RODRIQUEZ v. MOULTRIE GEORGIA et al
Filing
20
ORDER granting 14 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by U.S. District Judge HUGH LAWSON on 3/7/2014. (nbp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
GIOVANNI RODRIQUEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 7:13-CV-60 (HL)
CITY OF MOULTRIE, GEORGIA and
MOULTRIE POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
ORDER
This case is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 14). For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.
I.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that summary judgment be
granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). “The moving party bears ‘the initial responsibility of informing the . . . court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.’” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.
2004) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548
(1986) (internal quotations omitted)). Where the moving party makes such a
showing, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must go beyond the pleadings
and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact
does exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505
(1986).
In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Patton v. Trial Guar. Ins. Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th
Cir. 2002). But, the court is bound only to draw those inferences which are
reasonable. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Allen v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986)).“If
the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations
omitted).
Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendants’ motion. The Court “cannot
base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that the motion was
unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion.” United States v.
One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d
1099, 1011 (11th Cir. 2004). The Court “need not sua sponte review all of the
evidentiary materials on file at the time the motion is granted, but must ensure
that the motion itself is supported by evidentiary materials.” Id.
2
II.
FACTS
A.
Local Rule 56
In accordance with Local Rule 56, Defendants filed a statement of material
facts to which they contend there is no genuine dispute. (Doc. 15). As required
by Local Rule 56, each fact statement is supported by a specific citation to the
record. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 56.
Local Rule 56 requires the respondent to respond to each of the movant’s
numbered material facts. “All material facts contained in the moving party’s
statement which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to the record
shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate.” M.D.
Ga. L.R. 56. Plaintiff did not file any response to the statement of material facts.
Therefore, in accordance with Local Rule 56, the facts contained in Defendants’
statement are deemed admitted.
Even though Defendants’ submitted facts are deemed admitted,
Defendants “continue[] to shoulder the initial burden of production in
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and the court
must satisfy itself that the burden has been satisfactorily discharged.” Reese v.
Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008). The Court must “review the
movant’s citations to the record to determine if there is, indeed, no genuine issue
of material fact.” Id. at 1269 (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court has so reviewed the record, and viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, finds the facts for purposes of summary judgment to be as follows.
3
B.
Relevant Factual Background
Plaintiff is a Hispanic male. He was hired by the City of Moultrie in January
of 2006 to work as a police officer. Plaintiff resigned his employment with the City
on March 3, 2013.
Hope Allen is an African-American female. She began working for the City
as a police officer on July 9, 2012. Shortly after Ms. Allen was hired, she was
placed on a shift that was supervised by Sergeant Daniel Lindsay. Plaintiff also
worked on Sergeant Lindsay’s shift at this time. Corporal Rocky Hancock was
assigned as Ms. Allen’s field training officer and direct supervisor. Corporal
Hancock and Sergeant Lindsay are both Caucasian males.
On or about July 25, 2012, Ms. Allen submitted a letter to Frank Lang, the
Chief of Police. In the letter, Ms. Allen complained that Corporal Hancock
exchanged racial comments with Shunell Borders, an African-American female
police officer. Ms. Allen also stated that Corporal Hancock showed her videos of
a Caucasian female impersonating an African-American female working at a
hamburger restaurant and as a flight attendant. She further stated in the letter
that Corporal Hancock showed her a photograph of Ms. Borders holding a box of
Cracker Jacks that had been altered to read “Nigger Jacks.” Ms. Allen also
submitted a memorandum to Chief Lang regarding an incident between Ms. Allen
and John Vickers, who was working as a police officer for the City at the time, in
which Mr. Vickers allegedly called Ms. Allen a bitch.
4
After receiving the letter and memorandum from Ms. Allen, Chief Lang
assembled a panel of City employees to investigate the allegations made by Ms.
Allen. Plaintiff was interviewed by the panel. During his interview, Plaintiff told the
panel that he had altered a bag of Cracker Jacks so that it read “Nigger Jacks” or
“Nigga Jacks.” Plaintiff altered the bag while at work at the Police Department,
and presented the altered bag to Ms. Borders in, or immediately outside, the
briefing room at the Police Department. Ms. Borders was then photographed
holding the bag while wearing her police uniform.
On August 10, 2012, Chief Lang notified Plaintiff by letter that he was
being placed on Decision Making Leave for one day. Chief Lang wrote in relevant
part that “your level of participation in this pervasive and disrespectful behavior
played a major role in creating a hostile work environment. . . .In your interview
you admitted to writing on the Cracker Jack bag to cross out the letters C-R-A-CK and wrote in N-I-G-G to have the bag read ‘Nigger Jacks’. . . .Your actions
clearly crossed the line when you engaged in the disgusting and racist acts, and
the fact that you openly participated in creating the environment, leads me to
question if the law enforcement profession is right for you. . . .After much
consideration, I have decided to place you on Decision-Making Leave (DML),
with pay on Tuesday, August 14, 2012.” Sergeant Lindsay, Corporal Hancock,
Mr. Vickers, and Ms. Borders were all also placed on Decision Making Leave for
one day by Chief Lang.
