Weatherby v. Fulton County School System
Filing
62
ORDER AND OPINION granting defendant's 35 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages and 36 Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to this order, plaintiffs federal claims are DISMISSED and her state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. Signed by Judge Julie E. Carnes on 9/22/13. (ddm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
GAIL WEATHERBY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:11-cv-04578-JEC
FULTON COUNTY SCHOOL
SYSTEM,
Defendant.
OPINION & ORDER
This case is before the Court on defendant’s Motion for Leave to
File Excess Pages [35] and Motion for Summary Judgment [36].
The
Court has reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties and,
for the reasons set out below, concludes that defendant’s Motion for
Leave [35] and Motion for Summary Judgment [36] should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This is an employment discrimination case arising under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
Plaintiff is a teacher who
worked for the Fulton County School District for approximately 34
years.
(Weatherby Dep., attached to Def.’s Exs. [38] at Exs. 2-12.)
She was terminated from the district in 2010 pursuant to a reductionin-force (“RIF”).
(Id. at 56-57 and Def.’s Exs. [38] at Ex. 13.)
During the last several years of her employment with the
district, plaintiff worked at Roswell North Elementary School as an
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English as a Second Language (“ESOL”) teacher.
(Def.’s Exs. [38] at
Exs. 2-13.) In this position, plaintiff helped students who were not
performing at grade level because they had not mastered the English
language.
(Huff Dep., attached to Def.’s Exs. [38] at Exs. 27-28.)
She performed satisfactorily in this role.
(Id. at 112.)
Unfortunately, a budget shortfall forced the school district to
eliminate
plaintiff’s
ESOL
position
in
2007.
(Id.
at
22
and
Weatherby Dep. at 27.) Thereafter, plaintiff was reassigned to teach
kindergarten. (Huff Dep. at 22 and Weatherby Dep. at 27.) Plaintiff
told her principal Jerome Huff she was not well-suited to be a
kindergarten teacher, and that she would prefer to teach an early
intervention (“EIP”) class that involved similar responsibilities as
her old position.
(Huff Dep. at 22 and Weatherby Dep. at Ex. 22.)
Huff told plaintiff that no EIP positions were available, and that
she should focus on being a good kindergarten teacher. (Huff Dep. at
22.)
Although plaintiff ultimately accepted her reassignment, she
struggled in her new role as a kindergarten teacher.
[38] at Exs. 17-21.)
(Def.’s Exs.
Between 2007 and 2010, plaintiff had several
meetings with North Roswell administrators about how to improve her
teaching and classroom management skills.
(Id. at Exs. 19-21.)
Administrators and colleagues who observed plaintiff’s classroom
advised her to be more organized in her lesson plans and better
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target students according to their capabilities.
(Id.)
They also
urged plaintiff to use more consistent discipline and to keep her
classroom tidier.
(Id. at Exs. 21-22.)
In early 2010, Huff sent plaintiff several “Letters of Concern”
regarding her performance.
(Id. at Ex. 22.)
In the first letter,
Huff summarized the steps he and his administrators had taken to
improve plaintiff’s performance, and he indicated that these steps
had not resulted in satisfactory progress.
22.)
(Def.’s Exs. [38] at Ex.
In the second letter, Huff documented problems he observed
during a recent visit to plaintiff’s classroom and suggested that
plaintiff work with another kindergarten teacher to improve.
(Id.)
The third letter repeated many of the same concerns and noted that
plaintiff was not implementing the suggestions provided by the other
kindergarten teacher and that she either could not or would not
comply to make sure her classroom was conducive to learning. (Id. at
Ex. 23.)
In addition to the above issues, at least two serious and
potentially dangerous infractions were reported in plaintiff’s file.
On one occasion, an autistic child left plaintiff’s classroom without
plaintiff noticing.
(Id.)
On another occasion, plaintiff left
several children alone in her classroom after she took the other
children in the class to lunch.
(Id.)
