WILLIAMS v. TRISTAR PRODUCTS INC

Filing 63

ORDER denying 35 Motion in Limine; granting in part 36 Motion in Limine; denying 37 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 38 Motion in Limine. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE HUGH LAWSON on 8/27/2019. (aks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION

SAMANTHA WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 7:17-CV-66 (HL)

TRISTAR PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendant.

ORDER
Plaintiff Samantha Williams filed this products liability and personal injury
action after a pressure cooker manufactured by Defendant exploded in her
kitchen, causing severe personal injuries. Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. 37), as well as several pending Motions in Limine:
(1) Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Pratt (Doc. 35);
(2) Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Giachetti (Doc. 36);
and (3) Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Barnett (Doc.
38). The Court held a hearing on these motions on April 30, 2019.
I. FACTUAL SUMMARY
The incident in question occurred on February 14, 2017, as Plaintiff
Samantha Williams was alone in her home in Lakeland, Georgia. (Doc. 41, ¶¶ 1,
37). Plaintiff was cooking beef stew in her PC-WAL1/TRI-6 six-quart pressure
cooker when she alleges the device’s hot contents and steam were expelled onto

her, causing significant burn injuries. (Id. at ¶ 2). The specific PC-WAL1/TRI-6
cooker at issue was a model 1305 and was manufactured in May 2013. (Doc. 471, ¶ 24); (Doc. 38, p. 7). Plaintiff’s mother purchased the cooker in approximately
October or November of 2016 from a local Wal-Mart store in Douglas, Georgia
and gave it to Plaintiff as a Christmas gift on December 24, 2016. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶
10-11).
Plaintiff estimates that she used the subject pressure cooker three times
before the incident. (Doc. 41, ¶ 26). On the day of the incident, the cooker had
finished cooking and automatically went into “keep warm” mode. (Id. at ¶ 36).
Plaintiff stated that the cooker was emitting a “humming and buzzing” noise that
she had never before heard. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 15). Plaintiff states she then
approached the cooker and simply pressed the “cancel” button, which allegedly
resulted in the lid suddenly popping off of the cooker and the contents being
expelled outward onto her, causing her burn injuries. (Id. at ¶ 16). Plaintiff
suffered severe second-degree burns on both breasts, her entire right arm from
the shoulder to the wrist, and from her neck to above her belly button. (Id. at ¶
17).
In her deposition, Plaintiff stated that the pressure cooker was fully closed
at the time of the incident and denied that it was only partially closed. (Doc. 41, ¶
34). Plaintiff unequivocally stated that she did not attempt to remove the lid or
otherwise touch the cooker aside from pressing the “cancel” button. (Doc. 47-5,
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43:10-22). Both parties agree that the lid cannot “explosively separate from the
base” while the unit is “fully locked.” (Doc. 41, ¶ 21). Likewise, both parties admit
there are no deformations on the locks to suggest the lock was forcibly broken
open. (Id. at ¶ 22). However, Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Pratt has proven that the lid is
able to “explode off of the base” if the lid remains partially open with the locking
lugs overlapping by exactly 11/32 of an inch, or 0.344 inches, with an internal
pressure of exactly 7.4 pounds per square inch (PSI). (Id. at ¶ 23). Plaintiff’s
expert also avers that the subject pressure cooker lid can also pop off of the base
at “about 3/16 or 5/16 of an inch” of locking lug overlap with an internal pressure
of anywhere from 1 to 10 PSI. (Doc. 47-1, ¶ 23).
Plaintiff stated in her deposition that she had confirmed the lid was “fully
closed” because she heard the “click” of the locks, aligned the lock symbols on
the base with the top, and turned the lid “as far as it will go.” (Id. at ¶¶ 31-33).
There were no other witnesses to the event nor any other persons who could
have tampered with the cooker at the time of the incident. (Id. at ¶¶ 37-38).
Defendant’s expert, Dr. Giachetti, testified during his deposition that the cooker
can make a little “click” that is less audible but similar to the normal “click” of the
locks when the lid is nearly, but not completely, locked in position. (Doc. 47-1, ¶
31).
Plaintiff has testified that she operated the cooker in accordance with the
instruction manual which was provided with the cooker by Defendant. (Doc. 41, ¶
3

31). Defendant states that Plaintiff had not “read, relied upon, or attempted to
read or rely upon any warnings or instructions on the [subject pressure cooker’s]
‘caution label,’” but Plaintiff’s expert has indicated that the information on this
label was also contained in the instruction manual. (Doc. 47-1, ¶ 42). There is no
evidence that anyone attempted to open or otherwise touched or rotated the lid
of the subject pressure cooker while the contents were pressurized. (Doc. 41, ¶
40). There is also no evidence that any food clogged any valve on the cooker.
(Id. at ¶ 41). Plaintiff testified that the pressure cooker valve was not clogged, but
she was not asked about any other valves or clogging. (Doc. 47-1, ¶ 41).
The subject pressure cooker was designed and manufactured by
Zhongshan Usata Electrical Appliance Co., Ltd (“USATA”) at its factory in China.
(Doc. 41, ¶ 6). The cookers are then sold through Front Source Limited to
Defendant Tristar. (Id. at ¶ 8). Defendant states that Tristar is not a “design firm,”
nor does it do any manufacturing or “design work.” (Id. at ¶ 3). Plaintiff disputes
that USATA was the sole designer and manufacturer and contends that
Defendant’s involvement in the design and manufacture processes made Tristar
“ultimately responsible for the design of the WAL-1/TRI-6.” (Doc. 47-1, ¶ 6).
Defendant’s statement that Tristar merely “distributed and marketed the final
product” is likewise disputed. (Id. at ¶ 7).
Defendant held ultimate veto power over Engineering Change Request
(ECR) design changes to be performed by manufacturer USATA. (Doc. 47-2, ¶¶
4

