Walker v. City of Atlanta et al
Filing
30
ORDER AND OPINION granting defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 26 on plaintiffs § 1983 claims and dismissed without prejudice plaintiffs remaining state claims. Signed by Judge Julie E. Carnes on 3/24/14. (ddm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
PATRICIA WALKER,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO.
v.
1:11-cv-1167-JEC
CITY OF ATLANTA, ANDREW TADDEI,
Individually and in his
Official Capacity as an Atlanta
Police Officer, ADAM WRIGHT,
Individually and in his
Official Capacity as an Atlanta
Police Officer, COREY SAUBERAN,
Individually and in his
Official Capacity as an Atlanta
Police Officer, RICHARD
PENNINGTON, Individually and in
his Official Capacity as that
Atlanta Chief of Police, and
JOHN DOES 1-15, Individually
and in their Capacity as
Atlanta Police Officers,
Defendants.
ORDER & OPINION
This case is before the Court on defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [26].
The Court has reviewed the record and the arguments
of the parties and, for the reasons set out below, concludes that the
Motion for Summary Judgment [26] should be GRANTED.
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action to recover damages related to the
death of her son, Donald Hamilton.
(Compl. [1] at 18-19.)
Mr.
Hamilton died after he was shot by Atlanta police officers during a
confrontation with the police on May 4, 2008.
(Id. at ¶¶ 12-32.)
Plaintiff asserts claims against the City of Atlanta, all of the
police officers involved, and the Chief of the Atlanta Police
Department at the time of the incident.
(Id. at 1-2.)
The complaint
includes federal claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth
Amendment, in addition to several state law claims.
(Id. at ¶¶ 33-
61.)
The parties agree on the events leading up to Hamilton’s
shooting.
On the night of the incident, Hamilton and a friend went
to The Hole in the Wall, a club in Buckhead.
(Id. at ¶ 16.)
Hamilton got into a verbal altercation with a bathroom attendant and
was escorted from the premises.
(Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 17-18.)
tried to reenter the club but was not allowed.
He then
(Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.)
While waiting for his friends to exit the club, Hamilton began
walking down the street.
(Id. at ¶ 21.)
Bystanders who saw Hamilton
called 911 because he appeared to be drunk and he was openly carrying
a gun.
(Id. at ¶ 22.)
Although he did not threaten to use the gun,
Hamilton approached at least two people with the gun “basically
pointed in the same direction as [them].”
2
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
(Marr Statement [26] at
Ex. E.)
Five officers responded to the 911 call and found Hamilton still
walking down Peachtree street.
(“DSMF”) [26] at ¶ 7.)
(Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts
Four of the officers verbally ordered
Hamilton to stop, show his hands and get on the ground.
(Taddei
Decl. [26] at ¶ 4, Wright Decl. [26] at ¶ 4, White Statement [27] at
1, and Ervin Statement [27] at 1.)
The fifth officer, as well as all
four of the civilian witnesses to the scene, confirmed that the other
officers were shouting commands. (Sauberan Decl. [26] at ¶ 4, Smith
Statement [26] at 14, Terc Statement [26] at 16, Travis Statement
[26] at 21, and Shaw Statement [26] at 24.)
At this point, defendants contend that Hamilton pointed his gun
in the direction of Officer Taddei.
(DMSF [26] at ¶ 9.)
This
assertion is supported by the declarations of the three officers who
fired
upon
incident.1
Hamilton
as
well
as
the
civilian
witnesses
to
the
(Taddei Decl. [26] at ¶ 5, Wright Decl. [26] at ¶ 6,
Sauberan Decl. [26] at ¶ 6, Smith Statement [26] at 14, Terc
Statement [26] at 16, and Shaw Statement [26] at 24.)
Defendants
claim that three officers fired back in response to this threat.
1
Three of the four witnesses stated they saw Hamilton point his
gun at the officers.
The fourth witness stated that, during the
confrontation, he was looking at the police officers and not the
suspect so he did not see what Mr. Hamilton was doing.