As a result of all of these
issues, plaintiff consistently received a “Needs Improvement” rating
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in several key areas of her performance reviews.
at Ex. 23.)
(Def.’s Exs. [38]
Understandably, more than one parent asked for their
child to be removed from plaintiff’s class.
(Id. and Def.’s Exs.
[39] at Ex. 3.)
Throughout
this
same
time
period,
plaintiff
suffered
from
various physical ailments that impacted her ability to perform
certain tasks at work.
Since at least 1999, plaintiff had severe
allergies that limited the extent to which she could be outdoors.
(Weatherby Dep. at 115.)
A subsequent car accident left plaintiff
unable to bend, lift or use the stairs.
(Def.’s Exs. [38] at Ex.
30.) Plaintiff also took an extended leave of absence in mid-2008 to
recover from hepatitis, a disease she believed she contracted from
young children at the school.
(Weatherby Dep. at 132.)
Huff was generally accommodating of plaintiff’s conditions.
He
allowed plaintiff to stay indoors when her students went outside
during recess and exempted her from bus and carpool duty at the end
of the day so that she could avoid allergens and fumes.
Statement of Material Facts (“DSMF”) [37] at ¶ 5.)
(Def.’s
After the car
accident, Huff moved plaintiff’s classroom closer to the elevator and
gave her an elevator key so that she would not have to take the
stairs.
(Huff Dep. at 13 and Weatherby Dep. at 67-68, 70, 74.)
Huff
also permitted plaintiff to take time off from work in mid-2008 to
recover from hepatitis.
(Weatherby Dep. at 132.)
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That said, Huff did not accede to all of plaintiff’s requests
for accommodations.
On one occasion, Huff instructed plaintiff to
attend an outdoor “field day,” although he permitted her to wear a
mask to alleviate the effects of her allergies.
(Id. at 166.)
Plaintiff claims that she became ill as a result of attending this
event.
(Weatherby Aff. [48] at ¶ 9.)
In late 2009, Huff also moved
plaintiff’s classroom farther away from the elevator.
Dep. at 68.)
(Weatherby
Huff explained that the move was necessary because (1)
the classroom by the elevator was large and another teacher needed
the
space
and
(2)
plaintiff’s
new
classroom
was
near
other
kindergarten teachers and Huff thought plaintiff would benefit from
their guidance.
(Huff Dep. at 35-36.)
Finally, Huff did not permit
plaintiff to take the elevator during fire drills because he believed
state law required everyone to take the stairs in that situation.
(Id. at 14.)
Around March 2010, Fulton County initiated a second round of
budget cuts as a result of the financial crisis and decreasing tax
revenues.
(Def.’s Exs. [40] at Ex. 3.)
Ultimately, the Fulton
County Board of Education concluded that it needed to reduce the
teacher workforce by approximately 475 teachers, 252 of whom would
come from elementary schools.
(Wade Dep., attached to Def.’s Exs.
[39] at Ex. 1 and Def.’s Exs. 40 at Exs. 4, 6.)
The Board decided
that performance reviews would play a large role in determining which
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teachers would be discharged.
(Wade Dep. at 19, 27.)
On April 16,
2010, the Board informed plaintiff that her contract for the upcoming
school year would not be renewed as a result of the RIF.
Exs. [38] at Ex. 13 and Def.’s Exs. [40] at Ex. 12.)
later, plaintiff resigned from her position.
(Def.’s
A few weeks
(Def.’s Exs. [38] at
Ex. 13.) In her resignation letter, plaintiff stated that she had no
choice but to resign due to the “unethical and unlawful treatment”
she had received from Huff and other Fulton County employees.
Plaintiff
subsequently
filed
an
EEOC
charge
alleging
(Id.)
that
defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her race, age and
disability.
(Id. at Ex. 15.)
The EEOC charge included numerous
theories of unlawful discrimination. (Id.) It stated that plaintiff
was denied reasonable accommodations for her disability and that she
was exposed to a hostile work environment as a result of the critical
comments that Huff made about plaintiff in front of her colleagues.
