MCLEOD v. INGRAM et al

Filing 62

ORDER denying 58 Motion for Reconsideration. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE HUGH LAWSON on 11/26/2018. (aks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION

RICHARD JERRY MCLEOD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 7:16-CV-185

BILLY INGRAM, ET AL.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. (Doc. 58). For the
reasons set out below, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Jerry McLeod filed a pro se Complaint in this Court on October 11,

2016. (Doc. 1). Defendants timely submitted their Scheduling and Discovery Order
on February 2, 2018. (Doc. 51). Plaintiff did not join in that filing or file a separate
report or plan, nor did he file initial disclosures. As a result, the Court scheduled a
status conference for May 9, 2018 in Valdosta, Georgia. Plaintiff failed to appear.
At the hearing, Defendants made an oral motion to dismiss the case for failure to
prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. The Court granted
Defendants’ motion, and the case was subsequently dismissed without prejudice
on May 17, 2018 for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute and failure to comply with the
Court’s order. (Doc. 56). On May 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of the Court’s order dismissing the case. (Doc. 58). Defendants
Williams and Giddes filed a response in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 59),
as did Defendant Hall (Doc. 60). Plaintiff then filed a reply. (Doc. 61). 1
II.

DISCUSSION
Local Rule 7.6 provides that motions for reconsideration shall not be filed as

a matter of routine practice. M.D. Ga. R. 7.6. Generally, such motions will only be
granted if the movant demonstrates that (1) there was an intervening development
or change in controlling law, (2) new evidence has been discovered, or (3) the
court made a clear error of law or fact. Rhodes v. MacDonald, 670 F. Supp. 2d
1363, 1378 (M.D. Ga. 2009). The Court must liberally construe the filings of
McLeod, who is proceeding pro se. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed.” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)).
But even liberally construed, Plaintiff’s motion fails to allege a sufficient basis
for reconsideration. Plaintiff asserts that his inability to participate in discovery was
due to his unlawful arrest on February 23, 2017 following an unlawful search and
seizure of his property by Brooks County law enforcement. Plaintiff further alleges
that he was held without bail for more than two months so that other individuals
acting in concert with the Brooks County Sheriff’s Office could evict Plaintiff from
his property. Plaintiff states that during the search and seizure of his property, “[a]ll

The Court will not consider Plaintiff’s reply (Doc. 61) as Local Rule 7.6 expressly
prohibits the filing of reply briefs to motions for reconsideration.
1

records of the instant case including notes, answers, evidence, photographs, file
cabinets, brief cases containing files, computer records and every scrap of paper
related to this case were confiscated and are presumed destroyed.” (Doc. 58, p.
2). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that his failure to attend the Court’s scheduled
hearing on May 9, 2018 was “mandated by the exigent circumstances created by
the defendants in their bad faith and unlawful actions to prevent him being able to
prosecute his case.” (Id. at p. 4).
Although Plaintiff offers a lengthy recitation of facts and excuses blaming
Brooks County law enforcement and unspecified “defendants” for his inability to
prosecute his case and attend the Court’s hearing, 2 totally absent from Plaintiff’s
motion are any facts that could be construed as a basis for reconsideration. By
Plaintiff’s own admission, the events which prevented him from pursuing his case
occurred in February 2017, well over one year before his obligations to comply
with the Court’s orders. Further, Plaintiff’s recitations are irrelevant to the case at
hand as the facts do not demonstrate an intervening change in law, newly
discovered evidence, or an error of law. The Court’s standard for evaluating
motions for reconsideration do not involve determining the validity of Plaintiff’s
excuses.
Plaintiff also seems to argue that courts should not require pro se plaintiffs
to comply with procedural rules in civil cases. Plaintiff states in his motion that

Plaintiff’s ten-page Motion for Reconsideration is double the length permitted by
Local Rule 7.6. M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.6 (“All briefs are limited to five (5) pages.”).

2

“reprieve from procedural requirements is available to pro se litigants” in civil
cases. (Id. at p. 8). To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to use this argument as a
basis for his motion for reconsideration, that argument fails.
Plaintiff’s argument does not satisfy the first prong required for granting a
motion for reconsideration: that there has been an intervening change in controlling
law. As stated above, the Court liberally construes the pleadings of pro se litigants.
However, the Eleventh Circuit does not take such a lenient standard regarding
procedural rules: “although we are to give liberal construction to the pleadings of
pro se litigants, we nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural
rules.” Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks
omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s argument does not demonstrate a change in controlling
law regarding the requirement that pro se litigants adhere to procedural rules of
the Court.
Additionally, even if the Court were to construe Plaintiff’s statements as an
attempt to utilize the third prong required for granting a motion for reconsideration,
that the Court committed clear error by dismissing his action for failure to comply
with the Court’s orders and procedural requirements, that argument also fails for
the reasons set forth above. It is well-settled that the court’s power to dismiss a
case “is an inherent aspect of its authority to enforce its orders and insure prompt
disposition of lawsuits.” Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985);
see also Wang v. Ga. Highlands Coll., No. 1:12-cv-1280-TWT-GGB, 2013 WL
1180790, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 11, 2013) (recommending dismissal under Rule

41(b) where plaintiff missed a pretrial conference and did not attend her
deposition), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 1180801 (N.D. Ga.
Mar. 20, 2013); Cowe v. Equifax Credit Reporting, No: 1:09-cv-991-TWT, 2010 WL
925288, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 8, 2010) (dismissing case under Rule 41(b) where
plaintiff delayed the case, ignored discovery, refused to attend his deposition, and
showed contempt for the Federal Rules and orders of the court). Contrary to
Plaintiff’s assertions, civil pro se plaintiffs are required to conform to the procedural
rules of this Court. Inherent in the Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s case for failure to
prosecute and failure to comply with the Court’s orders was his failure to adhere
to the procedural rules of the Court. Therefore, it was within the Court’s authority
to dismiss Plaintiff’s case without prejudice. No clear error of law was committed
by the Court and Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate otherwise.
Accordingly, as Plaintiff demonstrates no change in controlling law, newly
discovered evidence not previously available, or clear error of law, his motion is
due to be denied.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc.

59) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 26th day of November, 2018.
/s/ Hugh Lawson_________________
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
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