5
On December 4, 2012, Plaintiff signed a Charge of Discrimination in which
he alleged that the Police Department discriminated against him on the basis of
his race. The basis of the Charge of Discrimination was Plaintiff’s placement on
Decision Making Leave. On February 12, 2013, the EEOC issued a Notice of
Right to Sue with respect to the Charge.
On April 29, 2013, Plaintiff filed his complaint in this case. Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by
discriminating against him on the basis of race. Defendants now move for
summary judgment on all claims raised in Plaintiff’s complaint.
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Claims against the Moultrie Police Department
Defendants move to dismiss all claims against the Moultrie Police
Department because it is not an entity capable of being sued. The Court agrees.
The issue of whether an entity is capable of being sued is determined by the law
of the state in which the district court is located. Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b)(3). Thus, in
this case, Georgia law controls. The Georgia Supreme Court has explained that
“[i]n every suit there must be a legal entity as the real plaintiff and the real
defendant. This state recognizes only three classes as legal entities, namely (1)
natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a corporation); and (3) such quasiartificial persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue.” Georgia
Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert County, 258 Ga. 317, 318, 368 S.E.2d 500,
502 (1988) (quotation omitted). A police department does not fall into any of
6
these categories, and therefore is not capable of being sued. Dean v. Barber,
951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Sheriff’s departments and police
departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit.”); Presnell v.
Paulding County, 454 F.App’x 763, 768 (11th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, all claims
against the Moultrie Police Department are dismissed.
B.
Title VII Discrimination Claim
To make a prima facie case for Title VII race discrimination, Plaintiff must
show (1) that he is a member of a protected class, (2) that he suffered an
adverse employment action; (3) that the employer treated similarly situated
employees outside his classification more favorably, and (4) that he was qualified
for the position. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 (11th Cir. 1997). The City
does not dispute that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class, that he suffered
an adverse employment action, or that he was qualified for his job. The City does
dispute that Plaintiff was subjected to disparate treatment.
During his deposition, Plaintiff testified that Travis Stokes, Kizzie Richard,
and Tamika Scott were all treated more favorably than him. In response, the City
contends that none of these individuals are proper comparators for purposes of
establishing a prima facie case.
To determine whether employees are similarly situated for purposes of
establishing a prima facie case, “it is necessary to consider whether the
employees are involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct and are
disciplined in different ways.” Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir.
7
1999). To properly evaluate comparator evidence, “the quantity and quality of the
comparator’s misconduct [must] be nearly identical to prevent courts from
second-guessing employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples with
oranges.” Id.
In McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 2008), the Eleventh Circuit
analyzed a plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim and applied the “nearly
identical” standard for comparators. Id. at 1374. The court adopted this standard
over the objections of the plaintiff, who argued for a “similar” standard for
comparators. In adopting the stricter “nearly identical” standard, the Eleventh
Circuit recognized the difficulty faced by the plaintiff in meeting the standard, but
stated that “we are bound by precedent to adhere to the ‘nearly identical
standard.’” Id. at 1374 n. 4. Thus, the “nearly identical” standard applies in the
present case.
All three of the purported comparators are African-American. Plaintiff
testified, based mainly on hearsay and rumors, that Ms. Scott was involved in
two domestic disturbances, that Ms. Richard committed perjury on two
occasions, and that Mr. Stokes was part of a motorcycle gang that was involved
in a disturbance and also fled from a Georgia State Patrol officer while riding a
motorcycle. Plaintiff believed that these officers were not punished for any of this
alleged conduct.
As correctly pointed out by the City, none of the alleged incidents involving
Mr. Stokes, Ms. Richard, or Ms. Scott involved participating in an offensive, race8
based “joke” while on duty at the police station. The other three officers’
misconduct is in no way nearly identical to Plaintiff’s misconduct. In fact, the
proper comparator, Ms. Borders, was treated in exactly the same manner as
Plaintiff, in that she was also given one day of Decision Making Leave.
In the Eleventh Circuit, “[i]f a plaintiff fails to show the existence of a
similarly situated employee, summary judgment is appropriate where no other
evidence of discrimination is present.” Coar v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 372 F.App’x
1, 3 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079,
1092 (11th Cir. 2004)). Here, Plaintiff has shown no other evidence of
discrimination. Therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment on the Title VII
claim is granted.
C.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claim
As the Moultrie Police Department has been dismissed from the case,
Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim remains against the City of Moultrie alone. The City
argues that Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim should be dismissed because such claims
must be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as § 1983 provides the exclusive
remedy against state actors for violations of the rights contained in § 1981, and
Plaintiff did not assert a § 1983 claim in his complaint.
The Court agrees with the City that Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim fails as a matter
of law. See Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 892-95 (11th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that a claimant cannot proceed with a cause of action against a state
actor based solely on § 1981); Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1273 n. 3
9
(11th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff cannot bring an independent claim under § 1981
against the City. Thus, the City is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 14) is granted.
SO ORDERED, this the 7th day of March, 2014.
s/ Hugh Lawson_______________
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
mbh
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?