Cartel Asset Management, Inc. v. Altisource Portfolio Solutions, S. A. et al
Filing
93
OPINION AND ORDER granting 67 Motion to Dismiss Altisource Portfolio Solutions, S.A., granting 82 Motion to Dismiss Altisource Solutions S.a.r.l., granting 89 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 8/29/13. (dr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
CARTEL ASSET MANAGEMENT,
INC., a Colorado corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 1:11-CV-2612-TWT
ALTISOURCE PORTFOLIO
SOLUTIONS, S. A. a corporation
chartered under the laws of the Grand
Duchy of Luxembourg, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This Order resolves the Altisource Defendants’ second motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction or lack of proper service. The Court concludes that it
cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over the remaining Defendants, two Luxembourg
corporations with minimal contacts with the State of Georgia. The Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss [Docs. 67 & 82] are granted.
I. Background
This suit concerns a trade secret allegedly stolen from the Plaintiff about
thirteen years ago. The Plaintiff, Cartel Asset Management, Inc., developed the trade
secret – a confidential list of experienced, responsive and competent realtors who
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produce high-quality broker price opinions at acceptable prices (the “Trade Secret”).
(Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11). In 2000, Ocwen Federal Bank, a large customer of
Cartel Asset Management, began to secretly copy the names and contact information
of the realtors who produced the broker price opinions that it purchased from Cartel
Asset Management. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14). Ocwen Federal then embedded the stolen
information into its own incomplete database of broker price opinion providers. (Id.
¶ 14). As a result, Ocwen Federal had realtors in its broker price opinion database (the
“Database”) that were identified as a direct result of the theft of the Trade Secret, and
Ocwen Federal was further able to find additional broker price opinion providers for
the Database via referrals from these realtors. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15).
Cartel Asset Management sued Ocwen Federal and its affiliates for theft of the
Trade Secret under the Colorado Uniform Trade Secrets Act in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 31). In 2004, a jury
awarded Cartel Asset Management compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. ¶ 32).
While the judgment was on appeal, Ocwen Financial Corporation dissolved Ocwen
Federal and transferred the Database to its wholly-owned subsidiary, Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17). Ocwen Loan Servicing continued to use and profit
from Cartel Asset Management’s Trade Secret and was added as a defendant in the
Colorado proceedings after the Tenth Circuit remanded the suit for a new trial on
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damages. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34). In September 2010, a jury returned a verdict in Cartel Asset
Management’s favor for more than $12.72 million in compensatory and punitive
damages based on the theft of the Trade Secret. The verdict assessed damages to the
use of the Trade Secret from the date it was stolen until August 10, 2009. (Id. ¶¶ 34,
36).
In August 2009, Ocwen Financial Corporation spun off Altisource Portfolio
Solutions, S.A. which had previously been a wholly owned subsidiary, and transferred
its broker price opinion business and the Database to it. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 18). As
a result of the spin off, Cartel Asset Management alleges that Altisource Portfolio
Solutions acquired Ocwen Financial Corporation’s mortgage service business either
directly or through its Luxembourg subsidiary, Altisource Solutions S.á.r.l. Cartel
Asset Management further alleges that Altisource S.á.r.l. acquired the broker price
opinion Database containing the Trade Secret and the list of brokers obtained via the
Trade Secret. (Id. at ¶ 25). Cartel Asset Management contends that Altisource S.á.r.l.
has provided broker price opinions and other mortgage-related services for the entire
Altisource Portfolio Solutions family of companies, using the Trade Secret, since the
spin off. (Id. at ¶ 26). Cartel Asset Management further contends that Altisource
S.á.r.l. “orders, acquires, purchases, and resells the Broker price opinions at the
direction and control of its parent, Altisource Portfolio Solutions.” (Id.) Altisource
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Portfolio Solutions is a corporation chartered under the laws of the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg and maintains its principal place of business within Luxembourg. (Sec.