28-34). Defendant created an Asian division engineering team that supervised
product development, including the manufacturing process, production process,
inspection process, and testing. (Id. at ¶ 16). As USATA would make changes at
Defendant’s direction, and then Defendant decided whether or not to approve or
deny any order at the factory before shipment and import. (Id. at ¶ 33).
Defendant, not USATA or Front Source, performed internal testing to address
situations where the lid is not fully locked yet still pressurized. (Id. at ¶ 40). The
multiple ECRs made by Defendant were more than simple requests because, as
stated by Defendant’s corporate representative, a change could not be made
without Tristar’s final approval after its own engineering team reviewed the
design modifications and drawings. (Doc. 47-1, ¶ 12). Defendant “initiated major
and critical design changes.” (Id. at ¶ 14). Additionally, Defendant holds two
design patents in the pressure cooker, including one for the design of the lid, and
one for the cooker’s control panel with surface ornamentation. (Id.).
The owner’s manual states in three places that the lid cannot be removed
when the contents are pressurized. (Id. at ¶ 28). This contradicts Dr. Pratt’s
experiment in which he found that the only way the lid can “explode off of the
base” of the cooking unit is if “the locking lugs overlap by precisely 11/32 of an
inch . . . with the exact internal pressure of 7.4 pounds per square inch,” or PSI.
(Doc. 41, ¶ 23). Defendant also admitted that it is possible for the subject
pressure cooker to pressurize without being completely closed/locked, which,
5

Plaintiff points out, is also in direct contradiction to statements made in the
owner’s manual. (Doc. 47-7, 90:11-13). Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Pratt stated in his
deposition that the issues he claims are present in the subject pressure cooker
have been re-designed and virtually eliminated in the newer models. (Doc. 47-2,
at ¶ 54). Defendant admits that these subsequent changes implemented in
newer models of the PC-WAL1 pressure cooker were not omitted from the older
designs for economic, technological, or other reasons of unfeasibility. (Id. at ¶
52). Rather, Defendant says, they had not received sufficient consumer
feedback, and the later implemented designs had not yet been considered. (Id. at
¶ 53).
In 2014, nearly three years before the incident in question, Defendant had
knowledge of injuries claimed to have been caused by the PC-WAL1/TRI-6
pressure cooker’s alleged failure to depressurize upon completion of cooking. (Id.
at ¶ 24). Defendant developed the subject pressure cooker’s instruction manual
and was responsible for the information inside, including warnings and frequently
asked questions. (Id. at ¶ 19). In 2015 and 2016, Defendant Tristar, not USATA
or Front Source, was directly involved in the Consumer Product Safety
Commission’s investigation into consumer reports of the subject pressure cooker
line pressurizing when not fully locked, and the lid coming off while pressurized
and causing burn injuries. (Id. at ¶ 47).

6

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit asserting various products liability claims against
Defendant Tristar including strict liability design defect, negligence, negligent
failure to warn, negligent design, negligent manufacture, and punitive damages.
(Doc. 1, p. 2). Defendant contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law because there is no fact question for the jury since Plaintiff’s testimony
directly conflicts with her expert’s opinions. (Doc. 51, p. 1). Defendant also claims
that Plaintiff has not provided sufficient facts to demonstrate a genuine issue for
trial as to proximate cause. (Id. at 2). Additionally, Defendant claims summary
judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff did not present any risk-utility or
alternative design evidence. (Id. at 5). Finally, Defendant claims summary
judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff’s warnings-based claims because she did not
present evidence of a duty, defect, or causation. (Id. at 8).
II. THE PARTIES’ DAUBERT MOTIONS
The Court will address the parties’ Daubert motions before turning to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment because whether the parties’
proposed experts will be allowed to testify relates to the summary judgment
analysis.
“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if” his
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;” his “testimony is based
7

on sufficient facts or data” and “is the product of reliable principles and methods;”
and he “reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed.
R. Evid. 702. Thus, in evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony, the Court
must consider whether “the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the
matters he intends to address,” whether his methodology “is sufficiently reliable,”
and whether his testimony will help the trier of fact “understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2004) (en banc). The Court's goal is to ensure “that an expert, whether
basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in
the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice
of an expert in the relevant field.” Id. (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 152 (1999)). To allow the testimony to be considered by the jury, the
Court must find that “it is properly grounded, well-reasoned, and not speculative.”
Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory comm. note to 2000 amends.).
A. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Pratt (Doc. 35)
Defendant has filed a Motion in Limine to exclude the opinions of Dr. John
Pratt for three reasons: (1) his opinions do not fit the facts of the case; (2) his
opinions are not the product of reliable scientific methodology, and therefore
would not assist the trier of fact; and (3) he is not qualified to proffer those
opinions because he is admittedly not a warnings or human factors expert.

