Richardson v. DeKalb County Police Department et al
Filing
11
ORDER AND OPINION granting in part and denying in part the defendants' 4 Motion to Dismiss. The motion is GRANTED as to the federal claims against the individual defendants and DENIED without prejudice as to all other claims. Signed by Judge Julie E. Carnes on 3/29/2013. (anc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
TRACY RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO.
v.
1:11-cv-4386-JEC
DEKALB COUNTY POLICE
DEPARTMENT, DETECTIVE M.G.
HELLERMAN, Individually and in
his Official Capacity,
DETECTIVE B.C. BRUEGGERMAN,
Individually and in his
Official Capacity, SOUTH DEKALB
TOWING & TRANSPORT, INC., and
HECTOR MELQUIADES CASTRO,
Defendants.
ORDER & OPINION
The case is before the Court on defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
[4].
The Court has reviewed the record and the arguments of the
parties
and,
for
the
reasons
discussed
below,
concludes
that
defendants’ Motion [4] should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
In support of the claims asserted in this action, plaintiff
alleges the following facts.
On December 18, 2009, plaintiff was
sitting in his black Chevrolet Yukon on a street in Lithonia,
Georgia.
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(Compl. [1] at ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff was joined in the front of
the vehicle by an unknown male with whom plaintiff intended to
negotiate
the
sale
of
a
“music
verse.”
(Id.)
According
to
plaintiff, his counterpart was supposed to pay $1,500 in exchange for
the verse.
(Id.)
However, to plaintiff’s dismay, the unknown male
attempted to purchase the verse with marijuana rather than money.
(Id. at ¶¶ 7-8.)
The exchange turned violent when the unknown
purchaser pulled out and discharged a handgun.
(Id. at ¶¶ 9-10.)
A
second unknown assailant subsequently drove up in a separate car and
fired several shots into the Yukon, some of which hit the plaintiff.
(Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 11-12, 14.)
fled the scene.
Both of the unknown assailants then
(Id. at ¶ 13.)
At some point during this melee, the DeKalb County Police
Department was called to the scene.
Upon their arrival, DeKalb
County detectives Hellerman and Brueggeman inspected the bulletriddled Yukon.
Brueggeman observed and collected a large amount of
marijuana, a notebook and two cell phones.
(Id. at ¶¶ 27-29.)
Brueggeman observed but did not collect a Mac laptop computer, which
had been sitting on the rear floor board of the Yukon underneath some
clothing.
(Id. at ¶¶ 30-31.)
The Yukon was subsequently “released”
to South DeKalb Towing & Transport, Inc. (“South DeKalb Towing”).
(Id.
at
¶¶
32-33.)
The
Yukon
was
towed
to
a
crime
lab
for
processing, and then taken back to the towing company’s headquarters.
(Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 34-35.)
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While recovering from his wounds at the hospital, plaintiff
asked his mother to collect certain valuables that were in the Yukon
at the time of the incident.
(Id. at ¶ 23.)
However, after speaking
to his mother, plaintiff realized that many of these items had
disappeared.
(Id. at ¶ 24.)
The missing items included:
a diamond
necklace with a diamond-encrusted Atlanta Falcons pendant, a gold and
diamond ring, diamond earrings, a Mac laptop, an Apple iPhone, a
Metro PCS cell phone, men’s clothing, sunglasses, Richardson’s birth
certificate, Richardson’s Georgia driver’s license, and a “lyrics
notebook.”
(Id.)
The detectives do not seem to have noticed most of these items
upon initial inspection of the vehicle, or at least they did not
collect them.
Plaintiff’s mother at one point filed a complaint
against detectives Hellerman and Brueggeman, alleging that they stole
property from the Yukon, but this does not seem to be plaintiff’s
theory today.
(Id. at ¶ 25.)
Instead, plaintiff alleges that at
some point while the Yukon was in the custody of South DeKalb Towing,
the
Mac
laptop
was
stolen
by
towing
company
employee
Hector
Melquiades Castro and sold to a pawn shop. (Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 36-37.)
Plaintiff asserts that there has been a “rash of reported thefts
involving vehicles towed by [South DeKalb Towing] prior to this
incident” and he accuses the detectives of a “lack of concern
towards” his belongings.
(Id. at ¶¶ 38, 61.)
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Plaintiff brings the present action against the County, its
detectives, South DeKalb Towing, and Castro.
(Id. at 1.)