Am. Compl. ¶ 2). Altisource S.á.r.l. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altisource
Portfolio Solutions, and is also organized under the laws of Luxembourg. (Id. at ¶ 3).
Cartel Asset Management filed its complaint in this Court on August 8, 2011,
asserting that Altisource Portfolio Solutions and its American subsidiaries
misappropriated its Trade Secret. [Doc. 1]. Cartel Asset Management amended the
Complaint on September 14, 2011. [Doc. 16]. Altisource Portfolio Solutions and its
subsidiaries filed motions to dismiss. [Docs. 20 & 21]. On December 1, 2011, the
Court denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On
January 6, 2012, the Court denied Defendant Altisource Portfolio Solutions’s motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper service of process, and
granted the Plaintiff’s motion for jurisdictional discovery. [Docs. 37 & 46]. On
August 14, 2012, Cartel Asset Management filed a second amended complaint against
Altisource Portfolio Solutions, dropping all Defendants except for Altisource Portfolio
Solutions and adding Altisource S.á.r.l. [Doc. 66]. Altisource Portfolio Solutions
moved to dismiss the second amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and
for improper service of process on August 31, 2012. [Doc. 67]. On April 16, 2013,
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Altisource S.á.r.l. also filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
[Doc. 82]. On June 7, 2013, Cartel Asset Management moved for leave to file a
supplemental brief in opposition to the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. [Doc. 89].
In general, Altisource Portfolio Solutions and Altisource S.á.r.l. argue that they
are not subject to personal jurisdiction in Georgia because they are Luxembourg
corporations that do not transact business in the United States, do not own or lease
property in the United States, have never paid taxes in the United States, and have
committed no acts with regard to the Plaintiff in the United States. Altisource
Portfolio Solutions further contends that the Plaintiff does not allege any direct facts
supporting personal jurisdiction over Altisource Portfolio Solutions and only relies on
indirect allegations with respect to Altisource S.á.r.l.
II. Motion to Dismiss Standards
A.
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
“In the context of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in which
no evidentiary hearing is held, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima
facie case of jurisdiction over the movant, nonresident defendant.” Morris v. SSE,
Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 492 (11th Cir. 1988). This standard is satisfied “if the plaintiff
presents enough evidence to withstand a motion for directed verdict.” Madara v. Hall,
916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990). In the Eleventh Circuit, a party presents
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enough evidence to withstand a motion for directed verdict by putting forth
“substantial evidence . . . of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded
persons in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions . . .”
Walker v. NationsBank of Florida, 53 F.3d 1548, 1555 (11th Cir. 1995). Therefore,
a plaintiff need not conclusively prove the facts necessary for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction. Rather, it must present enough evidence to create a jury question. A
court must construe the allegations in the complaint as true so long as the defendant
does not dispute the facts. Morris, 843 F.2d at 492. If the plaintiff’s complaint and
supporting evidence conflict with the defendant’s affidavits, however, courts should
construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514.
B.
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Effect Service of Process
Once a suit is filed in federal court, the defendants in the case must be served
with process in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. If service of process is not made
upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of a complaint, the court may
dismiss the complaint without prejudice or direct that service be effected within a
specified time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (m). If the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure,
the Court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period. Id.
III. Discussion
A.
Altisource S.á.r.l.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction
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The Court concludes that the Plaintiff has not established personal jurisdiction
over Defendant Altisource S.á.r.l. The Plaintiff’s assertion of jurisdiction is based on
three sets of facts. First, the Plaintiff contends that Altisource S.á.r.l. operates the
REALTrans Portal – an internet service that facilitates the production of broker price
opinions – in Georgia because use of the Portal required submission to Georgia law
and Georgia courts, and because the Portal involves performing broker price opinions
in Georgia. Second, the Plaintiff contends that Altisource S.á.r.l. conducts a large
amount of business with Ocwen Financial Corporation, a company that recently
moved to Georgia. Third, the Plaintiff contends that Altisource S.á.r.l. itself holds
property in Georgia and conducts business from that property. These allegations
alone are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in light of the sworn testimony
produced by the Defendants that they are not true.