8

Dr. Pratt opines that the pressure cooker manufactured by Defendant is
defective in a number of ways, mainly in that the contents can pressurize despite
the lid not being in the “fully locked” position. (Doc. 35-2, p. 14). Dr. Pratt’s
opinions are based on his examination of the subject pressure cooker, as well as
extensive testing on exemplar pressure cookers manufactured by Defendant.
Defendant argues that Dr. Pratt is repurposing his expert testimony used in
prior cases involving pressure cookers manufactured by Defendant and has
therefore failed to determine what caused the incident in this particular case.
(Doc. 35-2, p. 3). In those cases, Dr. Pratt testified that the pressure cookers
could explode when partially open. Here, Plaintiff has testified that she fully
closed the pressure cooker. Thus, Defendant argues, Dr. Pratt’s opinions do not
“fit” the facts of the case as required by Daubert because Dr. Pratt does not
explain how a pressure cooker can explode while in the fully locked position.
Defendant further argues that Dr. Pratt’s opinions do not meet the “fit”
requirement under Daubert because he did not read Plaintiff’s testimony prior to
forming his opinions, nor did he perform testing on the incident cooker. These
same reasons, Defendant contends, additionally support a finding that the
opinions are not based on sufficient data or reliable methodology.
The Court disagrees with Defendant and finds that Dr. Pratt’s testimony fits
the facts of the case and is reliable and based on sufficient data. As Plaintiff
explains in her response, “Dr. Pratt’s assignment was not to recreate the subject
9

incident; Dr. Pratt was asked to utilize his expertise in mechanical engineering,
combined with his extensive experience and familiarity with Tristar’s pressure
cookers, to find what defects in the subject pressure [cooker] could explain what
happened to Plaintiff, to see if those defects were consistent with the incident as
described by Plaintiff, and to consider whether Plaintiff’s misuse contributed to
the incident.” (Doc. 45, p. 9 n.1). “If a proposed expert opinion principally relies
on experience and knowledge, a court must satisfy itself that the expert has
appropriately explained how the expert’s experience and knowledge has led to
the conclusions, why the expert’s experience provides a sufficient basis for the
opinion, and why that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” Padgett v.
Kmart Corp., No. CV-315-048, 2016 WL 3746671, at *5 (S.D. Ga. July 8, 2016).
Simply put, “[p]hysical testing is not an absolute prerequisite to the admission of
expert testimony.” Hendrix v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 255 F.R.D. 568, 586 (N.D. Ga.
2009). Rather, “it is more common that engineering experts state that their
opinions are not based upon any scientific method but on general experience
and knowledge after a review of evidence.” Reid v. BMW of N. Am., 430 F. Supp.
2d 1365, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
While it is true that Dr. Pratt did not perform explosive testing on the
incident pressure cooker, he devotes an entire section of his expert report to his
findings after an examination of the incident pressure cooker. The Court
disagrees with Defendant’s position that “Dr. Pratt expects the Court to ‘take his
10

word for it’ that the Engineering Opinions are sound science.” (Doc. 35-1, p. 16).
Dr. Pratt, who has a Ph.D. in engineering and has extensive experience in design
and development of products, fasteners, machines, tools, and latching and
locking devices, explains his testing of an exemplar pressure cooker in detail. His
familiarity with pressure cookers manufactured by Defendant gained by testifying
as an expert in similar litigation further demonstrate his experience and
knowledge of the product. The Court finds that based on Dr. Pratt’s knowledge
and experience, his proposed testimony and methodology is sufficiently reliable.
Defendant’s argument that Dr. Pratt’s opinions do not “fit” the facts of the
case is also unconvincing. Under the “helpfulness” or “fit” requirement, which is
concerned primarily with relevance, the Court must consider “whether expert
testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it
will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute[.]” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (quoting
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)). Defendant
argues that because Dr. Pratt’s opinions on the potential removal of the cooker’s
lid conflict with Plaintiff’s testimony as to what happened, his opinions are thus
contradictory to the facts on the record and should be excluded.
Plaintiff responds by citing to Lee v. Smith & Wesson Corp., a Sixth Circuit
case in which the witness testimony and an expert’s description conflicted
identically to the present case. 760 F.3d 523, 536-27 (6th Cir. 2014). The Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court’s exclusion of the conflicting expert’s testimony
11