(Id.) It also alleged that Huff’s negative reviews of plaintiff were
in retaliation for objections plaintiff made to Huff’s removal of her
disability accommodations.
(Def.’s Exs. [38] at Ex. 15.)
In early October 2011, plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter
from the EEOC.
filed
this
(Pl.’s Resp. [46] at 1-2.)
action.
(Compl.
[1].)
In
On December 30, 2011, she
her
amended
complaint,
plaintiff asserts a federal claim for disability discrimination under
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the ADA.1 (Am. Compl. [5].) Plaintiff also asserts a state law claim
based on her allegation that defendant miscalculated her service time
and improperly withheld $12,000 from her retirement benefits.
at ¶¶ 38-46.)
(Id.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on both claims.
(Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [36].)
DISCUSSION
I.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”
materiality
is
determined
by
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
the
controlling
A fact’s
substantive
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
law.
An issue
is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict on the issue for the nonmovant.
Id. at 249-50.
Summary judgment is not properly viewed as a device that the
trial court may, in its discretion, implement in lieu of a trial on
the merits.
However, Federal Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary
judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of every element essential to that party’s
case on which he will bear the burden of proof at trial.
1
Celotex
Although plaintiff alleged race discrimination in her EEOC
charge, she did not include that claim in her amended complaint.
(Am. Compl. [5].) Plaintiff has also withdrawn a previously asserted
age discrimination claim. (Pl.’s Resp. [46] at 24.)
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Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In such a situation,
there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, as a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving
party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Id. at
322-23.
The movant bears the initial responsibility of asserting the
basis for his motion.
Id. at 323.
The movant is not required to
negate his opponent’s claim in order to meet this responsibility.
Rather, the movant may discharge his burden by merely “‘showing’-that is, pointing out to the district court--that there is an absence
of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.”
Id. at 325.
After the movant has carried his burden, the non-moving party is then
required to “go beyond the pleadings” and present competent evidence
designating “‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.’”
Id. at 324.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view
all evidence and draw any factual inferences in the light most
favorable to the non[-]moving party. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846
F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988).
But “the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 247-48 (1986). The requirement to avoid summary judgment
is that there be no “genuine issue of material fact.”
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Id.
II.
TIMELINESS OF PLAINTIFF’S ADA CLAIM
As a preliminary matter, defendant argues that plaintiff’s
discrimination claim is untimely.
(“Def.’s Br.”) [36] at 33.)
(Def.’s Br. in Supp. of Summ. J.
A plaintiff has 90 days to file a
lawsuit from the “giving” of a right-to-sue letter by the EEOC.
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
42
The EEOC issued plaintiff’s right-to-sue
letter on September 23, 2011.
(Id.)
Adding three days for mailing,
defendant contends that the 90-day period began to run on September
26, 2011 and expired on December 26, 2011.
file her complaint until December 30, 2011.
(Id.)
Plaintiff did not
(Compl. [1].)
However,
plaintiff argues that the complaint is timely because she did not
receive the right-to-sue letter until October 3, 2011.
(Pl.’s Resp.
[46] at 1-2.)
Plaintiff is correct that the 90-day time period begins to run
on the receipt of a right-to-sue letter, as opposed to its issuance.
Bryant v. United States Steel Corp., 428 Fed. App’x 895, 897 (11th
Cir. 2011).
See also Kerr v. McDonald's Corp., 427 F.3d 947, 952
(11th Cir. 2005).
There is no bright line rule to determine when the
letter is “received.”
Kerr, 427 F. 3d at 952.
As explained in Kerr:
the 90-day limitations period is to be analyzed on a caseby-case basis to fashion a fair and reasonable rule for the
circumstances of each case, one that would require
plaintiffs to assume some minimum responsibility . . .
without conditioning a claimant’s right to sue . . . on
fortuitous circumstances or events beyond [her] control.
