STEWART v. MOSES et al

Filing 14

ORDER granting 6 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Ordered by U.S. District Judge HUGH LAWSON on 7/2/2014. (nbp) ***

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION

WILLIAM STEWART,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 7:14-CV-34 (HL)

v.
MICHAEL MOSES and
CHAD WYNN,
Defendants.

ORDER
This case is before the Court on Defendants’ joint Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings. (Doc. 6). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ motion.
I.

BACKGROUND
On February 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint for Damages in the

Superior Court of Colquitt County, Georgia against Michael Moses and Chad
Wynn, officers employed by the Georgia Department of Public Safety. (Doc 1-1,
pp. 1-2). Plaintiff alleged that Defendants subjected him to “excessive
unreasonable and negligent force” during the course of a traffic stop and ensuing
arrest. Plaintiff made a $5,000.00 demand for medical expenses and lost wages
and a $1,000,000.00 claim for punitive damages.

Defendants removed the case to this Court on March 12, 2014. (Doc. 1).
Then, on April 11, 2014, Defendants’ filed their Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings. (Doc. 6). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court notified
Plaintiff about the pending motion and the possible consequences if he failed to
respond. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff’s mother filed a response to the motion on his behalf
on May 1, 2014. (Doc. 10). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1654, a party may represent
himself personally in any proceeding in the courts of the United States; however,
Plaintiff’s non-attorney mother, even acting as an agent under a valid power of
attorney, lacks the authority to represent Plaintiff. See Jacox v. DOD, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1871 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 10, 2007). “The existence of a power of attorney
does not authorize a nonlawyer to undertake to conduct legal proceedings on
behalf of a pro se litigant where the law otherwise requires that such proceedings
be conducted by a licensed attorney.” Id. at * 4. Accordingly, the Court must
strike Plaintiff’s response.
Defendants questioned Plaintiff’s mother’s right to represent Plaintiff in
their reply brief. (Doc. 11). On May 29, 2014, Plaintiff’s mother attempted to
remedy this issue by filing a rebuttal response signed by Plaintiff. (Doc. 12).
While Plaintiff’s signature appears on the document, it is clear from the pleading
that Plaintiff’s mother again prepared and filed the response with the explanation
that Plaintiff is “mentally unable to comprehend.” Even if Plaintiff prepared the
brief on his own accord, Local Rule 7.3.1(b) provides that the Court does not
2

favor sur-reply briefs. “A party desiring to file a sur-reply brief must move in
writing for permission to do so within fourteen (14) days of the filing of the brief to
which reply is desired.” M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.3.1(c). Plaintiff failed to move the Court
in a proper manner for leave to file his sur-reply, and the Court shall not consider
the contents of Plaintiff’s brief.
II.

FACTS
On February 10, 2012, Defendants Moses and Wynn stopped a vehicle

operated by Plaintiff. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 3). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “used
excessive unreasonable and negligent force upon the Plaintiff.” (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 3).
According to Plaintiff, in the course of placing him under arrest, Defendants hit
him in the head and face with their fists. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 7). Defendant Moses hit
Plaintiff with handcuffs. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 7). Plaintiff asserts that he was not resisting
arrest and that Defendants’ actions constituted an illegal and willful assault. (Doc.
1-1, ¶ 7).
As a result of Defendant’s actions, Plaintiff claims he suffered “facial
disfigurements, brain damage, vision damage, and eye damage” and that these
injuries are permanent. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 8, 9, 14). He alleges that the attack upon
his person violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that he is entitled to recover
both general and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 5, 1013). Plaintiff also asserts state law claims for negligence. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 3-4, 12).
Defendants jointly move for judgment on the pleadings.
3

II.

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS STANDARD
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is “‘appropriate only when the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him
to relief.” Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Moore
v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1213 (11th Cir. 2001). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In relation to a claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations that a person acting under color
of state law deprived him of a constitutionally protected right or privilege. Hale v.
Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). Where a litigant fails to
satisfy these requirements or to provide factual support for his claims, then the
complaint is subject to dismissal. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007).
The court must accept “all well-pleaded facts . . . as true, and the
reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271,1273 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1999).
While the court holds pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than
pleadings prepared by an attorney, see Salas v. Pierce, 297 Fed. Appx. 874, 875
(11th Cir. 2008), the court must dismiss the complaint if, “on the basis of a
dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the
4

cause of action.” Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992
F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 992
F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1991) and Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Heck v. Humphrey

Defendants move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims as barred by the
U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In
Heck, the Supreme Court held that
when a [plaintiff] seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district
court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence; if it would, then the complaint must be dismissed
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or
sentence has already been invalidated.
Id. at 487. Thus, when considering whether a § 1983 claim is Heck-barred, the
Court “must determine whether a plaintiff’s factual allegations, if proven, would
necessarily undermine the validity of the plaintiff’s conviction.” Shaw v. Terrill,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61960, at *8 (N.D. Fla. March 20, 2014). Heck will only bar
a § 1983 lawsuit where success on the merits would logically contradict the
underlying conviction. Dyer v. Lee, 488 F.3d 876, 884 (11th Cir. 2007).

5

Plaintiff here pleaded guilty to a variety a charges stemming from the
February 10, 2014 traffic stop, including obstruction of a law enforcement officer. 1
(Doc. 6-2, pp. 3-7, 13). An individual commits the crime of obstruction when he
“knowingly and wilfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer in the
lawful discharge of his official duties.” O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. Plaintiff does not
deny the guilty plea. However, Plaintiff now claims that he “was not resisting
Defendants’ attempts to arrest him” and that Defendants violated his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force in the course of his
arrest. (Doc. 1-1, p. 5).
The Eleventh Circuit has allowed § 1983 suits for claims of excessive use
of force where the allegations “did not necessarily imply the invalidity of the
underlying convictions.” Salas, 297 Fed. Appx. At 876 (citing to Dyer, 488 F.3d at
881-82). As explained in Dyer, to per se bar any § 1983 claim for excessive force
any time the plaintiff is convicted of obstruction or resisting arrest would in effect
mean that “once a person resists law enforcement, he has invited the police to
inflict any reaction or retribution they choose, while forfeiting the right to sue for
damages. . . . This would open the door to undesirable behavior and gut a large
share of the protections provided by § 1983.” 488 F.3d at 884 (quoting VanGilder
v. Baker, 435 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 2006)). Still, in order to remain in line with

1

A court may take judicial notice of another court order for the purpose of
recognizing the judicial action taken. Olmstead v. Humana, Inc., 154 Fed. Appx.
800, 803 n. 3 (11th Cir. 2005).
6

the intended import of Heck, any allegations of use of excessive force cannot
negate the underlying obstruction conviction. See id. at 881-83.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 must fail under Heck because to substantiate his
allegations that he did not resist arrest and that Defendants subjected him to
unreasonable force would directly contradict his conviction for obstruction. See
Hayward v. Kile, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59472 (S.D. Ga. July 13, 2009) (Section
1983 claim for excessive force Heck-barred where the plaintiff, who was
convicted of obstruction, alleged that he did not resist arrest and that the force
used by arresting officers was unreasonable). One of the elements of O.C.G.A.
§ 16-10-24 is the lawful discharge of the law enforcement officer’s official duties.
Plaintiff’s theory that he did not resist arrest and that Defendants unlawfully
attacked him without provocation collaterally attacks his conviction for obstruction
in violation of Heck. Plaintiff “voluntarily steered the action into Heck territory by
making specific allegations in the complaint that were inconsistent with the facts
upon which his criminal conviction was based.” Id. at *3 (internal citations and
punctuation omitted). The Court accordingly holds that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
are Heck-barred and must be dismissed.
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are Heck-barred, the
Court need not reach the merits of Defendants’ remaining arguments in
opposition to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

7

B.

State Law Claims

Plaintiff initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal claim
over which this Court has original subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In
his complaint, Plaintiff additionally asserts state law negligence claims. While the
Court maintains the authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related
state law claims, the Court may decline to do so where the claims over which the
Court has original jurisdiction have been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see
also Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004)
(encouraging district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when federal
claims are dismissed prior to trial). As explained above, Plaintiff’s claims under
§ 1983, the sole claims over which the Court may exercise original jurisdiction,
are dismissed as Heck-barred. The Court elects not to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Therefore, those claims are
dismissed without prejudice.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings (Doc. 6) is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in
favor of Defendants and to close this case.
SO ORDERED, this 2nd day of July, 2014.
s/ Hugh Lawson_______________
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
aks
8