Gordon v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts

Filing 69

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 57 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In granting summary judgment, the Court DENIES AS MOOT 46 Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order. Defendants John Doe and James Doe and the assault and battery claim asserted against only them are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Signed by Judge Clarence Cooper on 9/26/2011. (mdy) Modified on 9/26/2011 to edit docket text (mdy).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
JASON N. GORDON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STARWOOD HOTELS & RESORTS
WORLDWIDE, INC. d/b/a
WESTIN PEACHTREE PLAZA and
JOHN DOE and JAMES DOE,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:09-CV-3493-CC

OPINION AND ORDER
This premises liability action is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for
Protective Order [Doc. No. 46] and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[Doc. No. 57]. For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order
as moot.
I.

FACTS 1
For purposes of summary judgment, the following material facts are

undisputed. Plaintiff Jason Gordon came to Atlanta in 2007 for the Memorial Day
weekend to celebrate his 30th birthday. (Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts “DSMF” ¶1.) During his visit, Plaintiff rented a room for two nights

Plaintiff has objected to Defendant’s failure to list material facts in separate,
concise, numbered statements in Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [Doc.
No. 57-2]. The Court’s review of the parties’ summary judgment filings reveals, however,
that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant has complied strictly with this Court’s local rule
regarding summary judgment filings, Local Rule 56.1. Plaintiff, for example, filed an
Amended Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.
No. 64] (the “Amended Response”), which violates Local Rules 7.1(C) and 56.1(A).
Nevertheless, this Court exercises its discretion to consider Plaintiff’s Amended Response
and to consider all facts set forth by the parties that the Court deems material and that are
supported by evidence in the record.
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at the Westin Peachtree Plaza Hotel in downtown Atlanta (the “Hotel” or
“Defendant”). (DSMF ¶ 1.)
On the night of May 26, 2007, Plaintiff, along with Carl Gordon (Plaintiff’s
brother), George Bibb (Plaintiff’s friend from New Jersey), and Thomas Reynolds
(Plaintiff’s current attorney), went to the Lotus Lounge nightclub. (DSMF ¶ 3.) Two
other friends of Plaintiff, Lamech Darien and Jerrod Graham, were hosting a special
fund-raising event for NFL and NBA athletes that night at the Lotus Lounge.
(DSMF ¶ 3.) While at the nightclub, Plaintiff and his entourage were seated in a VIP
section. (DSMF ¶ 4.) Mr. Graham primarily worked inside the club and made sure
athletes were seated in the sections reserved for them, and Mr. Darien primarily
worked outside the nightclub. (Id.)
When the nightclub closed at 3:00 a.m., Plaintiff and his entourage headed
back to the Hotel. (DSMF ¶ 5.) Plaintiff rode in the backseat of a car driven by his
brother, Carl Gordon. (Id.) Plaintiff does not remember who was in the driver’s
side passenger seat. (Id.)
Mr. Graham and Mr. Darien rode together in a separate car from the nightclub
and arrived at the Hotel prior to Plaintiff and his entourage. (DSMF ¶ 7.) When
they pulled into the motor lobby of the Hotel, there was a line of cars. (Id.) The
Hotel valet was assisting one of the cars in front of them. (Id.)
While Mr. Darien waited for the valet’s assistance, Mr. Graham got out of the
car and started walking towards the entrance of the Hotel. (DSMF ¶ 8.) As Mr.
Graham walked towards the entrance, he saw another group of people walking
towards the entrance. (Id.) The group consisted of three to five black males,
including the men who started the fight that is the subject of this lawsuit. (Id.) The
group of males looked like they could have been Hotel guests getting out of their
cars to head into the Hotel. (DSMF ¶ 9.) There was nothing suspicious about the
group of men, and nothing about the group scared or alarmed Mr. Graham or made
him think they were about to attack him. (Id.) The men were not yelling or running,
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and they did not say anything to Mr. Graham before attacking him. (Id.) Mr.
Graham has no idea why they attacked him. (Deposition of Jerrod Graham
“Graham Dep.” at 39:11-12.) Mr. Graham recognized one of the men in the group
as “Kerris” from previous events he had put on. (Id. at 35:2-17.) As Mr. Graham
arrived at the entrance, he was hit in the face by the man he recognized as “Kerris”
and then other members of the group jumped him from behind. (Id. at 39:19-40:1-9.)
Plaintiff was getting out of the car driven by his brother, Carl, when he first
saw Mr. Graham being attacked. (DSMF ¶¶ 6, 11.) Plaintiff, intending to see what
was going on, stepped out of the car and took two steps towards the altercation.
(Deposition of Jason Gordon (“Gordon Dep.”) at 66: 2-22.) Plaintiff does not know
where the attackers came from. (DSMF ¶¶ 6, 11.) Other than his memory of getting
out of the car and taking two steps, he has no memory of anything related to the
fight. (Id.)
Meanwhile, as Mr. Darien was walking towards the valet attendant to give
him his keys, he noticed the fight involving the group of males and recognized Mr.
Graham and Plaintiff. (DSMF¶ 12.) Specifically, Mr. Darien testified:
Q

