Wells v. West Georgia Technical College et al
Filing
13
ORDER AND OPINION granting 10 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Julie E. Carnes on 8/2/12. (ddm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
MARGARETHA WELLS,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO.
v.
1:11-cv-3422-JEC
WEST GEORGIA TECHNICAL COLLEGE
(formerly known as West Central
Technical College), TECHNICAL
COLLEGE SYSTEM OF GEORGIA, and
STATE BOARD OF THE TECHNICAL
COLLEGE SYSTEM OF GEORGIA,
Defendants.
ORDER & OPINION
This case is before the Court on defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
[10].
The Court has reviewed the record and the arguments of the
parties
and,
for
the
reasons
set
out
below,
concludes
that
defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [10] should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the
“ADA”) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”). (Compl. at
¶ 2, attached to Notice of Removal [1] at Ex. A.)
former instructor at West Georgia Technical College.
Plaintiff is a
(Id. at ¶ 3.)
On August 18, 2009, plaintiff worked a half day in order to go to the
doctor.
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(Id. at ¶ 4.)
The doctor allegedly informed plaintiff that
she was “temporarily unable to work” for some unspecified reason.
(Id. at ¶ 6.)
Consequently, plaintiff contacted human resources
director Madelyn Warrenfell to obtain the forms necessary to request
medical leave.
(Id. at ¶¶ 7, 9.)
According to the complaint, Warrenfell berated plaintiff and
falsely accused her of not providing notice of her absence from work.
(Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 9, 11.) Plaintiff informed Warrenfell that she was
in an “emotionally fragile condition” and needed to go home as her
doctor had instructed. (Id. at ¶ 10.) However, Warrenfell persisted
in her accusations.
(Id. at ¶ 11.)
Thereafter, defendants denied
plaintiff’s request for medical leave and terminated her employment
effective August 31, 2009.
(Id. at ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff subsequently filed this action asserting claims for
disability discrimination in violation of the ADA and improper denial
of medical leave in violation of the FMLA.
(Id. at ¶¶ 13-25.)
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under
Federal Rule 12(b)(6). (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [10].) In support of
their motion, defendants argue that:
(1) the only legal entity that
is potentially subject to liability in this case is the Technical
College System of Georgia (“TCSG”), (2) plaintiff’s FMLA claim is
barred
by
sovereign
immunity,
and
(3)
plaintiff
has
not
pled
sufficient facts to support a claim for disability discrimination
under the ADA.
(Id.)
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DISCUSSION
I.
Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court assumes that all of the allegations in the complaint are true
and construes the facts in favor of the plaintiff.
610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010).
Randall v. Scott,
That said, in order to survive
a motion to dismiss a complaint “must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim [for] relief that is
plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A claim is “facial[ly] plausible” when it is supported with facts
that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
II.
Id.
Redundant Claims
Pursuant to state statute, the Technical College System of
Georgia (“TCSG”) exercises “management and operational control” over
all Georgia vocational centers, including West Georgia Technical
College.
O.C.G.A. § 20-4-18.
Thus, TCSG is the only legal entity
that is potentially subject to liability for plaintiff’s claims. Id.
Naming West Georgia Technical College and the State Board of the TCSG
is redundant and improper.
See Clark v. Fitzgerald Water, Light &
Bond Comm’n, 284 Ga. 12, 14 (2008)(the power to extend the right to
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a governmental agency to sue or be sued rests solely with the
legislature).
Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss [10] is
GRANTED as to West Georgia Technical College and the State Board of
the TCSG.
TCSG will remain as the sole defendant.
III. Plaintiff’s FMLA Claim
Plaintiff’s FMLA claim arises under the self-care provision of
the Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
(Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 20-25.)
That provision entitles an “eligible employee” to twelve weeks of
leave during any twelve month period if necessitated by “a serious
health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the
functions of [his or her] position.”
