Siemens Industry, Inc. v. SIPCO, LLC
Filing
156
ORDER AND OPINION denying defendants Motions for Reconsideration 148 and for Oral Argument 153 , granting plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a Surreply 154 , and granting the Motions to Seal 147 , 149 , and 151 . To facilitate the resolution of the remaining issues, the Court directs the parties to participate in mediation as outlined in the Order. Signed by Judge Julie E. Carnes on 5/23/13. (ddm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
SIEMENS INDUSTRY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO.
v.
1:10-cv-2478-JEC
SIPCO, LLC,
Defendant.
O R D E R
This
case
is
before
&
the
O P I N I O N
Court
on
defendant’s
Motion
for
Reconsideration [148] and related Motion for Oral Argument [153],
several Motions to Seal [147], [149], [151], and plaintiff’s Motion
for Leave to File a Surreply [154].
The Court has reviewed the
record and the arguments of the parties and, for the reasons set out
below, concludes that defendant’s Motions for Reconsideration [148]
and for Oral Argument [153] should be DENIED, plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to File a Surreply [154] should be GRANTED, and the Motions to
Seal [147], [149] and [151] should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from a contract and patent dispute.
Compl. [4] at ¶ 1.)
(Am.
In May, 2010, defendant filed a complaint in the
Eastern District of Texas alleging that plaintiff had infringed
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patents covering certain wireless network technology. (Id. at ¶¶ 5455.)
The patents were the subject of a prior settlement agreement
(the “Agreement”) between defendant and third party Landis+Gyr, Inc.
(“L&G”).
(Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.)
licensed
the
patents
to
Pursuant to the Agreement, defendant
L&G
and
L&G’s
corporate
affiliates,
identified collectively in the Agreement as “the L&G Parties.”
at ¶ 25.)
(Id.
In conjunction with the license, defendant released the
L&G Parties from “any and all . . . claims or demands alleging past
or present infringement” of the patents.
(L&G Settlement Agreement
[3] at § 5.1.)
Plaintiff filed this action in response to the Texas litigation,
based on its alleged status as an L&G Party.
30-52.)
(Am. Compl. [4] at ¶¶
In the complaint, plaintiff claimed that it was not liable
for patent infringement under the terms of the Agreement and that
defendant
had
litigation
in
breached
the
Agreement
Texas.
(Id.
at
¶¶
by
pursuing
70-80.)
The
the
patent
Texas
Court
subsequently transferred the patent litigation to this Court and the
parties completed the first phase of discovery, which was limited to
the contract issue.
(Order [72] at 5-6 and Jt. Prelim. Report and
Discovery Plan [80].)
Following discovery, the Court granted summary judgment to
plaintiff on the claims asserted in Counts I and III of the complaint
for
a
declaratory
judgment
of
non-infringement
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and
breach
of
contract, and as to the Counterclaims asserted by defendant for
infringement.
(Order [143].)
Specifically, and based on the
undisputed evidence in the record, the Court concluded that plaintiff
is an L&G Party with well-defined contractual rights under the
Agreement that include a license to the patents in suit and a release
from any suit to enforce the patents.
(L&G Settlement Agreement [3]
at §§ 1.1, 5.1 and 7.1.)
Defendant has filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s
summary
judgment
ruling.
(Def.’s
Mot.
to
Reconsider
[148].)
According to defendant, the Court erred in finding “no textual
support in the Agreement conditioning the contractual rights of the
L&G Parties on their obtaining authorization from a signatory.” (Id.
at 2.)
In addition to the motion to reconsider and several related
motions,
the
parties
have
filed
notices
concerning
remaining in the case following summary judgment.
the
claims
(Def.’s Notice
[145] and Pl.’s Notice [146].)
DISCUSSION
I.
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
As a preliminary matter, both parties have filed motions to seal
the pleadings submitted in connection with defendant’s motion to
reconsider.
(Mots. to Seal [147], [149], [151].)
Ordinarily, the
Court is reluctant to seal pleadings and other documents because of
the presumption in favor of public access.
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Romero v. Drummond Co.,
Inc., 480 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th Cir. 2007)(“‘[t]he common-law right
of access to judicial proceedings, an essential component of our
system of justice, is instrumental in securing the integrity of the
process’”)(quoting Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001)).
However, in this case
there is good cause to grant the motions to seal because the
referenced filings include and restate the material provisions of a
confidential settlement agreement. The Court thus GRANTS the motions
to seal [147], [149] and [151].
In addition to the motions to seal, defendant has filed a motion
for oral argument and plaintiff has filed a motion to submit a
surreply in connection with the motion for reconsideration.
(Def.’s
Mot. for Oral Argument [153] and Pl.’s Mot. to File Surreply [154].)
The issues raised in the motion for reconsideration can be resolved
on the written pleadings.
Accordingly, the Court finds that oral
argument is unnecessary and DENIES defendant’s motion [153].
surreply
addresses
an
argument
raised
for
the
first
defendant’s reply and is not prejudicial to defendant.
time
(Id.)
The
in
The
Court thus GRANTS plaintiff’s motion [154] and will consider the
surreply in ruling on the motion to reconsider.
As to the merits, Local Rule 7.2(E) authorizes a motion for
reconsideration when “absolutely necessary.”
LR 7.2(E), NDGa.
A
motion for reconsideration is not an appropriate mechanism to set
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forth new theories of law or introduce new evidence, unless the
evidence was previously unavailable.
Delaware Valley Floral Grp.,
Inc. v. Shaw Rose Nets, LLC, 597 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Likewise,
parties
cannot
use
a
motion
for
reconsideration
to
“relitigate old matters” or “raise argument[s] . . . that could have
been raised” earlier.
Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington,
408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).
