WOODRUFF v. LUKE

Filing 5

ORDER dismissing without prejudice 1 application for federal habeas corpus relief for failure to exhaust; finding as moot 4 Motion to Amend. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE HUGH LAWSON on 10/30/2015. (aks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION

JOHN MICHAELWOODRUFF,
Petitioner
VS.
JOSHUA LUKE,
Respondent.
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CIVIL NO. 7:15-CV-0184-HL-TQL

ORDER
Petitioner John Michael Woodruff has filed an application for federal habeas corpus
relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, to challenge his July 21, 2015, conviction in the
Superior Court of Lowndes County, Georgia. Under the rules governing habeas corpus
actions, district courts are required to examine every application filed and thereafter enter a
summary dismissal if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition that the petitioner is
not entitled to relief in the district court.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4; McFarland v. Scott,
512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Upon review, it is plain on the face
of the present application that Petitioner is not now entitled to relief in this Court.
“The federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court, limits the power of a federal court to grant a writ of habeas
corpus vacating the conviction of a state prisoner . . . .” Hardy v. Commisioner, Ala. Dept.

of Corr., 684 F.3d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, -- U.S. --, 131
S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c)). One of those limitations is that a
district court “may not grant such applications unless . . . the applicant has exhausted state
remedies.” Cullen, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. A state prisoner is thus required (with few
exceptions) to “exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will
entertain his petition for habeas corpus.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971).
“A failure to exhaust occurs . . . when a petitioner has not ‘fairly presented’ every
issue raised in his federal petition to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on
collateral review.” Pope v. Secretary for Dept. of Corr. 680 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir.
2012) (internal alterations omitted); Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 2010)
(per curiam). The exhaustion requirement thus reflects a policy of comity between state
and federal courts. Picard, 404 U.S. at 274. It is “an accommodation of our federal
system designed to give the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged
violations of its prisoners' federal rights.” Id. “If a petitioner fails to exhaust his state
remedies, a district court must dismiss the petition without prejudice to allow for such
exhaustion.” Gore v. Crews, 720 F.3d 811, 815 (11th Cir. 2013).
The present application was filed only two months after Petitioner’s conviction and
less than twenty days after his sentencing. Plaintiff also states that he has not yet filed an
appeal and is still awaiting the state court’s ruling on his motions for new trial. See
Petition (ECF No. 1) at 1, 3-4. Lack of exhaustion is therefore plain on the face of
Petitioner’s application. See id. Because this failure to exhaust cannot be cured by
amendment, Petitioner’s application must be DISMISSED without prejudice.

Once

Petitioner has afforded the State a full opportunity to review his grounds for relief, he may
return to federal court, if necessary.
Petitioner has no absolute entitlement to appeal this dismissal.

28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(1). Before he may appeal, the Court must first issue a certificate of appealability
(“COA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); 28 U.S.C. §2254, Rule 11(a). When, as here, “the
district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
prisoner's underlying constitutional claim,” a COA will not be issued unless the prisoner
can show, at least, “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states
a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”

Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Because it is clear on the face of this application
that Petitioner failed to exhaust available state judicial remedies before filing his petition in
federal court, reasonable jurists could not find that a dismissal of the instant action was
debatable or wrong.

Petitioner is accordingly DENIED a COA. See Alexander v.

Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) (approving denial of COA before movant filed
a notice of appeal).
Leave proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED in this action only for the purpose
of dismissal. Petitioner’s Motion to Amend (ECF No. 4) is MOOT.
SO ORDERED, this 30th day of October, 2015.
s/ Hugh Lawson
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE