PITTMAN v. PEDIATRIC SERVICES OF AMERICA

Filing 15

ORDER denying 12 Motion for Reconsideration. Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 5/3/2012. (nbp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
SONIA W. PITTMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 7:11-CV-159 (HL)

PEDIATRIC SERVICES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Sonia W. Pittman’s Motion for Reconsideration
on the Court’s Order and Judgment dismissing her case for failure to exhaust her
administrative remedies. (Doc. 12.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion for
Reconsideration is denied.
Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed on November 18, 2011, alleged discrimination in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621,
et seq. (“ADEA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5, et seq. (“Title VII”). In response to the Complaint, Defendant Pediatric Services
of America (“PSA”) filed a Motion to Dismiss. In its Motion, PSA claimed that
Plaintiff did not timely file her charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), and therefore, she did not properly exhaust her

administrative remedies and should be denied relief. Plaintiff did not file a
response to this Motion.1
Based on the evidence submitted by PSA, the Court granted the Motion to
Dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff failed to submit her charge with the EEOC
within the 180-day window allowed by Georgia law. See Sheffield v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 403 Fed. Appx. 452, 454 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff alleged
that the discrimination against her took place on October 26, 2011, and her
charge was stamped as received by the EEOC on August 10, 2011 (Doc. 6-1),
well after the 180-day period had closed.
Now, Plaintiff submits her Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that she
submitted information to the EEOC in January 2011, within the 180-day time
period. In support of her Motion, Plaintiff submits several documents to the Court.
After careful review, the Court is unconvinced that these documents change its
analysis. The documents submitted by Plaintiff provide some evidence that
Plaintiff made contact with the EEOC in January 2011, but the evidence is not
enough to affect the Court’s ultimate decision. For example, there is a fax
confirmation sheet dated January 19, 2011 (Doc. 12-1, p. 4), which Plaintiff
claims signifies her contact with the EEOC. However, this confirmation sheet
alone is not sufficient to show that Plaintiff properly submitted her charge in a
timely fashion. Also, there is the last page of an EEOC questionnaire dated

1

The Court issued an Order on February 23, 2012 to advise the Plaintiff, who is
proceeding pro se, of the importance of responding to a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc.
8.)
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November 28, 2010. This page, without more, does not suffice to prove that her
charge was submitted to the EEOC within the allowed time period.
There is also evidence, submitted by PSA, that the EEOC sent PSA a
Notice of Charge of Discrimination on January 25, 2011, which would indicate
some contact by Plaintiff prior to the expiration of the 180-day time period. (Doc.
6-2.) However, this form is not verified and cannot be considered a proper
charge. “The EEOC requires that a charge be ‘in writing and signed and …
verified.’” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.3(a). Verification is mandatory. Vason v. City of
Montgomery, Ala., 240 F.3d 905, 907 (11th Cir. 2001). In this case, the form
dated January 25, 2011 is not verified, and thus, it does not satisfy Title VII’s
requirements. See Francois v. Miami Date County, Port of Miami, 432 Fed. Appx.
819, 822 (11th Cir. 2011) (charge must be verified to be considered); Hammond
v. State of Ga., No. 2:11-CV-0051-RWS, 2012 WL 181647, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Jan.
23, 2012) (dismissal of complaint for lack of verification).
The evidence submitted by Plaintiff is insufficient to demonstrate that a
charge was properly filed with the EEOC. Without a properly executed EEOC
charge, Plaintiff has failed to show that she exhausted her administrative
remedies under Title VII, and therefore, her claims must fail. The Motion for
Reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of May, 2012.
s/ Hugh Lawson
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
ebr

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