However, reconsideration may be
warranted
an
where
there
is:
(1)
intervening
change
in
the
controlling law, (2) newly discovered evidence, or (3) a need to
correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.
Delaware Valley,
597 F.3d at 1383.
Defendant concedes that its motion for reconsideration is not
based on an intervening change in the law or newly discovered
evidence.
(Def.’s
Mot.
to
Reconsider
[148]
at
2.)
Instead,
defendant’s motion is premised on the Court’s alleged error in
interpreting the Agreement to permit plaintiff to invoke its license
and release provisions. (Id.) It is undisputed that plaintiff is an
“L&G Party” to which the license and release provisions expressly
apply.
(Order [143] at 8-9.)
Nevertheless, and contrary to the
plain language of the contract, defendant persists in its argument
that the signatories to the Agreement did not intend to grant any
rights to L&G Parties such as plaintiff unless those parties first
obtained authorization from the “L&G Party Representative.”
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(Defs.’
Mot. to Reconsider [143] at 2-3.)
As indicated in the Court’s previous order, there is no textual
basis in the Agreement for defendant’s preauthorization argument.
(Order [143] at 13.)
In the original briefing, defendant primarily
relied on § 10.8 of the Agreement to support the preauthorization
argument.
(Def.’s Br. in Supp. of Summ. J. [122] at 5 and Resp. Br.
[123] at 5, 8-15.)
Section 10.8 states:
No Third Party Rights: Nothing expressed or implied in this
Agreement will be construed to give any Person, other than
the parties to this Agreement, any legal or equitable
right, remedy or claim under or with respect to this
Agreement.
(L&G Settlement Agreement [3] at § 10.8.)
Rejecting defendant’s
argument, the Court explained that the above language “does not
establish a process for obtaining approval to assert a claim or
otherwise incorporate the authorization concept.” (Order [143] at 13
n.5.)
In the motion to reconsider, defendant focuses on § 10.2 of the
Agreement.
“L&G
That provision designates a specific individual as the
Representative”
and
grants
that
individual
the
power
and
authority to take certain actions with respect to the Agreement such
as giving and receiving notices and accepting service of process.
(L&G Settlement Agreement [3] at § 10.2.)
Section 10.2 does not, as
defendant suggests, establish a preauthorization process for L&G
Parties seeking to invoke the protection of the Agreement. (Id.) It
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does
give
the
L&G
Representative
the
authority
to
“agree
to,
negotiate, [and] enter into settlements and compromises of” claims
arising under the Agreement.
(Id.)
However, there is no evidence
that the L&G Representative made any attempt to negotiate or settle
the claims asserted by plaintiff in this case.
Having reviewed the terms of the Agreement, the Court believes
that its initial interpretation was correct.
The parties to the
Agreement chose to define L&G Parties broadly to include entities
such as plaintiff, and they used clear and unequivocal language to
grant every L&G Party a license to and a release from any claims
alleging infringement of the patents that are at issue in this case.
(Order
[143]
at
8.)
Had
the
parties
wanted
to
establish
a
preauthorization requirement for L&G Parties seeking to invoke the
protection of the license and release provisions, they easily could
have done so.
They did not.
The Court was unwilling to imply a
preauthorization requirement from the language of § 10.8, and is
likewise unable to find the basis for such a requirement in the
language of § 10.2.
In short, the Court is no more persuaded by the arguments in
defendant’s motion to reconsider than it was by the arguments in
defendant’s original briefing.
Based on the plain language of the
Agreement, defendant is an L&G Party entitled to the protections of
the license and release provisions.
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Accordingly, defendant’s motion
to reconsider [143] is DENIED.
II.
REMAINING CLAIMS
The Court’s summary judgment rulings disposed of the claims
asserted by plaintiff in Counts I and III of the complaint and the
infringement claims asserted by defendant in Counterclaims I, II and
III. (Order [143] at 16.) Following the order, plaintiff’s Count II
asserting a claim for a declaratory judgment of invalidity as to the
patents in suit and defendant’s Counterclaim IV for breach of
contract ostensibly remained pending.
(Id.)
At the conclusion of
the order, the Court thus asked the parties to inform it of their
intentions with respect to the remaining claim and counterclaim.
(Id.)
Pursuant to the Court’s request, defendant has filed a notice
indicating that it intends to pursue and is ready for trial on the
breach of contract claim.
(Def.’s Notice [145].)
Plaintiff has
filed a notice indicating that (1) it does not intend to pursue the
non-validity claim asserted in Count II of the complaint and (2) it
is ready for trial on the issue of damages.
(Pl.’s Notice [146].)
In accordance with plaintiff’s notice, the Court DISMISSES Count II
of the complaint.
As to defendant’s remaining claim for breach of contract and the
issue of damages, the Court believes that mediation might help the
parties resolve those issues most efficiently and economically.
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The
Court thus DIRECTS the parties to choose a mediator and advise the
Court of the name of the mediator by June 24, 2013.
The Court would
like mediation to be concluded by August 30, 2013 and the Court to be
advised by September 3, 2013, whether it was successful.
In the
event that mediation was not successful, the Court will have to
schedule a trial on (1) defendant’s counterclaim for breach of
contract and (2) plaintiff’s damages.
Given the long-standing
vacancies on this bench and the long backlog of civil cases, that
date will not likely be soon.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendant’s Motions
for
Reconsideration
[148]
and
for
Oral
Argument
[153],
GRANTS
plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Surreply [154], and GRANTS the
Motions
to
Seal
[147],
[149],
and
[151].
To
facilitate
the
resolution of the remaining issues, the Court DIRECTS the parties to
participate in mediation as explained above.
SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of May, 2013.
/s/ Julie E. Carnes
JULIE E. CARNES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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