OWENS v. LOWNDES COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT

Filing 12

ORDER granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; granting 6 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; denying 9 Motion to Appoint Counsel; granting 10 Motion to Amend/Correct; granting 11 Motion to Amend/Correct; dismissing Plaintiff's claims without prejudice. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE HUGH LAWSON on 6/20/2017. (aks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
RODRIQUEZ ANTONIO OWENS,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
VS.
:
:
LOWNDES COUNTY SHERIFF
:
DEPARTMENT,
:
:
Defendant.
:
________________________________ :

NO. 7:17-CV-20-HL-TQL

ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Rodriquez Antonio Owens, who is currently incarcerated at the
Lowndes County Jail in Valdosta, Georgia, has filed a civil rights complaint (ECF No. 1)
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and two motions to amend this complaint (ECF Nos. 10,
11). Plaintiff also seeks to proceed in this action without prepaying the filing fee (ECF
Nos. 2, 6) and also requests appointed counsel (ECF No. 9). Because Plaintiff is a
prisoner “seek[ing] redress from a governmental entity or [an] officer or employee of a
governmental entity,” the Court is required to conduct a preliminary screening of his
claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). After conducting this review, the Court finds that (1)
Plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis; (2) Plaintiff is not entitled to appointed counsel;
and (3) Plaintiff has failed to state a viable claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff’s Complaint is accordingly DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

I.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis
Section 1915 allows the district courts to authorize the commencement of a civil

action without prepayment of the normally-required fees upon a showing that the plaintiff
is indigent and financially unable to pay the filing fee. A prisoner seeking to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”) under this section must provide the district court with both (1) an
affidavit in support of his claim of indigence and (2) a certified copy of his prison “trust
fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the 6-month period immediately
preceding the filing of the complaint.” § 1915(b).
In this case, Plaintiff’s pauper’s affidavit and the account information he was able
to provide show that he is currently unable to prepay the Court’s filing fee. Plaintiff’s
motions to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 2, 6) are thus GRANTED. Plaintiff,
however, is still obligated to pay the full balance of the filing fee, in installments, as set
forth in § 1915(b) and explained below. It is accordingly requested that the CLERK
forward a copy of this ORDER to the business manager of the facility in which Plaintiff
is incarcerated so that withdrawals from his account may commence as payment towards
the filing fee. The district court’s filing fee is not refundable, regardless of the outcome
of the case, and must therefore be paid in full even if the Plaintiff’s Complaint (or any
part thereof) is dismissed prior to service.
A. Directions to Plaintiff’s Custodian
It is hereby ORDERED that the warden of the institution wherein Plaintiff is
incarcerated, or the sheriff of any county wherein he is held in custody, and any successor
custodians, each month cause to be remitted to the Clerk of this Court twenty percent
2

(20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s account at said institution
until the $350.00 filing fee has been paid in full. In accordance with provisions of the
PLRA, Plaintiff’s custodian is hereby authorized to forward payments from the prisoner’s
account to the Clerk of Court each month until the filing fee is paid in full, provided the
amount in the account exceeds $10.00.

It is further ORDERED that collection of

monthly payments from Plaintiff’s trust fund account shall continue until the entire
$350.00 has been collected, notwithstanding the dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit or the
granting of judgment against him prior to the collection of the full filing fee.
B. Plaintiff’s Obligations Upon Release
Pursuant to provisions of the PLRA, in the event Plaintiff is hereafter released
from the custody of the State of Georgia or any county thereof, he shall remain obligated
to pay any balance due on the filing fee in this proceeding until said amount has been
paid in full; Plaintiff shall continue to remit monthly payments as required by the PLRA.
Collection from Plaintiff of any balance due on the filing fee by any means permitted by
law is hereby authorized in the event Plaintiff is released from custody and fails to remit
payments.
II.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointed Counsel
Plaintiff has also filed a motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 9). Under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), the Court “may request an attorney to represent any person unable to
afford counsel.” There is, however, “no absolute constitutional right to the appointment
of counsel” in a § 1983 lawsuit. Poole v. Lambert, 819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987)
(per curiam). Appointment of counsel is a privilege that is justified only by exceptional
3

circumstances. Lopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1982). In deciding whether
legal counsel should be provided, the Court considers, among other factors, the merits of
Plaintiff’s claims and the complexity of the issues presented. Holt v. Ford, 862 F.2d 850,
853 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
In this case, Plaintiff has filed a complaint in a document substantially similar to
the Court’s standard § 1983 form. The Court is required to review the Complaint to
determine whether Plaintiff’s allegations state a colorable legal claim. This process is
routine in pro se prisoner actions and is thus not an “exceptional circumstance” justifying
appointment of counsel. The facts stated in Plaintiff’s Complaint are not complicated,
and the law governing Plaintiff’s claims is neither novel nor complex. Plaintiff’s motion
to appoint counsel (ECF No. 9) is accordingly DENIED.
III.

Preliminary Screening
A. Standard of Review

When conducting preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must
accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107,
1110 (11th Cir. 2006). Pro se pleadings, like the one in this case, are “held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
construed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a
prisoner complaint if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b).

4

A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller
v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court may dismiss claims that are based on “indisputably meritless legal” theories and
“claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level” and cannot “merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally
cognizable right of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (first alteration in original). In
other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for relief under §1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or
omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a
statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting
under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir.
1995).

If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual

allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See
Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003).

5

B. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff’s claims arise from his present imprisonment in the Lowndes County Jail.
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was detained for a warrant in Atlanta. ECF No. 1
at 2. The next day, he was “taken to the prison dorm,” apparently because his children’s
mother provided law enforcement with a statement alleging Plaintiff had committed
crimes. See id. Plaintiff alleges he was “never questioned about the statement,” read his
Miranda rights, booked or fingerprinted, or arraigned for the charges related to the
statement, which include kidnapping, terroristic threats, battery, and criminal trespassing.
Id. Plaintiff alleges that “because of these failures,” he has been falsely imprisoned and
that his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, his right to due
process, and his Miranda and “hearsay rights” have been violated. Plaintiff seeks a
release from prison, “all charges drop[p]ed,” and financial compensation for these alleged
constitutional injuries. Id. at 7. Plaintiff also filed a motion to amend (ECF No. 10) in
which he sought to remove the Lowndes County Sheriff’s Department as a Defendant
and add Lowndes County Sheriff Ashley Paulk and the Lowndes County Board of
Commissioners as Defendants in this case. ECF No. 10 at 1. Plaintiff’s second motion to
amend (ECF No. 11) seeks to add Deputy Coffee, the “arresting officer,” as a Defendant.1
C. Plaintiff’s Claims

1

Plaintiff may amend his Complaint once as a matter of course at this point in the
litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s
motion to amend (ECF No. 10). Because the Court “should freely give leave” to amend
“when justice so requires,” id., the Court will also GRANT Plaintiff’s second motion to
amend (ECF No. 11).
6

Plaintiff’s claims, as pleaded, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted and are therefore subject to dismissal without prejudice. In Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court explained that federal courts must
refrain from intervening with pending state criminal proceedings when the party
requesting federal intervention has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer
irreparable injury. Id. at 53. Younger abstention is thus required where (1) state judicial
proceedings are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve important state interests; and
(3) the state proceedings afford adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional issue.
See, e.g., Newsome v. Broward County Public Defenders, 304 F. App’x 814, 816 (11th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)); see also Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d 1405, 1406 (11th
Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (extending Younger to § 1983 actions for money damages).
In this case, it is evident from Plaintiff’s allegations that his criminal proceedings
are pending, and any decision by this Court with respect to the constitutional issues raised
by Plaintiff would substantially interfere with, and perhaps undermine, the decisions
reached by the state court in the pending criminal proceedings. See Newsome, 304 F.
App’x at 816 (noting that the relevant inquiry with respect to the first Middlesex factor is
“whether the federal proceeding will interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Watson v. Fla. Judicial Qualifications
Com’n, 618 F. App’x 487, 490 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). The pending criminal
proceedings also implicate the state’s important interest in prosecuting those who have
violated its criminal laws.

