CELESTINE v. NASHVILLE BERRIEN COUNTY NURSING HOME, et al.

Filing 7

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE HUGH LAWSON on 2/26/2018. (aks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION

BETTY CELESTINE,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 7:17-CV-163 (HL)

v.
NASHVILLE
BERRIEN
NURSING HOME, et al.,

COUNTY

Defendants.

ORDER
Sharon Julye commenced this pro se action on behalf of her mother,
Plaintiff Betty Celestine, by filing a letter with the Court that was construed as a
complaint on September 22, 1017. (Doc. 1). An initial pro se status conference
was held with Ms. Julye on October 11, 2017. The Court informed Ms. Julye that
the action would be stayed until January 11, 2018. (Doc. 4). On January 11,
2018, Ms. Julye filed a Motion for Extension of Time, which the Court granted.
(Doc. 6). The action was stayed until February 11, 2018. As of the date of this
order, Ms. Julye has not paid the required filing fee nor sought leave to proceed
in forma pauperis, and the record gives no indication that she has sought to
effect service. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the complaint
must be dismissed.

“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their
own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively,
are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654
(emphasis added). “By its own terms § 1654 requires those persons who seek to
represent themselves in federal courts to do so ‘personally,’ thereby foreclosing
on the possibility that such representation could occur by proxy.” Jacox v. Dep't
of Defense, 2007 WL 118102, at *1 (M.D.Ga. January 10, 2007); accord Brown
v. Great Northern Insurance Co., 2015 WL 898357, at *10 (N.D.Ga. March 3,
2015); Malinay v. Nishimura, 2013 WL 4240460, at *1 (D. Haw. August 14, 2013)
(“[T]he right to proceed pro se in civil cases is a personal right.”). Georgia law
makes it “unlawful for any person other than a duly licensed attorney at law ... [t]o
render legal services of any kind in actions or proceedings of any nature....”
O.C.G.A. § 15-19-51(a)(6). As a result, “[t]he existence of a power of attorney
does not authorize a nonlawyer to undertake to conduct legal proceedings on
behalf of a pro se litigant where the law otherwise requires that such proceedings
be conducted by a licensed attorney.” Jacox, 2007 WL 118102, at *1; accord
Brown, 2015 WL 898357, at *10.
In other words, as there is no licensed attorney of record, Ms. Julye is, by
all appearances, acting as her mother’s attorney. Even assuming that Plaintiff is
acting under a valid power of attorney, she may not provide legal representation
to her mother because she is not licensed to practice law in this Court. See
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Harris v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 2006 WL 3025882, at *3 (E.D. Pa. October
20, 2006) (“[F]ederal courts do not permit a non-attorney to engage in the
unauthorized practice of law by pursuing an action pro se with the plaintiff's
power of attorney.”); In re Conservatorship of Riebel, 625 N.W.2d 480, 482–83
(Minn. 2001) (holding that nonlawyer mother with power of attorney was not
permitted to sign pleadings on behalf of her daughter because such actions
constituted the unauthorized practice of law). In addition, because the complaint
was signed by Ms. Julye and not by Plaintiff or an attorney licensed to practice
law, the complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a),
which provides: “Every pleading ... must be signed by at least one attorney of
record in the attorney's name–or by a party personally if the party is
unrepresented.”
Accordingly, the Court finds that the complaint (Doc. 1) signed by Ms.
Julye should be dismissed without prejudice.

SO ORDERED this 26th day of February, 2018.

s/ Hugh Lawson_______________
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE

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