Kawasaki Motors Finance Corporation v. TIFTON CYCLES INC et al

Filing 42

ORDER directing plaintiff to supplement its 40 Motion for Default Judgment not later than 10/26/2012. Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 10/10/2012. (nbp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
KAWASAKI MOTORS
FINANCE CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 7:12-CV-16 (HL)

v.
TIFTON CYCLES, INC., et al.,
Defendant.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment
(Doc. 40).

Before deciding the motion, the Court requests that Plaintiff file

supplementary information regarding the $27,831.42 alleged deficiency.
I.

BACKGROUND
On January 26, 2012, the Court issued Plaintiff Kawasaki Motors Finance

Corporation (“KMFC”) a Writ of Immediate Possession to repossess securitized
collateral held by Defendant Tifton Cycle, Inc. (“TCI”). (Doc. 15). KMFC
repossessed and sold the inventory. All of the Defendants were served with
summons and the complaint, but none filed answers, leaving them all in default.
On September 6, 2012, KMFC filed a Motion for Default Judgment (Doc.
40), alleging that it is entitled to a default judgment of $27,831.42. (Doc. 40, p.
17). KMFC provided an affidavit signed by Susan McFaul, a senior collections
supervisor for KMFC, stating that TCI owes KMFC $27,831.42, which purports to

be the amount still due KMFC after the inventory sale. (Doc. 40-3 - Affidavit of
Susan McFaul). The question before the Court is whether a hearing on default
damages is necessary.
II.

ANALYSIS
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(1), “[i]f the plaintiff's

claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation, the
clerk - on the plaintiff's request, with an affidavit showing the amount due - must
enter judgment for that amount. . . .” Otherwise, Rule 55(b)(2) requires the party
to apply for default judgment, after which the court may conduct hearings to
determine damages.
A district court has discretion as to whether or not a default judgment
should be entered. United States v. Holman, No. 3:10-CV-095, 2011 WL
2175033, at *1 (M.D. Ga. 2011). The court must ensure “that there is a
substantive, sufficient basis in the pleadings for the particular relief sought.” Id.
(quoting Tyco Fire & Security, LLC v. Alcocer, 218 Fed. Appx. 860, 863 (11th Cir.
2007)). A hearing is not required when the record contains the necessary
evidence regarding damages. Great American Ins. Co. v. Wayne Evans Auction
Co. Inc., No. 4:12-CV-45, 2012 WL 2154245, at *1 (M.D. Ga. 2012). However,
alleging a specific amount is not alone sufficient to show a “sum certain.” Patray
v. Northwest Pub., Inc., 931 F.Supp. 865, 869 (S.D. Ga. 1996). To avoid a
hearing, the plaintiff must show that the amount claimed is a liquidated sum
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capable of calculation. Huddleston v. Smith, No. 1:09-CV-03669, 2010 WL
1410556, at *2 (N.D.Ga. 2010).
KMFC alleges, through the affidavit of Susan McFaul, that TCI owes
KMFC $27,831.42. KMFC fulfilled the affidavit requirement of Rule 55(b)(1) but
did not provide evidence to show how this number was calculated. As noted
above, specifying a damages sum does not automatically render it a “sum
certain.” The Court requests that KMFC provide supplementary information to
demonstrate that the $27, 831.42 is, in fact, a calculable sum and exactly how
that amount was reached. If, after reviewing the supplementary information, the
Court determines that the requested default amount is a “sum certain,” a default
damages hearing will be unnecessary. KMFC is ordered to supplement its motion
no later than October 26, 2012.
SO ORDERED, this 10th day of October, 2012.
s/ Hugh Lawson
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE

EdG/mbh

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