(Travis
Statement [26] at 22.)
3
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
(DMSJ [26] at 3.)
Two of the responding officers, Officer Ervin and Officer White,
did not fire their weapons during the altercation.
Officer Ervin
stated that he could never see the suspect’s hands from his point of
view.
(Ervin Statement [27] at 1-2.)
Officer White stated that at
first she could not see the suspect’s hands at all, but that she
later noticed that “[the suspect] kept going in his pockets as if he
were looking for something.”
(White Statement [27] at 1.)
White
claims that she followed Hamilton from behind and “saw him put a
small black handgun to the right side of his head.”
(Id.)
At that
point, she yelled “drop the weapon!” at least three or four times to
Mr. Hamilton, but he still failed to comply.
(Id.)
Officer White
never fired her weapon “because [she] never saw [the suspect’s] right
arm change position due to the angle that [she was] at.”
(Id.)
Plaintiff argues that Officer White’s testimony proves that
Hamilton never pointed his gun at any civilians or officers.
Resp.
to
DMSJ
(“Pl.’s
Resp.”)
[27]
at
2.)
Plaintiff
(Pl.’s
further
contends, without any evidence or record citations except to the
complaint, that after Hamilton was shot and lying on the ground,
Officer Wright handcuffed him and shot him in the back of the head.
(Id. at 3.)
The medical examiner, who concluded that the cause of
death was a gunshot wound to the head, could not determine the
distance at which this shot was fired.
4
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
(Rep. of Medical Examiner
[27] at 1.) However, the examiner’s report found an “absence of soot
or strippling on the skin” by the head wound.
(Id.)
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary
judgment
is
appropriate
when
the
pleadings,
the
discovery and disclosure materials on file and any affidavits, show
“that there is no genuine [issue] as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
P. 56(a).
FED. R. CIV.
The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that
there are no issues of material fact.
U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
When evaluating whether this burden has been
met, “the district court must review the evidence and all factual
inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913,
918-19 (11th Cir. 1993).
Once the movant carries its burden, the opposing party “must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material
fact[s].”
Scott
v.
Harris,
550
U.S.
372,
380
(2007)(internal citations and quotations omitted) “Where the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”
Id.
In
the qualified immunity context, the requirement that all evidence be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant “usually means
5
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
adopting [] the plaintiff’s version of the facts.”
Id. at 378.
However, when a party’s story is so blatantly contradicted by the
record that no reasonable jury could believe it, the court “should
not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a
motion for summary judgment.”
II.
Id. at 380.
FACTUAL DISPUTES
The only purported material factual disputes in this case
concern (1) whether Hamilton pointed his gun at any of the officers
before he was shot and (2) whether Officer Wright handcuffed Hamilton
and then shot him in the back of the head as he lay on the ground.
(Pl.’s Resp. [27] at 2-3, 9.)
In support of her claim that Hamilton
did not point his gun at the officers, plaintiff cites the statements
of Officers White and Ervin.
testified
that
“from
[his]
(Id. at 2, 9.)
point
of
view
However, Officer Ervin
[he]
could
not
see
[Hamilton’s] hands.” (Ervin Statement [27].) In response to several
clarifying questions, Ervin stated that he was 20-30 feet behind
Hamilton, and could not see Hamilton’s weapon at all. (Id.) Officer
White likewise emphasized that she did not see Hamilton point his gun
at the other officers “due to the angle” she was at.
Statement [27].)
(White
Neither White nor Ervin’s statement, nor any other
evidence in the record, contradicts the affirmative testimony of the
other officers and the civilian witnesses that Hamilton pointed his
gun directly at Officer Taddei just before he was shot.
6
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
(Wright
Statement [27], Sauberan Statement [27], Taddei Statement [27] and
Witness Statements [26] at 14, 16 and 24.)
In support of her claim that Wright shot Hamilton after he was
handcuffed, plaintiff cites an allegation in the complaint rather
than any evidence or testimony in the record.
