Rowell v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

Filing 71

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING AS MOOT Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's 55 Motion for Costs, DENYING Plaintiff Brandon Rowell's 63 Motion to Stay. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr. on 8/22/2014. (See Order for details.) (mdy)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
BRANDON ROWELL,
Plaintiff,
v.

1:12-cv-0491-WSD

METROPOLITAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Costs [55] and Plaintiff Brandon Rowell’s
(“Plaintiff”) Motion for Stay [63].
I.

BACKGROUND
On February 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant asserting

claims for racial discrimination and harassment, in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and racial
discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff also asserted state-law
claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
On February 12, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time to
Complete Discovery [40]. On March 4, 2013, Magistrate Judge Russell G.

Vineyard denied [43] Plaintiff’s motion, and on March 12, 2013, Plaintiff appealed
[44] the Magistrate Judge’s decision.
On March 18, 2013, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment [45],
and on October 9, 2013, the Magistrate Judge issued a Final Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) [51], recommending that Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment be granted. Plaintiff did not file objections to the R&R, and
on November 18, 2013, the Court adopted the R&R [53], granted Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, and denied Plaintiff’s appeal of the Magistrate
Judge’s discovery order.
On November 21, 2013, Defendant filed its Motion for Costs, asking the
Court to award $6,574.65 in “stenographic and video recording” costs. On January
13, 2014, Defendant filed its Bill of Costs [61] requesting that the Clerk tax
$6,574.65 in costs against Plaintiff.1 Plaintiff did not object to either Defendant’s
Motion for Costs or its Bill of Costs. On February 4, 2014, the Clerk taxed costs
of $6,574.65 against Plaintiff.
On February 6, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Stay, asking the Court to
stay the judgment of $6,574.65 in costs until his appeal in the Eleventh Circuit is

1

Defendant attached a sworn affidavit of Jamie Konn, Defendant’s counsel
and invoices detailing the specific costs incurred.
2

considered.2 On February 24, 2014, Defendant filed its Response in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Stay [64].
On March 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Reply in support of his Motion,
asserting that “his current financial position [will not] allow him to pay
[Defendant].” (Reply at 1). Plaintiff attached three (3) documents to support his
assertion that does not have any funds available, due to other financial obligations,
to pay Defendant $6,574.65 in costs.3
II.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant, as the prevailing party, is entitled

to its costs. (Reply at p. 1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (“costs--other than
attorney’s fees--should be allowed to the prevailing party.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2)
(Costs may be taxed for “[f]ees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts
necessarily obtained for use in the case.”). Plaintiff seeks only to stay the

2

On December 17, 2013, Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal [56] of the
Court’s November 18, 2013, Order. Plaintiff disagrees with the Court’s “decision
to deny his Motion to Extend Discovery, and asks the Court to reopen discovery.”
(Notice of Appeal at p. 1). Plaintiff has not appealed the Court’s decision to grant
summary judgment in favor of Defendant.
3
Plaintiff attached notices showing that he owes $3,818.32 to Everhome
Mortgage for defaulting on his monthly mortgage payments and $3,007.17 to the
Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (Reply at pp. 5, 7). Plaintiff
also has an outstanding balance of $11,347.63 on his American Express Credit
Card. (Id. at 8).
3

judgment pending the resolution of his appeal based upon his inability to pay the
judgment.4
As a rule, an appeal does not automatically stay the enforcement of a
judgment. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8 permits a
party to apply to the district court for “a stay of the judgment or order of a district
court pending appeal.” Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1)(A).5 Rule 62(d) provides that: “If
an appeal is taken, the appellant may obtain a stay by supersedeas bond . . . . The
bond may be given upon or after filing the notice of appeal or after obtaining the
order allowing the appeal. The stay takes effect when the court approves the
bond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d).
“The purpose of a supersedeas bond is to preserve the status quo while
protecting the non-appealing party's rights pending appeal.” Poplar Grove Planting
& Ref. Co., Inc. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1190-91 (5th Cir.
1979). “A judgment debtor who wishes to appeal may use the bond to avoid the
risk of satisfying the judgment only to find that restitution is impossible after

4

Defendant, in its Response, argues only that its costs should be taxed against
Plaintiff, and does not address whether a stay of the judgment is warranted.
5
The Court retains jurisdiction to grant a stay of its judgment, despite the
filing of a notice of appeal. See Rakovich v. Wade, 834 F.2d 673, 674 (7th Cir.
1987) (“a notice of appeal does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction over a
motion for stay of its judgment”).

4

reversal on appeal [while the bond also] secures the prevailing party against any
loss sustained as a result of being forced to forgo execution on a judgment during
the course of an ineffectual appeal.” Id. at 1191. “If a court chooses to depart
from the usual requirement of a full security supersedeas bond to suspend the
operation of an unconditional money judgment, it should place the burden on the
moving party to objectively demonstrate the reasons for such a departure.” Id. at
1191. See also Athridge v. Iglesias, 464 F.Supp.2d 19, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2006) (“a
full supersedeas bond should be the requirement in normal circumstances”)
(citations omitted).
Plaintiff has not posted a supersedeas bond to protected Defendant from loss
during the pendency of the appeal.6 Plaintiff does not state that he would be
willing or able to post such a bond, or otherwise suggest an alternative method to
protect Defendant’s judgment. Plaintiff merely asserts that he is unable to pay the
judgment due to existing debt obligations. Plaintiff identifies several outstanding
bills which total $18,172.12 in indebtedness. Plaintiff does not provide any detail
as to his current income or his current assets so as to determine whether he can pay
the above-mentioned debts. To the extent that Plaintiff’s financial situation is

6

A review of the docket in this case shows that Plaintiff paid his $505.00 fee [68]
to file his appeal in this case.

5

deteriorating, Defendant’s interest in protecting its judgment is particularly great.
Plaintiff does not provide any support to justify the Court staying its judgment and
implicitly giving priority to the above-referenced personal debts over Defendant’s
right to recover its costs in an action initiated by Plaintiff.
The Court’s “power to waive the requirement of a supersedeas bond . . . has
been exercised only in extraordinary circumstances and only where alternative
means of securing the judgment creditor’s interest were available.” See Tara
Prods., Inc. v. Hollywood Gadgets, Inc., 2011 WL 4020855, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
9, 2011) (quoting Grand Entm’t Group, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., No.
86-5763, 1992 WL 114953, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 1992)). Plaintiff has not
demonstrated extraordinary circumstances and has not proposed an alternative
means to protect Defendant’s interest in the judgment. See Grand Entm’t Group,
1992 WL 114953, at *2 (“It is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate objectively
that posting a full bond is impossible or impractical; likewise, it is the appellant’s
duty to propose a plan that will provide adequate (or as adequate as possible)
security for the appellee.”).
The Court declines to exercises its discretion to stay its judgment without
requiring Plaintiff to post a supersedeas bond. The Court approves a supersedeas
bond in $6,574.65.00, the amount of the judgment. If Plaintiff decides that he is

6

willing to post a supersedeas bond in this amount, or can propose a satisfactory
alternative method to protect Defendant’s interest in the judgment, Plaintiff may
again move to stay enforcement of the judgment pending the resolution of his
appeal.7
III.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance

Company’s Motion for Costs [55] is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Brandon Rowell’s Motion for
Stay [63] is DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 22nd day of August, 2014.

7

The Clerk taxed costs to Plaintiff [62] in response to Defendant’s submission
of its Bill of Costs [61], rendering Defendant’s Motion for Costs moot.
7