Anderson et al v. Blake et al
Filing
68
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 56 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; granting 67 Motion for Leave to File Surreply. Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 6/25/2012. (nbp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
BARBARA ANDERSON and
SCOTT ANDERSON,
Civil Action 7:11-CV-42 (HL)
Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHELLE ROSE BLAKE and
BRANDON M. BENNETT,
Defendants.
ORDER
This case is before the Court on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 56) and Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Leave to File Surreply to Defendant’s Reply Brief (Doc. 67). For the reasons
discussed herein, State Farm’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted, in
part, and denied, in part. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave is granted.
Plaintiffs live in Minnesota. Defendants live in Georgia. On July 18, 2009,
Plaintiff Barbara Anderson was a passenger in a vehicle traveling westbound on
Georgia Highway 122. Defendant Michelle Blake was operating a vehicle owned by
Defendant Brandon Bennett. Blake’s vehicle was traveling behind the vehicle
occupied by Barbara Anderson. Plaintiffs allege Defendant Blake passed the vehicle
occupied by Barbara Anderson as the vehicle made a left turn, causing the vehicle
driven by Defendant Blake to strike the vehicle occupied by Barbara Anderson.
Barbara Anderson alleges personal injuries as a result of the accident. The
vehicle owned by Defendant Bennett and operated by Defendant Blake was insured
by Progressive. Two Progressive policies, policy numbers 195904857-5 and
72075823-0, provide $75,000 in liability coverage. Other settlements have reduced
the amount available under the Progressive policies to $61,000.
The vehicle in which Barbara Anderson was a passenger is insured by USAA,
policy number 015213192U71086. The USAA policy provides $100,000 in uninsured
motorist coverage.
State Farm insures Plaintiffs under three policies. All three policies were
issued in Minnesota. The first is a motor vehicle insurance policy, policy number
355-8316-A20-23H, which provides uninsured motorist coverage with policy limits of
$250,000 per person. The second is a motor vehicle insurance policy, policy number
355-8317-B04-23G, which provides uninsured motorist coverage with policy limits of
$250,000 per person. The third is a personal liability umbrella policy, policy number
23-KY-4802-4, which provides coverage of $1,000,000 and includes an uninsured
motorist endorsement.
State Farm has moved for summary judgment on four issues: (1) Plaintiffs’
punitive damages claim against State Farm; (2) Whether State Farm is entitled to a
setoff of no-fault benefits paid on behalf of Barbara Anderson; (3) Whether the State
Farm motor vehicle policies can be stacked; and (4) Determining the priority of the
multiple policies at issue in this case. Plaintiffs and USAA have filed separate
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responses. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[s]ummary judgment is
appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment as a matter
of law in favor of the moving party.” Brown v. Sec’y of State of Fla., 668 F.3d 1271,
1274 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
I.
ANALYSIS
A.
Punitive Damages
State Farm argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover punitive damages
from State Farm as an uninsured motorist carrier. Plaintiffs agree that they are not
entitled to recover punitive damages against State Farm. Thus, State Farm is
entitled to summary judgment on that issue.
B.
Setoff or Subrogation of No-fault Benefits
State Farm contends that it is entitled to a setoff against Plaintiffs for no-fault
benefits paid to or on behalf of Barbara Anderson. Plaintiffs contend State Farm is
entitled to subrogation against the Defendants, but believe a ruling on this issue at
this time is premature. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that now is not the
appropriate time to make this determination. State Farm would only be entitled to a
setoff or subrogation if Plaintiffs are fully compensated for their injuries. In the
Court’s opinion, it is better to wait and see if the Plaintiffs are fully compensated after
the trial of this case than to make an advisory opinion now as to any setoff or
subrogation. If after trial State Farm believes it is entitled to a setoff or subrogation, it
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can file a motion to that effect, or perhaps the parties can reach a post-verdict
settlement on this issue. The Court denies State Farm’s request for summary
judgment on this matter.
C.
Stacking of State Farm’s Policies
State Farm contends that the two motor vehicle policies issued to Plaintiffs,
both of which provide uninsured motorist coverage, cannot be stacked. It argues that
coverage is available under only one of the State Farm motor vehicle insurance
policies.
Plaintiffs concede that they would be entitled to recover under only one State
Farm motor vehicle policy. Plaintiffs agree with State Farm that policy number 3558316-A20-23H provides $250,000 in uninsured motorist coverage to Plaintiffs, but
policy number 355-8317-B04-23G provides no coverage.