(Pl.’s Resp. [27] at
3 and Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts (“PSMF”) [27] at ¶ 13.)
In
fact, plaintiff’s allegation conflicts with every witness statement
in the record, even the statements that are otherwise relied upon by
plaintiff.
All of the witnesses attested that the only shots fired
by the police were before the officers made physical contact with
Hamilton.
(See Witness Statements, attached to Def.’s Mot. [26] at
Ex. E.)
Although the Court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, it need not adopt a version of the facts that
no
reasonable
jury
could
believe.
Scott,
550
U.S.
at
380.
Plaintiff’s claim that Hamilton did not point his gun at the officers
prior to his shooting, and her allegation that officer Wright shot
Hamilton after he was handcuffed, are entirely unsupported by the
record.
true.
As such, the Court does not assume these assertions to be
Id.
There are no other factual disputes that need to be
resolved in order for the Court to properly rule on the motion for
summary judgment.
7
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
III. SECTION 1983 LIABILITY
A.
City of Atlanta
A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for injury inflicted
by its employees or agents under a theory of respondeat superior.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
See also
Carter v. City of Melbourne, Fla., 731 F.3d 1161, 1166-67 (11th Cir.
2013)(applying Monell).
Instead, the municipality is only liable
under § 1983 when the execution of a governmental custom or policy
inflicts the injury.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
When the alleged
injury is not directly attributable to the municipality, a plaintiff
must
demonstrate
that
the
municipality,
through
its
deliberate
conduct, was the “moving force” behind the alleged injury.
Bd. of
the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
This burden is in accordance with the Supreme Court’s directive that
“rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to
ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the
actions of its employee.”
Id. at 405.
In support of her claim against the City, plaintiff argues that
the City’s failure to properly train and discipline officers with
regard to the use of excessive force constitutes “a policy that
allows [its] officers to use excessive and deadly force without
recourse.”
(Pl.’s Resp. [27] at 6.)
A failure to train or
discipline may in certain “limited circumstances” be the basis for
8
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
municipal liability under § 1983.
378,
387
(1989).
inadequate
police
But
the
discipline
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
Supreme
or
Court
training
has
only
emphasized
supports
§
that
1983
liability where the municipality’s failure “amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into
contact.”
Id. at 388, 391 (adopting “lesser standards of fault and
causation would open municipalities to unprecedented liability under
§ 1983”).
The failure becomes “deliberate” when the need for better
discipline or more training is so obvious and the inadequacy so
likely to result in a constitutional violation that the municipality
can be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.
Id.
at 390.
Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to support her claim
that the City provides such inadequate training to its officers on
the
use
of
excessive
force
constitutional violation.
that
it
would
likely
lead
to
a
Further, the only evidence plaintiff
submits to support her claim that the City had a policy of inadequate
discipline concerning excessive force violations are the incomplete
and nondescript discipline histories of Officers White, Sauberan and
Taddei.
Officer Taddei’s disciplinary history lists no complaints
for using excessive force or any similar violation.
History [27].)
(Taddei OPS
Sauberan’s disciplinary history lists no complaints
for excessive force but does contain a single internal investigation
9
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
for the “Use of Force.”
(Sauberan OPS History [27] at 1.)
the history shows he was exonerated of the charge.
However,
(Id.)
Officer
Wright’s history lists two incidents where a citizen complained of
“maltreatment or unnecessary force” in January, 2001 and in April,
2008.
(Wright OPS History [27].)
The first complaint was not
sustained and Wright was exonerated of the second complaint.
(Id.)
The above evidence is insufficient to demonstrate deliberate
indifference by the City in its discipline procedures concerning
excessive force. See Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th
Cir. 2013)(“the deliberate indifference standard—and the subjective
awareness required by it—is far more onerous than normal tort-based
standards of conduct sounding in negligence”). At most, the evidence
shows that the City documented and investigated three complaints
against the officers involved in this particular incident and found
them lacking.