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Id. (quoting Zillyette v. Cap. One Fin. Corp., 179 F.3d 1337, 1340
(11th Cir. 1999)).
Plaintiff has submitted the envelope containing the EEOC’s
letter as evidence that she received the letter on October 3, 2011.
(Pl.’s Exs. [47] at 1-3.)
The envelope is date stamped 9/28/2011,
and someone has scrawled “Rec’d 10/3/2011” on the front.
(Id.)
In
an email to defense counsel, plaintiff’s attorney represented that
the envelope reflects his “receipt on October 3rd after unsuccessful
attempts to deliver to my office.”
(Id.)
A certified number from
the postal service confirms that the letter was received on October
3, 2011 at 11:29 A.M.
(Id.)
The Court acknowledges the importance of providing employers
with adequate notice as to when employees might bring discrimination
claims against them.
But in this case the “Rec’d 10/3/2011" mark on
the envelope in which the notice was sent, along with counsel’s
representation and the postal service number, confirm that the notice
was received by plaintiff on October 3, 2011.
Because the complaint
was filed within 90 days of its receipt, the claims asserted in the
complaint are timely.
III. MERITS OF PLAINTIFF’S ADA CLAIM
Plaintiff’s ADA claim arises under Title I of the Act, which
prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals in regard to
the terms, conditions and privileges of their employment.
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See 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a) and D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220,
1227 (11th Cir. 2005).
To prevail on her ADA claim, plaintiff
ultimately must show that:
(1) she has a disability, (2) she is a
“qualified individual” as defined by the ADA, and (3) defendant
discriminated against her because of her disability.
Carruthers v.
BSA Adver., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 2004).
In order to
survive defendant’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff must
present sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact as to each of
those elements.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 .
Plaintiff acknowledges that there is no direct evidence of
disability discrimination.
(Pl.’s Resp. [46] at 23.)
Her claim is
thus best analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
See Wolfe v.
Postmaster Gen., 488 Fed. App’x 465, 468 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
Title VII burden-shifting framework applies to ADA claims . . . that
rely on circumstantial evidence.”).
Under that framework, plaintiff
must first show a prima facie case of employment discrimination. See
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 (2003)(explaining the
application of McDonnell Douglas in an ADA disparate treatment case).
The
burden
then
shifts
to
defendant
to
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
provide
Id.
a
legitimate,
If defendant meets
that burden, plaintiff has an opportunity to show that defendant’s
stated reason is pretext for a discriminatory motive.
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Id.
The amended complaint includes several theories under which
defendant may be liable for discrimination under the ADA.
Plaintiff
claims that defendant’s employees harassed her, creating a hostile
work environment.
(Am. Compl. [5] at ¶¶ 27, 33.)
She also alleges
disparate treatment and retaliation, charging that defendant gave her
negative evaluations and ultimately terminated her on account of her
disability and in retaliation for voicing opposition to defendant’s
employment practices.
(Id. at ¶¶ 24-26, 35-37.)
Finally, plaintiff
contends that in late 2009 and early 2010, Huff withdrew what had
been reasonable accommodations for her disabilities.
(Id. at ¶ 25.)
In her response brief, plaintiff clarifies that she no longer
seeks recovery on all the grounds asserted in the amended complaint.
Plaintiff
expressly
disavows
(Pl.’s Resp. [46] at 6.)
her
failure
to
accommodate
claim.
In addition, she fails to respond to
defendant’s arguments concerning her hostile work environment and
retaliation theories.
The Court agrees with defendant that the
evidence does not support either a hostile work environment or
retaliation claim. See generally Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc.,
277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002)(explaining that a hostile work
environment
claim
requires
evidence
of
severe
and
pervasive
harassment based on the plaintiff’s protected status) and Olmsted v.
Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457, 1460 (11th Cir. 1998)(to succeed on
a
retaliation
claim,
the
plaintiff
12
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must
show
some
statutorily
protected expression and a causal connection between the expression
and an adverse employment action). The Court thus GRANTS defendant’s
motion for summary judgment to the extent that plaintiff seeks
recovery on a failure to accommodate, hostile work environment or
retaliation theory.