State Farm is entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
D.
Priority of Insurance Policies
The final question before the Court is the priority of the uninsured motorist
coverage as between the competing policies from different states. State Farm and
USAA dispute whether the Court should apply Minnesota law or Georgia law to
resolve this issue. None of the policies provided to the Court contain a choice of law
provision.
State Farm argues that stacking of the insurance policies is governed by
Minnesota law. State Farm contends that applying Minnesota law, the policies stack
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as follows: the two Progressive policies, the State Farm motor vehicle policy, the
USAA policy, and the State Farm umbrella policy.1
USAA argues in response that the priority of the policies is governed by
Georgia law, as the accident occurred in Georgia. USAA contends that applying
Georgia law, the policies stack as follows: the two Progressive policies, the State
Farm motor vehicle policy, the State Farm umbrella policy, and the USAA policy. 2
Normally the Court would now be required to determine whether Georgia or
Minnesota law applies to this issue. However, under the circumstances presented in
this particular case, such a determination is not required. On December 15, 2011,
counsel for State Farm wrote all counsel, including counsel for USAA, to provide
State Farm’s position on the priority of the insurance policies. Counsel stated that the
Progressive policies would pay out first, the State Farm motor vehicle policy second,
the USAA policy third, and the State Farm umbrella policy last. State Farm’s counsel
specifically requested that the other attorneys let him know if they believed his
interpretation of the priority of the policies to be incorrect. (Doc. 66, p. 8). State
Farm’s counsel sent a second letter specifically to counsel for USAA on February 9,
2012, stating “[a]fter you have had a chance to review the policies please let me
know if you and your adjuster agree with our position regarding the priority of
1
A strict application of the Minnesota no-fault statute would actually result in the State
Farm motor vehicle policy coming after the USAA policy. However, a State Farm claims
representative mistakenly agreed that the State Farm motor vehicle policy had priority over
the USAA policy, and State Farm has decided to honor the position asserted by its claims
representative and place the State Farm motor vehicle policy ahead of the USAA policy.
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coverage in this case.” (Doc. 66, p. 10). USAA did not respond to either letter and
assert its position that the State Farm umbrella policy had priority over the USAA
policy.
State Farm argues that USAA has made an admission by silence by not
responding to the position asserted by State Farm regarding the priority of the
policies in this case. The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize that silence can be an
admission. Under Rule 801(d), a statement is not hearsay if “[t]he statement is
offered against an opposing party and . . . is one the party manifested that it adopted
or believed to be true.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(B). In the context of letters, it has been
held that “the mere failure to respond to a letter does not indicate an adoption unless
it was reasonable under the circumstances for the sender to expect the recipient to
respond and to correct erroneous assertions.” S. Stone Co., Inc. v. Singer, 665 F.2d
698, 702-03 (5th Cir. 1982). The letters sent by State Farm contain clear assertions
about its position on the priority of the policies. The correspondence was made
“under circumstances which reasonably called for a reply.” Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 340 F.2d 398, 402 (2d Cir. 1965). Thus, a failure to reply may be found to
be an admission by silence. Id.; Singer, 665 F.2d at 702-03. USAA received at least
the first letter from State Farm regarding the priority issue because it requested
copies of State Farm’s policies in response. In the Court’s opinion, the letter
reasonably called for some response from USAA if it believed the statements to be
2
Plaintiffs do not have an opinion on how the policies should be stacked.
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untrue. The Court finds that the letter is an adoptive admission by a party-opponent
under Rule 801(d)(2)(B), and therefore, USAA has admitted by its silence that the
policies stack as follows: the Progressive policies, the State Farm motor vehicle
policy, the USAA policy, and the State Farm umbrella policy. Of course, depending
on what the jury decides at trial in October, the stacking priority may not be an issue.
State Farm is entitled to summary judgment on this issue to the extent that the
policies will be stacked as outlined above.
II.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons addressed above, State Farm’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Doc. 56) is granted, in part, and denied, in part. Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Leave (Doc. 67) is granted.
This case will be scheduled for trial during the October 2012 term of court,
which will begin on October 1, 2012 in Valdosta, Georgia. A pretrial conference will
be held on September 18, 2012 in Valdosta. Additional information about the pretrial
conference will be provided to the parties and counsel in late August.
SO ORDERED, this the 25th day of June, 2012.
s/ Hugh Lawson
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
mbh
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