GARDNER v. AUTOZONERS LLC
Filing
38
ORDER denying as moot 22 Motion for Sanctions; granting 25 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE HUGH LAWSON on 5/6/2020. (aks)
Case 7:18-cv-00087-HL Document 38 Filed 05/06/20 Page 1 of 18
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
PAULA GARDNER,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 7:18-CV-87 (HL)
AUTOZONERS, LLC,
Defendant.
ORDER
Plaintiff Paula Gardner brought this action against Defendant AutoZoners,
LLC (“AutoZone”) alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e)–3(a). Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Doc. 25). 1 After reviewing the briefs and evidentiary materials presented, and
with the benefit of oral argument, the Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to
support her claims with sufficient evidence. The Court accordingly GRANTS
Defendant’s motion.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant at its Thomasville, Georgia AutoZone
store. (Doc. 31-2, p. 5). She was hired as a part-time driver and sales employee
1
Defendant also filed a Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 22). After hearing oral
argument, the Court dismissed this motion.
Case 7:18-cv-00087-HL Document 38 Filed 05/06/20 Page 2 of 18
in May 2016, and Defendant promoted her to a full-time position two months
later. (Id. at pp. 5, 12). Plaintiff is an African American woman. (Doc. 31-3, p. 4).
Elijah White is the District Manager of the Thomasville, Georgia AutoZone.
(Doc. 31-1, p. 12). Plaintiff communicated to White that she wanted to interview
for a management position. (Id. at pp. 14–15). On November 8, 2016, however,
Plaintiff notified White by text that she no longer sought the management position
because she “wasn’t ready.” (Id. at p. 15). Four days later, Plaintiff texted White
again, asking if she could participate in the manager’s class that “White offered to
help employees learn more about store operations and processes.” (Id. at p. 16).
On March 1, 2017, Plaintiff asked White to interview her for a management
position. (Id. at p. 18). Two days later, Plaintiff again texted White to take herself
out of consideration for the management position. (Id.). The March 3 text
exchange between Plaintiff and White is a point of factual dispute for the parties.
In addition to saying she no longer intended to interview for management,
Plaintiff also wrote that she had “two interviews [the] next week,” including one
with Defendant’s competitor O’Reilly Auto Parts. (Doc. 31-8, p. 4). Defendant
argues that Plaintiff’s texts to White “indicated that she intended to resign.” (Doc.
25-2, p. 7). Plaintiff denies this allegation, and instead asserts that her texts
showed that “she was exploring job opportunities outside of AutoZone[,] and
[she] had taken herself out of consideration for promotions.” (Doc. 31-2, p. 19).
Crucially, Plaintiff testified that she did not intend to resign. See (Doc. 31-3, pp.
2
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3–4); (Doc. 25-3, pp. 17–18). She continued to work at AutoZone after March 3.
(Doc. 31-3, p. 4).
Plaintiff alleges that on March 14, 2017, a regular commercial customer,
Michael Hoffman, used racial slurs while speaking to Plaintiff. (Doc. 25-3, pp. 47–
49). 2 According to Plaintiff, he used racial slurs on five to ten other occasions
prior to March 14 while shopping at AutoZone. (Doc. 31-1, pp. 5–6). Plaintiff
reported these past instances of racial discrimination to her immediate
supervisor, Sanya Baker. (Doc. 31-3, p. 3). Hoffman called Defendant’s
corporate office to complain about his interaction with Plaintiff. (Doc. 31-2, pp.
25–26); (Doc. 31-7, p. 7). Hoffman said that Plaintiff was rude to him and used
curse words. (Id.). Plaintiff states that she reported Hoffman’s racial harassment
directly to White. (Id.). After White received Hoffman’s complaint, White talked
with Plaintiff about how she should not speak rudely to customers. Plaintiff was
upset with White’s response and felt that the company was allowing customers to
discriminate against her. (Doc. 31-7). 3
2
In the Complaint and Answer, the parties refer to the customer as Michael
Hoffman. (Docs. 1, 6). In the discovery documents, the customer is referred to as
both Hoffman (Docs. 25-3, 31-4, 31-9) and Huffman (Docs. 31-3, 31-7). In
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s response, the parties
refer to the customer as Huffman. The Court will use Hoffman as the customer’s
name.
