Greely et al v. Lazer Spot, Inc.
Filing
78
ORDER granting 75 Motion to Change Venue, directing the Clerk to transfer this action to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District Georgia, Atlanta Division and close this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 01/19/2012. (thb)[Transferred from Georgia Southern on 1/19/2012.]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
JERRY GREELY, WARD HERRING,
DANIEL BUTTERSWORTH, JOHNNY
NEARS, BARRY JIVIDEN, WAYNE
SPRINGER, ROBERT ANKEN, WAYNE
BRUNER, JOSEPH ZETTLER, SR.,
and CHRISTOPHER GOSSELIN,
individually and on behalf
of other similarly situated
employees,
Plaintiffs,
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CV 411-096
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V.
LAZER SPOT, INC.,
Defendant.
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ORDER
Presently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Unopposed
Motion to Transfer Venue of this Case to the Northern District
of Georgia, Atlanta Division. (Doc. no. 75.) For the reasons
set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion is hereby GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 15, 2011, Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court
alleging that Lazer Spot, Inc. ("Defendant") violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201,
et seq.
(Compl.
¶ 28.) Plaintiffs are a group of yard hostlers who are current
and former employees of Defendant. (Id. ¶ 22.) According to
the Complaint, Plaintiffs' primary employment responsibilities
involve connecting a hostler truck to freight trailers and then
transporting the trailers around a distribution or manufacturing
center.
(Id. ¶ 23.)
Plaintiffs allege that, while employed by
Defendant, they routinely worked in excess of forty (40) hours
per week without overtime compensation. (Id. ¶ 24.) They
allege that Defendant failed to pay them overtime because
Defendant misclassified the yard hostlers as exempt employees
under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b). (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs claim that
Defendant's failure to pay overtime violated the FLSA,
specifically 29 U.S.C. § 207, which requires that employers pay
time-and-a-half for hours that non-exempt employees work in
excess of forty (40) hours.
(Id. ¶ 28.)
On March 25, 2011, approximately three weeks before
Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court, another group of yard
hostlers employed by Defendant filed an almost identical action
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, Atlanta Division. (1:11-cv-971, Doc. no. 1.) That
case, Mainor v. Lazer Spot Inc., was filed on behalf of a named
plaintiff, who was employed by Defendant as a yard hostler, and
all similarly situated yard hostlers. (Id.) On August 9, 2011,
the Mainor court granted a motion for conditional certification
and defined the class as follows:
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All current and former yard hostlers, yard jockeys,
yard drivers or yard spotters who were employed by the
defendant at any locations any time from [three years
back from the date notice is sent] to the present; and
worked more than 40 hours during one or more workweeks
while employed by the defendants; and were not paid
time and a half compensation for the hours worked over
40 in a workweek.
(1:11-cv-971, Doc. no. 34.)
After the Mainor court granted the conditional
certification, Defendant and the Mainor plaintiffs filed a joint
motion to stay the case to allow the parties the opportunity to
participate in mediation.
(1:11-cv-971, Doc. no. 35.)
In their
joint motion, the parties asserted that they would agree to a
date for mediation by November 1, 2011.
(Id.) The Mainor court
granted the parties' motions and ordered said mediation to be
completed no later than December 1, 2011.
no. 36.)
((l:l1-cv-971, Doc.
Due to the substitution of counsel, the deadline for
mediation was later extended through February 29, 2012.
(1:11-
cv-971, Doc. no. 43.)
The parties in Mainor, however, were unable to agree on a
date for mediation. As a result, on December 15, 2011, the
Mainor plaintiffs filed a motion asking the court to lift the
stay and allow litigation to proceed. (1:11-cv-971, Doc. no.
46.) In that motion, the Mainor plaintiffs also sought an order
requiring Defendant to provide a list of putative class members.
(Id.) On January 13, 2012, the Mainor court lifted the stay and
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ordered Defendant to provide the list of putative class members.
(1:11-cv-971, Doc. no. 50.)
Plaintiffs in the present action filed the current motion
seeking a transfer of this case to the Northern District of
Georgia, Atlanta Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Plaintiffs contend that the Northern District of Georgia is a
more convenient forum for this case because the Mainor case
involves the same central issue - whether Defendant's yard
hostlers are exempt employees under FLSA. Plaintiffs further
argue that litigating these cases simultaneously in two
different courts will result in a waste of time, energy, and
money.
Plaintiffs therefore assert that the interests of
justice weigh heavily in favor of a transfer to the Northern
District of Georgia.
Defendant has not opposed this transfer
request.
II. MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE STANDARD
Section 1404(a) provides that "[f]o r the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought."
1401 (a) .
28 U.S.C. §
The party seeking a transfer of venue has the burden
to establish that the transfer is warranted. In re Ricoh Corp.,
870 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1989) .
The decision to transfer a
case under section 1404(a) rests within the trial court's sound
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discretion. See Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 980 F.2d 648,
654-55 (11th Cir. 1993) (reviewing district court's transfer of
venue for clear abuse of discretion) . Section 1404(a) "requires
the court to consider three factors: (1) the convenience of the
parties; (2) the convenience of the witnesses; and (3) the
interest of justice."
