Bodana v. Cagle

Filing 11

OPINION AND ORDER granting Defendant's 4 Motion to Dismiss. This action is DISMISSED. The 5 Motion to Stay is denied as moot. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 3/13/2013. (anc) Modified on 3/13/2013 in order to update docket text (anc).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
ANJI REDDY BODANA, D.V.M.,
Plaintiff,
v.

1:12-cv-1104-WSD

MERRY CAGLE, in her individual
capacity,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Merry Cagle’s Motion to
Dismiss [4]. Also before the Court is Defendant Merry Cagle’s Motion to Stay [5].
I.

BACKGROUND
This is a civil rights action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by Plaintiff

Anji Reddy Bodana, D.V.M. (“Plaintiff”), a veterinarian licensed by the State of
Georgia, against Defendant Merry Cagle (“Defendant”), a former investigator for
the Georgia Secretary of State.
A.

Relevant Factual Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that, in December 2001, he opened a veterinary clinic in
Cobb County, Georgia. In November 2003, various federal and state law
enforcement officers and investigators inspected and photographed Plaintiff’s

clinic. This investigation did not result in any action against Plaintiff.
In December 2006, Defendant, working as an investigator for the Georgia
Secretary of State, inspected and photographed Plaintiff’s clinic. This inspection
resulted in Plaintiff being cited by the Georgia Board of Veterinary Medicine
(“Veterinary Board”) for various violations. Plaintiff responded to the Veterinary
Board and corrected the alleged violations. In May 2007, Defendant performed a
follow-up inspection of Plaintiff’s clinic, and she found no violations.
In January 2008, Defendant performed another inspection of Plaintiff’s
clinic. Following this inspection, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, “as a
complaining witness,” presented false and misleading information to the
Veterinary Board and the Georgia Attorney General. Plaintiff specifically alleges
that Defendant intentionally misrepresented the findings of her January 2008
inspection by presenting certain photographs of the clinic as having been taken
during the inspection even though the photographs had been taken on an earlier
date.
As a result of Defendant’s actions, Plaintiff alleges that the Veterinary
Board and the Attorney General charged him with “various violations of rules and
regulations governing veterinarians.”1 In connection with these charges, Plaintiff
1

Plaintiff specifically alleges that,

2

was subject to an administrative hearing.2
B.

Procedural History

On March 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed this action asserting a civil rights claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his
constitutional rights in connection with her actions as a “complaining witness”
providing allegedly false information to the Veterinary Board and Attorney

[a]s a direct and consequential result of the intentional use of false and
misleading inspection reports, incorrect photographs and false
information provided by Defendant to the Veterinary Board and
Attorney General, the Plaintiff was fraudulently charged with various
violations of rules and regulations governing veterinarians, and was
denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
(See Compl. [1] ¶ 25.)
2

The Complaint does not allege the outcome of the hearing. With her Motion to
Dismiss, Plaintiff submitted portions of the administrative record showing that,
after multiple hearings before the Veterinary Board and appeals to the Superior
Court, the proceedings ultimately resulted in Plaintiff being penalized for certain
regulatory violations. (See generally Def.’s Exs. 8–9 [4-11, 4-12].) Plaintiff does
not dispute this evidenc.

3

On February 23, 2011, Plaintiff filed in this Court a lawsuit, based on the same
alleged conduct, against Defendant (the “Original Action”). See generally
Complaint, Bodana v. Cagle, No. 1:11-cv-539-WSD (N.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2011),
ECF No. 1. On September 30, 2011, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal,
pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of the Original
Action. See Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, Bodana v. Cagle, No. 1:11cv-539-WSD (N.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2011), ECF No. 14.

3

General.4
On June 4, 2012, Defendant filed her Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant seeks
dismissal on the grounds that (i) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, (ii) Plaintiff’s Complaint, on its face, is time barred,
(iii) Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and (iii) Defendant is entitled to immunity.5
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Court must “assume that the factual allegations in the
complaint are true and give the plaintiff[] the benefit of reasonable factual
inferences.” Wooten v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F.3d 1187, 1196 (11th Cir.
2010). Although reasonable inferences are made in the plaintiff’s favor,
4

In subsequent briefing to the Court, Plaintiff has made clear that he asserts a
claim based only on Defendant’s actions “as a complaining witness” prior to
Plaintiff’s administrative hearing. (Pl.’s Br. [7] at 3–4.) Plaintiff does not assert
any claims based on the hearing itself, including Defendant’s testimony at the
hearing. (Id.)
5

On June 18, 2012, Defendant filed her Motion to Stay seeking a stay of discovery
pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss. Because this Order decides the
Motion to Dismiss, the Motion to Stay is denied as moot.

