HORTON v. ENIGMA GEORGIA et al

Filing 153

ORDER finding as moot 91 Motion to Exclude Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert; granting 98 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 99 Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's federal law claims and dismissing Plaintiff's state law claims without prejudice. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE HUGH LAWSON on 6/1/2016. (aks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION

DARRELL HORTON,
as Temporary Administrator of the
Estate
of
MATTHEW
DEAN
HORTON,
Civil Action No. 7:14-CV-00031-HL
Plaintiff,
v.
BERRIEN COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
HIEDI MANCIL and
ANTHONY MANCIL,
Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 7:14-CV-00121-HL

v.
BERRIEN COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
MATTHEW TERRY PRESCOTT,
Individually and as Temporary
Administrator of the Estate of
KELLY MARIE PRESCOTT,
Plaintiff,
v.
BERRIEN COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 7:14-CV-00029-HL

KIMBERLY MICHELLE SUMMEY,
Mother and Natural Guardian of the
Minor Children, MBH and SMH,
Civil Action No. 7:14-CV-00148-HL
Plaintiff,
v.
BERRIEN COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
These cases are before the Court on the Motions to Exclude Opinions of
Thomas Barker, filed by Defendants Berrien County, Walter M. Kegley, Jr., and
Anthony W. Heath; Motions for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants Berrien
County, Walter M. Kegley, Jr., and Anthony W. Heath; and Motions for Summary
Judgment, filed by Defendants Tift County, Floyd Cospelich, David E.
Scarborough, and Robert Brannen.
For the reasons set forth below, the Motions for Summary Judgement are
GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
state law claims, and they are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Motions to Exclude Opinions of Thomas Barker are DENIED as moot.

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The

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a police pursuit of a fleeing suspect, Israel Timothy

Rutland (“Rutland”), which ended in an accident involving Plaintiffs and their
decedents on November 12, 2013. (BCDSOMF ¶¶ 2, 20).1
A.

Israel Timothy Rutland

Rutland was a criminal known to the Tift County Sheriff’s Office with an
extensive history of traffic violations, substance abuse, and running from law
enforcement. (TCDSOMF ¶¶ 2–4).2 In the eight days leading up to the collision
at issue in this litigation, Rutland was convicted of DUI (TCDSOMF ¶ 3), fled
police pursuit on three occasions (TCDSOMF ¶¶ 24, 61, 74), and had warrants
issued for his arrest for Felony Aggravated Assault upon a Law Enforcement
Officer and Felony Fleeing/Eluding a Police Officer (TCDSOMF ¶ 64). In addition
to the three pursuits in the days preceding the collision, Rutland fled police in
June of 2004 and May of 2013. (TCDSOMF ¶¶ 6, 13). Rutland was driving with
a suspended license at the time of this accident. (TCDSOMF ¶ 2).
B.

Tift County Defendants’ Involvement

On November 12, 2013, Tift County law enforcement began actively
searching for Rutland in an effort to arrest him on the outstanding warrants.
(TCDSOMF ¶ 66). After a failed pursuit earlier in the day (TCDSOMF ¶¶ 69, 74),

1

“BCDSOMF” refers to the Berrien County Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts. The facts cited are those admitted by Plaintiffs.
2
“TCDSOMF” refers to the Tift County Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts. The facts cited are those admitted by Plaintiffs.
3

Lieutenant Floyd Cospelich (“Cospelich”) spotted Rutland and began to follow
him without activating his lights and siren (TCDSOMF ¶ 86). Cospelich notified
Colonel Robert Brannen (“Brannen”), who instructed Cospelich to keep Rutland
in sight until more units could get to the area. (TCDSOMF ¶ 85). When Brannen
neared the vicinity where Cospelich was continuing to follow Rutland, he
instructed Cospelich to “go ahead and try to stop Rutland because [they] were
getting close to Enigma city limits.” ((TCDSOMF ¶ 92 (internal citation omitted)).
At that point, Cospelich activated his lights and siren. (TCDSOMF ¶ 93). Instead
of stopping, Rutland accelerated. (TCDSOMF ¶ 93). Cospelich and other Tift
County law enforcement officers pursued Rutland through the city of Enigma
twice, and eventually onto Enigma-Nashville Road, heading towards the city of
Nashville. (TCDSOMF ¶¶ 94–95, 97).
C.

Berrien County Defendants’ Involvement

As the pursuit neared Berrien County, the Tift County Sheriff’s Office
contacted the Berrien County Sheriff’s Department through dispatchers and
asked for Berrien County’s assistance.

