Files et al v. DeKalb County School District et al
Filing
10
ORDER and OPINION granting 3 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Julie E. Carnes on 3/2/12. (ddm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
ROBYN FILES, CELENA APPLE,
SCOTT ARANT, DEBORAH ARANT,
KATHY FORTE, ROBERT KADOORI,
KIMBERLY KIRKLAND, KEREN
LACHOVER, BEN MARKS, MARGO
MARKS, BRADLEY ROSEN, MEREDITH
ROSEN, and NORMA SHOHET,
individually and on behalf of
their minor children,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION NO.
v.
1:11-cv-1798-JEC
DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
RAMONA TYSON, individually and
in her official capacity as
Superintendent of the DeKalb
County School District, and
NANCY JESTER, individually and
in her official capacity as a
member of the DeKalb County
Board of Education,
Defendants.
ORDER & OPINION
This case is presently before the Court on defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss [3].
The Court has reviewed the record and the
arguments of
the parties and, for the reasons set out below, concludes that
defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [3] should be GRANTED.
AO 72A
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BACKGROUND
This lawsuit arises out of a redistricting plan proposed for the
five elementary schools that serve the Dunwoody community in DeKalb
County, Georgia.
(Compl. [1] at ¶ 1.)
prepared
DeKalb
by
District”).
the
(Id.)
County
The challenged plan was
School
District
(the
“School
It was approved by the DeKalb County Board of
Education (the “BOE”) based upon the endorsement of DeKalb County
Superintendent Ramona Tyson and the advocacy of District One BOE
member Nancy Jester.
(Id. at ¶¶ 1, 18.)
According to plaintiffs,
the plan was intended to eliminate racial minorities from certain
schools, specifically Austin and Vanderlyn, and concentrate minority
students at Dunwoody Elementary.
(Id. at ¶ 1.)
Plaintiffs are the parents of children enrolled in schools
impacted by the redistricting plan.
(Id. at ¶ 4.)
They claim that
the plan makes race a predominating factor in the assignment of
students to public schools, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
(Compl. [1] at ¶ 23.)
Based on
the alleged constitutional violation, plaintiffs assert a § 1983
claim against defendants in Count I of their complaint.
22-23.)
(Id. at ¶¶
In Count II, plaintiffs assert a state law claim for breach
of an implied contract.
(Id. at ¶¶ 25-27.)
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss both counts of the
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6). (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss
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[3].)
In support of their motion, defendants argue that plaintiffs
do not adequately plead either discriminatory intent by the School
District or causation sufficient to support a § 1983 claim.
Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Br.”) [3] at 2.)
(Defs.’
As to the
contract claim, defendants contend that plaintiffs do not allege the
necessary elements of consideration and detrimental reliance.
at 2, 15.)
(Id.
Defendants further assert that the BOE is entitled to
sovereign immunity on the contract claim.
(Id. at 2, 15.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court assumes that all of the allegations in the complaint are true
and construes all of the facts in favor of the plaintiff.
Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010).
Randall v.
That said, in order to
survive a motion to dismiss a complaint “must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
A claim is “facially plausible” when it is
supported with facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id.
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II.
Section 1983
In order to prevail on their § 1983 claim, plaintiffs must show
that defendants (1) deprived plaintiffs of a constitutional right,
(2) under color of state law.
Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49
F.3d 1517, 1522 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.
635 (1980)).
There is no respondeat superior or vicarious liability
under § 1983.
Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1307
(11th Cir. 2001)(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Serv., 436 U.S.
658, 663 (1978)).
Thus, a municipality is only liable under § 1983
for constitutional deprivations that are caused by a governmental
policy or custom.
Id.
Likewise, an individual defendant is only
liable if there is a causal connection between the defendant’s
unlawful actions and the alleged deprivation.
Dixon v. Burke Cnty.,
303 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002)(“[w]ithout causation, [a] § 1983
case fails as a matter of law”).
Plaintiffs claim that the challenged redistricting plan deprives
them
of
rights
granted
Fourteenth Amendment.
Clause provides that:
by
the
Equal
Protection
(Compl. [1] at ¶ 23.)
Clause
of
The Equal Protection
“No State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
U.S.