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
According to plaintiff, TCSG violated the FMLA’s self-care provision
by refusing her request for medical leave and terminating her
employment.
(Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 24-25.)
The Court agrees with defendant that plaintiff’s FMLA claim is
barred by sovereign immunity.
Article I of the Georgia Constitution
extends sovereign immunity to the state and all of its departments
and agencies.
Ga. Const. art. I, § II, ¶ IX(e).
See also McCobb v.
Clayton Cnty., 309 Ga. App. 217, 218 (2011)(applying Georgia’s
constitutional sovereign immunity provision).
The immunity can only
be waived by an Act of the Georgia legislature that specifically
provides for and describes the extent of the waiver. Ga. Const. art.
I, § II, ¶ IX(e).
Any such waiver must be established by the party
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seeking to benefit from the waiver: in this case, plaintiff. McCobb,
309 Ga. App. at 218.
There are two Georgia statutes that specifically waive sovereign
immunity, neither of which is applicable here.
First, the Georgia
Tort Claims Act waives immunity for certain torts committed by state
officers and employees while acting within the scope of their
official duties.
O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20, et seq.
Plaintiff does not
assert any allegations that could conceivably be encompassed by the
Tort Claims Act, nor is there any indication that plaintiff complied
with the mandatory notice provisions of the Act before she filed her
complaint.
See O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26.
Plaintiff apparently concedes
that the Tort Claims Act does not apply, because she does not respond
to defendant’s arguments concerning the Act.
(Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’
Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Resp.”) [11].)
In addition to certain tort claims, Georgia law waives sovereign
immunity for actions arising from the state’s breach of a written
contract.
O.C.G.A. § 50-21-1(a).
In support of her argument that
the contract waiver applies here, plaintiff asserts that “[a]n
employment relationship is obviously contractual.” (Pl.’s Resp. [11]
at 4.)
But plaintiff does not cite to any written contract or
describe its terms.
See Georgia Dep’t of Cmty. Health v. Data
Inquiry, LLC, 313 Ga. App. 683, 685-86 (2012)(plaintiff “has the
burden of showing that the contract sought to be enforced is in
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writing and contains all of the terms necessary to constitute a valid
contract”).
Even assuming a written contract exists, plaintiff’s
complaint does not include a claim for breach of that contract.
More generally, plaintiff suggests that defendant’s sovereign
immunity argument runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
In Hibbs,
the Supreme Court held that Congress had validly abrogated state
immunity for claims arising under the family-care provision of the
FMLA.
Id. at 725.
The Hibbs Court explained that:
(1) Congress
made its intention to abrogate state immunity clear in the text of
the FMLA, and (2) it acted pursuant to a valid exercise of its
constitutional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
726, 735.
Id. at
Specifically with respect to the second point, the Court
concluded that the family-care provision was a legitimate attempt to
enforce
the
substantive
guarantees
of
§
1
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment, among them equal protection of the laws, by enacting
appropriate legislation.
Id. at 727.
This conclusion was based on
substantial evidence of state-sanctioned gender discrimination with
respect to family leave policies.
Id. at 726-39.
In a recent decision expressly addressing the issue, the Supreme
Court declined to extend the Hibbs rule to claims arising under the
FMLA’s self-care provision.
See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of
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Maryland, 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1332 (Mar. 20, 2012).1
Citing Hibbs, the
Court noted in Coleman that Congress had made its intention to
abrogate state immunity “unmistakably clear” in the FMLA.
1333.
Id. at
However, the Court held that Congress’s attempt to abrogate
immunity with respect to the self-care provision of the FMLA was not
a valid exercise of congressional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, because it was not based on a “well-documented pattern of
sex-based discrimination” by the states in their administration of
self-care leave policies.
Id. at 1334.
Applying Coleman, the immunity rule announced in Hibbs is not
applicable to plaintiff’s FMLA self-care claim.