3
Holley Roberts, an employee at Defendant’s Thomasville store, sat in the
meeting with White and Plaintiff. (Doc. 31-7, p. 2). According to Roberts, Plaintiff
responded to White saying, “[S]o we are just supposed to let customers talk to us
3
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After the March 14 incident with Hoffman, Plaintiff called Defendant’s
Regional Office and spoke with Karen Shakerin, the Regional Human Resources
Manager. (Doc. 31-2, pp. 13, 27). Plaintiff reported the incident to Shakerin, but
she omitted that the customer used racial slurs. (Id. at 27). Rather, Plaintiff
alluded to Hoffman’s harassment and said “she did not want to work for a
company that expected her to be disrespected.” (Id. at p. 28). 4 Plaintiff also told
Shakerin that she had interviewed with O’Reilly Auto Parts. (Id.).
The parties dispute whether Plaintiff resigned her position at AutoZone
during this conversation with Shakerin. According to Defendant, Plaintiff told
Shakerin that she was submitting her two weeks’ notice of resignation and that
she planned to go work for O’Reilly Auto Parts. (Doc. 25-4, p. 3). Based on this
information, Shakerin spoke with Curtis Allen, Defendant’s Regional Manager.
(Doc. 25-4, p. 6); (Doc. 25-2, p. 11). Allen advised Shakerin to accept Plaintiff’s
resignation immediately rather than allow her to continue working for two weeks.
(Doc. 25-4, p. 6). Defendant, through its employees, decided to accelerate
Plaintiff’s resignation because she indicated that she was leaving to work for a
competitor. (Id.). Shakerin relayed this information to White, and he
any way they want to? I can’t believe this company will allow customers to do
that.” (Id.).
4
Plaintiff said something similar to White. Baker’s notes were submitted into
evidence, documenting a meeting between himself, Plaintiff, and White. (Doc.
31-7). Baker wrote that he heard “Paula Gar[d]ner ask White [‘]What kind of
company would let a customer talk to them any kind of [] way, cuss them[,] and
talk to them like a dog.[’]” (Id. at p. 1).
4
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communicated to Plaintiff that her resignation had been accepted effective
immediately. (Doc. 25-4, pp. 13–14); (Doc. 31-7, p. 5).
Plaintiff contends that she never resigned from her employment and never
submitted a two weeks’ notice. (Doc. 31-3, p. 3). Plaintiff argues that she called
Shakerin to complain about how the company treated her and to request
information as to how she should resign. (Doc. 30, p. 2). She sought only to
inquire about Defendant’s resignation policy—not actually resign. (Id.). According
to Plaintiff, Defendant “purposely distorted her request for information” by
immediately accepting her purported resignation. (Id.).
II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A principal purpose of the summary judgment rule is “to isolate and
dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). Courts grant summary judgment when “the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of
material fact arises only when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Each party may support their factual assertions by citing to
evidence in the record, including the discovery and disclosure materials on file,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations, or other materials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court evaluates all the
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evidence, together with any logical inferences, in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (“The evidence of the non-movant
is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”). The
court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id.; see
also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000).
Credibility determinations and weighing of the evidence are functions solely of a
jury—“not those of a judge.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings two claims alleging race discrimination and retaliation under
Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating
against individuals based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2). Similarly,
§ 1981 ensures all citizens have “the same right” to “make and enforce contracts”
and shall receive “the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings . . . as is
enjoyed by white citizens.” The two provisions essentially overlap. CBOCS W.,
Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 454–55 (2008) (acknowledging “a necessary
overlap between Title VII and § 1981”) (quotation marks omitted). When a
plaintiff brings claims under Title VII and § 1981 “for the same allegedly unlawful
employment discrimination, the elements of the two causes of action are
identical, and identical methods of proof, such as the McDonnell Douglas
framework, are used for both causes of action.” Johnson v. Miami-Dade County,
948 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).
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Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated Title VII and § 1981 by
wrongfully terminating her. (Doc. 30, p. 2). She alleges that she complained to
Defendant’s human resources representative about the treatment she received
after alerting her manager to a customer using racial slurs toward her. (Id.).
During this conversation, Plaintiff expressed her concerns about how the
company addresses racial harassment from customers. Plaintiff also inquired
about Defendant’s resignation policy. (Id.). But, according to Plaintiff, Defendant
“purposefully distorted her request for information as a resignation.” (Id.).
Therefore, Defendant terminated her and disingenuously asserted that it relied
on her valid resignation. She claims that race discrimination and retaliation for
expressing her concerns motivated Defendant to accept and accelerate her
purported resignation.