See Bute v. Schuller Int’l, Inc., 998 F. Supp.
1473, 1477 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (Hunt, J.)(dismissing a claim that
plaintiff failed to address in opposition to a summary judgment
motion).
Plaintiff’s remaining ground for recovery is that she
received negative evaluations and was ultimately terminated as a
result of her disability.
A.
(Pl.’s Resp. [46] at 6.)
Prima Facie Case
To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination,
plaintiff must show that she was disabled and qualified for her job.
Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 519 (11th Cir. 1996).
She also must present some evidence that supports an inference of
discrimination against her based on her disability.
Id.
Defendant
equivocates
and
plaintiff
presents
about
evidence
whether
to
plaintiff
suggest
that
was
she
disabled
meets
the
more
liberal
standards for disability under the 2008 amendments to the ADA.
(Def.’s Br. [36] at 15, 27 and Pl.’s Resp. [46] at 6-10.)
thus
assumes
for
purposes
of
this
motion
that
The Court
plaintiff
was
“disabled” at the time of her termination.
In addition, the Court agrees with plaintiff that she was
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qualified for her position.
plaintiff’s
unqualified.
performance
are
Defendant’s subjective reviews of
insufficient
to
show
that
she
was
Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 769
(11th Cir. 2005). Defendant does not argue that plaintiff lacked the
credentials, experience or any other objective prerequisites for the
position. (Def.’s Br. [36] at 15-16.) In fact, defendant apparently
concedes that plaintiff would not have been terminated from the
position absent the budget shortfall.
(Id. at 12-13.)
The only
asserted reason for plaintiff’s termination is a budget-driven RIF
and an accompanying directive to achieve the RIF by terminating the
employees with the worst performance reviews.
That
said,
plaintiff
must
still
(Id.)
present
discrimination to survive summary judgment.
some
evidence
of
A plaintiff typically
meets this burden by showing that a similarly situated employee
outside her protected class was treated more favorably.
Hammons v.
George C. Wallace State Cmty. Coll., 174 Fed. App’x 459, 462-63 (11th
Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff does not cite any comparator evidence or
otherwise argue that she was treated less favorably than any nondisabled employee either generally or in the RIF.
The lack of a comparator is not fatal to plaintiff’s claim.
at 463.
But in its absence, plaintiff must come forward with some
other evidence of discriminatory animus.
plaintiff
points
to
her
negative
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Id.
Id.
performance
In her response,
reviews
and
the
withdrawal of certain accommodations for her disability.
Resp. [46] at 10-19.)
(Pl.’s
No doubt these experiences were negative for
plaintiff, but that is only half of the equation. Plaintiff does not
cite any evidence to suggest that the accommodations decision or the
performance reviews were related in any way to her disability.
Plaintiff concedes that the evidence does not support a failure to
accommodate claim under the ADA.
(Id. at 6.)
With respect to her
negative performance reviews, plaintiff supplies no basis upon which
a reasonable juror could find that her assessors were untruthful in
their evaluations, much less that the evaluations were the result of
discrimination against plaintiff on the basis of her disability.
B.
Even
Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Motive
if
plaintiff
could
show
a
prima
facie
case
of
discrimination, the remaining steps in the McDonnell Douglas warrant
summary judgment.
Defendant’s stated rationale for discharging
plaintiff is that: (1) budgetary concerns required elementary school
teachers to be discharged, (2) teachers with poor performance reviews
were selected to be among those discharged and (3) plaintiff had poor
performance reviews.
(Def.’s Br. [36] at 19.)
This rationale meets
defendant’s burden under the second step of McDonnell Douglas.
See
Vessels, 408 F.3d at 769-70 (describing the burden as “exceedingly
light”) and Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1034-35 (11th Cir.