“Although all justifiable inferences are to be drawn
in favor of the nonmoving party, inferences based upon speculation
are not reasonable.”
1301 (11th Cir. 2012).
Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294,
Without more information regarding the cited
incidents or any evidence concerning other incidents, a jury cannot
reasonably infer that the City’s discipline procedures rose to the
level of deliberate indifference with respect to the use of excessive
force by its police officers.
at 388.
Id.
Accordingly, the City is entitled to summary judgment on
10
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
See also City of Canton, 489 U.S.
plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.2
B.
Defendant Richard Pennington
Defendants contend that summary judgment is warranted with
respect to defendant Chief Richard Pennington in his individual
capacity as well.
(Defs.’ Mot. [26] at 9.)
Defendants point out
that plaintiff does not allege that Chief Pennington was personally
involved in Hamilton’s shooting and that there is no potential causal
connection between any action by Pennington and Hamilton’s alleged
constitutional deprivation.
(Id.)
Plaintiff does not address this
argument or otherwise refer to defendant Pennington in her response.
Again, it is axiomatic that liability under § 1983 must be based
on more than just a theory of respondeat superior.
Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990).
Brown v.
Thus, a supervisor is
only liable under § 1983 for the actions of an employee when the
supervisor personally participated in the alleged constitutional
violation or when the plaintiff can establish a causal connection
between the actions of the supervising official and the violation.
Id.
This
causal
connection
may
2
be
established
by
showing
a
To the extent the individual officers and the Chief of Police
are sued in their official capacity, they are also entitled to
summary judgment.
See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66
(1985)(official capacity suits “generally represent only another way
of pleading an action against an entity of which [the government]
officer is an agent”) and Jones v. Rutherford, 2013 WL 5273091 at *2
(11th Cir. 2013)(“a suit against a public official in his official
capacity is a suit against the local government he represents”).
11
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
widespread history of the violation that would put the supervisor on
notice of the need for corrective action.
Jones,
575
F.3d
1281,
1299-1300
(11th
supervisory liability under § 1983).
Id.
See also Bryant v.
Cir.
2009)(discussing
To support liability, the
history of abuse must be “obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued
duration.”
Brown, 906 F.2d at 671.
As noted, plaintiff does not allege that Pennington participated
in the use of excessive force against Hamilton.
Plaintiff likewise
fails to present evidence that widespread abuse was occurring at all,
let alone that any such abuse was “obvious, flagrant, rampant and of
continued duration.”
Id.
The incomplete disciplinary histories
cited above show three instances of excessive force complaints
during the involved officers’ cumulative thirty years of service.3
Even assuming that each of these complaints constituted an “abuse”
the complaints still only rise to the level of “isolated occurrences”
regarding select officers rather than continued widespread abuse.
Id.
There is no evidence in the record to support Pennington’s
liability, other than the disciplinary histories.
The Court thus
finds that Pennington is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claim against him in his individual capacity.
3
According to their disciplinary histories, Wright was hired
in 1997, Taddei in 2001 and Sauberan in 2007. (OPS Histories [27].)
Their disciplinary reports were run in June 2012.
12
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
C.
Defendants Taddei, Wright and Sauberan
Defendants argue that the individual claims against Officers
Taddei, Wright and Sauberan should be dismissed for two reasons.
First, defendants contend that shooting Hamilton was not an excessive
use of force under the circumstances.
(Defs.’ Mot. [26] at 9.)
Second, defendants contend that the officers are entitled to the
defense of qualified immunity. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff disputes both
of these contentions, based solely on the fact that two of the
responding officers who were present during the incident, Officers
White and Ervin, did not discharge their weapons.
at 9.)
(Pl.’s Resp. [27]
According to plaintiff, Officer White and Officer Ervin’s
failure to shoot Hamilton raises a genuine issue of fact as to
whether the named officers felt an immediate threat of danger that
would justify the use of deadly force.
(Id. at 12.)
This argument
is unpersuasive as to the asserted constitutional violation and
inadequate to overcome qualified immunity.
