McFall v. Scruggs et al
Filing
28
ORDER granting 26 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's counsel is directed to provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and to file written notice with the Court not later than 7/6/2012 exhibiting her signature and that of the Plaintiff. Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 6/22/2012. (nbp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
CATHERINE McFALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 7:11-CV-53 (HL)
FERRELL SCRUGGS, JR. d/b/a THE
SCRUGGS COMPANY, and STEVE
MURRAY,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
Ferrell Scruggs d/b/a The Scruggs Company and Steve Murray. (Doc. 26.) For
the reasons stated more fully below, the Motion is granted.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case involves allegations of discrimination and harassment brought by
Plaintiff Catherine McFall (“Plaintiff”), an African-American woman, against
Defendants Ferrell Scruggs d/b/a The Scruggs Company (“Scruggs”) and Steve
Murray (“Murray”) under Title VII.
Plaintiff formerly worked as a truck driver for a highway construction
business, The Scruggs Company. (Doc. 26-1, Defendants’ Statement of Material
Facts (“DSMF”)1 ¶¶ 1, 3.) The Scruggs Company, incorporated in 1965, performs
site contracting work, operates several permanent asphalt plants, two sand plant
operations, and operates a fleet of tractor-trailer trucks. (DSMF ¶3.) Ferrell
Scruggs, Jr. serves as the CEO and CFO of The Scruggs Company, a position
which he has held for several years. (DSMF ¶ 4.) Steve Murray was the Trucking
Department Manager at The Scruggs Company from 2007-2009. (DSMF ¶ 5.)
Plaintiff was employed as a truck driver for The Scruggs Company from
May 4, 2007 through April 2, 2009. (DSMF ¶ 14.) In her Complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that she was repeatedly harassed by Joe Eunice (“Eunice”), a co-worker
at The Scruggs Company. (See Complaint, Doc. 1.) Plaintiff claims that Eunice
addressed Plaintiff in a derogatory way, repeatedly making race-specific and
gender-specific comments. As an example of a race-specific comment, Plaintiff
claims that in 2007, Eunice wrapped his arm around her and stated “I like Oreos
in my milk.” (DSMF ¶19(a); Complaint ¶ 10.) Later that year, Eunice told Plaintiff
to “kiss my white ass” during a dispute. (DSMF ¶ 19(b); Complaint ¶ 12.) The
allegations of gender-specific harassment are more numerous, with Plaintiff
alleging eleven specific instances when Eunice inappropriately addressed
Plaintiff. (DSMF ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges that Eunice called her “Ms. Shit”, “bitch”,
1
According to Local Rule 56, “[a]ll material facts contained in the moving party’s
statement which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to the record
shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate.” M.D.
Ga. L.R. 56. In this case, Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ Statement of
Material Facts, and thus, Defendants’ assertions of fact are deemed admitted by
Plaintiff.
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and “whore”, calling Plaintiff these names in person and over his personal CB
radio. (DSMF ¶¶ 21, 22.) Plaintiff cites other incidents when Eunice addressed
her in degrading or disturbing ways. (DSMF ¶¶ 21(a) – 21(k).)
Plaintiff alleges that she complained to Steve Murray about Eunice in
November 2007. (DSMF ¶ 23.) Approximately seventeen months later, Plaintiff
was terminated from her job. (DSMF ¶ 23.) Plaintiff claims that the reason for her
termination was discrimination; however, Defendants claim that there was a
legitimate reason for her termination, namely, that Plaintiff’s performance was
poor. (DSMF ¶¶ 23, 24.) In support, Defendants cite to Plaintiff’s driving record at
The Scruggs Company, which includes two Employee Warning Notices and a
complaint made by a person following Plaintiff as she drove on the highway.
(DSMF ¶¶ 24(b), 24(d).) Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s “unsafe driving” record
was the reason for her termination. (DSMF ¶ 24(g).)
After her termination, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (DSMF ¶7.) The Charge
was signed by Plaintiff on November 27, 2009 and was received by the EEOC on
December 2, 2009. (DSMF ¶ 7; see also Doc. 27-9.) According to the Charge,
the last act of discrimination took place on April 2, 2009, the date Plaintiff was
terminated by The Scruggs Company. (DSMF ¶ 7; see also Doc. 27-9.) Plaintiff
filed this lawsuit on April 25, 2011.
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II.
STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and … the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322,
106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact arises only when
“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct.
2505 (1986).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must
evaluate all of the evidence, together with any logical inferences, in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 354-55. The court may not, however,
make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. at 255; see also
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097
(2000).
The
party
seeking
summary
judgment
“always
bears
the
initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying
those
portions
of
the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of a material fact.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) (internal quotation
marks omitted). If the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the
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nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and present specific evidence
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, or that the nonmoving
party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 324-26. This evidence
must consist of more than mere conclusory allegations. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932
F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991). Under this framework, summary judgment
must be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
III.
ANALYSIS
In this case, it is not necessary to address the merits of Plaintiff’s claim
because the proper defendants have not been named. It is well established that
the proper defendant in a Title VII case is the plaintiff’s employer, not individual
employees. Cross v. State of Ala., State Dep’t of Mental Health, 49 F.3d 1490,
1504 (11th Cir. 1995). In Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.
1991), the Eleventh Circuit stated that “[i]ndividual capacity suits under Title VII
are … inappropriate. The relief granted under Title VII is against the employer,
not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act.”
The only proper individual defendants in a Title VII action are supervisory
employees in their capacity as agents of the employer. Hinson v. Clinch Cnty.,
Georgia Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Busby, 931 F.2d
at 772)).
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In this case, Plaintiff has named Steve Murray and Ferrell Scruggs, Jr.
d/b/a The Scruggs Company as Defendants. Steve Murray is an individual, and
therefore, is not a proper defendant to this Title VII action. Ferrell Scruggs, Jr.
d/b/a The Scruggs Company is also an individual, not a proper defendant. The
Scruggs Company is a Georgia Corporation and Scruggs simply acts as the CEO
and CFO. (DSMF ¶¶ 1, 4.) There is no evidence that Scruggs himself employed
any individuals or acted as an agent of The Scruggs Company. Without a proper
defendant, this case cannot move forward.
It is also worth noting that Plaintiff’s counsel, Ms. Betty Lanier, should have
been aware of the deficiencies in the Complaint. Defendants included in the
Scheduling and Discovery Order the following statement: “Defendant further
contends that Plaintiff was employed by The Scruggs Company, a Georgia
Corporation, and that Ferrell Scruggs, Jr. is an improper party.” (Doc. 20.) This
should have alerted Ms. Lanier that there was a problem with the named
defendants.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted based on the
Plaintiff’s failure to name a proper defendant. Ms. Betty Lanier, counsel for
Plaintiff, has been largely unresponsive throughout this litigation, culminating with
her decision not to respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, giving
Plaintiff very little chance to succeed in her case. Ms. Lanier is directed by order
of this Court to provide her client a copy of this Order, and she is further directed
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to file a written notice with the Court no later than July 6, 2012, signed by herself
and her client, acknowledging that the Order has been given to her client.
SO ORDERED, this 22nd day of June, 2012.
s/ Hugh Lawson
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
ebr
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