2000)(a
subjective
evaluation
15
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may
provide
a
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory basis for an adverse employment action, if there is
a “clear and reasonably specific factual basis” for the opinion).
Defendant has provided extensive documentation regarding the County’s
budgetary dilemma in the spring of 2010.
2.)
(Def.’s Exs. [40] at Ex.
Given the Board’s directive to provide the best education
possible to Fulton County students, it is eminently reasonable that
the RIF targeted teachers with poor performance reviews. (Id. at Ex.
3.)
It is undisputed that plaintiff fell into the “poor review”
category.
C.
(Defs.’ Exs. [38] at Ex. 22.)
Pretext
At this stage in the analysis, plaintiff must present “evidence
. . . sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that
the reasons given by [defendant] were not the real reasons for the
adverse employment decision.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d
1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff can show pretext “‘either
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’”
Kragor
v. Takeda Pharms. Am., Inc., 702 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981)).
She has failed to do either.
As indicated above, there is no evidence to suggest that a
discriminatory reason “more likely” motivated defendant than a fairly
16
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administered, budget-driven RIF.
withdrawal
suggests
of
certain
pretext.
Plaintiff suggests that Huff’s
accommodations
(Pl.’s
Resp.
previously
[46]
at
6,
granted
18-19.)
to
her
These
accommodations included: an elevator key and permission to take the
elevator rather than the stairs, an exemption from outdoor activities
such as bus duty and recess, and a classroom near the elevator.
(Id.)
Although these accommodations were slightly modified, they
were not entirely eliminated.
Plaintiff’s classroom was relocated
farther away from the elevator, but she was only required to take the
stairs during fire drills.
(Huff Dep. at 14, 35-36.)
Huff asked
plaintiff to attend a field day on one occasion, but he still
exempted plaintiff from outdoor duties such as recess and bus duty
that every other teacher was required to perform.
(Id. and Def.’s
Exs. [38] at Ex. 22.)
Each of the above modifications was justified by a good faith
explanation.
Although plaintiff was not regularly required to take
the stairs, Huff believed that state law required everyone to take
the stairs during fire drills.
(Huff Dep. at 14.)
Huff encouraged
plaintiff to attend certain outdoor events such as the field day in
order to improve her relationship with the children and their
parents.
(Id.
and
Defs.’
Exs.
[38]
at
Ex.
22.)
Plaintiff
acknowledges that she was allowed to wear a mask to protect her
against allergies anytime she had to be outside.
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(Weatherby Dep. at
166.)
Huff does not recall plaintiff’s protesting her move to a new
classroom, and by all accounts the new classroom was nicer than the
old one.
(Huff Dep. at 35-36.)
If anything, Huff’s willingness to accommodate plaintiff in the
first instance and his commitment to continue accommodating her to
the fullest extent possible negates any suggestion of discriminatory
animus.
Plaintiff
has
provided
only
speculation
that
Huff’s
explanations for the revocation of certain privileges was insincere.
See Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[M]ere
conclusions
and
unsupported
factual
allegations
insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.”).
Huff’s
limited
revocation
of
certain
are
legally
Even assuming
previously
granted
accommodations were motivated by some hostility toward plaintiff, she
fails to show that the hostility was related to her disability.
See
Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 986 (11th Cir. 1989)(“an
admitted bias would not necessarily translate into discriminatory
intent.”).
Plaintiff
also
questions
the
credibility
of
defendant’s
explanation, claiming that her negative performance reviews were
unjustified.
out
by
the
(Pl.’s Resp. [46] at 18-19.)
evidence.
At
the
time
of
This claim is not borne
her
reassignment
as
a
kindergarten teacher, plaintiff herself expressed doubt about her
ability to be effective in that role.
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(Def.’s Exs. [38] at Ex. 21.)
Following her reassignment, at least five different individuals who
evaluated
plaintiff’s
performance
uniformly
concluded
plaintiff’s classroom was not conducive to learning.
that
(Def.’s Exs.