1.
Defendants did not violate the Fourth Amendment.4
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is evaluated under the Fourth
4
This finding further supports summary judgment in favor of the
City and Pennington. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S.
796, 799 (1986)(finding no potential for municipal liability where
the plaintiff “has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of
the individual police officer”).
13
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
Amendment’s “objective[] reasonable[ness]” standard.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
Graham v.
Under this standard, the legality
of the force used is judged from the perspective of a reasonable
officer under the facts and circumstances confronting the officer at
the time, rather than with the benefit of hindsight.
Id. at 396.
In
the deadly force context, the Eleventh Circuit has observed that a
police
officer
may
constitutionally
use
deadly
force
when
the
officer:
(1) “has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses
a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or
to others” or “that he has committed a crime involving the
infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical
harm”; (2) reasonably believes that the use of deadly force
[i]s necessary to prevent escape; and (3) has given some
warning about the possible use of deadly force, if
feasible.
Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. 2013)(quoting
McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009)).
In
determining whether an officer used excessive force, the Court must
be “mindful that officers make split-second decisions in tough and
tense situations.”
Id.
Plaintiff argues that material issues of fact remain over
whether defendants acted reasonably given that neither White nor
Ervin, both of whom were at the scene, fired their weapons.
Resp. [27] at 9.)
(Pl.’s
Plaintiff also cites Officer White’s testimony
that she only saw Hamilton point the gun at his own head and not at
14
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
the other officers.
(Id.)
Based on White’s statement and the
failure of White and Ervin to participate in the shooting, plaintiff
infers that these two officers must not have perceived Hamilton to be
a threat or that deadly force was necessary.
(Id.)
Plaintiff
concludes that if White and Ervin did not fear for their safety, a
genuine issue of material fact must exist as to whether the three
officers named in this action did.
(Id.)
As discussed above, there is no evidence to contradict the
affirmative testimony of the civilian witnesses and three of the
involved officers that Hamilton pointed his gun at Officer Taddei
just before he was shot.
The statements cited by plaintiff merely
establish that Officer Ervin could not see Hamilton’s hands or any
weapon at all from his position 20-30 feet behind the suspect and
that Officer White did not see Hamilton pointing his gun at Officer
Taddei “due to the angle” that she was at.
White Statement [27].)
(Ervin Statement [27] and
For the purpose of summary judgment, the
Court assumes that Officers White and Ervin did not fear for their
own safety.
However, the fact that other officers did not shoot or
did not fear for their own safety misses the point of the Fourth
Amendment inquiry. The relevant inquiry is not whether every officer
would react in exactly the same way in the given situation, but
whether the accused officer’s actions were objectively reasonable.
Penley v. Enslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 852 (11th Cir. 2010).
15
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
While the
former inquiry may be helpful in the evaluation of the latter, the
fact that other officers would not or, as in this case, did not shoot
is certainly not dispositive.
Penley is instructive.
fake
gun,
which
officers
Id.
In Penley, a 15-year old boy brought a
believed
to
be
real,
to
school
and
eventually the situation devolved into a standoff between the boy and
police officers.
Id. at 846.
On the scene, there were at least two
officers other than the named defendant who did not fire their
weapons.
Id.
In fact, one of the officers, a hostage negotiator,
testified that at no point in time did he feel like his life was in
danger.
Id.
Despite the fact that neither of the other two officers
fired their weapons and one even testified that he did not feel
threatened, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision
that
the
force
used
by
the
defendant
officer
was
objectively
reasonable because the Court found the negotiator’s feelings were not
relevant to the proper inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.
Penley,
605 F.3d at 852.
Attempting to distinguish Penley, plaintiff claims that Officer
Wright was standing in the same position as officers White and Ervin
and thus, had the same view as them.
(Pl.’s Resp. [27] at 9.)
The
Penley court noted that the officers who did not discharge their
weapons were standing in a different place so their knowledge of the
situation was not the same.