Moreover,
the
Georgia
plaintiff’s FMLA claim.
legislature
has
not
waived
Id.
at 1332.
immunity
for
Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss
[10] is GRANTED with respect to the FMLA claim asserted in Count II
of the Complaint.
IV.
Plaintiff’s ADA Claim
Plaintiff’s ADA claim arises under Title I of the Act, which
prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals in regard to
1
Coleman was decided by a plurality opinion delivered by
Justice Kennedy and joined by Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and
Justice Alito.
Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1332.
Justice Scalia
concurred in the judgment, writing separately to express his view
that Congress’s power under § 5 should be limited to the regulation
of conduct that itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment, which does
not include failing to grant state employees leave for the purpose of
self-care. Id. at 1338-39.
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the terms, conditions and privileges of their employment.
See 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a) and D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220,
1227 (11th Cir. 2005).
To prevail on her ADA claim, plaintiff
ultimately must show that:
(1) she has a disability, (2) she is a
“qualified individual” as defined by the ADA, and (3) defendant
discriminated against her because of her disability.
Carruthers v.
BSA Adver., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 2004).
In order to
survive defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff’s complaint must
include sufficient facts on each of those elements to support a
“reasonable inference” that she is entitled to relief under the ADA.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff’s complaint does not meet the above standard.
The
only facts that plaintiff cites in support of her “disability” are
that:
(1) she took a half day off of work on August 18, 2009 to see
her doctor, (2) the doctor instructed her that she was “temporarily
unable to work” for some unspecified reason, and (3) she was in an
“emotionally fragile condition” when she subsequently went to pick up
medical leave forms.
(Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 4, 6, 10.)
Those facts do
not permit a reasonable inference that plaintiff was disabled at the
time of her termination.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (an individual is
“disabled” under the ADA if she has “a physical or mental impairment
that
substantially
limits
one
or
more
of
[her]
major
life
activities”) and Garrett v. Univ. of Alabama at Birmingham, 507 F.3d
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1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007)(concluding that the limitations resulting
from plaintiff’s cancer were insufficiently severe and long-term to
rise to the level of a “disability”).
Neither does plaintiff cite any facts to suggest that she was
“qualified” for her position, other than the dates of her employment
as an instructor at West Georgia Technical College.
¶ 3.)
(Compl. [1] at
See Wood v. Green, 323 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003) (a
disabled individual is “qualified” under the ADA if she can perform
the “essential functions” of her job “with or without a reasonable
accommodation”). Plaintiff suggests that defendant should have given
her a “reasonable accommodation[]” under the ADA, but she does not
allege
that
she
requested
an
accommodation
or
that
any
accommodation would have enabled her to perform her job duties.
such
See
Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2001)
(an
ADA
plaintiff
has
the
burden
of
identifying
a
reasonable
accommodation and demonstrating that it would enable her to perform
the essential functions of her job).
In fact, most of plaintiff’s ADA allegations merely recite the
elements of a disability discrimination claim as set forth in the
statute.
(Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 13-18.)
For example, plaintiff alleges
that she is a “qualified individual with a disability” and that
defendant discriminated against her “because of her disability.”
(Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.)
However, plaintiff does not provide any factual
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enhancement to support those assertions.
As the Supreme Court
recognized in Iqbal, a complaint that offers only “‘labels and
conclusions’” or a “‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action’” does not meet the pleading standard set forth in Twombly.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Although plaintiff is represented by counsel and defendant’s
motion to dismiss has been pending for several months, she has not
filed a motion or otherwise requested an opportunity to amend her
complaint.
See Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d
541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002)(“A district court is not required to grant
a
plaintiff
leave
to
amend
his
complaint
sua
sponte
when
the
plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to
amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.”).
Moreover, the complaint clearly is deficient under Twombly and Iqbal.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss [10] the
ADA claim asserted in Count I of plaintiff’s complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss [10].
The clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
SO ORDERED, this 2nd day of August, 2012.
/s/ Julie E. Carnes
JULIE E. CARNES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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