[38] at Exs. 22-23, [39] at Exs. 4-6, and [40] at Exs. 17-18.)
evaluators
included
subordinate.
plaintiff’s
superiors,
colleagues
These
and
one
(Id.)
Several parents expressed similar concerns about plaintiff’s
performance.
(Def.’s Exs. [38] at Ex. 22 and [39] at Ex. 3.)
One
parent told Huff that she was “not happy with her [daughter’s]
academic progress and her behavior” in plaintiff’s class.
Exs. [39] at Ex. 3.)
Other parents asked that their children be
removed from plaintiff’s class.
number
of
(Def.’s
plaintiff’s
negative
(Def.’s Exs. [38] at Ex. 22.)
reviews,
and
their
The
consistency,
demonstrate that even if some parts of these reviews were inaccurate,
the errors were honest mistakes and not evidence of unlawful pretext.
Finally, plaintiff points out that her reviews until the 2009-10
school year had been satisfactory, whereas the flurry of negative
reviews only arose when Huff sensed an RIF may be imminent.
Resp. [46] at 18-19.)
(Pl.’s
Again, this argument is not borne out by the
evidence in the record.
According to plaintiff’s own notes, Huff
expressed dissatisfaction with her performance as a kindergarten
teacher as early as September 2007.
(Defs.’ Exs. [38] at Ex. 21.)
Plaintiff acknowledges that she was told during the 2007-08 school
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year that she needed improvement.
(Id.)
Plaintiff’s reviews from
1999, 2001 and 2008 also indicated a need for improvement in some
areas.
(Id. at Exs. 17-19.)
While these reviews may be too
attenuated to form the basis for her inclusion in the 2010 RIF, they
contradict plaintiff’s theory that all of her reviews prior to the
2009-10 school year were satisfactory.
Where an adverse employment action is purportedly based upon an
employee’s misconduct or poor performance, the relevant pretext
inquiry “is not whether the employer’s determination was correct, but
whether it constitutes an ‘honest explanation’ for terminating the
plaintiff’s employment.”
Lowry v. Regis Salons Corp., No. 1:05-cv-
1970-WSD, 2006 WL 2583224, at *19 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2006)(Duffey,
J.)(quoting Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir.
2000)).
See also Hawkins, 883 F.2d at 980 (where an employee is
fired based on a negative performance review, the pertinent question
is whether the employer “honestly believed” the negative report to be
true). Plaintiff challenges the accuracy of her performance reviews,
but she does not present any evidence to support her theory that
defendant’s explanation for her negative reviews or her ultimate
termination is pretextual.
For this additional reason, plaintiff’s
ADA claim must fail.
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IV.
PLAINTIFF’S REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIM
As all of plaintiff’s federal claims have been removed from the
case, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) applies.
Pursuant to § 1367(c)(3), the
Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant
state claims if it has dismissed all of the claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
The Supreme Court
has observed that:
a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and
at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to
decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought
in that court involving pendent state-law claims. When the
balance of these factors indicates that a case properly
belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have
dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only
state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline
the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing th[ose claims]
without prejudice.
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (footnote
omitted).
See also Hardy v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 954 F.2d 1546,
1550 (11th Cir. 1992).
The Court concludes that dismissal of plaintiff’s remaining
state law claims is appropriate in this case because plaintiff’s
federal claims have been dismissed in the early stages of the
litigation.
See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
726 (1966)("Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before
trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.").
Accordingly,
the
Court
DISMISSES
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without
prejudice
plaintiff’s
remaining state law claims regarding her retirement benefits.
(Am.
Compl. [5] at ¶¶ 38-46.)
CONCLUSION
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
the
Court
GRANTS
defendant’s
defendant’s Motion for Leave [35] and Motion for Summary Judgment
[36].
Pursuant to this order, plaintiff’s federal claims are
DISMISSED and her state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.
The clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
SO ORDERED, this 22nd day of September, 2013.
/s/ Julie E. Carnes
JULIE E. CARNES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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