Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc.

Filing 210

OPINION AND ORDER granting 202 Motion for Attorney Fees. IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's counsel shall pay to Defendant the amount of $571,282.40 to compensate Defendant for attorneys' fees for the unnecessary provision of legal services in this action and the amount of $11,102.69 to compensate Defendant for unnecessary expenses incurred, for a total award of attorneys' fees and expenses of $582,385.09. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 4/6/2016. (anc)

course of the litigation, counsel for Plaintiff represented to the Court on no fewer
than on five separate occasions that the Court had jurisdiction over this matter. It
was not until Plaintiff appealed and the Circuit Court asked again whether
complete diversity existed between all of Plaintiff’s limited liability company
members and Defendant that Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged that a further
review disclosed that the parties were not diverse. The Circuit Court remanded the
case to the Court to make a “factual determination as to whether diversity
jurisdiction exists.” [167].
In two separate evidentiary hearings, the Court heard evidence regarding the
citizenship of Plaintiff’s limited liability company members. Despite the
incomplete, ambiguous and seemingly evasive testimony of Plaintiff’s witnesses,
the Court finally was able to determine the parties were not diverse, and advised
the Court of Appeals of its factual finding. [182]. The Court of Appeals directed
that the case be remanded to the state court from which it was removed.
Finding that “[i]t was the fundamental misrepresentation of [one of Plaintiff
member’s citizenship] to Defendant and to the Court, and Plaintiff’s counsel’s
failure to conduct a competent investigation into Plaintiff’s citizenship,” the Court,
determined that “Plaintiff’s litigation counsel . . . engaged in conduct that is
sanctionable under Rule 26(g)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
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Court’s inherent powers.” (September 25, 2015, Order at 44-45). The Court
determined further that “[t]he proper sanction . . . is an award of attorneys’ fees
and costs [Defendant] incurred after this case was removed to this Court.” (Id. at
45). The Court determined that the attorneys’ fees and cost to which Defendant
was entitled are those “it incurred in this action that it would not have incurred if
the case had not been removed.” Id. at 46. This limitation was imposed because
the Court determined that “[t]o award to Defendant all of its fees and
costs . . . would not be reasonably tailored to remedy the harm Defendant suffered
as a result of Plaintiff’s counsel’s misrepresentations . . . .” That is, the Court
intended not to reimburse attorneys’ fees for services provided where the resulting
work product could be used in the litigation on remand.1
Defendant has now submitted its attorneys’ fees and cost request and
Plaintiff has filed its objections to it. The determination of reasonable attorneys’
fees and costs to be awarded is now before the Court.

1

The Court intends to compensate Defendant for attorneys’ fees and costs it
incurred and which may now be re-incurred on remand. That is, reimbursement
will be allowed for attorneys’ fees and expenses that will be duplicated in the state
court case.
3

II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court concludes, and the parties agree, that the lodestar analytical
method applies in evaluating whether the attorneys’ fees and expenses requested
here are reasonable. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (authorizing fees “reasonably
incurred”) (emphasis added); In re Trinity Indus., Inc., 876 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir.
1989) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); Norman
v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988)).
The lodestar figure is calculated by “multiplying the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. at 1495. The party
seeking attorneys’ fees “is responsible for submitting satisfactory evidence to
establish both that the requested rate is in accord with the prevailing market rate
and that the hours are reasonable.” Duckworth v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1396
(11th Cir. 1996). “[H]ours that are excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary”
should be excluded from the amount claimed. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
“After determining the lodestar, the court may adjust the amount depending
upon a number of factors, including the quality of the results and representation of
the litigation.” Duckworth, 97 F.3d at 1396; see also Johnson v. Ga. Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). In evaluating a claim for
attorneys’ fees, the Court, itself being an expert on these questions, “may consider
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its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may
form an independent judgment.” Id. (quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143,
144 (5th Cir. 1940)); see also In re Holywell Corp., 967 F.2d 568, 571 (11th Cir.
1992) (“Under Norman, resolution of issues regarding hourly rates and total hours
billed are generally within the trial court’s discretion.”). Ultimately, “[t]he
determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee is left to the sound discretion of the
trial judge.” Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 467 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1972).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Reimbursable attorneys’ fees and expenses
Defendant describes the attorneys’ fees and expenses for which it applies by
segmenting its legal services into four phases. Each of these phases reflects a
different period of activity in the litigation. This framework aids in evaluating
Defendant’s reimbursement request including whether the services provided are
those that would not have been incurred if the case was not removed, the
reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees and costs requested, and Plaintiff’s objections
to the request. The Court considers each of the time periods separately, but begins
with an evaluation of the reasonableness of the hourly rates of the timekeepers who
billed time for their legal services in this matter.