and determined that the district court had abused its discretion in excluding the
opinion because the expert “had the appropriate qualifications, he used reliable
methods, and his opinions were based on physical evidence from the accident.”
Id. at 526. Plaintiff also cites to similar decisions made by district courts in
Georgia. In Cameron v. Teeberry Logistics, the Northern District of Georgia
denied the plaintiff’s motion to exclude the defendant’s accident reconstructionist
after he provided opinions as to timing that conflicted with the plaintiff’s
deposition testimony. No. 3:12-cv-181-TCB, 2013 WL 7874709, at *4 (N.D. Ga.
May 21, 2013). In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the expert should be
excluded, the court stated “the fact that [the expert’s] opinion is inconsistent with
other facts of this case is not a proper basis for exclusion.” Id. Similarly, in
Souder v. Floyd Cty., Ga., the Northern District of Georgia denied the
defendant’s motion to exclude the opinions of the plaintiff’s accident
reconstructionist because the reconstructionist’s opinions were contrary to
portions of his own deposition testimony. Nos. 4:03-CV-0085-HLM, 4:04-CV0095-HLM, 2005 WL 6218033, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2005). The court rejected
the defendant’s argument, finding that “contrary evidence goes not to the
admissibility of the expert testimony; rather, it goes to the weight of that
testimony.” Id. at *6.
Although, as Defendant argues, Dr. Pratt formed his opinions prior to
Plaintiff’s deposition, Dr. Pratt based his opinions on documents in the record, an
12

examination of the incident pressure cooker, and pressure testing of an exemplar
cooker manufactured by Defendant, in addition to his extensive knowledge and
experience. This evidence supports his opinions, despite conflicting with portions
of Plaintiff’s testimony. Weighing of competing evidence is for the jury, not the
court. Hockensmith v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:01-CV-3645-GET, 2003 WL
25639639, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 17, 2003).
Lastly, Defendant’s argument that Dr. Pratt’s opinions should be excluded
because he is not a warnings expert must fail. Dr. Pratt admits that he is not a
warnings expert in his deposition, and while that may be true, Dr. Pratt has
relevant experience rendering him qualified to testify as to the adequacy of the
warnings in Defendant’s instruction manual. Defendant cites to this Court’s
previous decision in Hernandez v. Crown Equipment Corp., 92 F. Supp. 3d 1325,
1347 (M.D. Ga. 2015), in support of its argument that Dr. Pratt should not be
allowed to testify as to the opinions expressed in a section of his expert report
entitled “Misleading Information in The Owner’s Manual.” (Doc. 35-1, p. 20). In
Hernandez, this Court granted the defendant’s motion to exclude the plaintiff’s
expert, Mark Elrod, from testifying as to the effectiveness of the warnings and
instructions provided for the Crown forklift because not only did the expert admit
in his deposition that he was not a warnings expert, but there was “no evidence
that he [had] ever developed or designed warnings or instructions for how forklift
operators should respond to emergency situations while operating a forklift.”. Id.
13

But that is not the case here. Dr. Pratt has experience not only in designing
products, but he also has drafted instructions, manuals, and warnings for cockpit
door latching mechanisms and pneumatic tools. (Doc. 45-2, 138:13-20). Further,
while Dr. Pratt does not purport to be an expert in human factors, he has studied
human factors as part of his engineering education. (Id., 29:3-6). Plaintiff does
not intend to offer Dr. Pratt as a human factors expert, but the Court finds that he
may testify as to the opinions in his report concerning the misleading information
in the owner’s manual. 1
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Pratt (Doc.
35) is DENIED.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Giachetti (Doc. 36)
Defendant’s expert, Dr. Giachetti, is a mechanical engineer who has
worked on more than a hundred cases as a mechanical engineering expert,
including cases regarding pressure cookers. (Doc. 43, p. 3). Dr. Giachetti intends
to proffer opinions that (1) the subject pressure cooker lid did not “explode from
the base”; (2) it is more likely than not that Plaintiff had her left arm around the
edge of the lid at the time the cooker was opened; (3) there was only “nominal
pressure inside of” the cooker when the lid was opened; and (4) it is more likely
that Plaintiff’s injuries occurred while trying to open the pressure cooker from a
“fully locked” position than from the lid exploding off of the base. (Id. at 3-4).
Dr. Pratt may not, however, testify as to his opinion that the instructions for bean
recipes are misleading, as it is irrelevant to the case at hand. (Doc. 35-2, pp. 13-14).
14
1

Plaintiff moved to exclude Dr. Giachetti’s testimony in regards to both opinions
(2) and (4) described above. However, at the April 30th hearing, Plaintiff
withdrew her objection to opinion (4), leaving only Dr. Giachetti’s opinion that
Plaintiff’s burns were caused from the contents of the pressure cooker spilling
onto her after attempting to open the pressure cooker for the Court’s
consideration. (Doc. 61, 59:17-61:16).
Plaintiff does not challenge Dr. Giachetti’s engineering qualifications.
Rather, what Plaintiff contends is that Dr. Giachetti’s opinions are irrelevant and
unreliable. (Doc. 36, p. 5). Dr. Giachetti has admitted that he is not an expert in
burn injuries and does not intend to testify regarding “medical and burn injuries
opinions.” (Doc. 43, p. 7). Dr. Giachetti did, however, examine photographs of
Plaintiff’s burn injuries to theorize about the manner in which the scalding liquid
came to be on Plaintiff’s skin and whether those burn patterns would be
consistent with her testimony. (Id. at 7-8). But Plaintiff contends that this is
insufficient evidence for Dr. Giachetti to rely on in proffering his opinion that
Plaintiff’s burns were not caused by hot contents exploding onto her skin, but
instead that her burns are more consistent with Plaintiff grabbing the pressure
cooker and forcing the lid open, spilling the contents onto herself. During the
hearing, Plaintiff argued that “[b]oth sides can say their theories, but [Dr.
Giachetti] wants to go a step further and say he can rule out the other one, and I
just don’t think he’s qualified to do it.” (Doc. 61, 66:19-22). In other words,
15