And you got out of the car to try to find a valet person?

A

Yes.

Q

And what happened after that?

A
I remember getting his attention, walking towards him to
give him my keys, and then seeing the fight had broken out.
Q

The fight being between Jerrod and some guys?

A
There were a group of people there. I think Jason was
there and Jerrod was there.
Q
knew?
A

When you first saw the fight, who was involved that you
I only recognized Jerrod and Jason.

(Darien Dep. at 23:18-24:6.) Mr. Darien further testified:
Q

When you saw the fight break out, what did you do?
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A
First, I looked around for security, asked the valet for
help. When I saw nobody was coming over, I went over and tried to
break it up.
Q

Did you actually break it up?

A
There was kind of a stand-off. There was a point where
Jason got hit with a bottle, and he was unconscious. That kind of put
everybody in a shock and they went their separate ways after that.
(Id. at 28:12-16.)
Plaintiff was taken by ambulance to Grady Memorial Hospital. (Gordon Dep.
at 81:8-20.) Plaintiff’s brother, Carl Gordon, rode with Plaintiff to the hospital. (Id.)
Plaintiff returned from Grady Hospital to the Hotel early Sunday morning. (Id.)
Darryl Jett, the Hotel manager, indicated that it is normal for the Hotel to
employ four to five security personnel during the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift.
(Deposition of Darryl Jett (“Jett Dep.”) 21:7-9; PSMF ¶ 25.) As a part of their duties,
the security guards are required to perform their normal duties as security staff as
well as other non-security-related duties for the Hotel. (PSMF ¶ 25.) Mr. Jett
indicated that the Hotel security staff is responsible for monitoring guest areas and
other checkpoints throughout the Hotel. (Jett Dep. at 32:9-23.)
Mr. Jett indicated that the Hotel also has cameras located on the outside of the
building. (Jett Dep. at 44:14-25.) The cameras located outside were installed and
upgraded in 2007. (Id. at 65:3-16.) The security system and surveillance cameras
used by the Hotel have the capability of recording directly to a computer. (PSMF ¶
26; Jett Dep. at 65:17-25.) Mr. Jett indicated that although there is a camera in the
motor lobby that has recording capabilities, on the day in question, the recording
system was not working and operational. (PSMF ¶ 28.) In fact, the security
recording system had not been working properly since late 2006. (Jett Dep. at 66:1225.)
According to Mr. Jett, for at least four years prior to the incident involving
Plaintiff, there had not been any fights, attacks, assaults or violent crimes of any kind
inside the Hotel or in the motor lobby area. (DSMF ¶ 20; Jett Aff. ¶¶ 4, 5.) The
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Hotel, however, is located in an area where previous crimes have occurred. (PSMF
¶ 23.)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issue as to any material fact

is present and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). In seeking summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial
responsibility to demonstrate there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970).
The moving party’s burden is discharged merely by showing that there is an absence
of evidence supporting an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). “Only
when that burden has been met does the burden shift to the non-moving party to
demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary
judgment.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991).
In evaluating the argument of the moving party, the court must view all
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all facts
in its favor. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment when the
non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element
of the case with respect to which the non-moving party has the burden of proof.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
A fact is material when the controlling substantive law identifies it as an
essential element of the non-moving party’s case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 247, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Additionally, an issue is
genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in
favor of the non-moving party. Id. An issue of fact is not genuine if it is
unsupported by evidence or if it is created by evidence that is “merely colorable”or
“not significantly probative.” Id. at 249-250. “[T]he mere existence of some alleged
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factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.” Id. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts claims in this action for negligent failure to maintain the

premises in a reasonably safe manner, failure to warn of unsafe conditions, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff also asserts assault and battery
claims against only John Doe and James Doe, who have never been named or
served. Plaintiff finally seeks to recover punitive damages.
The Court need not and does not address the merits of Plaintiff’s assault and
battery claims against John Doe and James Doe, as these defendants and the claims
against them are due to be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(m) for lack of service. However, for the reasons stated below,
Defendant Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. d/b/a Westin Peachtree
Plaza (“Defendant”) is entitled to summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs’ other
claims.
A.