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1. Reasonable hourly rates in the locality
There are three classes of timekeepers who billed for the legal services
provided to Defendant on this matter: partners, associates and paraprofessionals.2
The Court reviewed the hourly rates that were in place for Defendant’s lawyers
during the four phases that are the subject of Defendant’s attorneys’ fees and
expense application. In considering the partner, associate and paraprofessional
rates over the four phases,3 the Court finds the rates comport, with insignificant
variation, with the rates that Plaintiff’s expert determined were reasonable lodestar
rates for use in evaluating Defendant’s attorneys’ fee and expense request. The
rates used by Plaintiff were $650 per hour for partners, $350 per hour for
associates, and $225 per hour for paraprofessionals. The hourly rates charged by
Defendant’s counsel also are consistent with those charged by competent and
experienced counsel for litigation of this type in the Atlanta metropolitan area.

2

Faegre Baker Daniels employed a “Project Manager Complex Matters” on
this engagement. This timekeeper billed at an hourly rate of $290. From a review
of this person’s time entries, the services performed were consistent with what
would have been performed by a competent paralegal. The timekeeper’s Ph.d in
Analytical Chemistry did not appear particularly useful in the services provided
here in this commercial dispute.
3
The hourly timekeeper rates increased approximately 9% over the period of
the four phases.
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The Court thus uses Defendant’s lawyers’ hourly rates in its review of Defendant’s
attorneys’ fees and expenses reimbursement request.
2. Phase One
This period, which Defendant describes as January 20, 2012, to
March 27, 2012, represents the early stages of the federal litigation. The attorneys’
fees for which Defendant seeks reimbursement involve three activities that
occurred during this phase:
1. To prepare and file the Certificate of Interested Persons and the
Corporate Disclosure Statement required by the Court;
2. To prepare and file Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and to Transfer
Venue (the “Motion”); and
3. To prepare and file the Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery
Plan, also required by the Court.
Defendant contends these requirements are not ones that are imposed in state
court litigation. It thus argues the fees for these submissions were unique to this
federal action. Plaintiff contends that state courts may require filings similar to
those described in subsections (a) and (c) above and provides examples of orders
that impose similar submissions in a case litigated in the Fulton County Superior
Court. Plaintiff does not cite a uniform State rule, like those that apply in this
Court, that imposes these same obligations in state cases. Plaintiff’s objection to
the subsection (a) and (c) activities is not persuasive. Defendant incurred the
expenses associated with these activities and there is no persuasive authority that
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these requirements routinely are imposed in a state court proceeding. They thus
qualify for reimbursement because they are within the scope of allowable
reimbursable expenses.
Plaintiff next objects to reimbursement of fees and expenses incurred to
prosecute the Motion. Plaintiff acknowledges there is no state court counterpart to
a motion for change of venue but argues that reimbursement is not reasonable here
because the Motion was denied. The standard here, however, is not whether
Defendant was a prevailing party, but whether the attorney’s fees were incurred
because the case was litigated in federal court. Plaintiff essentially acknowledges
the Motion was one that would not be filed in state court and it does not contend
the Motion was frivolous. This activity falls within the scope of allowable
attorneys’ fees for which reimbursement is allowed.
Plaintiff next objects to the attorneys’ fees requested because the amount
claimed is unreasonable. Defendant seeks attorneys’ fees for Phase 1 activities in
the aggregate amount of $39,203.50 which constitutes fees claimed by the Faegre
Baker Daniels firm in Minneapolis (“Lead Counsel”) in the amount of $31,351.50
and by Kilpatrick Stockton’s Atlanta office (“Local Counsel”) in the amount of
$7,852.00. Plaintiff claims there was redundancy and inefficiencies in the