A. Race Discrimination
Plaintiff proceeds on her race discrimination claim by relying on
circumstantial evidence of Defendant’s discriminatory conduct. (Doc. 30, p. 7). To
survive summary judgment, Plaintiff first bears the burden to satisfy the prima
facie elements set forth in the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
Lewis v. Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc)
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Under
McDonnell Douglas, she must demonstrate: “(1) that she belongs to a protected
class, (2) that she was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) that she
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was qualified to perform the job in question, and (4) that her employer treated
‘similarly situated’ employees outside her class more favorably.” Id. at 1220–21.
If Plaintiff satisfies these elements, then the burden shifts to Defendant “to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Id. at 1221.
Should Defendant make this showing, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff. Id.
Plaintiff
must
demonstrate
that
Defendant’s
proffered
“legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” was “merely a pretext for [its] unlawful discrimination.”
Id.
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff, an African American woman,
belongs to a protected class. Neither do they dispute that she was qualified to
perform her job at Defendant’s AutoZone store. Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment argues primarily that Plaintiff resigned from her position, and thus she
suffered no adverse employment action. (Doc. 25-1, p. 13). Defendant further
argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant treated its white employees
more favorably because Defendant also immediately terminated those
employees who resigned and indicated that they were leaving to work for a
competitor. (Id.). The Court first addresses these disputed elements to determine
whether Plaintiff has established her prima facie case or if material disputes of
fact exist.
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1. Adverse Employment Action
Firing an employee constitutes an adverse employment action to sustain a
race discrimination case. See Webb-Edwards v. Orange Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 525
F.3d 1013, 1031 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court has defined an adverse
employment action as . . . [a] tangible employment action [that] constitutes
significant change in employment status such as hiring, firing, . . . .” (quotation
marks and citation omitted)). Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot satisfy this
element because she resigned from her job at AutoZone. (Doc. 25). Plaintiff
called Shakerin, Defendant’s Regional Human Resources Manager, to report the
incident of racial harassment, and according to Shakerin, during that call Plaintiff
“said she was giving her two-weeks[’] notice.” (Doc. 25-4, p. 3). Further, Shakerin
said Plaintiff “stated she had interviewed with O’Reilly’s, . . . and [she was] going
to work for them.” (Id.). Plaintiff avers in her declaration that she “never resigned”
from her employment with AutoZone; she never offered her two weeks’ notice;
and to the extent that Defendant interpreted Plaintiff’s communications as a
resignation, Plaintiff contends it was never her intention to resign. (Doc. 31-3, pp.
3–4). Rather, she called Shakerin to inquire about how to resign should she
decide to do so. (Doc. 31-9, p. 2).
These contradicting narratives from Plaintiff and Defendant indicate a
material factual dispute regarding whether Plaintiff suffered an adverse
employment action. A reasonable jury could find Plaintiff’s evidence credible and
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conclude that Defendant terminated her employment. The Court finds, therefore,
that Plaintiff’s evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to her, precludes
summary judgment as to this issue.
2. Similarly Situated Employees
The Court next considers whether Defendant treated similarly situated
white employees more favorably than Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s first task is to point to
other AutoZone employees who were in a similar position as Plaintiff.
Specifically, a plaintiff “must show that she and her comparators are similarly
situated in all material respects.” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1226 (quotation marks
omitted). “[A] valid comparison will turn not on formal labels,” such as job title or
function, “but rather on substantive likenesses.” Id. at 1228. To have “substantive
likeness,” a comparator generally: “will have engaged in the same basic conduct
(or misconduct) as the plaintiff; will have been subject to the same employment
policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff; will ordinarily (although not invariably)
have been under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the plaintiff; and will
share the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary history.” Id. at 1227–28 (citations
omitted). Then, Plaintiff must show that Defendant treated these similarly situated
employees more favorably.
As to this element, Plaintiff points to four white employees who resigned
from their employment with Defendant. (Doc. 30, pp. 10–11). The four white
employees “unambiguously resigned” and told Defendant that they were going to
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work for a competitor. (Id.). Defendant consequently accelerated their
resignations. Like Plaintiff, these employees were not permitted to work two
weeks after notifying Defendant of their resignations. (Doc. 31-4, pp. 10–12). In
these instances with Plaintiff and the white employees Defendant invoked its
policy of accepting and accelerating a resignation when the employee expresses
that he or she is going to work for a competitor.
The difference in conduct—specifically, that the white employees
“unambiguously resigned” and Plaintiff only complained or inquired about how to
resign—does not defeat “similarly situated” status. First, Defendant perceived
that Plaintiff and the white employees engaged in the same conduct. Second,
Plaintiff’s assertion that she and the white employees conducted themselves
differently is, according to Plaintiff, evidence of the alleged racial discrimination.