(BCDSOMF ¶ 3).

The Tift County

dispatcher advised the Berrien County dispatcher that Tift County law
enforcement officers “[were] trying to catch up with a vehicle because they [had]
outstanding warrants on [Rutland] for assault on a peace officer.” (BCDSOMF ¶
4).
In response to the Tift County Sheriff’s Office’s request for assistance,
Lieutenant Walter Kegley (“Kegley”), of the Berrien County Sheriff’s Department,
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attempted to locate Rutland based on radio communication. (BCDSOMF ¶¶ 9–
10). As Kegley drove south on Nashville-Enigma Road, he observed Rutland
quickly approaching from behind, followed by several law enforcement vehicles.
(BCDSOMF ¶ 11). Rutland passed the unmarked pickup truck that Kegley was
driving, and the officers pursuing Rutland slowed to allow Kegley to proceed in
front of them. (BCDSOMF ¶¶ 12, 14). Kegley accelerated to assist in the pursuit
and followed Rutland for 45 seconds prior to the collision. (BCDSOMF ¶¶ 15,
22). During his pursuit, Kegley did not gain any ground on Rutland. (BCDSOMF
¶ 16).
D.

Accident Involving Plaintiffs and Their Decedents

As the pursuit approached the intersection of Nashville-Enigma Road and
Tifton Road, Kegley reduced his speed. (TCDSOMF ¶ 111; BCDSOMF ¶ 18).
Rutland, almost half a mile ahead of Kegley and the other pursuing officers
(BCDSOMF ¶ 21), ran the stop sign at the intersection and “violently struck” the
Chevrolet Trail Blazer occupied by Plaintiffs and their decedents (BCDSOMF ¶
112).

As a result of the collision, Matthew Horton and Kelly Prescott were

ejected and killed. (TCDSOMF ¶ 113). Hiedi Mancil survived the collision but
suffered severe injuries.

(TCDSOMF ¶ 113).

On the date of the accident,

Defendant David E. Scarborough (“Scarborough”) was the Sheriff of Tift County
and Defendant Anthony W. Heath (“Heath”) was the Sheriff of Berrien County.

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II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is required where “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.”

FindWhat Investor Grp. v.

FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute over such a fact is
“genuine” if the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Id. In making this determination, the court must view all of
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draw all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Johnson v. Booker T. Washington
Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir. 2000). But, the court is bound
only to draw those inferences which are reasonable. “Where the record taken as
a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,
there is no genuine issue for trial.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646
(11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50
(citations omitted).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To satisfy this burden, the movant must show
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the court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case. Id. at 325. Where the moving party makes such a showing, the burden
shifts to the non-movant, who must go beyond the pleadings, and present
affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact does exist.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
III.

ANALYSIS
The various complaints and amended complaints filed by Plaintiffs in these

actions allege both federal law claims, arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state
law claims, arising under Georgia law.
A.

Federal Law Claims
1.

Claims against Defendants Kegley, Cospelich and Brannen

Defendants Kegley, Cospelich, and Brannen personally participated in the
pursuit of Rutland on November 13, 2012. Plaintiffs allege that their personal
involvement in the pursuit shows a conscience-shocking reckless disregard of
proper law enforcement procedures, constituting a violation of Plaintiffs’ and
Plaintiffs’ decedents’ substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a result, Plaintiffs allege that these Defendants are liable under
§ 1983. In response, Defendants argue that Kegley, Cospelich, and Brannen are
entitled to qualified immunity. The Court agrees.
“[Q]ualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials
sued in their individual capacities as long as their conduct violates no clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
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have known.” Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 904 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Qualified immunity protects officers acting within the
scope of their discretionary authority at the time of their allegedly wrongful act.
McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009). If the officer was
acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to show that a reasonable officer would have known that he was violating
the plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory rights. Id.
A defendant acts within his discretionary authority when “his actions were
undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties and within the scope of his
authority.”

Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Courts “ask whether the government employee was
(a) performing a legitimate job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related
goal), (b) through means that were within his power to utilize.” Holloman ex rel.
Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs do not
dispute that Defendants Kegley, Cospelich, and Brannen were acting within their
discretionary authority at the time they were pursuing Rutland. (See Plaintiffs’
Response to Berrien County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 9–
10; Plaintiffs’ Response to Tift County Defendants’ Motions for Summary
Judgment, pp. 9–10).
Because these Defendants were acting within their discretionary authority,
Plaintiffs have the burden to show: (1) that these Defendants engaged in conduct
that violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) that their
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conduct was prohibited by clearly established law.