See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977)
7

(recognizing important state interest in the enforcement of its laws). And Plaintiff has
failed to meet his burden of showing that the state proceeding will not provide him with
an adequate opportunity to raise his claims that he has not been appropriately Mirandized,
arraigned, or that his prosecution is being otherwise mishandled. See Watson, 618 F.
App’x at 490 (noting that federal courts should assume that the state procedures provide
an adequate remedy absent “unambiguous authority” to the contrary).
Further, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that suggest an exception to the
Younger abstention doctrine applies. Younger abstention may not be required where “(1)
there is evidence of state proceedings motivated by bad faith; (2) irreparable injury would
occur; or (3) there is no adequate state forum where the constitutional issues can be
raised.” Hughes v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1263 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff has not shown that his pending state proceedings were motivated by bad faith;
that any special circumstances exist which create a threat of irreparable harm if this Court
fails to intervene in his ongoing criminal prosecution; or that he will be somehow
deprived of an adequate forum where his constitutional challenges can be addressed. The
fact that Plaintiff must endure a state criminal prosecution fails to demonstrate irreparable
harm. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 46.
Claims for injunctive relief are properly dismissed when Younger applies. See
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for

injunctive relief against Defendants must be DISMISSED without prejudice.2 In cases

2

The Court also notes that Plaintiff cannot obtain a dismissal of pending charges or
speedier release through a § 1983 action. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487,
8

where Younger abstention is appropriate and the plaintiff also seeks damages, the
common practice “is for a district court to stay the claims for damages pending the
outcome of the state proceedings, such that they can move forward without interference.”
Boyd v. Farrin, 575 F. App’x 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). This preference for
a stay is applicable only where the complaint “allege[s] injuries under federal law
sufficient to justify the District Court’s retention of jurisdiction.” Deakins v. Monaghan,
484 U.S. 193, 204 (1988). Federal courts have interpreted that limitation to mean that a
stay is not required where the district court determines that the claim for damages is not
cognizable.

Boyd, 575 F. App’x at 519-20 (collecting cases); see also Johnson v.

Walcott, 1:15 CV 0073, 2015 WL 574816, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2015), aff'd (Aug.
13, 2015) (“Although generally the Younger doctrine requires a federal court to stay an
action for damages during the pendency of a state action on the same matter, a court may
dismiss a damage claim, rather than hold it in abeyance, when the plaintiff has failed to
state a viable claim for relief.”).
In this case, Plaintiff’s claims against the named Defendants are not cognizable
under § 1983. Plaintiff has made no specific factual allegations against any of these
Defendants in his Complaint or the amendments thereto. It is therefore unclear what
exactly each of these Defendants did to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. His
claims could be dismissed on these grounds alone. Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316,
489 (1973). “[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges
the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release[.]” Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks dismissal of
the charges against him as a remedy for the constitutional violations he alleges, such
relief is not available in a Section 1983 case.
9

1321-22 (11th Cir. 2008) (dismissal of defendants appropriate where plaintiff failed to
allege facts associating defendants with a particular constitutional violation).
In addition, to the extent Plaintiff believes Defendant Paulk should be liable as the
supervisor of any other Lowndes County employee, such claims fail. Supervisors can
only be held liable under § 1983 if they personally participated in the allegedly
unconstitutional conduct or if there is a causal connection between their actions and the
alleged constitutional violation. See, e.g., Hendrix v. Tucker, 535 F. App’x 803, 805
(11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). A causal connection can be established if the plaintiff
shows
(1) a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice
of the need to correct the alleged deprivation and he fail[ed] to do so; (2)
the supervisor’s improper custom or policy le[d] to deliberate indifference
to constitutional rights; or (3) facts support an inference that the supervisor
directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates
would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.
Id. “The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in her individual capacity for the
actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Paulk personally participated in any decision
regarding Plaintiff, had any customs or policies that could have led to the violation of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, directed any of his subordinates to violate Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, or knew they were doing so, had an opportunity to act, and failed to
stop them.
Likewise, Plaintiff has not alleged that any member of the Lowndes County Board
of Commissioners personally or directly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; nor has
10