Negligent Failure to Maintain the Premises

To prevail on a cause of action for negligence under Georgia law, the plaintiff
must establish the essential elements of duty, breach of duty, proximate causation
and damages. Black v. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. Co., 202 Ga. App. 805, 806, 415 S.E.2d
705 (1992). Under Georgia law, the owner or occupier of real property owes a duty
to its invitees to exercise ordinary care in keeping its premises safe. O.C.G.A. § 513-1. Nonetheless, while the law imposes such a duty on the property owner, the
proprietor is not the insurer of the invitee’s safety, and a mere showing that an
injury occurred while on the premises of a proprietor is not sufficient, by itself, to
create a presumption of negligence. Lee v. Food Lion, 243 Ga. App. 819, 820, 534
S.E.2d 507 (2000); Cleghorn v. Winn Dixie Stores, 228 Ga. App. 766, 767, 492 S.E.2d
745 (1997).
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With respect to the duty of a property owner to keep an invitee safe from the
criminal act of a third party, there are two principles of law that govern the
imposition of liability for the failure to protect against such a criminal act. B-T Two,
Inc. v. Bennett, 307 Ga. App. 649, 654-55, 706 S.E.2d 87 (2011) (citations omitted). In
B-T Two, the Georgia Court of Appeals set forth these two principles as follows:
The first of these principles is that an owner or occupier must protect
an invitee against the criminal act of a third party only to the extent that
the criminal act is reasonably foreseeable. The second principle is that,
even when a criminal act is reasonably foreseeable, an owner or
occupier is not liable for injuries resulting from the criminal act of a
third party unless he had superior knowledge of the danger.
307 Ga. App. at 655 (internal citations omitted).
The plaintiff’s evidentiary burden is to establish foreseeability of criminal acts
by the existence of prior similar crimes on the premises or within close proximity of
the premises. Drayton v. Kroger Co., 297 Ga. App. 484, 485, 677 S.E.2d 316 (2009);
Donaldson v. Olympic Health Spa, Inc., 175 Ga. App. 258, 260, 333 S.E.2d 98 (1985).
In order to be “substantially similar,” Georgia law requires that the circumstances
surrounding the prior incidents be sufficiently similar “to attract the owner’s
attention to the dangerous condition which resulted in the litigated incident.”
Grandma’s Biscuits, Inc. v. Baisden, 192 Ga. App. 816, 817, 386 S.E.2d 415 (1989)
(citation and internal quotes omitted). The crimes must: (1) occur at comparable
locations; (2) occur under similar physical circumstances and conditions; (3) be of
similar type; and (4) not be too remote in time. Burnett v. Stagner Hotel Courts, Inc.,
821 F. Supp. 678, 683 (N.D. Ga. 1993). “Although the prior criminal activity must be
substantially similar to the crime in question, there is no requirement that the crimes
be identical.” Walker v. Aderhold Props., Inc., 303 Ga. App. 710, 712, 694 S.E.2d 119
(2010) (citation omitted).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff has not presented competent evidence that the
criminal act committed against him by the unidentified third parties was reasonably
foreseeable. Plaintiff contends that a report quantifying and listing the various
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crimes occurring at or within the area surrounding the Hotel between 2000 and 20082
and the deposition of part-time security guard Ted Skinner are sufficient to create
or demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant was on
notice of potential criminal assaults on guests of the Hotel. The Court disagrees.
As Defendants argue in moving for summary judgment, Plaintiff cannot point
to any crimes occurring at or in close proximity to the Hotel that are substantially
similar to the incident at issue in this case. First, the portions of Mr. Skinner’s
deposition testimony attached to Plaintiff’s summary judgment filings indicate that
Mr. Skinner testified that he did not recall any violent crimes occurring at the Hotel
and no robberies, in particular. He was aware that there had been guest room thefts,
but he emphasized that there had been no robberies or other incidents like that.
Second, the crime report, which is attached to the unnotarized affidavit of Curtis
Davenport, the custodian or records for Atlanta Police Department, purportedly
pertains to “criminal activity at 210 Peachtree Street Atlanta, Ga,” (Affidavit of
Curtis Davenport “Davenport Aff.” ¶ 2), which the Court judicially notes is the
address for the Hotel. However, part of the crime report on which Plaintiff relies
heavily pertains to “Crime for Beat 506, including 210 Peachtree St.” (Doc. No. 64-9
at 3) (emphasis added). Plaintiff offers no information or evidence regarding the
breadth of the geographical area covered within “Beat 506,” but this particular page
of the report’s use of the phrase “including 210 Peachtree St” indicates that the crime
