Brown v. Refuse Materials, Inc. et al

Filing 38

ORDER directing parties to amend their motion and supply further information not later than 1/28/2014. Ordered by U.S. District Judge Hugh Lawson on 1/15/2014. (nbp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION

MOSES BROWN, on behalf of
himself and all similarly situated
individuals,
Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 7:13-CV-37 (HL)

v.
REFUSE MATERIALS,
DONALD POPE, II,

INC.

and

Defendants.

ORDER
Before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion to Approve Settlement and
Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 37). The parties ask the Court to
approve the proposed settlement of the Plaintiffs’ claims brought under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 216, which they concede is a
compromise of what the Plaintiffs believe they are entitled to under FLSA. The
Court is required to undertake a fairness review of the proposed settlement. See
29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350,
1353 (11th Cir. 1982). Before ruling on the motion to approve the settlement, the
Court orders that the parties amend their motion and supply the following
information no later than January 28, 2014:

1. The amount of damages that Plaintiff Moses Brown as well as the opt-in
plaintiffs originally claimed to be entitled to, with the monetary figures
delineated for each individual plaintiff;
2. The number of hours the Plaintiffs worked for which they allege they
have not been adequately compensated, as well as the salary or hourly
wage at which Plaintiffs allege they should have been paid, with both
the hours and wages delineated for each individual plaintiff;
3. Whether the opt-in plaintiffs Ronnie Stanley, Luciano Cibrian, William
McAlpin, and Gregory Johnson have been informed of this proposed
settlement;
4. Why the proposed settlement amount for Plaintiff Brown is so much
greater than the proposed amounts for opt-in plaintiffs Stanley, Cibrian,
and McAlpin, as well as why Johnson is paid nothing under the
proposed settlement;
5. Why the motion to approve the settlement should not be denied since
the settlement contains a general clause that would release Defendants
from more than the FLSA claims (Doc. 37-2, pp. 4-5, ¶4), see Hogan v.
All-State Beverage Co., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1282-83 (M.D.Ala.
2011);

2

6. Why the motion to approve the settlement should not be denied since
the settlement contains a confidentiality clause (Doc. 37-2, p. 5, ¶¶5,
6(D)), see Hogan, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 1282-83;
7. Whether the attorney’s fees for Plaintiffs’ counsel were negotiated
separately from the settlement of the Plaintiffs’ claims and without
regard for what the Plaintiffs were paid; and
8. An explanation of the attorney’s fees including a break-down of the
number of hours Plaintiffs’ counsel worked on this matter, the tasks
performed, and the hourly rate at which counsel seeks to be paid, see
Patel v. Shree Jalarm, Inc., 2013 WL 5175949, at *4-7 (S.D.Ala. Sept.
13, 2013) (calculating the “lodestar” for attorney’s fees); Bivens v. Wrap
It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008); Johnson v. Ga.
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). Counsel
should provide the Court with an explanation for why the hourly rate
and the number of hours worked are reasonable.
If the parties believe that a hearing would allow them to better respond to
these issues and facilitate the Court’s fairness review, they are encouraged to
request one.

SO ORDERED, this the 15th day of January, 2014.

3

s/Hugh Lawson________________
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE

scr

4