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provision of these legal services that unreasonably increased the attorneys’ fees
claimed.
Defendant acknowledges that blocks of billing entries included reimbursable
and nonreimbursable time, and sought to identify the time in an individual entry
that included reimbursable services and applied the applicable billing rate only to
the services for which attorneys’ fees reimbursement is allowed. The Court
recognizes the good faith effort Defendant made to identify only time it believed
was reimbursable. The Court, however, reviewed the time incurred by counsel
during this phase and itself determined if there were inefficiencies and duplication
of services during this phase. Defendant has not persuaded the Court that it has
accounted for all redundancies and the inherent inefficiencies in counsels’
provision of legal services in this matter. These inefficiencies and redundancies,
the Court concludes, are the result of multiple attorneys working on this case by
performing various discrete but interrelated functions. For example, the continuity
of the provision of key legal services by Lead Counsel was disrupted by the
departure of a key lawyer working on the matter when the lawyer departed the firm
for other employment and, upon return, was reassigned to this matter.
The Court also analyzed whether the services performed were assigned to an
attorney at the appropriate level of experience and hourly rate. This is a more
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difficult analysis. Partners are responsible for reviewing and approving the work
of lawyers they supervise, but the time and scope of this supervision must be
reasonable. It requires discipline and reasoned restraint. For example, the Court’s
review of the legal services performed by the Lead Counsel partner shows the
services exceeded what was reasonable for this phase. The Lead Counsel senior
partner billed, during Phase 1 alone, more than three times the number of hours the
other, lower billing rate partner billed, indicating work was not being assigned at
the most appropriate partner level.4 It is difficult and time-consuming to identify
every inefficiency and redundancy in the legal services performed on a matter to
make refined adjustments in the legal services claims. Our circuit has found that
across-the-board reductions of fees is appropriate where, like here, it is difficult to
determine the time spent on particular tasks. Dial HD, Inc. v. ClearOne
Commc’ns, 536 F. App’x 927, 931 (11th Cir. 2013). The Court thus chooses to
adjust the attorneys’ fees claim for work during this phase by reducing the senior
partner’s billed time by 40%, and then reducing the total attorneys’ fees for this
4

All the time billed by Local Counsel in this case for which is seeks
reimbursement was for services performed by a senior level partner whose billing
rate ranged from $540 to $635 per hour during these four phases, and for time
billed was by a paralegal. This evidences a failure to have services performed at a
reasonable rate, in this case at the rate of an associate attorney. This staffing
decision resulted in Local Counsel’s request, in the initial submission, for
reimbursement of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $162,031.00.
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phase by 10%. With these adjustments, the Court finds the reasonable attorneys’
fees for Phase 1 to be as follows: Lead Counsel: $24,131.80 and Local Counsel
$7,066.80, for total reasonable fees of $31,198.60.
3. Phase 2
This phase, which Defendant describes as encompassing the period
March 28, 2012, through July 1, 2013, focused on discovery and other preliminary
processing of the case. The parties have agreed that the legal services performed
during this phase will be used in the state court litigation and Defendant does not
apply for reimbursement of attorneys’ fees for this phase.
4. Phase 3
This phase, which Defendant describes as encompassing the period
July 1, 2013, through June 6, 2014, focused on the processing of Defendant’s
summary judgment motion through the time Plaintiff filed its notice of appeal.
There are three activities Defendant claims it performed during this phase which it
would not have incurred, and will not incur, in a state court action. The three
activities are:
1. Seeking an award of costs under Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure after summary judgment was awarded in Defendant’s favor;
2. Preparation of the appendix submitted in support of Defendant’s
summary judgment motion; and
3. Seeking continuing protection of documents in connection with the
parties’ summary judgment briefs.
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The Court begins by evaluating if these discrete activities are ones which
Defendant incurred because this litigation was processed in federal court. The
Court concludes they were. The application for an award of costs under Rule 54 is
a federal procedure. Even if Defendant were able to apply in state court for the
costs it requested in the federal court—the Court is unaware of any authority to do
so—the fact is Defendant engaged this federal procedure and incurred costs to do
so. The attorneys’ fees billed for this activity is reimbursable.
The summary judgment appendix that was submitted in this case was
required by the Court. Paragraph 15 of the Court’s Standing Order Regarding
Civil Litigation (the “Standing Order”) requires litigants to prepare for the Court
an appendix containing the specific record evidence supporting each undisputed
fact upon which the litigant relies in seeking summary judgment. This requirement
aids the Court in its timely issuance of orders, especially in fact-intensive cases
like the one here. While other courts may impose a similar requirement, it is not
one that is widely imposed. The appendix requirement is a specific requirement of
the Court and there is no evidence that a similar requirement is imposed by
Georgia state courts, including the state court that will preside over this matter on
remand. These legal services are within the scope of services for which Defendant
may be reimbursed.
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The Court’s continuing protection process under the Stipulated Protective
Order [51] (“Protective Order”) also are unique. The continuing protection
requirement derives from the Court’s commitment to making the orders it issues
available for review and scrutiny by the public. Scrutiny is impeded by allowing
the parties to designate material as confidential which denies public access to
evidence including that upon which the Court relies in deciding a motion and
issuing an order on it. The Protective Order contained, as required by paragraph
11 of the Court’s Standing Order, the provision that any document, material or
other information that is submitted to the Court in support of a pleading and
identified as protected under the Protective Order loses its protection if a party
does not, within ten (10) days after it is submitted, ask the Court to allow the
document, material or information to continue to be protected. For the Court to
review the materials for which continued protection is requested, the party must
submit un-redacted forms of the information with a copy showing the redactions
proposed. The submissions must be appropriately tabbed for efficient review by
the Court.
Both parties submitted multiple notebooks of material for the Court’s review
to determine which, if any, of the hundreds of documents submitted would be
provided continuing protection. The material to be reviewed was voluminous and
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the expense incurred, by both parties, to provide the information on which
continued protection was requested was substantial.5 The preparation of these
continuing protection materials for review was required by the Court and the Court
is certain that a similar requirement does not exist in state litigation. The
attorneys’ fees incurred to meet this requirement are reimbursable.
The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s general objection to the reasonableness of
the attorneys’ fees for which Defendant seeks reimbursement for these three
Phase 3 activities. The Court has reviewed the time entries that support
Defendant’s Phase 3 reimbursement request. The reimbursement total amount
requested is $176,187.50 (Lead Counsel: $113,102.00; Local Counsel: $63,085.50)
Although the per activity attorneys’ fees totals are not provided, the Court’s review
of all of the Phase 3 time entries shows that the same large firm litigation
inefficiencies and redundancies apply here. The Court concludes that not all
assignments were performed at the most cost effective billing level, there was
redundancy in the review of work by less senior timekeepers and, overall, the time
expended exceeded what was reasonable. The Court reduces, by 30%, the