statistics reported on the page cover geographical areas beyond the Hotel. There
simply is insufficient evidence for the Court to conclude that the areas included are
in such close proximity to the Hotel so as to put the Hotel on notice of the possibility
of criminal activity occurring at the Hotel. The other pages of the report do appear
to relate to criminal activity occurring specifically at the address of the Hotel.
The Court notes that crimes that occurred in 2008 would not have put the
Hotel on notice of the possibility of criminal activity in 2007. See Drayton, 297 Ga. App. at
487.
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However, the crimes, which occurred over the aforementioned eight-year period,
include robbery, assault and battery, burglary, larceny, shoplifting, and theft of
automobiles, trucks, vans, or buses. Of the 338 incidents reported during the eightyear period, the overwhelming majority are shoplifting offenses or crimes of larceny
from the building or vehicles. The Court therefore rejects Plaintiff’s position that
there were thousands of crimes and hundreds of violent crimes that occurred at the
Hotel between 2006 and 2008, which would have put the Hotel on notice of the
possibility of a violent crime occurring like the one in this case. See Agnes Scott
College, Inc. v. Clark, 273 Ga. App. 619, 616 S.E.2d 468 (2005) (awarding summary
judgment where the prior criminal acts relied on by the plaintiff, including general
crime statistics and evidence of previous minor property crimes in the area, “[did]
not suggest that personal injury would occur in the manner that it did in [that]
case”). There were only seven violent crimes that occurred at the address of the
Hotel within five years preceding the incident in dispute. Five of these incidents
appear to be robberies that occurred on the street, and two of these incidents
involved some type of assault. While the circumstances surrounding these incidents
are otherwise unknown and the incidents arguably might have been substantially
similar to the incident in question, significantly, Plaintiff has pointed to absolutely
no evidence that the Hotel had knowledge of these incidents. To the contrary,
Defendant has come forward with the affidavit of Darryl Jett, the manager of the
Hotel, who attested that he completed a comprehensive security review when he
began working at the Hotel in the summer of 2006. That review informed “that for
at least five years prior to plaintiff’s assault, there [were] no violent crimes of any
kind in the Hotel or in the motor lobby area.” (Jett Aff. ¶ 4.) He further attested that
“[t]o the extent that there may have been violent crimes in the nearby downtown
Atlanta area, the Hotel has no knowledge or information about any of them.” (Id.)
Accordingly, the crime report is insufficient to establish that the crime that occurred
in this case was reasonably foreseeable and that the Hotel had any duty to warn
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Plaintiff of or protect him against the criminal activities of the third parties who
assaulted him. See Whitmore v. First Federal Sav. Bank of Brunswick, 225 Ga. App.
768, 769, 484 S.E.2d 708 (1997) (“With regard to the police reports and printouts,
although it is true they demonstrate that certain crimes of violence occurred in the
area surrounding the bank over a two year period, they do not demonstrate that
First Federal had any knowledge concerning such crimes.”); Sun Trust Banks, Inc.
v. Killebrew, 266 Ga. 109, 109-110, 464 S.E.2d 207 (1995) (holding that bank was not
liable to customer shot by third party since the bank had no knowledge of the prior
crime that occurred).3
Defendant also is entitled to summary judgment because the Hotel did not
have superior knowledge of the harm and Plaintiff assumed the risk of harm. As
stated supra, the true basis for an owner’s liability is his superior knowledge of the
existence of a condition that could subject his invitees to an unreasonable risk of
harm or injury. Garret v. Hanes, 273 Ga. App. 894, 895, 616 S.E.2d 202 (2005). Under
Georgia case law, if an invitee knows of a dangerous condition, there is no duty on
the part of the proprietor to warn him and there is no liability for resulting injury
because the invitee has as much knowledge of the danger as the proprietor. Pound
v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 166, 167, 279 S.E.2d 342 (1981). Here, Plaintiff
admits to having had knowledge of the dangerous, ongoing altercation before he
exited his vehicle and moved towards the altercation with the intent of seeing what
was going on. All evidence indicates that Plaintiff knew of and appreciated the
danger and willingly proceeded, despite the danger. Thus, Plaintiff essentially
assumed the risk. See Fagan v. Atnalta, Inc., 189 Ga. App. 460, 461, 376 S.E.2d 204
(1998); Sailors v. Esmail Int’l, 217 Ga. App. 811, 813, 459 S.E.2d 465 (1995). At the
very least, his knowledge of the dangerous condition was equal, if not superior, to