First, the Defendants have shown that the REALTrans Portal does not involve
the Defendant performing broker price opinions in Georgia and has no connection to
Georgia. This business is conducted from Luxembourg and India. According to the
Defendants, Altisource S.á.r.l. does not perform broker price opinions, it only
provides broker price opinions performed by third-party vendors. Thus, third-party
vendors who provide broker price opinions sign up with Altisource S.á.r.l. to use its
REALTrans software, which in turn provides the broker price opinions performed by
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the third parties to customers. Typically, when a customer requests a broker price
opinion, the REALTrans software will automatically select a third-party vendor who
would then have the opportunity to review and accept the broker price opinion order,
and provide it to the customer. (See Shepro Decl. ¶¶ 19-26). The Defendants contend
that Altisource S.á.r.l.’s contacts with Georgia are nothing more than identifying thirdparty vendors who may be in Georgia. Indeed, the Portal facilitates the production of
broker price opinions throughout the United States, not just in Georgia. The Plaintiff
has not shown that the Portal is operated out of Georgia or has any connection to
Georgia outside the choice of law and forum provisions, which were changed to
mandate Luxembourg law in 2011. Further, the fact that the REALTrans Portal
required users to submit to Georgia law and Georgia courts for a period of time is
insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over Altisource S.á.r.l.
Next, Altisource S.á.r.l.’s contacts with Georgia by virtue of its contacts with
Ocwen Financial Corporation are insufficient to support specific jurisdiction because
Ocwen Financial Corporation moved to Georgia unilaterally after this case was filed,
and there is no indication that Ocwen Financial Corporation’s move to Georgia
affected the contracting parties’ obligations in any way. Indeed, the amendment to the
service agreement extending the contract to 2020 and the loan agreement by which
Altisource S.á.r.l. loaned Ocwen Financial Corporation over $70 million both list it
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as a Florida corporation. (See Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def. Altisource S.A.’s Mot. to
Dismiss, Ex. 3; Id. Ex. 7). Additionally, the service agreement itself is governed by
New York law. (See id. Ex. 1, at 12).
In McDonald v. Ricci, No. 1:07-cv-804-TWT, 2007 WL 2001732 (N.D. Ga.
Jul. 5, 2007), the court concluded that a contracting party’s unilateral move to Georgia
was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the other contracting party in
Georgia. The lawsuit stemmed from a sales contract whereby the plaintiff sold his
interest in a limited liability company equally owned by the plaintiff and the
defendants to the defendants, a husband and wife. At some point, the defendants
refused to continue making installments under the sales contract arguing that the
plaintiff had, prior to the sale, used the LLC to purchase property in Georgia and then
divert the profits from the sale of that property to himself. The plaintiff, who had
moved to Georgia around the time the parties entered into the sales contract, sought
declaratory relief in Georgia and the defendants argued they were not subject to
personal jurisdiction in Georgia. The court agreed with the defendants. The court
noted that “[t]wo Florida residents purchased interests in a Florida corporation from
a former Florida resident, and signed a contract stating that Florida law would control
the outcome of any legal disputes,” a fact which deserves much weight in the
“purposeful availment” analysis. Id. at *3. The court further noted that, because the
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plaintiff moved to Georgia around the time the sales contract was completed, the
defendants had not “reached out to Georgia in order to sell goods to a longtime state
resident.” Id. The court noted that even though the sales contract listed the plaintiff
as having a Georgia residence, and even though the contract required the defendants
to pay the plaintiff wherever he was located, “[t]he act of sending payments, or even
correspondence, is not enough for the Defendants to reasonably anticipate being sued
in Georgia.” Id. Noting that the “existence of the contract… does not create contacts
with the forum,” the court concluded the plaintiff had not established specific personal
jurisdiction over the defendants. Id. (citing Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
478-79 (1985)).