5

Characteristic of this case, the over-designation of material for which
protection was requested was troubling and caused the Court to expend significant
time and resources to conduct the review required.
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attorneys’ fees claimed by Lead Counsel and Local Counsel for this phase.6 Total
reasonable fees are reimbursable to Lead Counsel in the amount of $79,171.40 and
total reasonable fees are reimbursable to Local Counsel in the amount of
$44,159.85, for total aggregate reimbursable fees for this phase in the amount of
$123,331.25.
5. Phase 4
This phase, which Defendant describes as encompassing the period
June 9, 2014, forward, focused on activities associated with Plaintiff’s appeal to
the Eleventh Circuit, preparation for the hearings conducted by the Court in
response to the Circuit Court’s requirement that the Court investigate if there was
subject matter jurisdiction in this case, and the preparation and prosecution of
6

The Court, in determining reasonable fees and expenses in this case
considered the opinions offered by Mr. Robbins, Plaintiff’s expert, and
Mr. Daniels, Defendant’s expert. The information provided by Mr. Daniels and
which was presented in Defendant’s Reply underscores that even the briefs on this
attorneys’ fees reimbursement issue is driven by overzealous advocacy. Reply at
6-7. In the charts presented on pages 6-7, Defendant compares the attorneys’ fees
charged to Plaintiff with those which Mr. Robbins claims are reasonable for the
tasks billed. The chart shows that Plaintiff’s counsel’s attorneys’ fees eclipsed the
fees that its expert, Mr. Robbins, opined were reasonable. The Court’s function is
to determine reasonable attorneys’ fees for work performed by competent,
experienced counsel in this locality. While the expert opinions have been
somewhat helpful, the Court relies more on its personal practice experience and its
review of attorneys’ fee requests over the last twelve years in determining the
reasonable reimbursable attorneys’ fees in this case. In doing so, the Court has
applied its best billing judgment.
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Defendant’s motion for sanctions. Plaintiff only argues the services performed in
connection with the appeal itself were not unique to this federal proceeding and
would have been incurred in a state court case. Plaintiff misses the point. Here
there was an appeal in a case in which it ultimately was determined that subject
matter jurisdiction does not exist. That there may later be a state appeal of some
kind underscores that the time and expense incurred in this appeal resulted solely
from Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to disclose the citizenship of its client and to
repeatedly wrongfully misrepresent there was federal jurisdiction over this matter.
All of the appeal expenses are reimbursable.
Defendant seeks attorneys’ fees for Phase 4 in the aggregate amount of
$529,712.50, which consists of fees claimed by Lead Counsel in the amount of
$438,619.00, and fees claimed by Local Counsel in the amount of $91,093.50. In
its Reply, Defendant seeks further fees of $165,021.50, just to prepare the Reply,
bringing the total Phase 4 reimbursement request to $694,734.00. Defendant, in its
Reply, does not specify to which firm the $165,021.50 is attributable. The Court,
in reviewing the exhibits attached to the Reply, determined that $39,395.00 is
attributable to Lead Counsel, $70,626.50 is attributable to Local Counsel, and
$55,000.00 are the fees paid to Defendant’s expert Mr. Daniel. It is not clear
which firm engaged Mr. Daniel on behalf of Defendant. The Court, accordingly,
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attributes 50% of Mr. Daniel’s fee to Lead Counsel and the other 50% to Local
Counsel.
Plaintiff’s principal objection to the Phase 4 attorneys’ fees claimed is that
they are unreasonable. It claims the time spent on these three activity areas
exceeded, by at least twice, what would be reasonable to charge for these activities.
The Court agrees that the attorneys’ fees claimed are, at least facially,
unreasonable if not preposterous. That there was patent redundancy and
inefficiency in the services performed during this phase is illustrated by a couple of
specific examples. A review of Mr. Kahnke’s time entries shows a patterned use
of canned language to describe the activities involved. These pattern entries are
illustrated by the three examples below:
July 21, 2014: “Analyze issues and emails regarding 11th Circuit
mediation, sanctions motion, strategic options, and next steps.
July 22, 2014: “Analyze issues, telephone conferences, and email
regarding 11th Circuit mediation, potential sanctions motion, strategic