In other words, these cases suggest that Defendant applied its resignation policy
differently to the white employees and Plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant treated these white employees more
favorably because Defendant applied the resignation policy to Plaintiff although
she did not resign. In the four instances where Defendant accepted the white
employees’ resignations, those resignations were unambiguous. Here, Plaintiff
alleges that she did not intend to resign. Nevertheless, Defendant accepted and
accelerated her unintended resignation. According to Plaintiff, the difference in
how
these
employees
communicated
11
their
resignations
demonstrates
Case 7:18-cv-00087-HL Document 38 Filed 05/06/20 Page 12 of 18
Defendant’s favorable treatment to its white employees. Defendant allowed the
white employees to articulate their resignations fully and intentionally before
applying its resignation policy. Plaintiff alleges she merely expressed her
complaints to Shakerin and inquired about how to resign. That conversation, in
turn, resulted in her termination. The difference between Plaintiff and the white
employees’ communications suggests that Defendant did not offer to Plaintiff the
same opportunity to discuss her intentions with the company that the white
employees received. Instead, Defendant unilaterally accelerated Plaintiff’s
termination even though she had not “unambiguously resigned” like the white
employees.
Because, as discussed above, the fact as to whether Plaintiff resigned is
still in dispute, a dispute also exists as to whether similarly situated employees
received more favorable treatment. Should a reasonable jury find that Plaintiff did
not resign in her conversation to Shakerin, then the jury could also find that
Defendant treated its white employees more favorably because Defendant
subjected Plaintiff to its resignation policy despite Plaintiff not communicating her
“unambiguous” intention to resign.
3. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Explanation
Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to establish the prima facie
elements of her race discrimination claim. The burden now shifts to Defendant “to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Lewis, 918 F.3d
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at 1221. Defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s
termination is that Shakerin genuinely believed that Plaintiff intended to resign.
According to Shakerin, Plaintiff told her that “she was giving her two-weeks[’]
notice;” she had “interviewed with O’Reilly’s;” and she was leaving AutoZone to
work for the competitor. (Doc. 25-4, p. 3); (Doc. 31-7). Shakerin also stated that
during her phone conversation with Plaintiff, Plaintiff did not mention that
Hoffman had used racial slurs. She indicated only that “a customer had
disrespected her and used profanity,” and she felt like Defendant “allow[ed] a
customer to disrespect her.” (Id. at p. 4). Plaintiff admitted during her deposition
that she did not tell Shakerin that Hoffman used racial slurs. (Doc. 25-3, p. 85).
Furthermore, Shakerin’s testimony is consistent with evidence concerning
Plaintiff’s conversations with Baker, Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, and White,
the Thomasville AutoZone’s District Manager. On March 3, 2017, two weeks
before the incident with Hoffman, Plaintiff texted White that she had an interview
with O’Reilly Auto Parts scheduled for the next week. (Doc. 31-8, p. 4). On March
14, 2017, the day of the incident, Plaintiff told Baker that she was submitting her
two weeks’ notice and “might take the job” at O’Reilly Auto Parts. (Doc. 31-7, p.
1).
Although Plaintiff disputes that she resigned, given the evidence
Defendant has presented, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff did in fact
resign, or at least, Defendant reasonably interpreted her communications as a
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resignation without any discriminatory intent. The Court finds that Defendant has
provided sufficient evidence to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating Plaintiff.
4. Pretext
The evidentiary burden now shifts back to Plaintiff to show that
Defendant’s proffered reason for her termination was merely pretext for racial
discrimination. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981) (“[T]he plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove . . . that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a
pretext for discrimination.”). To establish pretext, a plaintiff must prove “both that
the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary’s
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). This means that a plaintiff must
address the proffered reason “head on and rebut” its truth. Chapman v. AI
Trans., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000). “[T]he employee cannot succeed
by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” Id. Rather, the court’s
“inquiry is limited to whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its
behavior.” Id. (quoting Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th
Cir. 1991)). A plaintiff can demonstrate that the articulated reasons were not
believable
“by
pointing
to
weaknesses,
implausibilities,
inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the proffered explanation.” Brooks v. Cty.