As such, the Clause prohibits states from
discriminating against individuals on the basis of race.
Burton v.
City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1189-90 (11th Cir. 1999).
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the
In
particular, the Clause generally forbids a municipality from relying
on racial classifications to assign students to primary and secondary
public schools.
See Parents Involved In Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730 (2007)(“‘[a]t the heart of the
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command
that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply
components of a racial . . . class’”)(quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 911 (1995)).
Defendants do not dispute that the challenged redistricting plan
was proposed and enacted under color of state law.
(Defs.’ Br. [3]
and Reply [9].) However, they contend that plaintiffs fail to allege
any basis for inferring racial discrimination by the School District
or for imposing § 1983 liability as a result of a District custom or
policy.
(Defs.’ Br. [3] at 4-7, 10-12.)
In addition, defendants
argue that there is no causal connection between defendant Jester’s
alleged
discriminatory
motive
in
proposing
the
plan
and
constitutional deprivation that plaintiffs allegedly suffered.
the
(Id.
at 7-10.)
A.
The School District
The Court agrees that there is no basis in the complaint for
holding the School District liable under § 1983.
The redistricting
plan allegedly was conceived and championed by District One BOE
5
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member Jester.1
(Compl. [1] at ¶ 1.)
Notwithstanding Jester’s
advocacy and support, the plan could not be implemented until it was
adopted by the DeKalb County BOE.
by a 7 to 2 vote.2
(Id.)
(Defs.’ Br. [3] at 8.)
The BOE approved the plan
Plaintiffs do not allege
any discriminatory motive on the part of the BOE as a whole, or on
the part of any individual BOE member except Jester.
In
fact,
the
allegations
suggest
that
Jester
responsible for the discriminatory nature of the plan.
at ¶¶ 1, 8-20.)
was
solely
(Compl. [1]
Plaintiffs claim that Jester advocated the plan in
an attempt to benefit personal friends and key political supporters
whose children and grandchildren live in the Austin attendance zone,
and who wanted minorities removed from Austin.
(Id. at ¶ 1.)
Plaintiffs allege no facts to indicate that the other BOE members
shared or even were aware of Jester’s discriminatory intent. Indeed,
plaintiffs claim that Jester misrepresented the level of parental
support for the redistricting plan in an effort to obtain the BOE’s
approval.
(Id. at ¶ 15.)
1
To emphasize Jester’s role in creating the plan, plaintiffs
refer to the plan as the “Jester Plan.” (Pls.’ Resp. [6] at 6.)
2
The Court takes judicial notice of the margin of the BOE’s
vote, which is a matter of public record. See Garfield v. NDC Health
Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1260 n.2 (11th Cir. 2006)(“public records [are]
capable of being judicially noticed at the motion to dismiss
stage.”).
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Neither do plaintiffs allege any BOE or School District custom
or policy that might have contributed to the discrimination.
There
are three ways to show a governmental policy or custom: (1) an
express policy, (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent and
well-settled as to constitute a custom, or (3) the act or decision of
a municipal official with final policy-making authority.
Cuesta v.
Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 285 F.3d 962, 966-68 (11th Cir. 2002).
In order to establish § 1983 liability, it is not sufficient for a
municipal
custom
or
policy
constitutional deprivation.”
to
be
“tangentially
Id. at 967.
related
to
a
Instead, “the ‘official
policy must be the moving force of the constitutional violation.’”
Id. (citing Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894, 901 (11th Cir.
1984)).
Based on the allegations in the complaint, the District’s stated
policy goals included only non-racial redistricting principles such
as balancing enrollment and achieving optimal geographic proximity.
(Compl. [1] at ¶ 1.)
Thus, the District’s express policy did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, there are no facts in
the complaint to suggest that the BOE or the School District had a
wide-spread or well-settled practice of considering race in the
redistricting process. Nor can it reasonably be inferred that Jester
had final policy-making authority, as plaintiffs concede that the
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redistricting plan could only be implemented upon its approval by the
nine-member BOE.
(Id. and Defs.’ Br. [3] at 8.)
Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that the School District can be
held
liable
under
§
1983
because
the
District
(1)
approved
a
redistricting plan that had the effect of concentrating minorities in
one school and (2) rejected an alternative plan that was consistent
with its redistricting goals while at the same time resulting in more
integrated schools.
unpersuasive.