options and next steps.
July 23, 2014: “Analyze issues and emails regarding jurisdiction,
potential sanctions motion, strategic options, and next steps.”
This rote description is used in some form 40 times in the Phase 4 time entries.
Although often tied to particular general issues, this entry language and its rote
nature does not provide a sufficient basis for the Court to consider that the time
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claimed is accurate or reasonable. Indeed, it suggests a failure of billing discipline.
Another example of this billing failure is Mr. Kahnke’s entries for conferences that
do not have corresponding entries by other timekeepers to support that the
conferences emails referenced in the entries occurred.7 The Court notes also that a
key associate took personal time off during this important phase of the litigation,
requiring another associate to assist in this late stage of the case, compounding the
inefficiencies in providing legal services during this time period and inflating the
attorneys’ fees charged.
Next, the two evidentiary hearings were overstaffed by Defendant especially
considering the presentations made and Plaintiff’s burden to present evidence of
what accounted for the misrepresentations made to the Court. The hearings, of
course, were serious ones involving lawyer conduct and competency. The Court
notes further that a second hearing was required because of Plaintiff’s shallow and
7

For example, many of Mr. Kahnke’s entries begin with the phrase “[a]nalyze
issues, conferences, and emails,” including his entries for July 31, 2014 and
August 1, 2014. On these two days, Mr. Kahnke billed time to: “[a]nalyze issues,
conferences, and emails regarding third-party document production, potential
sanctions motion, strategic options and next steps.” No other timekeepers billed
any time that day, suggesting that Mr. Kahnke’s rote use of the “[a]nalyze issues,
conferences, and emails” does not accurately reflect the tasks he actually
performed that day, as no other timekeeper billed any time for “conferences.”
These repeated failures of billing discipline hinder the Court’s efforts to determine
what attorneys’ fees were reasonably charged and are should be subject to
reimbursement.
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ambiguous evidence and its general inability to explain various matters about its
corporate organization and the manner in which it and its counsel undertook to
determine the citizenship of its members. The first hearing was so unproductive
the Court had to order the specific testimony and evidence Plaintiff was required to
present so the Court could fulfill the investigation and findings obligation required
by the Eleventh Circuit. If Plaintiff had been properly prepared and its witnesses
knowledgeable about the facts and issues that were the focus of the first hearing, a
second hearing would not have been required. Thus, the attorneys’ fees and
expenses Defendant incurred in connection with the hearings were enhanced as a
result of Plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct and incomplete preparation for the first
hearing.
That a second hearing should not have been necessary does not excuse
Defendant’s decision to increase its fees and expense by having six lawyers at the
first hearing and four at the second. It is this sort of case overstaffing and overkill
for which clients and the public criticize the legal profession.
The two examples mentioned above are representative of what the Court
found during its review of the Phase 4 fees and expenses and support that the
attorneys’ fees and expense for this phase are unreasonable, in the extreme. The
Court, having reviewed the Phase 4 time entries, concludes that a 40% reduction in
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the attorneys’ fees claimed will result in a reasonable fee amount for the legal
services performed. The Court thus allows reimbursement of attorneys’ fees to
Lead Counsel for this phase in the amount of $303,308.40, and attorneys’ fees to
Local Counsel in the amount of $113,532.00, for reimbursable attorneys’ fees for
this phase in the amount of $416,840.40.
6. Expenses
Defendant seeks reimbursement of six (6) limited costs it would not have
incurred if Plaintiff has accurately represented its citizenship. There are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The removal filing fee ($350.00);
Pro hac vice application fees ($1,050.00);
Preparation of summary judgment appendix ($4,714.85);
Eleventh Circuit admission fees ($1,078.28);
Service of documents on PPL in connection with jurisdictional inquiry
($155.84); and
6. Expenses to attend the August 20 and October 22, 2014, evidentiary
hearings ($12,533.97).