Plaintiff does not oppose Dr. Giachetti testifying as to his theory of how the
incident occurred but moves to preclude Dr. Giachetti from testifying that, based
on his evaluation of Plaintiff’s medical records and photos of her burn injuries,
that her burns were not caused by an explosion.
As part of the methodology for Dr. Giachetti’s second opinion, he states
that the lack of burns on Plaintiff’s right elbow crease supported the hypothesis
that she had her elbow bent while trying to force open the subject pressure
cooker, but Plaintiff did have burns on her right elbow crease. (Doc. 36-3, 107:2108:9). Also, in considering Plaintiff’s burn pattern in his fluid dynamic analysis,
Dr. Giachetti admitted he was unaware what clothing Plaintiff was wearing and
stated “it was irrelevant to [his] analysis.” (Id. at 91:7-12). Some clothing is more
protective than others. Undoubtedly, when subjected to scalding liquids, wearing
a tank top such as Plaintiff was wearing at the time of the incidence, would result
in different burn patterns on the wearer than if she were, hypothetically, wearing
a loose-fitted, long-sleeved sweater or some type of sleeve on one arm. (Doc.
48, p. 6). Additionally, Dr. Giachetti’s opinion that the pressure cooker was
forcibly opened would conflict directly with Plaintiff’s consistent and repeated
testimony that she did not touch the cooker aside from pressing the “cancel”
button, casting further doubt pm Dr. Giachetti’s opnion. (Doc. 48, p. 3-4). Without
affirmative scientific or physical evidence that the pressure cooker lid was forced
opened, this opinion is mere speculation.
16

Dr. Giachetti developed his opinions after examining a surprisingly small
amount of data, some of which was incorrect. Then, despite not having any
expertise in burn injuries, he advanced a theory that Plaintiff forcibly opened the
pressure cooker based on her burn patterns – a deduction directly contrary to
Plaintiff’s unequivocal statement that she did nothing more than press the
“cancel” button prior to the explosion. Additionally, Dr. Giachetti did not perform
any of the calculations outlined in his deposition. As a whole, the Court finds that
Dr. Giachetti’s opinions as to both the cause of the incident and the analysis of
Plaintiff’s burn injuries are not sufficiently based on scientific fact or reliable
methodology and should be excluded from trial. Nevertheless, at the hearing on
the motion to exclude Dr. Giachetti’s opinions, Plaintiff consented to permitting
Dr. Giachetti to testify regarding his theory of how the incident occurred. Dr.
Giachetti may not, however, testify as to any opinions based on his evaluation of
Plaintiff’s burn injuries.
For the foregoing reasons, the expert opinions and testimony of Dr.
Giachetti as described herein are excluded from this trial. Plaintiff’s Motion to
Exclude and Limit Opinions and Testimony of Defendant’s Expert, Robert
Giachetti, Ph.D., is GRANTED.
C. Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Barnett (Doc. 38)
Dr. Barnett’s expert opinions are statistical analyses that he has created
and intends to present at trial to explain to the jury of laymen how slim the
17

chances of experiencing injury from the subject pressure cooker as opposed to
other extreme and unlikely scenarios. For instance, Dr. Barnett’s statistics
conclude that a user of a Tristar PC-WAL1/TRI-6 pressure cooker is twenty (20)
times more likely to suffer death or injury from pneumonia in a given year than
they are to experience an explosive incident with the pressure cooker.
Dr. Barnett’s qualifications are not challenged; however, Plaintiff contends
that Dr. Barnett’s opinions are irrelevant and unreliable. (Doc. 38, p. 4-5). The
statistics presented by Dr. Barnett are based on standard statistical
methodologies. (Doc. 44, p. 1). His testimony is intended to demonstrate that
Tristar’s products are not prone to explosive events by providing comparisons of
the probability that the product at issue will cause the alleged harm to the
likelihood of dissimilar and unrelated events taking place. (Id. at 1-2). These
dissimilar incidents include anecdotes like the odds of winning the lottery, being
elected to public office, or being harmed from accidental poisoning. (Barnett Rpt.,
pp. 4-5). Unlike the statistical opinions that this Court allowed in Hernandez,
these statistics are not regarding similar injuries from similar products. 92 F.
Supp. 3d at 1342. Rather, the statistics proffered by Dr. Barnett are irrelevant to
this case and would serve only to distract the jury by introducing a bevy of flights
of fancy to consider with no particularly important legal effect. Furthermore, the
simple comparisons of the chances of one thing happening versus another are
not “beyond the understanding of the average lay person” and thus expert
18

testimony of this nature is unnecessary. Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier, 402 F.3d
1092, 1111 (11th Cir. 2005).
The data Dr. Barnett used to create these statistics included multiple
different models of the pressure cooker which may or may not be functionally
identical to the PC-WAL1/TRI-6 model 1305 pressure cooker at issue. (Dr.
Barnett Dep., 18:24-19:7). Without evidence that these pressure cookers had
the same present risks and rates of failure as the specific model that Plaintiff had
used there is no way to be certain that the resulting statistics are accurate and,
therefore, reliable. Additionally, Dr. Barnett was unaware that the subject
pressure cooker’s model had undergone design changes from 2013 to 2018,
which affected the likelihood of the cookers’ lid explosively separating from the
base of the unit. (Id. at 19:8-24). Finally, Dr. Barnett admits he did not and could
not perform an analysis to isolate the failure rate of the subject 2013
manufactured PC-WAL1-TRI-6 model 1305 pressure cooker. (Id. 22:7-22). For
these reasons, the Court finds that the methodology used by Dr. Barnett in his
statistical findings is unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible.
For the foregoing reasons, the expert opinions and testimony of Dr. Barnett
are excluded. Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Opinions and Testimony of
Defendant’s Expert, Arnold Barnett, Ph.D, is GRANTED.