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134

S.Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014). The United States Supreme Court has held that, when
a law enforcement officer is charged with violating the Fourteenth Amendment by
causing death “in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a
suspected offender . . . only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate
object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the
conscience, necessary for a due process violation.” County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998) (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged, and there is no evidence to show, that
Defendants Kegley, Cospelich, or Brannen had a purpose to cause harm to
anyone, including Rutland, Plaintiffs, or their decedents, outside the legitimate
object of Rutland’s arrest.

Rather, Plaintiffs allege that these Defendants

engaged in conduct that shows a “reckless disregard of proper law enforcement
procedures,” which “shocks the conscience.” While the Supreme Court left open
the possibility that some forms of deliberate indifference might rise to the level of
“conscience shocking,” that is not the case for the circumstances presented here.
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849.

The Supreme Court was clear that the “deliberate

indifference” standard applies only when actual deliberation is practical. Id. at
851. Deliberation is not practical when law enforcement is deciding whether to
pursue a suspected criminal:
A police officer deciding whether to give chase must balance on one
hand the need to stop a suspect and show that flight from the law is
no way to freedom, and, on the other, the high-speed threat to all
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those within stopping range, be they suspects, their passengers,
other drivers, or bystanders. To recognize a substantive due
process violation in these circumstances . . . would be to forget that
liability for deliberate indifference to inmate welfare rests upon the
luxury enjoyed by prison officials of having time to make unhurried
judgments, upon the chance for repeated reflection, largely
uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations . . . . [W]hen
unforeseen circumstances demand an officer’s instant judgment,
even precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to harmful
purpose to spark the shock that implicates “the large concerns of the
governors and the governed.”
Id. at 853.
Unlike prison officials, Defendants Kegley, Cospelich, and Brannen were
all faced with circumstances “calling for fast action,” which did not allow for time
to make unhurried judgments, or the opportunity to reflect repeatedly on their
decision to pursue Rutland. Id. at 853. As a result, the standard for Fourteenth
Amendment liability under § 1983 is a purpose to cause harm. Because Plaintiffs
have not alleged, and there is no evidence to show, that these Defendants acted
with a purpose to cause harm to anyone, they cannot meet their burden to prove
that these Defendants engaged in conduct that violated Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiffs’
decedents’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, Defendants
Kegley, Cospelich, and Brannen are entitled to qualified immunity. Summary
judgment is granted with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Defendants
Kegley, Cospelich, and Brannen.
2.

Claims against Defendants Heath and Scarborough

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Heath and Scarborough, as Sheriffs of
their respective counties, are liable in their individual capacities under § 1983 for
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the violations to Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiffs’ decedents’ constitutional rights.
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that these Defendants (1) implemented policies
and/or customs that led to the violation of rights, and (2) failed to train their
deputies, leading to the violation of rights. “Supervisory officials are not liable
under section 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”
Hardin v. Hayes, 957 F.2d 845, 849 (11th Cir. 1992). “They may, however, be
liable under section 1983 when there is a causal connection between actions of
the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Belcher v. City
of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1396–97 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Where, as here, there is no underlying constitutional violation, supervisory
officials cannot be held liable under § 1983. See Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588
F.3d 1291, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that “claims under a theory of
supervisory liability fail [if] the underlying § 1983 claims fail”). Here, the Court
has held that Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiffs’ decedents’ constitutional rights were not
violated, because the law enforcement officials who were personally involved in
Rutland’s pursuit are entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot
state a claim for supervisory liability against Defendants Heath and Scarborough.
Summary judgment is granted with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against
Defendants Heath and Scarborough.

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3.

Claims Against Berrien County and Tift County

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Berrien County and Tift County (1) failed
to implement a proper policy or custom governing high speed pursuits and (2)
failed to “properly and adequately train” law enforcement officers. These failures
resulted in alleged violations of the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs and their
decedents. Thus, Plaintiffs contend that the counties are liable under § 1983.
A county may not be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A county is
liable only for acts for which it is responsible. Turquitt v. Jefferson County, 137
F.3d 1285, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The Eleventh Circuit has held that a
county is not liable “for the actions of a sheriff over whom it had no supervisory or
administrative control.” Id. at 1292. Indeed, there is no cause of action against
local governments under § 1983 for acts of those whom the local government
has no authority to control. Id.
Berrien County and Tift County have no authority over the sheriffs of their
counties or the sheriffs’ deputies. See Grech v. Clayton County, Georgia, 335
F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“In Georgia, a county has no
authority and control over the sheriff’s law enforcement function”). There is no
evidence that policies, customs, or practices of Berrien or Tift County resulted in
the alleged violations of Plaintiffs’ or Plaintiffs’ decedents’ constitutional rights.
Thus, these counties cannot be held liable under § 1983 for any defective
training or policies regarding the sheriff or deputies, or for any of their actions.
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Accordingly, summary judgment is granted with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983
claims against Defendants Berrien County and Tift County.
B.