The Court approves the reimbursement of the removal filing fee, pro hac
vice application fee and Eleventh Circuit admission fees. These fees were all
incurred as a result of the asserted federal jurisdiction in this matter.8 Plaintiff also

8

Plaintiff claims that Defendant will incur similar pro hac vice fees in state
court, emphasizing that these cost would not have been incurred but for Plaintiff’s
representations. That pro hac vice fees may be incurred also in the state court
proceedings supports that those incurred in this case are reimbursable because they
were ultimately unnecessary.
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asserts that the appendix preparation costs would have been incurred in a state
court action. There is no firm factual basis for this assertion other than had this
case been assigned to the Fulton County Business Court, and if the business court
required it, this cost may have been incurred in the state court action. Assuming,
however, that Defendant will move for summary judgment in the state court after
remand, the Court concludes the appendix will be useful and thus agrees to limit to
50% reimbursement of these requested cost. The cost for service fees, the basis of
which is not articulated in Defendant’s submission, is denied reimbursement.
Finally, the Court turns to the matter of travel expense for the evidentiary
hearings in Atlanta. As the Court already has noted, the number of lawyers who
attended the hearings from Minnesota was excessive and the Court agrees to
reimburse only a portion of the travel expenses claimed. Travel expenses are
reduced by 50%. Accordingly, the total reasonable expense reimbursement
allowed in this case is $11,102.69.
B. Exercise of continuing jurisdiction
The Court has discretion to continue to exercise its jurisdiction when the
circumstances warrant it. It is appropriate to retain jurisdiction in a matter to
evaluate and make an award of attorneys’ fees. See Thomas v. Early County, Ga.,
360 F. App’x 71, 75 (11th Cir. 2010). Certainly a court can exercise jurisdiction
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over collateral matters even after a complaint is dismissed. See Cooter & Gell
v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990) (court could award attorneys’ fees as
required upon finding of Rule 11 violation even though complaint was dismissed).
Here, Defendant argues that the remanded state court action may be litigated in
such a way that certain of the activities it now expects may be used in the state
court action will not be usable. Because of these uncertainties, Defendant requests
the Court to maintain jurisdiction over this matter because Defendant believes,
based on uncertain events, that it might be entitled to a further award of attorneys’
fees and expenses. The Court declines to maintain jurisdiction.
The Court here is awarding attorneys’ fee as a sanction for Plaintiff’s
counsel’s litigation conduct in representing to Defendant’s counsel and this Court
that Plaintiff’s counsel had properly investigated Plaintiff’s citizenship and
determined it was diverse from Defendant. It was this wrongful representation that
resulted in the Court and Defendant investing an extraordinary amount of time
presiding over this matter only to find that Plaintiff’s counsel’s citizenship
investigation was not competent and not complete. The Court concludes that the
award of attorneys’ fees and expense made in this Order is a sufficient sanction for
Plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct and a further award is unnecessary as is the
continuation of the Court’s jurisdiction over this matter.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses are
awarded as a sanction for Plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct pursuant to the Court’s
September 25, 2015, Order. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s counsel shall pay to Defendant
the amount of $571,282.40 to compensate Defendant for attorneys’ fees for the
unnecessary provision of legal services in this action and the amount of $11,102.69
to compensate Defendant for unnecessary expenses incurred, for a total award of
attorneys’ fees and expenses of $582,385.09.

SO ORDERED this 6th day of April, 2016.

_______________________________
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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