Plaintiff’s reliance on Meyers v. Ramada Hotel Operating Co., 833 F.2d 1521
(11th Cir. 1987), a case applying Florida law, is misplaced.
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Defendant’s.
The Court further rejects Plaintiff’s position that Defendant failed to maintain
the premises in a reasonably safe manner and that the alleged inadequate security
measures of the Hotel proximately caused Plaintiff’s injury. Prior to the start of the
altercation, there was nothing about the group of aggressors that would have caused
Hotel security to be suspicious. According to the evidence pointed to by Defendant,
the men looked like they could have been guests returning to the Hotel. They were
not running, yelling, or acting suspicious. Simply put, there was nothing to suggest
that the group of men who attacked Plaintiff and Mr. Graham did not belong in the
motor lobby, that they should not have been there at that time, or that Hotel security
should have removed them from the motor lobby before the fight broke out. There
simply is no evidence that the Hotel’s security staffing was negligent in any manner,
and there likewise is no evidence that the Hotel could have done anything to
prevent or shorten the fight prior to Plaintiff’s injury.
Plaintiff maintains that if Defendant had properly working security cameras
and a reasonable number of security guards working in the motor lobby on the night
in question, Plaintiff’s attackers would have been deterred. However, “a plaintiff
must do more than merely speculate as to whether enhanced security measures
would have prevented an attack.” Walker, 303 Ga. App. at 714-15. Plaintiff’s
assertion that a properly working security system and a reasonable number of
security guards in the Hotel’s motor lobby would have served as a deterrent for the
attackers is merely speculative and is not supported by competent evidence.
Plaintiff has failed to present any argument or evidence as to how the inability of the
security camera to record to videotape caused or contributed to this incident.
Moreover, there is no evidence that the Hotel violated any standard of care by
having four or five security officers present on the premises at the time in question.
There is no evidence, for example, that this fight was started because there were no
security officers in view. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence demonstrating a
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causal link between the security measures taken or not taken by the Hotel and the
injuries sustained by Plaintiff to support his claim of Defendant’s negligence. “A
plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion
that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact
of the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough.” Post Props., Inc.
v. Doe, 230 Ga. App. 34, 39, 495 S.E.2d 573 (1997) (citation omitted). “Guesses or
speculation which raise merely a conjecture or possibility are not sufficient to create
even an inference of fact for consideration on summary judgment.” Id. (citation
omitted). Therefore, the Court concludes that there is an absence of evidence to
demonstrate causation.
B.

Negligent Failure to Warn and Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligent failure to
warn and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims because Plaintiff has
abandoned the claims by failing to address them in response to Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587,
599 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[G]rounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in
summary judgment are deemed abandoned.”); Road Sprinkler Fitters v. Indep.
Sprinkler Corp., 10 F.3d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1994) (same). Moreover, as the Court’s
analysis above demonstrates, these claims also are without substantive merit.
Plaintiff is unable to show that Defendant was negligent in any manner. Defendant
had no notice of any latent dangers and had no obligation to warn invitees of a
generalized risk of crime. Anderson v. Radisson Hotel Corp., 834 F. Supp. 1364,
1372 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (citations omitted).
C.

Punitive Damages

Plaintiff seeks to recover punitive damages from Defendant. “Punitive
damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct, malice,
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fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the
presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.” O.C.G.A § 51-12-5.1(b).
“In accordance with O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1, punitive damages can only be awarded
as additional damages.” Nelson v. Glynn-Brunswick Hosp. Auth., 257 Ga. App. 571,
580, 571 S.E.2d 557 (2002). Here, because Plaintiff has failed to establish that he has
any viable claim against Defendant, Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 57]. In granting summary judgment, the Court
DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order [Doc. No. 46]. Defendants
John Doe and James Doe and the assault and battery claim asserted against only
them are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(m).
SO ORDERED this 26th day of September, 2011.
s/ CLARENCE COOPER
CLARENCE COOPER
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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