Id.
16
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
The evidence here suggests that
Officers Wright, White and Ervin were all standing behind and to the
left of Hamilton.
(Id.)
However, it does not follow that all of the
officers had the same viewpoint or knowledge of the situation.
This
fact is highlighted by the statements of White and Ervin, on which
plaintiff relies.
White stated that she saw Hamilton holding a gun
and point it to his own head.
(White Statement [27] at 1.)
Ervin
stated that he never saw the suspect’s hands, let alone a gun in them
during the entire altercation. (Ervin Statement [27] at 1-2.) It is
thus clear that, as in Penley, the officers here all had different
vantage points.
Given these different viewpoints, the actions of
Officers White and Ervin have little relevance to whether the other
officers acted reasonably in shooting Hamilton.
Moreover, even were one to assume, contrary to the evidence,
that the officers were mistaken in their belief that Hamilton was
pointing
a
gun
at
Officer
Taddei,
the
officers’
actions
were
nontheless objectively reasonable under the Eleventh Circuit’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
See Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158,
1169 (11th Cir. 2009)(“the fact that [the suspect] did not comply
with the officers’ repeated commands to drop his gun justified the
use of deadly force under these particular circumstances.”).
In
Garczynski, police surrounded a suspect who was in his car with a gun
and threatening to kill himself.
Id. at 1163.
Believing that the
suspect was going to try to drive away, the police decided to
17
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
approach the car.
Id.
An altercation ensued during which the
officers claimed that the suspect pointed his gun at them, although
the plaintiffs argued that the evidence did not support the officers’
statements.
position
Id.
was
reasonable.
The Eleventh Circuit held that even if plaintiff’s
taken,
Id.
at
the
1169.
officer’s
In
so
actions
holding,
were
the
objectively
Circuit
Court
emphasized the fact that the suspect had ignored orders to drop his
weapon.
Garczynski, 573 F.3d at 1169.
the Court stated,
Under these circumstances,
an officer need not wait until the armed man “has
drawn a bead on the officer or others before using deadly force.”
Id. (quoting Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 181, 185 (11th Cir. 1997)).
Plaintiff cannot persuasively argue that Hamilton posed any less
serious of a threat to the safety of the officers and civilians
around him than the suspect in Garczynski. The suspect in Garczynski
“had not yet fired his gun and was not attempting to escape.”
There were no civilians in the area.
Id. at 1162-64.
Id.
Nevertheless,
the Eleventh Circuit found that the suspect’s repeated refusal to
obey commands to show his hands or drop his gun provided a sufficient
basis for an officer to reasonably believe that the suspect posed an
immediate risk of serious harm to them.
Id. at 1169.
Likewise,
Hamilton’s repeated refusal to drop his weapon gave the officers
sufficient reason to believe that he was a threat to their immediate
safety, as well as the safety of the several civilians nearby.
18
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
In
essence, this was exactly the type of “tough and tense” situation
contemplated by the Eleventh Circuit in Morton, 707 F.3d at 1281.
In short, it is undisputed that Hamilton repeatedly ignored
several commands to show his hands, to get on the ground, and to drop
his weapon. Uncontroverted evidence in the record further shows that
Hamilton pointed his gun at or in the direction of one of the
officers at some point during the confrontation.
Given these
circumstances, the defendants’ belief that Hamilton posed a threat to
themselves, their fellow officers, and the surrounding public was
reasonable.
As defendants did not use excessive force against
Hamilton or otherwise violate his Fourth Amendment rights, they are
entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s § 1983 claims asserted
against them in their individual capacities.
2.
Defendants Are Entitled Qualified Immunity.
Even were one to assume that the defendant officers violated the
Fourth Amendment when they shot Hamilton, summary judgment is still
warranted because the officers are entitled to qualified immunity for
their conduct.
performing
Qualified immunity protects government officials
discretionary
individual capacities.
functions
from
being
sued
in
their
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
In order to prove that they are entitled to qualified immunity,
defendants must first show that they were acting within the scope of
their discretionary authority.