(Pls.’ Resp. [6] at 12.)
This argument is
The Equal Protection Clause does not require the
District to maintain racial diversity in its elementary schools. See
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 732 (“Even in the context of mandatory
desegregation, we have stressed that racial proportionality is not
required.”)
and
Milliken
v.
Bradley,
433
U.S.
267,
281
n.14
(1977)(“the Court has consistently held that the Constitution is not
violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more”).
On the
contrary, as a general rule, the Equal Protection Clause forbids the
District from relying on racial classifications even when they are
used to foster diversity.
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 732.
Plaintiffs alternatively suggest that the School District can be
held liable on a “cat’s paw” theory, as a result of its practice of
deferring to the BOE member who represents the schools effected by a
proposed redistricting plan, in this case Jester.
(Pls.’ Resp. [6]
at 12-14.) The BOE apparently did not exercise complete deference in
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this case, as two members voted against the plan.
In any case, the
cat’s paw theory does not apply in the § 1983 context.
As discussed
above, there is no respondeat superior or vicarious liability under
§ 1983.
Griffin, 261 F.3d at 1307.
In accordance with that
principle, the Eleventh Circuit has expressly rejected the argument,
advanced by plaintiffs, that one BOE member’s motive can be imputed
to the entire BOE.
See Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1313
(11th Cir. 2006)(“An improper motive of one of the members of a ninemember
Planning
Commission
is
not
imputed
to
the
rest
of
the
Commission.”) and Mason v. Vill. of El Portal, 240 F.3d 1337, 1340
(11th Cir. 2001)(“there can be no municipal liability unless all
three members of the council who voted against reappointing Plaintiff
shared the illegal motive”).
In short, even assuming that the allegations in the complaint
are true, there is no plausible basis for imposing § 1983 liability
on the School District. Plaintiffs fail to allege any discriminatory
motive or action on the part of the District or the BOE as a whole.
And the District cannot, as a matter of law, be held accountable
under § 1983 for the discriminatory actions of BOE member Jester.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the School District’s motion to dismiss
Count I of the complaint.3
3
The Court’s analysis applies both to the School District and
to the individuals sued in their official capacity. See Busby v.
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B.
The Individual Defendants
1.
Ramona Tyson
As with the School District, there are no allegations in the
complaint to suggest that defendant Tyson was complicit in Jester’s
racially motivated plan. Indeed, the only asserted basis for Tyson’s
liability is that, in her role as Superintendent for the DeKalb
County Schools, she presented the plan to the BOE for a vote.
(Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 6, 18.)
Tyson’s position as Superintendent during
the redistricting process is not in itself sufficient to infer racial
discrimination or to hold her liable under § 1983.
See Holloman v.
Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that an
individual is generally only liable under § 1983 for his own personal
actions).4
The Court thus GRANTS defendant Tyson’s motion to dismiss
Count I of the complaint.
2.
Nancy Jester
The allegations concerning defendant Nancy Jester are more
City of
is sued
another
officer
Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991)(“when an officer
. . . in his or her official capacity, the suit is simply
way of pleading an action against . . . the city that the
represents”)(internal quotations omitted).
4
Under certain limited circumstances an individual may be held
liable on a supervisory theory for the actions of his subordinates.
Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1263. However, plaintiffs do not allege any
facts that would give rise to supervisory liability in this case.
Id.
See also Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir.
1990)(discussing the basis of supervisory liability under § 1983).
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specific.
As mentioned, Jester is the BOE member who represents the
schools that were impacted by the redistricting plan. (Compl. [1] at
¶ 7.)
According to plaintiffs, Jester was the principal architect
and advocate of the plan.
(Id. at ¶¶ 1, 11-19.)
She developed the
plan with the specific intent of removing minorities from certain
schools in order to appease her personal friends and political
supporters.
(Id. at ¶¶ 1, 19.)
She then obtained passage of the
plan by manipulating and misleading the Superintendent and other BOE
members.
(Id. at ¶¶ 15-20.)
Assuming the above allegations are true, Jester unlawfully
injected
race
into
her
own
Involved, 551 U.S. at 730.
decision-making
process.