19

III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 allows a party to move for summary
judgment when the party contends that no genuine issue of material fact remains
and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. “Summary judgment is
appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1118 (11th Cir. 2013). “A
genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.”
Grimes v. Miami Dade Cty., 552 F. App’x 902, 904 (11th Cir. 2014).
“An issue of fact is ‘material’ if it is a legal element of the claim under the
applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case.” Allen v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). “It is ‘genuine’ if the
record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th
Cir. 1992). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all evidence
and factual inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and determine whether that evidence could reasonably sustain

20

a jury verdict in its favor. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23
(1986); Allen, 121 F.3d at 646.
The movant bears the initial burden of showing, by reference to the record,
that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323;
Barreto v. Davie Marketplace, LLC, 331 F. App’x 672, 673 (11th Cir. 2009). The
movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing that there is no
genuine dispute of material fact or by demonstrating that the nonmoving party
has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it
bears the ultimate burden of proof. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–24; Barreto,
331 F. App’x at 673. “When that burden has been met, the burden shifts to the
nonmovant . . . to go beyond the pleadings and to present competent evidence in
the form of affidavits, answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions and the
like, designating specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Lamar v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 597 F. App’x 555, 556–57 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
B. Discussion
Defendant Tristar moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims
for four reasons. First, Defendant contends that it is not subject to liability for
Plaintiff’s injuries because it did not manufacture the pressure cooker and is
merely a product seller. Second, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not met
her burden of proving that the pressure cooker was defective and that her injuries
were proximately caused by the defect in the pressure cooker. Third, Defendant
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argues that Plaintiff has failed to present evidence of a reasonable alternative
design in support of her design defect claim. Lastly, Defendant argues that
Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages must fail because her underlying claims fail
as a matter of law.
1. Product Seller v. Manufacturer
By the plain language of the Georgia products liability statute, O.C.G.A §
51-1-11.1(a), a cause of action for strict liability can by maintained only against
the manufacturer of a product. Under Georgia law, an entity may be a
“manufacturer” if it satisfies one of two alternative definitions: (1) an actual
manufacturer or designer of the product or (2) a manufacturer of a component
part which caused the plaintiff injury. Freeman v. United Cities Propane Gas of
Ga., Inc., 807 F. Supp. 1533, 1539 (M.D. Ga. 1992). “[M]anufacturers are those
entities that have an active role in the production, design, or assembly of
products,” not entities “that ha[ve] no real role in the creation of products, such as
those who merely label a product as their own.” Buchan v. Lawrence Metal
Prods., Inc., 270 Ga. App. 517, 520–21 (2004). A “product seller,” by contrast, is
not subject to strict liability. O.C.G.A. § 51–1–11.1(b). A product seller is any
person who “sells and distributes; installs; prepares; blends; packages; labels;
markets; or assembles pursuant to a manufacturer's plan, intention, design,
specifications, or formulation; or repairs; maintains; or otherwise is involved in
placing a product in the stream of commerce.” O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11.1(a). A
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“product seller,” however, may become a “manufacturer” subject to statutory
liability by having input or by being actively involved in the conception, design, or
specification of the product. Nelson v. C.M. City, Inc., 218 Ga. App. 850, 852
(1995).
Defendant argues that it cannot be held liable as a manufacturer because
it merely “identified manufacturers who designed and manufactured pressure
cookers” and only had “commonsensical” input into the design process. (Doc. 371, p. 9). Defendant contends that the cooker is manufactured in China by
USATA, and that it is USATA who makes the ultimate determination as to what
design changes should be implemented. (Id. at p. 6). But there is evidence on the
record suggesting that Defendant is more than a mere product seller. Tristar had
staff monitoring production in China; Tristar created an Asian division
engineering team that worked directly with factories to manage product
development, inspection, and testing of products; Tristar initiated and had final
approval of design changes; and Tristar had direct involvement with the
Consumer Product Safety Commission’s investigation into consumer reports
regarding pressure cookers. The jury must weigh this evidence to determine if
Defendant was a manufacturer or merely a product seller.
2. Defect and Proximate Cause
Under Georgia law, the maker of an article for sale or use by others must
use reasonable care and skill in designing the article so that it is reasonably safe
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for the purposes for which it is intended and for other uses which are foreseeably
probable. Dorsey Trailers Se., Inc. v. Brackett, 185 Ga. App. 172, 174 (1987). To
recover on a design defect claim, Plaintiff must show (1) that Defendant’s design
is defective and (2) that the defective design caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Folsom v.
Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A., 509 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1374 (M.D. Ga. 2007). A
risk-utility test is applied in design defect cases to determine “if the risks inherent
in a product design [outweigh] the utility or benefit derived from the product.”
Dean v. Toyota Indus. Equip. Mfg. Inc., 246 Ga. App. 255, 259 (2000). The
Georgia Supreme Court has promulgated a non-exhaustive list of factors for the
trier of fact to consider in applying the risk-utility test. Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc.,
264 Ga. 732, 734-35 (1994). Those factors include: the usefulness of the
product; the gravity and severity of the danger posed by the design; the likelihood
of that danger; the avoidability of the danger, i.e., the user’s knowledge of the
product; publicity surrounding the danger, or the efficacy of warnings, common
knowledge, the expectation of danger; the user’s ability to avoid danger; the state
of the art at the time the product is manufactured; the ability to eliminate danger
without impairing the usefulness of the product or making it too expensive; and
the feasibility of spreading the loss in the setting of the product’s price or by
purchasing insurance. Id. at 736 n. 6.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not met her burden of proving either
that the pressure cooker is defective or that the defect proximately caused her
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injury. Defendant’s argument largely rests on its contention that Plaintiff’s expert
Dr. Pratt should be precluded from testifying. But Defendant argues that even if
Dr. Pratt’s opinions are admissible, Plaintiff still has no evidence to raise a
question of fact as to proximate cause.
Unlike factual cause, true proximate cause has nothing to do with factual
issues of cause and effect. See generally, Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Daniels,
8 Ga. App. 775, 778 (1911) (“When a negligent act so operates upon a normal
situation of prudently conducted activities as to produce through it an injury
which, according to the law of ordinary human probability, would not otherwise
have happened, and no other wrongful act is found among the nearby activities
which have joined in bringing about the injury, the negligent act is to be regarded
as the sole and proximate cause of the injury.”). It is sufficient if, in ordinary
prudence, the defendant might have foreseen that some injury would result from
his act or omission. Milton Bradley Co. of Ga. v. Cooper, 79 Ga. App. 302, 307
(1949). Although expert opinions are often necessary to establish proximate
cause in products liability cases, expert testimony is not always required where
jurors are capable of determining whether injuries were caused by alleged
defects in a product based on their own experiences. Owens v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 272 Ga. App. 842, 846 (2005).
Here, Plaintiff has presented evidence of a defect in the form of admissible
testimony from her expert Dr. Pratt. Dr. Pratt opines, and Defendant does not
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dispute, that the subject pressure cooker can explosively separate from the base
if the lid is exactly turned to 0.344 inches from the “fully locked” position and has
pressurized to exactly 7.4 PSI. Plaintiff’s testimony and injuries are consistent
with the allegation that the lid explosively separated. Although Plaintiff
unequivocally testified that the cooker was fully closed and she heard a “click” to
indicate its complete closure, there is evidence on the record that the pressure
cooker can produce a click when nearly, but not completely, closed.
Further, Plaintiff has presented evidence that the alleged defects in the
subject pressure cooker proximately caused her injuries. In Georgia, “it is
axiomatic that questions regarding proximate cause are undeniably a jury
question and may only be determined by the courts in plain and undisputed
cases.” Sanders v. Lull Intern., Inc., 411 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Sewing Mach. v. Smith, 275 Ga. 683, 687 (2002)). The Court disagrees
with Defendant that the lack of evidence that at the time of the accident, the lugs
on the subject pressure cooker overlapped by precisely .344 of one inch and
were pressurized to exactly 7.4 PSI, weigh against Plaintiff’s proximate cause
argument. Rather, the Court does not find that this case is one in which the issue
of proximate cause is “plain and undisputed.” Thus, it should be for the jury to
determine if Plaintiff was mistaken as to whether she had closed the lid
completely, meaning that the defect in the pressure cooker proximately caused

