GUIDEONE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. DANIEL et al

Filing 6

ORDER allowing Plaintiff until 10/4/2013 in which to file an amendment correcting deficiencies. Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 9/25/2013. (nbp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
GUIDEONE MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 7:13-CV-126 (HL)
v.
TIMOTHY J. DANIEL II,
HEATHER J. DANIEL, and
JODI E. DARSEY,
Defendants.
ORDER
On September 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed this matter in the Valdosta Division of
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, alleging diversity
as the basis for federal jurisdiction. Because federal courts have only limited
jurisdiction, part of the Court’s initial review process requires the Court to determine
whether a proper jurisdictional basis exists in each case. Thus, when a plaintiff files
a claim in federal court it is generally the plaintiff’s burden to allege the specific facts
necessary to establish jurisdiction. Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255,
1273 (11th Cir. 2000).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity jurisdiction requires the legal matter to
exceed the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and be between
citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

An action for declaratory relief, such as this case, must independently satisfy
federal subject matter jurisdiction requirements; the Declaratory Judgment Act does
not create an independent basis for jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)
(authorizing district courts to grant declaratory relief in “a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction”); Borden v. Katzman, 881 F.2d 1035, 1037 (11th Cir. 1989).
Thus, in order for Plaintiff to maintain its action for declaratory judgment in this Court,
it must still satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites for filing an action in the federal
district courts.
Plaintiff alleges that jurisdiction is proper in this Court because there is
diversity of citizenship of the parties and the amount in controversy is greater than
$75,000. Plaintiff alleges that it is an Iowa corporation, authorized to do business in
the State of Georgia. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Timothy J. Daniel II resides in
Tift County, Georgia; that Defendant Heather J. Daniel resides in Tift County,
Georgia; and that Defendant Jodi E. Darsey resides in Morgan County, Georgia.
For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a corporation is deemed to be a citizen of
any state in which it has been incorporated and the state where it has its one
principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Thus, pursuant to § 1332, a
corporation may be deemed to be a citizen of more than one state. To establish the
citizenship of a domestic corporation, a party must allege both the state of
incorporation and state of the corporation’s principal place of business. In its

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jurisdictional allegations presented in the complaint, Plaintiff failed to identify the
state of its principal place of business.
As for the Defendants, there is no statutory definition of what constitutes a
“citizen” for diversity purposes. Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden, 924 F.2d 729, 730 (7th
Cir. 1991)). Federal courts interpret citizenship under § 1332 as requiring a natural
person to be a United States citizen and be domiciled in a state. See e.g., Las Vistas
Villas, S.A. v. Petersen, 778 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (M.D. Fla. 1991), aff’d, 13 F.3d
409 (11th Cir. 1994). Thus, there are two necessary inquiries regarding citizenship
for diversity jurisdiction: (1) whether the person is a United States citizen, and (2)
whether the person is domiciled in a particular state.
Under the first inquiry, “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. Regarding the second inquiry, domicile - synonymous with “state
citizenship” in diversity jurisprudence - generally requires two elements: (1) physical
presence in a state; and (2) the intent to make the state one’s home. Duff v. Beaty,
804 F. Supp. 332, 334 (N.D. Ga. 1992). A complaint merely alleging residency, as
opposed to state citizenship or domicile, is insufficient to invoke diversity jurisdiction.
Id. Domicile is not always the same as residence, as a person may reside in one
place but be domiciled elsewhere. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30, 48, 109 S. Ct. 1597, 1608 (1989). Therefore, a party must plead
citizenship distinctly and affirmatively. Toms v. Country Quality Meats, Inc., 610 F.2d

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313, 316 (5th Cir. 1980); Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 600 F.2d
15, 16 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Duff, 804 F. Supp. at 334. Plaintiff’s mere allegations
of residency as to Defendants Timothy J. Daniel II, Heather J. Daniel, and Jodi E.
Darsey are insufficient.
As a result of these deficiencies, this Court is unable to ascertain whether
complete diversity of citizenship exists and, therefore, the Complaint fails to satisfy
the prerequisites of subject matter jurisdiction. However, the Court is of the opinion
that Plaintiff should be allowed to amend to correct the deficiencies noted.
Accordingly, Plaintiff shall have until October 4, 2013 in which to file an amendment
that conforms to the findings of this Order. Failure to plead the necessary
jurisdictional prerequisites in a timely manner will result in dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED, this the 25th day of September, 2013.

s/ Hugh Lawson
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE

mbh

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