Plaintiff alleged a factual basis for holding the Lowndes County Board of Commissioners
liable for the actions of Defendant Paulk or any of his employees.3 “In Georgia, sheriffs
are elected officials who possess final authority over matters of law enforcement.”
Thompson v. Carter, 905 F. Supp. 1073, 1074 (M.D. Ga. 1995). It therefore follows that
a “suit against the sheriff for actions taken by him within his bailiwick does not translate
into suit against the board of commissioners, who operate within an entirely separate
sphere of influence.” Id.; see also Duffey v. Bryant, 950 F. Supp. 1168, 1174 (M.D. Ga.
1997) (“It is well-settled law in Georgia that a county and its commissioners are without
authority of the sheriff or his deputies.”).
Further, even assuming Defendant Coffee was the party who failed to book,
fingerprint, or read Plaintiff his rights, these allegations are insufficient to establish
substantive constitutional violations in this case. First, to the extent Plaintiff challenges
the apparent delay in his arraignment, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Plaintiff
3

Naming the board of commissioners as a Defendant in this lawsuit is not the equivalent
of naming the county itself. See, e.g., Thompson v. Carter, 905 F. Supp. 1073, 1074
(M.D. Ga. 1995). To the extent Plaintiff intended to name the county as a Defendant,
however, Plaintiff’s claims still fail. “A local government may be held liable under §
1983 only for acts for which it is actually responsible, ‘acts which the [local government]
has officially sanctioned or ordered.’” Turquitt v. Jefferson County, 137 F.3d 1285, 1287
(11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986).
Thus, “[a] county’s liability under § 1983 may not be based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior,” or supervisory liability; instead, “a county is liable only when the county’s
‘official policy’ causes a constitutional violation.” Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d
1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). A plaintiff can establish a county’s “policy” in
two ways: “identify either (1) an officially promulgated county policy or (2) an unofficial
custom or practice of the county shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker
for the county.” Id. at 1329-30. Plaintiff has failed to allege that Lowndes County has
any officially promulgated policy or any unofficial custom or practice that could serve as
a moving force behind the constitutional violations he alleges.
11

acknowledges he was initially detained pursuant to a warrant, and he does not challenge
the validity of this warrant, the lawfulness of his arrest, or the detention arising from it.
Plaintiff has therefore failed to show that his liberty rights were violated by any delay in
arraigning him on the charges related to his children’s mother’s statement. See, e.g.,
Robertson v. Price City Police Dep’t, 83 F. App’x 286, 287-88 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding
that because plaintiff who was initially detained for parole revocation was “appropriately
restrained” by this detention, any delays in arraignment on other charges “had no impact
on his liberty” and thus § 1983 claims based on such delay were frivolous).
Similarly, to the extent Plaintiff contends Defendants failed to provide him
Miranda warnings, the Eleventh Circuit has held that an allegation that law enforcement
officers “failed to follow Miranda procedures [is] insufficient to assert that the officers
violated [a plaintiff’s] substantive constitutional rights.” Parris v. Taft, 630 F. App’x
895, 901 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).

And it is altogether unclear how Plaintiff

believes that Defendants’ failure to “book” him or take his fingerprints violates his
constitutional rights, particularly given that Plaintiff does not challenge the lawfulness of
his original detention.
In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. Plaintiff’s damages claims against Defendants are therefore subject to
dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and thus the Court finds that a stay of those
claims, as generally required under Younger, would be futile. Outright dismissal of
Plaintiff’s Complaint is therefore permissible under Younger. See, e.g., Christman v.
Crist, 315 F. App’x 231, 232 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (affirming sua sponte
12

dismissal of § 1983 complaint where all three Younger requirements were met).
Plaintiff’s claims shall therefore be DISMISSED without prejudice.
IV.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motions for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2, 6) and his motions to amend (ECF Nos. 10, 11)
but DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for appointed counsel (ECF No. 9). The Court also
concludes that Plaintiff’s claims must be DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED, this 20th day of June, 2017.

s/ Hugh Lawson_______________________
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE

13