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her injuries. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this issue
is DENIED.
3. Reasonable Alternative Design
The “heart” of a design defect case is the reasonableness of selecting from
alternative product designs and adopting the safest, most feasible one. Jones v.
NordicTrack, Inc., 274 Ga. 115, 118 (2001). The Georgia Supreme Court has set
forth certain risk-utility factors applicable specifically to alternative design: “the
feasibility of an alternative design; the availability of an effective substitute for the
product which meets the same need but is safer; the financial cost of the
improved design; and the adverse effects from the alternative.” Banks, 264 Ga.
at 736 n.6.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s design defect claim must fail because she
has not presented any evidence of a reasonable alternative design through
expert testimony or otherwise. While it is true that the language in Banks makes
it seem likely that the Georgia Supreme Court would require a plaintiff to present
evidence of alternative designs, Georgia courts and other federal district courts
applying Georgia law have held otherwise. See Bodymasters Sports Indus., Inc.
v. Wimberley, 232 Ga. App. 170, 173 (1998); Timmons v. Ford Motor Co., 982 F.
Supp. 1475, 1479 (“While at the ‘heart’ of the analysis, the Georgia Supreme
Court clearly found that alternative designs were a factor that may be considered
and not a requirement.”); Bunch v. Pac. Cycle, No. 4:13-CV-0036-HLM, 2014 WL
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12495343, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 14, 2014) (“Although the existence of an available
alternative design is a factor affecting the risk-utility analysis, that factor is not
controlling.”). Defendant also incorrectly argues that alternative design evidence
must be presented in the form of expert testimony. But it is not required that
either Plaintiff present evidence of reasonable alternative designs or that the
evidence be in the form of expert testimony. Here, Plaintiff has presented
evidence – through the testimony of her expert witness and the 30(b)(6)
deposition testimony of Tristar – that the later models of the subject pressure
cooker, which effectively prevent the alleged defect at issue, are a reasonable
alternative design. Regardless, reasonable alternative design is not an
independent element of a design defect claim. Whether the reasonable
alternative design theories presented by Plaintiff are viable goes to the weight of
the evidence—and it is not for the Court to deprive the jury of its role in
performing the risk-utility analysis.
4. Failure to Warn
“Under Georgia law, a manufacturer has a duty to warn of nonobvious
foreseeable dangers from normal use of its product.” Thornton v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours Co., Inc., 22 F.3d 284, 289 (11th Cir. 1994). To establish a failure to
warn claim, “a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant knew, or had reason to
know, that the product is likely to be dangerous for the intended use; (2) the
defendant had no reason to believe that the user would realize the danger; and
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(3) the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care to inform the user about the
danger.” Carmical v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 117 F.3d 490, 494–95 (11th
Cir. 1997) (applying Georgia law). Where a duty to warn arises, it may be
breached by “(1) failing to adequately communicate the warning to the ultimate
user or (2) failing to provide an adequate warning of the product’s potential risk.”
Wilson Foods Corp. v. Turner, 218 Ga. App. 74, 75 (1995) (quoting Thornton, 22
F.3d at 289). Additionally, Georgia law imposes on the manufacturer of personal
property the duty to exercise ordinary care to warn users of a known or
reasonably foreseeable risk of injury after a product’s sale because the
manufacturer’s duty to warn does not cease upon sale. Chrysler Corp. v. Batten,
264 Ga. 723, 724 (1994). This post-sale duty to warn arises when a
manufacturer actually or constructively acquires post-sale knowledge of risk. Id.
Plaintiff appear to assert negligence claims against Defendant for failure to warn
users both at the time of the sale and after the sale of the product.
Defendant contends that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
Plaintiff’s negligent warning claim because Plaintiff has failed to present evidence
that Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of “any connection between
a ‘humming’ sound and an explosion. . . .” (Doc. 51, p. 8). But the Court
disagrees.

