WALKER v. HOMERVILLE CITY OF et al
Filing
44
ORDER denying 34 Motion for Certificate of Appealability; denying 36 Motion for Reconsideration ; denying 39 Motion for Leave to File. Ordered by U.S. District Judge HUGH LAWSON on 3/26/2014. (nbp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
LAWRENCE WESLEY WALKER,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 7:12-CV-137 (HL)
v.
CITY OF HOMERVILLE, a Municipal
Corporation;
MARGARET
PEG
BLITCH, Individually and as Mayor
of the City of Homerville; WILLIE
ALFORD HARDEE, Individually and
as City Councilman for the City of
Homerville; AND WILLIAM VEST,
Individually
and
as
a
City
Councilman
for
the
City
of
Homerville, Georgia,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Certify for Interlocutory Appeal
the February 10, 2014 Order on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 34), their Motion for Reconsideration of the Order (Doc. 36), and their
Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39). After
holding a hearing on these motions on March 18, 2014, the Court now denies
them for the reasons stated below.
Motion to Certify for an Interlocutory Appeal
The motion to certify this Court’s Order partially denying summary
judgment to Defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), is denied because the
issues which Defendants wish to appeal do not involve pure questions of
controlling law. See McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1251, 1259 (11th
Cir. 2004). Disputes over material facts remain in this case including, according
to defense counsel’s contention at the hearing, whether Plaintiff even entered an
employment contract with the City of Homerville. See id. (“The antithesis of a
proper § 1292(b) appeal is one that turns on whether there is a genuine issue of
fact…”).
Motion for Reconsideration
The motion for reconsideration is also denied. Defendants’ principal
concern in this motion seems to be with their construction of the Court’s Order
partially denying summary judgment, particularly with reference to the breach of
contract claim. When considering a summary judgment motion, the district court
must evaluate all of the evidence, together with any logical inferences, in the light
most favorable to the non-movant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 254-55, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). This was the standard the
Court applied to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court found that
Plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to determine
2
that he had an oral employment contract with the City of Homerville; that he had
been reassured his term of office would be for one year; and that the city
breached the contract by terminating his employment in bad faith before the term
had expired. See id. at 248 (noting a genuine issue of material fact exists when
“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party”). The Court did not conclusively rule on these issues, since
Plaintiff did not move for summary judgment, and they must be resolved by a
jury. Plaintiff still bears the burden of proving the elements of his claims at trial,
and the jury will weigh the credibility of Plaintiff and any other witnesses as they
might testify concerning the alleged oral employment contract. See Allen v.
Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC, ___ F. App’x ___, 2014 WL 1016926 (11th Cir.
Mar. 18, 2014); Davila v. Menendez, 717 F.3d 1179, 1184 (11th Cir. 2013).
Defendants’ confusion may have crept in where the Court’s Order applied
Georgia contract law to the purported contract. Viewed in Plaintiff’s favor, the
evidence showed he had a one-year contract with no provision he could be fired
at will during that term. Applying Georgia law to this construction of the contract,
the Court found that Plaintiff’s employment could not be terminated at will during
that year. At trial the jury may very well determine that Plaintiff was never told his
employment would last for a definite term, in which case the legal restriction to
terminate Plaintiff’s employment in good faith would not be imposed on the city.
3
To the extent Defendants argue that Plaintiff testified in his deposition that
when he accepted the job in Homerville he knew the city council would vote on
his re-appointment in January 2011, the motion for reconsideration is also
denied. During his deposition, Plaintiff repeatedly testified that his contract with
the city was on a “year-to-year basis.” (Doc. 26, pp. 12, 61, 113-14). Defendants
contend that Plaintiff was referring to the calendar year and was testifying that his
contract would expire each December. Possibly this is what Plaintiff intended to
express, but it is equally reasonable to conclude that Plaintiff was testifying that
he had a contract lasting for twelve months, regardless of when the twelfth month
ended in the calendar year. Plaintiff certainly argued for this construction of the
contract when he responded to the summary judgment motion. Defense counsel
could have clarified Plaintiff’s testimony during the deposition and may certainly
do so at trial, but for summary judgment purposes the Court was required to
make reasonable inferences of the testimony in favor of Plaintiff.
There are two points in the deposition transcript that the Court will
specifically address.
Q.
Okay. All right. And then you said the next thing that
happened was the City Council meeting was held on
January 4, 2011, I guess, here in this room that
we’re in today, correct?
A.
There was—there was another meeting that was
held, I was told. I think it was, like, on December the
28th, that they went into executive session to
4
supposedly discuss whether or not they were going
to retain me.
…
Q.
But you did not attend that—
A.
No, sir.
Q.
--meeting, whatever it was. You don’t know who was
in attendance, or anything.
A.
No, sir. After that meeting, it’s—they had their
regularly scheduled City Council meeting on January
4th, and that was when they decided to not reappoint
me for the upcoming year.
