SCENTCO LLC v. SIMON DISTRIBUTING COMPANY et al

Filing 31

ORDER denying 26 Motion for Reconsideration. Ordered by US Mag Judge Thomas Q Langstaff on 7/2/2013. (nbp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION

SCENTCO, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 7:13-cv-17 (HL)

SIMON DISTRIBUTING COMPANY,
SIMON DISTRIBUTING, INC., SIMON
DISTRIBUTING, LLC, and PATRICK
SIMON,
Defendants.

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Scentco, LLC’s Motion for Reconsideration
(Doc. 26). In the motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its order remanding
this case to state court (Doc. 23). Plaintiff accuses the Court of “ignoring
altogether Plaintiff’s request for royalty damages….” (Doc. 26, p. 1 (emphasis
in original)). The Motion for Reconsideration is denied for the following reasons.
As pointed out by Defendants, this Court does not have proper jurisdiction
to review a motion for reconsideration on a remand order. Harris v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 951 F.2d 325, 330 (11th Cir. 1992). The
authority given to a federal district judge to remand a case after it is removed
comes from 28 U.S.C. § 1447, which sets out federal procedures after removal.
Section 1447(c) provides that a motion to remand must be filed within thirty days.

This statutory section also states that “[i]f at any time before final judgment it
appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Section 1447(d) addresses the issue of
appellate review of a remand order. “An order remanding a case to the State
court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except
that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed
pursuant to section 1442 or 14431 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or
otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
Courts have held that the language of § 1447(d) unequivocally bars
appellate review and reconsideration of any remand order. Harris, 951 at 330;
see also Wachovia Mortg. FSB v. Marquez, --- Fed. App’x ---, 2013 WL 2319435
at *2 (11th Cir. May 28, 2013) (noting that § 1447(d) “not only forecloses
appellate review, but also bars reconsideration by the district court of its own
remand order”); Bender v. Mazda Motor Corp., 657 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir.
2011) (stating that “even if the district court erroneously remanded the case to
state court, § 1447(d) prohibits the district court from reconsidering its remand
order because the district court no longer had jurisdiction over the case”).
Defendants argue that its intent behind the Motion for Reconsideration is
not to second-guess the Court’s subjective ruling. Rather, Defendants contend
that they simply want to “direct[ ] this Court’s attention to a significant damage

1

Section 1442 addresses removal for those cases that deal with federal officers
or agencies as defendants. Section 1443 addresses removal of civil rights cases.
Neither is at issue in this case.
2

allegation that was not considered,” namely the royalty payments that
Defendants would be forced to pay as injunctive relief if Plaintiff prevails (Doc.
30, p. 1). The very essence of a motion for reconsideration is that a party asks
the court to reconsider something that the party believes the court did not
properly consider. Thus, Defendants’ motion is not an exception to the rule
barring reconsideration of remand orders. Motions for reconsideration are barred
by Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence, and this Court will not make an exception for
Defendants.2
Based on this precedent, the Court does not have jurisdiction to consider
the Motion for Reconsideration. The case has been remanded to state court, and
there it will stay.
SO ORDERED, this 2nd day of July, 2013.

s/ Hugh Lawson_______________
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
ebrs

2

Without considering the merits of the motion, the Court would like to point out
that injunctive relief was addressed in the order remanding the case to state
court. The Court cited Federated Mutual Insurance Co. v. McKinnon Motors,
LLC, 329 F.3d 805, 807 (11th Cir. 2003) for the premise that “[w]hen a plaintiff
seeks injunctive or declaratory relief, the amount in controversy is the monetary
value of the object of the litigation from plaintiff’s perspective.” Federated Mut.
Ins. Co., 329 F.3d at 807 (citing Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069,
1077 (11th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff claimed $74,000 in damages for all claims,
including injunctive relief, and in the remand order, the Court determined that
Defendants did not present sufficient evidence to disprove the Plaintiff’s
articulation of damages under the legal certainty standard.
3