Here, Altisource S.á.r.l.’s contacts with Georgia through its contract with
Ocwen Financial Corporation are similarly attenuated.
Like the contract in
McDonald, the contract here does not specify the application of Georgia law, instead
it calls for New York law. In McDonald, the contract noted that the plaintiff was a
Georgia resident.
Here, however, the initial contract listed Ocwen Financial
Corporation as a Florida corporation, and, although Altisource S.á.r.l. concedes that
Ocwen Financial Corporation moved to Georgia, both the amendment extending the
contract to 2020 and the loan agreement continued to list Ocwen Financial
Corporation as a Florida corporation. Importantly, in both cases, the contracting party
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unilaterally moved to Georgia while the contract was in force. Simply because Ocwen
Financial Corporation moved to Georgia does not subject Altisource S.á.r.l. to
personal jurisdiction in Georgia. See McDonald, 2007 WL 2001732, at *3 (noting
that personal jurisdiction does not automatically extend to whichever state the plaintiff
moves to while the contract is in force). Because the initial contract between
Altisource S.á.r.l. and Ocwen Financial Corporation listed Ocwen Financial
Corporation as a Florida company, because the contract calls for the application of
New York law, and because, even after Ocwen Financial Corporation relocated to
Georgia, it was still listed as a Florida company in later agreements, the contracts
between Altisource S.á.r.l. and Ocwen Financial Corporation are insufficient to create
specific personal jurisdiction over the Defendants in Georgia.
Finally, the Plaintiff’s assertion that Altisource S.á.r.l. holds property in
Georgia is belied by the Defendants’ evidence. According to the declaration of
William Shepro, a manager on Altisource S.á.r.l.’s Board of Managers, Altisource
S.á.r.l. does not have and has never had an office in Georgia or in the United States.
Shepro further declares that Altisource S.á.r.l. has never held any property in Georgia
or the United States, has never paid any taxes in Georgia or the United States, has
never committed any acts associated with the Plaintiff in Georgia or the United States,
has no employees in Georgia, and has never been a Georgia corporation or sought a
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certificate to transact business in Georgia. (Shepro Decl. in Supp. of Altisource
S.á.r.l.’s Mot. to Dismiss ¶¶ 9-17).
Even assuming that with the above allegations the Plaintiff could establish that
Altisource S.á.r.l.’s contacts with Georgia satisfied the Georgia long-arm statute,
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, Altisource S.á.r.l. does not have sufficient contacts with Georgia
to satisfy due process. According to the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the Due Process Clause in International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 320 (1945), and its progeny, a court can exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if the defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the
forum state and exercising jurisdiction would not offend “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.” Id. at 316; accord Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
472-76 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92
(1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 85 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
To fulfill the minimum contacts requirements, a plaintiff must demonstrate the
presence of three factors based entirely on the non-resident defendant’s conduct. See
Ruiz de Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency, Inc., 207 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th Cir.
2000) (“[I]t is important to remember that the conduct at issue is that of the
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defendants. No plaintiff can establish jurisdiction over a defendant through his own
actions.”). First, the plaintiff’s cause of action must arise out of or relate to the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill,
P.C., 74 F.3d 253, 258 (11th Cir. 1996). Second, the contacts must show that the nonresident defendant purposefully availed itself to the forum state and invoked its
protections and benefits.
Robinson, 74 F.3d at 258.
Third, the non-resident
defendant’s contacts must show that it reasonably anticipated being haled into court
in the forum state. Id.
