., Councilman, TIMOTHY H.
CARROLL, Councilman, ROBERT YOST,
Councilman, JOHN EUNICE, Mayor Pro
Tem, and CHRIS PRINE, Sheriff of
Lowndes County,
Defendants.
ORDER
This case is before the Court on Defendant Chris Prine’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 8). For the reasons discussed below, the Motion to Dismiss is granted.
I.

FACTS
Plaintiffs have filed this lawsuit against a number of Defendants, including

Chris Prine, Sheriff of Lowndes County. Plaintiff Winters alleges that in 2009, without
his consent, deputies with the Lowndes County Sheriff’s Office placed a registered
sex offender in Plaintiff Winters’ boarding home despite the fact that the property is
in proximity to a school, church, park, and daycare facility. Plaintiff Winters alleges
that he notified the Sheriff’s Office that the boarder is a registered sex offender and

requested that the boarder be removed, but the Sheriff’s Office did not comply with
the request. Plaintiff Winters contends that the presence of the boarder has
damaged Plaintiff Winters’ business and has caused him emotional distress.
Plaintiff Winters states that as Sheriff, Defendant Prine is liable for the actions
of the deputies. Plaintiff Winters alleges that the actions of the deputies were done
pursuant to a policy, custom, or practice of Defendant Prine. Plaintiff Winters seeks
damages from Defendant Prine under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1
Defendant Prine has moved to dismiss the complaint. He contends that the
complaint against him fails because there is no respondeat superior liability under
§ 1983, and because the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.2
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court “must accept the well pleaded facts

as true and resolve them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Paradise Divers,
Inc. v. Upmal, 402 F.3d 1087, 1089 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). However, to survive scrutiny under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129

1

Defendant Prine has been sued in his official capacity only.

2

Defendant Prine also moved to dismiss the complaint for two other reasons: (1) improper
service; and (2) Eleventh Amendment immunity. As the Court finds that the complaint
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, it is not necessary to address these other
arguments.
2

S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127
S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual
content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949 (citation omitted). A “plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted).
III.

ANALYSIS
“It is well established in this circuit that supervisory officials are not liable

under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates ‘on the basis of
respondeat superior or vicarious liability.’” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269
(11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir.
1994) (citation and quotation omitted)). “[S]upervisory liability under § 1983 occurs
either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional
conduct or when there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising
official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352,
1360 (11th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiffs do not contend that Defendant Prine personally participated in the
alleged unconstitutional conduct. Thus, in order to state a claim for relief against
Defendant Prine, Plaintiffs must allege a causal connection between Defendant
Prine’s actions and the alleged constitutional violations committed by the deputies.
This causal connection may be established “where the supervisor’s improper custom
3

or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.” Hartley, 193 F.3d
at 1269 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).3 “A policy is a decision that
is officially adopted by the municipality, or created by an official of such rank that he
or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the municipality.” Goebert v. Lee
County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1332 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). “A custom
is an unwritten practice that is applied consistently enough to have the same effect
as a policy with the force of law.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “Demonstrating a
policy or custom requires showing a persistent and wide-spread practice.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Plaintiffs only make one reference to an alleged policy or custom of Defendant
Prine. In Paragraph 32 of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he actions of the
Sheriff’s deputies, as alleged herein, were taken under the color of law and were
pursuant to a policy, custom, or practice of the Sheriff.” There is no mention
anywhere in the complaint of what the alleged policy or custom is. This allegation is
an impermissible “naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. at 1949 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To meet the pleading
requirements established by Twombly and Iqbal, Plaintiffs have to do more than
make this sort of “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.4

3

The causal connection can also be established when a history of widespread abuse puts
the supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, but he fails to do so.
Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1269. Plaintiffs here, however, have only alleged that Defendant
Prine’s custom or policy resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights.

4

Even in Plaintiff’s response to the Motion to Dismiss, they do nothing more make the same
conclusory allegations that Defendant Prine condoned a policy or custom resulting in a
4

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted as to Defendant Prine. Thus, the Motion to Dismiss is granted.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Defendant Prine’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Damages (Doc. 8) is

granted. Plaintiffs’ complaint as to Defendant Prine is dismissed without prejudice.
The remaining parties are to file their discovery plan with the Court no later
than May 13, 2011.

SO ORDERED, this the 9 th day of May, 2011.
s/ Hugh Lawson
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
mbh

violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
5