Ledford v. Austin et al
Filing
41
ORDER granting 30 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 5/11/11. (cem)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
LARRY L. LEDFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
DALLAS AUSTIN, TINA
GORDON CHISM, ANTWONE
FISHER, CHRIS ROBINSON,
TIONNE WATKINS, WARNER
BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC.,
and ATLANTIC RECORDING
CORPORATION,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:09-CV-3237-RWS
ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [30]. After considering the record, the Court enters the following
Order.
Background
Plaintiff’s Complaint [2] asserts claims under the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 501 et seq., and under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
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Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.1 Plaintiff’s Complaint
[2] alleges the film ATL infringed his copyright in a screenplay entitled
Southern Hospitality. Plaintiff’s screenplay involves
Geoffrey Jackson an [a]spiring artist who has dreams of breaking
into the movie industry as a screenwriter. He relocates to Atlanta,
Georgia and discovers new friends and the warmth of Southern
Hospitality. He takes a dead end job as a four star cook at a local
popular restaurant called club loo. As Geoffrey makes his
transition to Atlanta, he soon meets a very well to do lady name[d]
Natasha Greene, not knowing her back ground Natasha accepts
Geoffrey for who, and what he is, thus becoming intimately
involved in the movie.
(Dkt. [2] at 13). Plaintiff asserts that his screenplay became public in late 2004
when he entered it into a screenwriting competition associated with an
independent black film festival. (Id. at 14). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
Dallas Austin’s foundation had partnered with the festival in early 2005, and it
was then that Austin began reworking Plaintiff’s script into the script for ATL.
(Id. at 14).
In 1999, Defendant Warner Bros. acquired the exclusive right to portray
the life stories of Defendants Tionne Watkins and Dallas Austin and registered
a copyright for that right under the title “Jellybeans” in 2000. (Dkt. [30-3] at
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Plaintiff’s Complaint also asserts a claim for the criminal violation of 17
U.S.C. § 506, which the Court previously dismissed as frivolous. (Dkt. [4]).
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21). The rights granted to Warner Bros. “relate to the general events and the
period of [Austin’s] life while [he was] at a roller rink in Atlanta, which is the
approximately 4-year period from 1986 through 1989.” (Id. at 28). Defendant
Fisher delivered his first draft of the screenplay for “Jellybeans” to Warner
Bros. in July 2000. (Id. at 35-149). From 2000 to 2004, the screenplay
underwent multiple revisions, and Defendant Chism completed the tenth draft
on April 6, 2004. (Id. at 153-271). As presented in the tenth draft of the
screenplay, the story concerned
a young aspiring artist [who] comes of age in a lower-income
Southwest Atlanta neighborhood; socializes at the local skating
rink; struggles with family issues, crime, and early adult
responsibilities; and falls in love with a girl of higher social status
who sees him for the good-hearted, talented young man that he is.
(Dkt. [30-1] at 5; see also Dkt. [30-3] at 153-271). The screenplay underwent
several more revisions before the final screenplay was submitted on August 16,
2005. (Id. at 151). The characters and plot of the final screenplay for ATL
closely resemble those of the April 2004 draft. (Compare Id. at 153-271 and Id.
at 273-387).
Discussion
I.
Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that summary judgment be
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granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). “The moving party bears ‘the initial responsibility of informing the . . .
court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.’” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259
(11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.
Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) (internal quotations omitted)). Where the
moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who
must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a
genuine issue of material fact does exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 257, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
II.
Plaintiff’s Copyright Infringement Claims
To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove two elements:
“(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of
the work that are original.” Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499
U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (citation omitted). Demonstrating the second of these
elements,
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entails proof of both factual and legal copying, that is: (1) whether
the defendant, as a factual matter, copied portions of the plaintiff’s
work; and (2) whether, as a mixed issue of fact and law, those
elements of the copyrighted work that have been copied are
protected expression and of such importance to the copied work
that the appropriation is actionable.
Peter Letterese and Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Intl’l,
533 F.3d 1287, 1300 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal punctuation
omitted). “In the absence of direct proof, factual copying may be inferred from
circumstantial evidence, either through establishing that the works are strikingly
similar; or through proof of access to the copyrighted work and probative
similarity.” Id. (internal citations and punctuation omitted). Copyright only
protects original expression and does not extend to any underlying ideas,
procedures, and systems. Id. at 1302. “For example, the idea of hunting a
formidable whale at the lead of an eccentric captain is not protected by
copyright law. The expression of this idea as it is encapsulated in the novel
Moby-Dick, however, is protected by copyright.” Id. (quoting BUC Int’l Corp.
v. Int’l Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d 1129, 1143 (11th Cir. 2007)).
Plaintiff contends that “[t]he central focus and plot of both movies are the
relationships between the key actors Geoffrey Jackson and Natasha Green of
Southern Hospitality, and Rashad and New New of the movie ATL.” (Dkt. [2]
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at 14). In response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [30],
Plaintiff notes that Geoffrey speaks with a New York accent in the screenplay
for Southern Hospitality, and asserts that Defendants used Geoffrey as the basis
for the character Brooklyn in ATL. (Dkt. [38] at 2). However, in his
Complaint [2] Plaintiff appears to assert that Geoffrey was the basis for the
character Rashad in ATL. (Dkt. [2] at 13). Plaintiff’s Response [38] also notes
that the character KB in Southern Hospitality is a poet and rapper, and served as
the basis for the character Teddy in ATL, who speaks with a southern accent
and southern dialect. (Id. at 2-3). However, Plaintiff previously asserted that
his character KB was the basis for Brooklyn’s character in ATL. (Dkt. [30-5] at
20). Even ignoring the inconsistency of Plaintiff’s allegations of similarity, the
alleged similarities between Southern Hospitality and ATL are insufficient to
state a claim for copyright infringement. At best, the allegations are akin to an
author of a story about an eccentric captain hunting a formidable whale–a story
that is otherwise dissimilar to Moby-Dick–claiming that Herman Melville’s
work infringed upon his copyright.
The Eleventh Circuit has noted that “where the similarity between two
works concerns only non-copyrightable elements of the plaintiff’s work, or
where no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that the two works are
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substantially similar, summary judgment is appropriate.” Peter Letterese and
Assocs. Inc., 533 F.3d at 1302 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In the present action, summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff’s claim of
copyright infringement. Plaintiff has failed to “present affirmative evidence to
show that a genuine issue of material fact” exists as to whether the two works
are “strikingly similar.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Peter Letterese and
Assocs., Inc., 533 F.3d at 1300. Even assuming that Plaintiff could
demonstrate probative similarity between Southern Hospitality and ATL,
Plaintiff has failed to present any affirmative evidence that any of the
Defendants actually had access to his screenplay prior to the creation of the
screenplay for ATL. Without affirmative evidence in either regard, Plaintiff
cannot demonstrate that Defendants copied original constituent elements of
Southern Hospitality. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims of copyright infringement
fail to demonstrate a genuine dispute as to a material fact.
III.
Plaintiff’s RICO Claim
To succeed on a claim under RICO a plaintiff must prove each of the
following four elements: (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern
(4) of racketeering activity. Durham v. Bus. Mgmt. Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505,
1511 (11th Cir. 1988). It appears that Plaintiff relies upon his allegations of
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copyright infringement as the necessary predicate offenses of racketeering
activity for the asserted RICO claims. Because Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that copyright infringement occurred, he cannot prove a violation
of RICO. Therefore, Plaintiff’s RICO claims fail to demonstrate a genuine
dispute as to a material fact.
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [30] is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED, this 11th
day of May, 2010.
________________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
United States District Judge
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