Here, as discussed above, the Plaintiff has not established that Altisource S.á.r.l.
has any contacts with Georgia aside from its association with Ocwen Financial
Corporation after it moved to Georgia and its requirement that users of the
REALTrans Portal submit to Georgia law and Georgia courts. Even assuming these
contacts are sufficiently related to this litigation to support specific jurisdiction, the
contacts do not establish that Altisource S.á.r.l. unilaterally made contact with
Georgia. As noted, Ocwen Financial Corporation moved to Georgia after Altisource
S.á.r.l. signed the service agreement with Ocwen Financial Corporation. There is no
indication that Ocwen Financial Corporation’s move to Georgia changed any
obligation under the service agreement. Further, the renewed service agreement still
identifies Ocwen Financial Corporation as a Florida corporation and mandates the
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operation of New York law. Nothing in Altisource S.á.r.l.’s relationship with Ocwen
Financial Corporation suggests that Altisource S.á.r.l. purposefully availed itself of
Georgia’ protections and benefits. Likewise, Altisource S.á.r.l.’s use of Georgia law
and Georgia courts for litigation relating to the REALTrans Portal is not a sufficient
contact with Georgia to warrant personal jurisdiction. As noted, the REALTrans
Portal now requires the use of Luxembourg law. Further, the Defendants have shown
that the REALTrans Portal is not used to produce broker price opinions in Georgia,
but rather to connect customers and realtors throughout the United States. The limited
connection that Altisource S.á.r.l. has with Georgia through the REALTrans Portal is
not enough to indicate that it could anticipate being haled into court in Georgia.
Accordingly, Altisource S.á.r.l. does not have sufficient minimum contacts with
Georgia to warrant personal jurisdiction.
Furthermore, notions of fair play and substantial justice counsel against
asserting jurisdiction over Altisource S.á.r.l. in Georgia. Altisource S.á.r.l. is a
Luxembourg corporation that has never had an office in Georgia, has never had
property in Georgia, has never paid taxes in Georgia, has never registered to operate
in Georgia, and has never had employees in Georgia. These facts suggest that haling
Altisource S.á.r.l. into court in Georgia would impose a substantial burden.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff has not established that this Court can exercise personal
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jurisdiction over Altisource S.á.r.l., and Altisource S.á.r.l.’s motion to dismiss should
be granted.
B.
Altisource S.A.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
The Plaintiff seeks to establish personal jurisdiction over Altisource Portfolio
Solutions in Georgia through its subsidiary, Altisource S.á.r.l., and by alleging that
Altisource Portfolio Solutions itself holds property in Georgia. While a foreign
corporation is not subject to jurisdiction in Georgia merely because a subsidiary is
doing business in Georgia, Consolidated Development Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d
1286, 1293 (2000), “if the subsidiary is merely an agent through which the parent
company conducts business in [Georgia]...then the subsidiary’s business will be
viewed as that of the parent and the latter will be said to be doing business in
[Georgia] through the subsidiary for purposes of asserting personal jurisdiction.”
Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Intern. Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002);
accord Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357,
1361 (11th Cir. 2006). Here, however, as discussed above, the Plaintiff has not
established that Altisource S.á.r.l. transacts business in Georgia. Even assuming the
Plaintiff had shown Altisource S.á.r.l. was transacting business in Georgia, there is no
indication that Altisource S.á.r.l. was merely an agent for Altisource Portfolio
Solutions. The Plaintiff has now abandoned its claim that Altisource Portfolio
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Solutions’ subsidiaries that do operate in the United States are merely agents through
which it transacts business in Georgia.
Additionally, contrary to the Plaintiff’s allegations, the Defendants have shown
that Altisource Portfolio Solutions does not hold property in Georgia or transact
business in Georgia. The Defendants provide evidence indicating that Altisource
Portfolio Solutions is a Luxembourg corporation whose managers and officers reside
in Luxembourg. Altisource Portfolio Solutions has never held property in Georgia,
has never had an office in Georgia, does not accept mail in Georgia, has never done
business in Georgia, has never had employees in Georgia, has never paid taxes in
Georgia, and has committed no acts or omissions with respect to the Plaintiff in
Georgia. Indeed, according to its CEO, Altisource Portfolio Solutions has never even
conducted business or held property in the United States generally.1 (See Shepro
The Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief in
Opposition to the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [Doc. 89]. Through the motion,
the Plaintiffs offer an email sent from an “Altisource.com” email address that lists an
office address in Atlanta, Georgia. Altisource Portfolio Solutions argues that the
email the Plaintiff provides is unauthenticated and was not sent by Altisource
Portfolio Solutions or Altisource S.á.r.l., but rather by an employee of Ocwen
Financial Services located in Uruguay. Whatever the source of the email, the email
itself does not override the Defendants’ evidence that neither Altisource Portfolio
Solutions nor Altisource S.á.r.l. hold property in Georgia or have an office in Georgia.
The Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file supplemental evidence should be granted, but
the email itself is not dispositive.
1
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Decl. in Supp. of Def. Altisource Portfolio Solutions, S.A.’s Motion to Dismiss ¶¶ 419).
Even assuming the Plaintiff had shown that Altisource Portfolio Solutions’
conduct in Georgia satisfies the Georgia long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, the
Plaintiff has not shown that exercising personal jurisdiction over Altisource Portfolio
Solutions would satisfy due process. As noted, to fulfill the minimum contacts
requirements to support specific personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must demonstrate the
presence of three factors based entirely on the non-resident defendant’s conduct. See
Ruiz de Molina, 207 F.3d at 1356. First, the plaintiff’s cause of action must arise out
of or relate to the non-resident defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Robinson,
74 F.3d at 258. Second, the contacts must show that the non-resident defendant
purposefully availed itself to the forum state and invoked its protections and benefits.
Robinson, 74 F.3d at 258. And third, the non-resident defendant’s contacts must show
that it reasonably anticipated being haled into court in the forum state. Id.
Here, the Plaintiff has not shown that Altisource Portfolio Solutions has any
contacts with Georgia relating to the theft of the Trade Secret. Indeed, there is no
indication that Altisource Portfolio Solutions has committed any acts or omissions in
Georgia with any connection whatsoever to the Plaintiff. Further, even if Altisource
Portfolio Solutions had committed acts in Georgia in connection to the Plaintiff’s
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cause of action, there is no indication that Altisource Portfolio Solutions purposefully
availed itself of Georgia’s protections in benefits. The evidence shows that Altisource
Portfolio Solutions has no connections with Georgia or with the United States
generally. Even though Altisource Portfolio Solutions has subsidiaries operating in
Georgia, there is no indication that the subsidiaries were merely agents of Altisource
Portfolio Solutions through which Altisource Portfolio Solutions could be expected
to be haled into court in Georgia. Overall, considering Altisource Portfolio Solutions’
complete lack of contact with Georgia, Altisource Portfolio Solutions did not invoke
Georgia’s benefits and protections and could not have reasonably anticipated being
haled into court in Georgia.
Finally, as with its subsidiary Altisource S.á.r.l., notions of fair play and
substantial justice counsel against asserting personal jurisdiction over Altisource
Portfolio Solutions in Georgia. Altisource Portfolio Solutions is a Luxembourg
corporation with minimal if any contacts with the United States generally, let alone
Georgia.
Litigation in Georgia would therefore be a substantial hardship on
Altisource Portfolio Solutions. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has not established that this
Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over Altisource Portfolio Solutions, and
Altisource Portfolio Solutions’ motion to dismiss should therefore be granted.1
Because the Court concludes that the Plaintiff cannot establish personal
jurisdiction over the Defendants, the Court need not resolve Altisource Portfolio
1
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Altisource Portfolio Solutions’s
motion to dismiss [Doc. 67] is GRANTED and Defendant Altisource S.á.r.l.’s motion
to dismiss [Doc. 82] is GRANTED. Cartel Asset Management’s Motion for Leave to
File a Supplemental Brief in Opposition to the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [Doc.
89] is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this 29 day of August, 2013.
/s/Thomas W. Thrash
THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge
Solutions’ contention that it has not been properly served.
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