Parents
The question that remains is whether
Jester’s racially-based motivations for championing a particular plan
“caused”
the
plaintiffs.
2002)(a
constitutional
deprivation
allegedly
suffered
by
See Dixon v. Burke Cnty., 303 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir.
causal
connection
between
the
wrongful
act
and
the
constitutional deprivation is an essential element of any § 1983
claim).
Jester did not have the authority to implement the plan
without the approval of the BOE.
Under similar circumstances, the
Eleventh Circuit has held that causation does not exist “when the
continuum between [a] Defendant’s action and the ultimate harm is
occupied by the conduct of deliberative and autonomous decisionmakers.”
Id.
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Plaintiffs
do
not
address
Dixon,
which
indistinguishable from the facts of this case.
is
materially
The plaintiff in
Dixon sued Burke County, its district attorney, and a grand juror
under § 1983 as a result of the grand jury’s allegedly discriminatory
vote to fill a vacancy on the county school board.
vote,
the
district
attorney
and
one
of
the
Prior to the
jurors
expressly
recommended the selection of a white male for the position.
grand jury adhered to that recommendation.
The
However, because the
entire jury voted on the candidate’s selection, the Eleventh Circuit
held that any causal connection between the alleged discriminatory
actions
and
the
constitutional
violation
was
“severed
by
the
intervening free, independent, and volitional acts of the [g]rand
[j]ury.”
Id.
The principle announced in Dixon applies with equal force here.
Given the BOE’s intervening vote, a § 1983 claim based on the
allegation that Jester individually deprived plaintiffs of their
constitutional rights is implausible on its face.
550 U.S. at 570.
Id.
and Twombly,
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant Jester’s
motion to dismiss Count I of the complaint.
III. Breach Of Contract
In Count II of the complaint, plaintiffs assert a state law
claim for breach of an implied contract.
(Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 24-27.)
The contract that is the basis for this claim allegedly arose from
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the School District’s representations that the redistricting process
would be driven by non-racial considerations.
(Id. at ¶ 25.)
Defendants argue that the contract claim should be dismissed because:
(1) school districts have sovereign immunity against claims for
breach of implied contract and (2) plaintiffs have not pled the
necessary elements of a contract between themselves and any defendant
in this case.
(Defs.’ Br. [3] at 14-16.)
Plaintiffs do not respond to the above arguments.
The Court
thus finds that plaintiffs have abandoned their breach of contract
claim.
See Adams v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 508 F. Supp. 2d 1302,
1318 (N.D. Ga. 2007)(Murphy, J.)(failure to respond to a defendant’s
arguments on a particular claim constitutes abandonment of that
claim).
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss
Count II of the complaint as unopposed.
See LR 7.1(B), NDGa (failure
to respond to a motion indicates lack of opposition) and Burnette v.
Northside Hosp., 342 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1140 (N.D. Ga. 2004)(Duffey,
J.)(“Failure to respond to the opposing party’s summary judgment
arguments . . . warrants the entry of summary judgment”).
The Court also notes that defendants’ arguments as to the breach
of contract claim are persuasive on the merits.
The complaint does
not contain allegations that plausibly support the existence of a
contract between plaintiffs and either the School District or the
individual defendants.
See Eastview Healthcare, LLC v. Synertx,
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Inc., 296 Ga. App. 393, 398 (2009)(plaintiffs have “the burden of
pleading . . . a valid contract”).5
In particular, plaintiffs do not
adequately plead consideration, an essential element of a breach of
contract claim.
without
Id. at 399.
consideration
is
See also O.C.G.A. § 13-3-40 (a contract
unenforceable).
Moreover,
the
School
District clearly is immune from liability on a claim for breach of
implied contract.
See Merk v. DeKalb Cnty., 226 Ga. App. 191, 192
(1997)(“an implied contract will not support a waiver of sovereign
immunity under the provisions of the Georgia Constitution”).
For
these additional reasons, the Court dismisses the claim asserted in
Count II of the complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss [3].
SO ORDERED, this 2nd day of MARCH, 2012.
/s/ Julie E. Carnes
JULIE E. CARNES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5
The parties agree that Count II is governed by Georgia law.
(Defs.’ Br. [3] at 15 and Pl.’s Resp. [6].)
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