Moore v. McKibbon Bros., Inc., 41 F.
Supp. 2d 1350, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
III. DISCUSSION
The question of whether a transfer is appropriate depends
upon two inquiries: (1) whether the action might have been
brought in the proposed transferee court, and (2) whether the
various convenience factors are present to justify the transfer.
Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs., 146 F. Supp. 2d
1355, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2001) . After a review of the record, the
Court finds that the balance of factors under section 1404(a)
weighs substantially in favor of transferring this case to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia.
The Court must first consider whether the pending action
"might have been brought" in the Northern District of Georgia.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
It is clear that the action could have
been maintained in that district.
Defendant is a Georgia
corporation with its principal place of business in Alpharetta,
Georgia.
(Compi. ¶ 15.)
Defendant also operates and conducts
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business in Georgia and therefore would be subject to personal
jurisdiction in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia.
The next consideration is whether the transfer would be for
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the
interests of justice.
The Court finds that these factors
justify a transfer.
In the typical motion to transfer, the plaintiff will be
inconvenienced because the defendant usually attempts to remove
the case to the defendant's home forum. In this case, however,
it is Plaintiffs who are seeking to transfer the case to the
Northern District of Georgia. As such, it is assumed that the
transferee forum is convenient for Plaintiffs. Meterlogic, Inc.
v. Copier Solutions, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1300 (S.D. Fla.
2002) . Moreover, the fact that Plaintiffs requested the
transfer can be considered as one factor in favor of allowing a
change of venue. See id. (noting the fact that plaintiff filed
motion to transfer was one factor in favor of granting the
change of venue);
Moore, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1356 (granting
transfer motion where, among other factors, plaintiff was moving
party) .
Additionally, the Northern District of Georgia is a
more convenient forum for Defendant.
Defendant's corporate
office and Defendant's counsel are located in Atlanta. As a
result, a transfer to the Northern District of Georgia will
result in less travel and expense for Defendant.
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The convenience of the witnesses also supports a transfer
to the Northern District of Georgia. "The convenience of the
witnesses is of great importance to the decision to transfer
venue from one forum to another." Ramsey v. Fox News Network,
LLC, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2004) .
According to
Defendant's initial disclosures, almost all of its witnesses are
its corporate officers who reside in the Atlanta area.
no. 75, Ex. 8.)
(Doc.
Moreover, most of the witnesses identified by
Defendant in this case are the same as those identified by
Defendant in the Mainor case. Therefore, not only will a
transfer to the Northern District of Georgia result in less
travel and expense for Defendant and Defendant's counsel, but it
will also decrease the burden on Defendant's witnesses who are
already required to appear in the Northern District of Georgia
for the Mainor case.
Finally, trial efficiency and the interests of justice
weigh in favor of transfer. The purpose behind § 1404(a) is to
prevent unnecessary inconvenience and expense to parties,
witnesses, and the public.
Cont'l Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585,
364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960) . The Supreme Court has held that "a
situation in which two cases involving precisely the same issues
are simultaneously pending in different District Courts leads to
the wastefulness of time, energy, and money that § 1404(a) was
designed to prevent."
Id.
Here, both the present action and
the Mainor case involve the same issues.
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In both cases,
Defendant's liability will turn on whether it can successfully
establish its affirmative defense that the yard hostlers are
exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA. As a result,
allowing this action to remain pending in this Court, while the
Mainor case proceeds in the Northern District of Georgia, would
waste time, energy, and money.
Moreover, consolidation with a case pending in another
district is a relevant factor under § 1404(a).
U.S. v. Casey,
420 F. Supp. 2d 273, 277 (S.D. Ga. 1976). The presence of
related proceedings in the transferee court is a factor that
should be considered by a court when determining whether a
transfer is appropriate.
See Hoffman v. Medguest, Inc., No.
1:04-cv-3452, 2005 WL 3095713, at *2 (N.D.
Ga. Nov. 16, 2005)
(noting "the presence of related proceedings in the transferee
court is also a factor to be considered by the court"); Weber
v. Basic Comfort Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 283, 286 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
("[The presence of a related case] is powerful enough to tilt
the balance in favor of transfer even when the convenience of
parties and witnesses would suggest opposite."). The Mainor
case has already been conditionally certified as a collective
action by the District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, and Plaintiffs fall within that class definition. As
the Mainor case is already designated a collective action, this
case and Mainor are well suited for consolidation. Therefore, a
transfer of venue is appropriate.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that, for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interests of
justice, this matter should be transferred to the Northern
District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. Therefore, Plaintiffs'
Unopposed Motion to Transfer Venue (doc. no. 75) is GRANTED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to TRANSFER this action to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
Atlanta Division and CLOSE this case.
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia this / _/ - day of
January, 2012.
BLE J. NDAL HALL
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
RN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
J
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