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Comm’n of Jefferson Cty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Defendant’s legitimate reason for terminating Plaintiff was its honest belief
that she had submitted her resignation. To establish pretext, Plaintiff argues that
she never resigned her employment from AutoZone and that she did not
immediately start working for an AutoZone competitor. (Doc. 30, p. 11). The fact
that Plaintiff never actually resigned—absent any evidence of discrimination—
does not suggest any pretext. An employer’s honestly held, nondiscriminatory
belief, though mistaken, is insufficient to establish liability. Alvarez v. Royal
Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010). “[O]ur sole
concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivated the decision” to
terminate Plaintiff. Id. (quoting Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir.
2002)) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, even though Shakerin may have
incorrectly concluded that Plaintiff resigned, that fact alone cannot establish
pretext. An employer may fire an employee based on erroneous facts as long as
discrimination is not the employer’s true motivation. Id. And no evidence in the
record suggests Defendant’s decision was discriminatory.
Similarly, that Plaintiff did not immediately work for a competitor also
cannot establish that Defendant’s decision to accelerate Plaintiff’s purported
resignation was discriminatory. Defendant has presented evidence that Shakerin
and White honestly believed that Plaintiff intended to leave AutoZone to work for
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a competitor. Plaintiff’s affidavit states that as of March 14, 2017, she “had
neither been offered nor accepted a position with any AutoZone competitor.”
(Doc. 31-3, p. 4). That assertion, however, is insufficient to create a factual
dispute regarding pretext because it does not refute what Plaintiff may have said
to Shakerin, or what Shakerin may have genuinely understood from their
conversation. 5 At the time Defendant terminated Plaintiff, Defendant was
unaware that she had neither been offered nor accepted a position with a
competitor. What matters is what Shakerin understood from her conversation
with Plaintiff. And Plaintiff has not presented evidence to refute that when
speaking with Shakerin, she may have suggested an intention to work for
O’Reilly Auto Parts.
The evidence before the Court demonstrates nothing more than a
miscommunication between Plaintiff and Shakerin. Shakerin discerned from their
conversation
that
Plaintiff
intended
to
resign
from
AutoZone.
Plaintiff
characterizes her words as complaints about AutoZone or simply an inquiry
about how to resign, but not rising to a resignation. Although Shakerin may have
misunderstood Plaintiff, no evidence suggests that discriminatory animus was
Defendant’s true motive for terminating Plaintiff. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264
(“Despite [the] shifts in the burden of production, the ultimate burden of
5
When Plaintiff was specifically asked about whether she told Shakerin that she
intended to work for O’Reilly Auto Parts, Plaintiff said she did “not recall” telling
Shakerin about the O’Reilly Auto Parts’ position. (Doc. 25-3, p. 85).
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persuasion remains on the plaintiff to show that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against her.”). The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has not
satisfied her burden to establish pretext, and her race discrimination claim fails.
B. Retaliation
Title VII and § 1981 prohibit employers from retaliating against an
employee because she engaged in a statutorily protected activity. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a); CBOCS W., Inc., 553 U.S. at 457 (holding “that 42 U.S.C. § 1981
encompasses claims of retaliation”). Like Plaintiff’s direct discrimination claim,
the Court uses the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to analyze her
race-based retaliation claim. “Under this framework, a plaintiff alleging retaliation
must first establish a prima facie case by showing that: (1) he engaged in a
statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and
(3) he established a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse
action.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 2009). Once the
plaintiff establishes her prima facie case of retaliation, the burden “shifts to the
defendant to rebut the presumption [of retaliation] by articulating a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. at 1308. After
the defendant makes this showing, the plaintiff then has the “opportunity to
demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason was merely a pretext to mask
discriminatory actions.” Id.
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To sustain her retaliation claim, Plaintiff relies on the same evidence
discussed above regarding her direct discrimination claim. (Doc. 30, pp. 12–13).
Even if Plaintiff can satisfy the other elements of her prima facie case or at least
raise a material dispute, the Court has already concluded that she has not put
forth any evidence to show pretext. No evidence suggests that Defendant’s
acceptance of her resignation was discriminatory, and Plaintiff has not shown
that Defendant’s articulated reason for accepting her resignation was untrue.
Rather, viewing the evidence in the best light for Plaintiff, the evidence shows
that Defendant may have unintentionally misinterpreted Plaintiff’s complaints as a
resignation, and consequently, accelerated her resignation based on Plaintiff’s
conversations with Shakerin and various other AutoZone employees indicating
that she intended to work for O’Reilly Auto Parts.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to suggest that racial
discrimination motivated Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s
claims fail, and accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 25). Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED this 6th day of May, 2020.
s/ Hugh Lawson_______________
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
kac
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