Q.
Okay. And it was your understanding that that
January 4, 2011, meeting would have been the first
Council meeting of that calendar year, correct?
A.
Correct.
Q.
And all appointments would be considered at that
time.
A.
Correct.
Q.
Including your appointment, or reappointment, or no
reappointment as chief of police.
A.
Correct.
(Doc. 26, pp. 101-02).
As the transcript makes clear, Plaintiff only testified that he knew, in the
days leading up to January 4, 2011, that on that date the city council would vote
on his continued employment. The question about Plaintiff’s knowledge of the
5
January 4 meeting immediately followed a lengthy description, prompted by
defense counsel, of his actions and conversations with Defendants in the days
following the gambling arrests in December 2010. A natural construction of
Plaintiff’s testimony would be that, sometime after the arrests in December, he
learned the city council would hold its first meeting of 2011 on January 4 when it
intended to vote on his continued employment. If Defendants wished to learn
whether Plaintiff knew when he accepted the job that his reappointment would be
voted on the following January, a clearer question should have been posed.1 The
fact that Plaintiff, when first questioned about the January 4 vote during his
deposition, called it a “termination” rather than a “reappointment” decision
suggests he viewed the city council’s vote as falling outside the scheduled
reappointment process. (Doc. 26, p. 10).
Defendants have also argued that Plaintiff knew he was an at-will
employee, liable to being discharged for any reason during his alleged term of
office, but his deposition testimony conflicts with this assertion. Plaintiff only
testified he was an at-will employee with regards to the reappointment process,
meaning his reappointment as police chief for a new term fell entirely within the
discretion of the city council.
1
Counsel asked a similarly ambiguous question when inquiring as to whether “it was
your understanding that you would come back up for reconsideration at the beginning of
2011.” Plaintiff’s affirmative response could just as easily have referred to March 2011,
when twelve months of employment would have ended, as January 2011, particularly
since he had just said he was employed on a “year-to-year basis.” (Doc. 26, p. 12).
6
Q.
And it was also your understanding that you served
at the will of the City Council of the City of
Homerville, correct?
A.
That’s correct.
Q.
You were, in essence, an at-will employee.
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And that they could reappoint you or not—they could
reappoint you or not reappoint you, whether they had
a reason or not, correct?
A.
As long as I was doing my job, I felt like that I was
doing what I needed to do to get reappointed.
Q.
Okay. I understand you felt you knew what you were
doing—you felt you were doing what you needed to
do to be reappointed, but it was your understanding
that if they didn’t think you were doing what you were
supposed to be doing, they could decline to
reappoint you, correct?
A.
…
I guess they had that option, yes, sir.
Q.
You allege…that you had a valid contract with the
City of Homerville. Is that true?
A.
I feel like that I had a verbal agreement, which
constitutes a contract from—for a year-to-year basis.
Q.
Okay. For a year-to-year basis.
A.
Uh-huh (yes).
Q.
Is that right?
A.
Yes, sir.
7
Q.
At the pleasure of the City Council, correct?
A.
As long—I mean, you keep saying at the pleasure of
the City Council. I felt like that as long as I was doing
my job and I was doing it effectively, and I was
accomplishing what they wanted me to accomplish,
then I felt like my job was safe. It got to a point,
though, that they asked me to do something that was
illegal. And at that point, I felt like that they were
asking me to violate my oath of office, and I was not
going to do that and risk going to jail with criminal
charges to save my job. And that’s what I felt like I
got to the point of, is that they were influencing me to
do that. And I—I wasn’t going to do that for—
Q.
Okay. And who—
A.
--to save my job.
Q.
--who, with the City, gave you the terms of this
contract, this verbal contract that you have?
A.
When I met with them in the beginning, that was, I
think, one of the things we discussed, is that it would
be on a year-to-year basis, as long as I
accomplished what they wanted me to accomplish.
And like I say, up until this point, I had not received
any write-ups, any verbal warnings, nothing indicated
to me by any of the City Council that I was doing
anything wrong until this search warrant in
December….
(Doc. 26, pp. 12-13, 113-14).
Plaintiff’s deposition testimony provided a factual basis that required this
Court, applying the relevant law, to deny in part Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. The Court finds no evidence the testimony was purposefully
8
misleading. If Defendants find ambiguity in Plaintiff’s testimony, then their
counsel may clarify it at trial. The motion for reconsideration is denied.
Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Summary Judgment
This motion is also denied. The time for filing dispositive motions expired
on August 29, 2013. (Doc. 14, p. 5). Far from being able to show “excusable
neglect” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) for failing to raise
Defendants’ new arguments prior to the filing deadline, at the motions hearing
defense counsel acknowledged being aware of the defenses but said he made a
strategic litigation decision not to include them in the initial summary judgment
motion.
SO ORDERED, this the 26th day of March, 2014.
s/ Hugh Lawson_______________
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
scr
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?