Plaintiff

has

presented

evidence

demonstrating

Defendant’s

knowledge of injuries resulting from its pressure cooker’s failure to depressurize
since 2014. Plaintiff showed that hundreds of complaints were filed in the form of
29

letters sent directly to Defendant, as well as complaints filed with the Consumer
Product Safety Commission. Further, the Consumer Product Safety Commission
began an investigation after receiving such complaints. Even after this
investigation began, Defendant took no action to warn consumers. Based on
these factors, the Court cannot find that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law as to Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim. Accordingly, summary
judgment is DENIED as to this issue.
5. Punitive Damages
In Georgia, punitive damages are governed by statute. O.C.G.A. § 51-125.1. Punitive damages are only awarded in tort actions in which a plaintiff proves
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s misconduct was willful,
malicious, fraudulent, wanton, oppressive, or exhibited a want of care which
would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b). A party’s negligence, even gross negligence, is
insufficient to support an award of punitive damages. Troutman v. B.C.B. Co.,
Inc., 209 Ga. App. 166, 168 (1993). Punitive damages are a derivative claim and
may only survive if the underlying tort claims survive. Lewis v. Meredith Corp.,
293 Ga. App. 747, 750 (2008). Numerous Georgia cases have held that punitive
damages are available where a manufacturer knows that its product is potentially
dangerous and chooses to do nothing to make it safer or to warn customers.
Cisson v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-00196, 2013 WL 5700513, at *13 (S.D.
30

W. Va. Oct. 18, 2013) (applying Georgia law).
When considering punitive damages at the summary judgment stage, it is
important to remember that the issue of “[p]unitive damages is usually a matter
for the jury.” Reid, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 1374 (denying summary judgment as to
punitive damages where issue of fact existed as to whether car manufacturer
was aware of defect and failed to warn others). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
punitive damages claim fails because her underlying substantive claims must fail,
and also that she has not met her burden of proving that Defendant’s actions
rose to the level of willful misconduct. Plaintiff disagrees and states that she has
presented enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
punitive damages. The Court agrees. Plaintiff has put forth ample evidence that
Defendant was aware that the subject model pressure cooker could pressurize
despite not being fully closed but took no action. Based this knowledge, it is
possible that a jury could find that such a failure to act reached the level of bad
faith or conscious indifference to consequences. Thus, Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment as to punitive damages is DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 37), DENIES Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude
the Opinions of Dr. Pratt (Doc. 35), GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion in
Limine to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Giachetti (Doc. 36), and GRANTS
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Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude the Opinions of Dr. Barnett (Doc. 38). The
case shall be placed on the Court’s next available trial calendar.
SO ORDERED this 27th day of August, 2019.

s/ Hugh Lawson______________
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
ehm

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