State Law Claims

Plaintiffs initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal claim
over which this Court has original subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
In their complaints and amended complaints, Plaintiffs also assert state law
negligence claims.

While the Court maintains the authority to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims, the Court may decline to
do so where the claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction have been
dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d
1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (encouraging district courts to dismiss any remaining
state claims when federal claims are dismissed prior to trial).

As explained

above, Plaintiffs’ claims under § 1983, the sole claims over which the Court may
exercise original jurisdiction, are dismissed. The Court elects not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Therefore, those
claims are dismissed without prejudice.
C.

Motion to Exclude

In light of the above rulings, no claims remain pending before this Court.
Accordingly, the Motions to Exclude Testimony of Thomas Barker, filed by
Defendants Berrien County, Walter M. Kegley, Jr., and Anthony W. Heath, are
denied as moot.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
A.

DARRELL HORTON, as Temporary Administrator of the Estate
of MATTHEW DEAN HORTON, Plaintiff, v. BERRIEN COUNTY, et
al., Defendants (Civil Action No. 7:14-CV-00031-HL)

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants Berrien County, Anthony W. Heath, and Walter M. Kegley, Jr. (Doc.
98) is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s federal law claims. The Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Robert Brannen, Jr., Floyd Cospelich,
David E. Scarborough, and Tift County (Doc. 99) is GRANTED with respect to
Plaintiff’s federal law claims. The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims, which are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The
Motion to Exclude Opinions of Thomas Barker filed by Berrien County, Anthony
W. Heath, and Walter M. Kegley, Jr. (Doc. 91) is DENIED as moot.
B.

HIEDI MANCIL and ANTHONY MANCIL, Plaintiffs, v. BERRIEN
COUNTY, et al., Defendants (Civil Action No. 7:14-CV-00121-HL)

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants Berrien County, Anthony W. Heath, and Walter M. Kegley, Jr. (Doc.
74) is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ federal law claims. The Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Robert Brannen, Jr., Floyd Cospelich,
David E. Scarborough, and Tift County (Doc. 75) is GRANTED with respect to
Plaintiffs’ federal law claims. The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ state law claims, which are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The

14

Motion to Exclude Opinions of Thomas Barker filed by Berrien County, Anthony
W. Heath, and Walter M. Kegley, Jr. (Doc. 67) is DENIED as moot.
C.

MATTHEW TERRY PRESCOTT, Individually and as Temporary
Administrator of the Estate of KELLY MARIE PRESCOTT,
Plaintiff, v. BERRIEN COUNTY, et al., Defendants (Civil Action
Number 7:14-CV-00029-HL)

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants Berrien County, Anthony W. Heath, and Walter M. Kegley, Jr. (Doc.
103) is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s federal law claims. The Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Robert Brannen, Jr., Floyd Cospelich,
David E. Scarborough, and Tift County (Doc. 104) is GRANTED with respect to
Plaintiff’s federal law claims. The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims, which are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The
Motion to Exclude Opinions of Thomas Barker filed by Berrien County, Anthony
W. Heath, and Walter M. Kegley, Jr. (Doc. 96) is DENIED as moot.
D.

KIMBERLY MICHELLE SUMMEY, Mother and Natural Guardian
of the Minor Children, MBH and SMH, Plaintiff, v. BERRIEN
COUNTY, et al., Defendants (Civil Action Number 7:14-CV00148-HL)

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants Berrien County, Anthony W. Heath, and Walter M. Kegley, Jr. (Doc.
62) is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s federal law claims. The Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Robert Brannen, Jr., Floyd Cospelich,
David E. Scarborough, and Tift County (Doc. 63) is GRANTED with respect to
Plaintiff’s federal law claims. The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over
15

Plaintiff’s state law claims, which are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The
Motion to Exclude Opinions of Thomas Barker filed by Berrien County, Anthony
W. Heath, and Walter M. Kegley, Jr. (Doc. 57) is DENIED as moot.

SO ORDERED, this the 1st day of June, 2016.
/s/ Hugh Lawson_________________
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
les

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