In the
complaint, plaintiff asserts federal constitutional claims against
defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
state law claims.
(Id. at 1-2.)
(Id.)
He also asserts various
Plaintiff’s claims can be grouped
into three different categories: (1) federal constitutional claims
against the detectives for performing an inadequate inventory of the
Yukon, (2) federal constitutional claims against the County based on
the
detectives’
adequately
train
actions
them,
and
and
based
(3)
on
state
detectives and against the County.
the
law
County’s
claims
failure
against
to
the
(Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 26-65.)
Defendants DeKalb County and the detectives have filed a motion to
dismiss, which is now before the Court.1
(Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss
[4].)
DISCUSSION
I.
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court assumes that all of the allegations in the complaint are true
and construes all of the facts in favor of the plaintiff.
v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010).
1
Randall
That said, in order
South DeKalb Towing is named as a defendant but has not joined
the County’s motion and has not filed an answer or its own motion to
dismiss. Castro has been dismissed as a defendant due to lack of
service. (Order [10].)
4
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to survive a motion to dismiss a complaint “must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
A claim is “facially plausible” when it is
supported with facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id.
II.
FEDERAL CLAIMS AGAINST DETECTIVES IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES
In Count I of the complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants
Hellerman and Brueggeman violated his rights by not conducting an
inventory at the scene of the crime.
Count II,
(Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 26-33.)
In
plaintiff alleges that the detectives failed to conduct
an inventory “during the execution of a search warrant.”
(Id. at ¶¶
34-54.).2 In both Counts, plaintiff seeks to impose liability on the
2
Plaintiff describes the detectives’ actions at the crime scene
as the “execut[ion] [of] a search warrant,” but in another part of
the complaint he states that the detectives “intended to execute a
search warrant . . . and failed to perform an inventory.” (Compl.
[1] at ¶¶ 26, 40, 43.) The Court is thus uncertain whether plaintiff
believes the detectives executed a search warrant, or that they
intended to execute a search warrant but failed to do so. It is also
unclear whether the detectives would have had enough time to obtain
a search warrant before arriving on the scene of the shooting. In
any event, plaintiff’s argument is not that the detectives
impermissibly conducted a search without a warrant, but instead he
complains that the detectives did not perform a more invasive and
effective search.
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detectives in their individual capacity.
(Id. at ¶¶ 26-54.)
To address defendants’ specific arguments, it is helpful to
distinguish between an inventory search and an investigative search.
The police may impound a car and take an inventory of an automobile
without a search warrant, if under the circumstances it is reasonable
to do so.
1992).
See Sammons v. Taylor, 967 F.2d 1533, 1543 (11th Cir.
“Because an inventory search is an exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement, . . . the government officer has the
burden
to
show
that
the
exception have been met.”
requirements
Id.
of
the
inventory
search
The Supreme Court has generally
described those requirements as follows:
When vehicles are impounded, local police departments
generally follow a routine practice of securing and
inventorying the automobiles’ contents. These procedures
developed in response to three distinct needs:
the
protection of the owner’s property while it remains in
police custody, United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960,
961 (CA9 1972); the protection the police [sic] against
claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, United
States v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176, 178 (CA5 1972); and the
protection of the police from potential danger, Cooper v.
California, supra, 386 U.S., at 61-62, 87 S. Ct., at 790.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1976).
An inventory
vehicle search may not be used as a pretext for an investigatory
police motive.
Sammons, 967 F.2d at 1543 (citing Opperman, 428 U.S.
at 375-76).
The Court offers this background to clarify that plaintiff is
not challenging the search of his car as unduly invasive, or as a
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pretext for an investigatory search.
is
that
the
police
did
not
Instead, plaintiff’s grievance
search
his
car
thoroughly
enough,
resulting in their failure to adequately secure or inventory the
car’s contents.
(Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 40-41, 46.)
With this in mind,
the Court considers the viability of the claims asserted in Counts
I and II against the detectives in their individual capacity.
To succeed on his constitutional claims against the detectives,
it is plaintiff’s obligation to explain what duty the detectives owed
him concerning their inventory search.
Both in his complaint and in
his response brief, plaintiff fails to point to such a duty. Indeed,
plaintiff
cites
no
constitutional
right
inventoried, and the Court is aware of none.
to
have
one’s
car
At most, plaintiff’s
claims against the officers is one of negligence, but negligent
conduct by a state’s police officers does not give rise to a
constitutional violation.
Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1307-08
(11th Cir. 2007)(citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328
(1986)).
In addition, plaintiff has also failed to allege a violation of
clearly
established
detectives’
qualified
federal
law
immunity
sufficient
from
suit
in
to
overcome
their
the
individual
capacities. See Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346-50 (11th Cir.
2002)(“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government
officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct does
7
AO 72A
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not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.”).
With respect to
qualified immunity, the salient question is whether, based on the law
in existence at that time, the detectives had “fair warning” that
their alleged treatment of plaintiff was unconstitutional.
Id.
Plaintiff presents no argument or authority to address this question,
and he fails to respond to defendants’ argument that the detectives
are shielded from liability by qualified immunity.
at 3.)
(Pl.’s Resp. [6]
Thus, with respect to plaintiff’s constitutional claims
against the detectives in their individual capacities, defendants’
Motion to Dismiss [4] is GRANTED.
III. FEDERAL CLAIMS AGAINST DEKALB COUNTY
Plaintiff asserts two claims against DeKalb County.3
[1] at 12-16.)
(Compl.
First, plaintiff sues the detectives in their
official capacities for violating plaintiff’s constitutional rights,
which the Court will interpret as an action against DeKalb County.
See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985).
(Id. at 1.)
Second, plaintiff claims that DeKalb County failed to train its
3
Plaintiff names the DeKalb County Police Department rather
than DeKalb County as a defendant.
This might have presented a
problem, but plaintiff has sued the detectives in their official
capacities, which is the same as suing DeKalb County. The Court will
thus refer to DeKalb County as the defendant, not the DeKalb County
Police Department.
8
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officers, including detectives Hellerman and Brueggeman, in the
proper procedure for inventorying a vehicle.
(Id. at 14-15.)
Local government entities are typically not liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of an employee, unless the deprivation of
rights was the result of a policy or custom of the municipality.
Davis v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 1367, 1375 (11th Cir.
2000)(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of New York,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)(“it is when execution of a government's
policy or custom...inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983.”)). However, a municipality with
the
“correct”
policy
in
place
may
be
sued
if
it
displays
indifference toward whether its employees followed that policy.
Id.
at 1375-76.
In the present case, plaintiff does not argue that DeKalb County
lacked a proper policy regarding inventory searches of vehicles and
the
need
standards.
for
such
intrusions
to
comply
with
Fourth
Amendment
Instead, plaintiff argues that the County failed to have
its officers implement this policy and thereby exhibited deliberate
indifference toward the rights of citizens whose vehicles are subject
to inventory searches.
In support of his theory, plaintiff avers
that, prior to this incident, South DeKalb Towing has been implicated
in “a rash” of thefts in connection with its towing activities taken
at the behest of DeKalb County, as part of the latter’s practices
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regarding the impoundment and inventory search of vehicles.
(Compl.
[1] at ¶ 38.)
In response, defendant DeKalb County replies that“[t]here is no
evidence that DeKalb County would have been on notice of a serious
supervisory or training deficiency in the matter of inventory of
personal property.” (Def.’s Br. [4] at 7.) The Court concludes that
plaintiff’s allegation is sufficient, at the motion to dismiss stage,
to proceed with this claim.
Accordingly, defendant’s motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s federal claim against the County for failure to
train is DENIED without prejudice.4
IV.
STATE LAW CLAIMS
As mentioned, plaintiff also alleges that defendants violated
state law.
(Compl. [1] at 1-2.)
Defendants seek to dismiss
plaintiff’s state law claims against the defendants on various
grounds.
The Court DENIES without prejudice this motion.
DeKalb
4
That said, prior to summary judgment motions, plaintiff will
be expected to put more meat on the bones of this purported
Constitutional claim.
That is, if it turns out only that DeKalb
County was deliberately indifferent as to the state property rights
of its citizens not to have stolen property they have entrusted to
the County, then it is difficult to see how such an allegation makes
out a federal constitutional claim, as opposed to merely a state law
claim.
If plaintiff can foresee that a federal claim will be difficult
to sustain, he might be well advised to expedite what may be stronger
state law claims by dismissing this federal action.
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County may file a summary judgment motion on these grounds, if it
chooses to do, following the conclusion of discovery.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [4] is
GRANTED as to the federal claims against the individual defendants
and DENIED without prejudice as to all other claims.
SO ORDERED, this 29th day of MARCH, 2013.
/s/ Julie E. Carnes
JULIE E. CARNES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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