Leslie v. Hancock County Bd. of
19
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
Educ., 720 F.3d 1338, 1345 (11th Cir. 2013). If defendants establish
that they were acting in their discretionary capacity, then the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity
is not appropriate.
Id.
In order to meet that burden, plaintiff
must show that the actions of the government official violated a
constitutional right and the right violated was “clearly established”
at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.
Id.
See also
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
The parties agree that defendants were acting within their
discretionary authority when Hamilton was shot. (Pl.’s Resp. [27] at
7.)
Thus, in order to avoid summary judgment, plaintiff must show
that the defendants’ actions violated a constitutional right that was
“clearly established” at the time of the incident.
at 1345.
use
of
Leslie, 720 F.3d
The only constitutional violation plaintiff alleges is the
excessive
force
in
the
apprehension
of
Hamilton.
As
previously reasoned, defendants did not use excessive force in
violation
Hamilton.
of
the
Fourth
Amendment
when
they
shot
and
killed
Thus, plaintiff fails to meet the first prong of the
qualified immunity test.
“Because
violation
[the
occurred,
Court]
[it]
conclude[s]
need
not
that
reach
no
the
constitutional
second
prong.”
Garczynski, 573 F.3d at 1166 (citing Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317,
1328 (11th Cir. 2009)).
However, even assuming a constitutional
20
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
violation occurred, plaintiff fails to meet the second requirement
for defeating qualified immunity.
That requirement is not met by
pointing to cases that establish the general proposition that police
may not use excessive force in apprehending a suspect, as plaintiff
does here.
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198-99 (2004)(quoting
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-202 (2001)).
Instead, “[t]he
relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is
clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer
that
his
confronted.”
conduct
was
unlawful
in
the
situation
he
Id. at 199.
Plaintiff does not cite any cases that would provide the more
“particularized” notice to or “fairly warn” defendants that their use
of force against Hamilton would be excessive under the circumstances.
See
Pace
v.
Capobianco,
283
F.3d
1275,
1283
(11th
Cir.
2002)(“[b]ecause the preexisting law did not warn defendants fairly
that shooting the decedent in these circumstances would clearly
violate federal law, defendants [] are entitled to [qualified]
immunity”).
Indeed, an officer familiar with Garczynski or Penley
would likely believe that his actions clearly would not violate a
constitutional right.
Qualified immunity thus clearly applies.
For
this additional reason, Officers Wright, Taddei and Sauberan are
entitled to summary judgment in their individual capacities.
21
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
IV.
STATE LAW CLAIMS
In addition to her § 1983 claims, plaintiff asserts a wide array
of state law claims against the defendants: trespass, assault,
battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence and
claims under the Georgia RICO statute.
(Compl. [1].)
Because all
the claims over which the Court had original jurisdiction now have
been removed from the case due to the Court’s decision to grant
defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s
federal claim, § 1367(c)(3) applies.
“[t]he
district
courts
may
This section provides that
decline
to
exercise
supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if the district court
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
As the Supreme Court has observed, “a federal court should
consider
and
weigh
in
each
case,
and
at
every
stage
of
the
litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over
a case brought in that court involving pendant state-law claims.
When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly
belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped
out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims
remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction
by dismissing the case without prejudice.”
22
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (footnote omitted).
See also Hardy
v. Birmingham Bd. Of Educ., 954 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir. 1992).
The Court concludes that dismissal is appropriate in this case
because plaintiff’s federal claims have been dismissed.
Moreover,
“[n]eedless decision of state law should be avoided both as a matter
of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring
for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” Un. Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES
without prejudice plaintiff’s remaining state law claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment [26] on plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and DISMISSES
without prejudice plaintiff’s remaining state claims.
SO ORDERED, this 24th day of March, 2014.
/s/ Julie E. Carnes
JULIE E. CARNES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
23
AO 72A
(Rev.8/82)
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?