DENSON v. PARKER et al

Filing 6

ORDER finding as moot 5 Motion to Appoint Counsel ; granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; dismissing complaint as frivolous. Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 6/20/2012. (nbp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
RANDY DENSON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
JONI B. PARKER and
ELIZABETH C CLEVELAND,

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NO. 7:12-CV-0075-HL-TQL

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Defendants.
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ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff Randy Denson, a prisoner at the Rutledge State Prison in Columbus, Georgia, has
filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeks leave to proceed without
prepayment of the $350.00 filing fee or security therefor pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). After
having conducted a preliminary review of Plaintiff's Complaint, as required by 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a), the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous and fails to state any claim upon
which relief may be granted. Thus, leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be GRANTED, but
only for the purpose of this dismissal. Plaintiff's Compliant shall be DISMISSED pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court must accept all
factual allegations in the complaint as true. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir.
2004). Pro se pleadings, like the one in this case, are also “held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys” and will be “liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148
F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However, a district court may still dismiss a prisoner complaint

if it (1) is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”; or (2)
“seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not include “enough factual matter (taken as
true)” to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests[.]” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). The factual allegations in
a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot
“merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. In other words, the
complaint must allege “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence” supporting a claim. Id. “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663, 129
S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) an act or omission
deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United
States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Hale
v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1581 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these
requirements, or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint
is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
STATEMENT AND ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff Randy Denson has filed this civil rights action against Lowndes County Magistrates
Joni Parker and Elizabeth Cleveland for an alleged violation of his constitutional rights.

This

violation allegedly occurred after Plaintiff accused the district attorney of committing the “criminal
offense . . . of theft by conversion,” “conceal[ing] a record,”and “present[ing] an altered and falsified
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state’s exhibit” to the jury during his state criminal trial. Plaintiff apparently submitted “three state
warrant affidavits” to the Lowndes County Magistrate Court in an effort to bring criminal charges
against the district attorney, but he was told, by the “Magistrate Court” that he would need to file
a report with the local law enforcement agency before any criminal warrants can be issued. Though
Plaintiff does not identify which Magistrate denied his request, he claims that the “Magistrate Court”
violated his constitutional rights of access to the courts and his right to equal protection under the
law when the Magistrate refused to file his warrant affidavits.
These allegations, even when considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, fail to state
any cognizable constitutional claim. “[A] private citizen has no judicially cognizable interest in the
prosecution or non-prosecution of another.” Otero v. U. S. Attorney Gen., 832 F.2d 141, 141 (11th
Cir. 1987). Moreover, neither of the defendants are amenable to suit. State judges are absolutely
immune in a § 1983 suit for damages for judicial acts done within the jurisdiction of the court.
Unless a judge has acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction, his or her acts are protected by judicial
immunity no matter how injurious they may be to the plaintiff, even when such acts are alleged to
be malicious, in excess of jurisdiction or authority, procedurally or otherwise erroneous, or corrupt
or done pursuant to bribe or conspiracy. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98
L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967).
Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts suggesting that Defendants acted in the clear absence
of all jurisdiction. In Georgia, the decision of whether or not to issue an arrest warrant is within the
jurisdiction of the magistrate court, see O.C.G.A. § 15–10–2, and is thus an exercise of discretion
for which a local magistrate is granted absolute judicial immunity. See Penaranda v. Cato, 740 F.
Supp. 1578, 1581 (S.D. Ga. June 29, 1990) (local magistrate who issued arrest warrant based upon
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citizen's complaint was acting within his jurisdiction under Georgia law and entitled to absolute
judicial immunity).
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous and fails to state any
claim upon which relief may be GRANTED. The present Complaint is accordingly DISMISSED
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff’s pending Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc.
5] is MOOT.
SO ORDERED, this 20th day of June, 2012.
s/ Hugh Lawson
HUGH LAWSON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
jlr

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