4

“‘unwarranted deductions of fact’ are not admitted as true.” Aldana v. Del Monte
Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting S. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 408 n.10 (1996)). Similarly, the Court is
not required to accept conclusory allegations and legal conclusions as true. See
Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010)
(construing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). Mere “labels and
conclusions” are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This requires more than
the “mere possibility of misconduct.” Am. Dental, 605 F.3d at 1290 (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The well-pled allegations must “nudge[] their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 1289 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570).

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B.

Analysis6
1.

Failure to Allege a Constitutional Violation

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege that “(1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the
United States Constitution or federal law and (2) such deprivation occurred under
color of state law.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010).
6

Because the Court must resolve jurisdictional questions before turning to the
merits of a dispute, see, e.g., CAMP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,
451 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2006), the Court first addresses Defendant’s
argument under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a
jurisdictional rule that precludes district courts from reviewing state court
judgments. Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (2009). It applies only in
cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 1274 (quoting Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Plaintiff
does not seek a “review and rejection” of his disciplinary action. He seeks
monetary damages against Defendant, who was a witness, not a party, in Plaintiff’s
state action, for alleged constitutional violations preceding the state action.
Rooker-Feldman does not apply, and the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over
this case.

6

Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States
Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 144 n.3 (1979). Thus, “[t]he factors necessary to establish a [§ 1983]
violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
676. For example, where the constitutional claim is invidious discrimination in
violation of the First and Fifth Amendments, “the plaintiff must plead . . . that the
defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.” Id. (citing Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540–41 (1993); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)).
The Court is not able to undertake an analysis of any “factors” here because
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specify a particular constitutional or federal right
that Defendant violated. The source of Plaintiff’s claim appears to be his
allegation that Defendant “presented false and misleading information about the
January 3, 2008 inspection.” (See Compl. [1] ¶ 20.) The Complaint does not
identify the particular right of which he was deprived because of this alleged
conduct. Cf. Coates v. Natale, 409 F. App’x 238, 240 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding
that plaintiff failed to state a § 1983 claim “because she failed to identify any
fundamental rights that were violated”).

7

In the only paragraph of the Complaint mentioning a constitutional
provision, other than the introductory paragraph, Plaintiff alleges:
As a direct and consequential result of the intentional use of false and
misleading inspection reports, incorrect photographs and false
information provided by Defendant to the Veterinary Board and
Attorney General, the Plaintiff was fraudulently charged with various
violations of rules and regulations governing veterinarians, and was
denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
(See Compl. [1] ¶ 25.) This allegation is not sufficient to show a specific
constitutional violation by Defendant. First, this paragraph alleges that Plaintiff
was denied “due process” by “the use” of the allegedly false materials by someone
other than Defendant—not that Defendant herself deprived Plaintiff of “due
process” by giving over the materials. Second, even if the Court construed this
allegation as applying to Defendant, a general assertion of a denial of “due
process” under the Fourteenth Amendment is far too vague and conclusory to
inform the Court of the particular constitutional right at issue. See Taylor ex rel.
Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting that that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause includes “procedural” and
“substantive” rights and that the “substantive” rights include “rights such as those
listed in the Bill of Rights and those rights held to be so fundamental that a state
may not take them away”); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,

8

841 n.5 (1998) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)) (noting that
first step in evaluating a § 1983 Due Process claim is to “identify the exact
contours of the underlying right said to have been violated”). Because each of the
numerous rights encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment has its own “factors”
that a plaintiff must plead, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, and Plaintiff’s Complaint
does not allege any particular right, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state
a claim for a constitutional violation. On this basis, Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss is required to be granted.
In his brief, but not in the Complaint, Plaintiff argues that the constitutional
violation at issue here is “analogous to a situation where an investigating law
enforcement officer uses or plants false evidence to obtain a conviction.” (Pl.’s Br.
[7] at 23.) The Court does not consider this argument because, on the Motion to
Dismiss, the Court looks only at the allegations in the Complaint, not Plaintiff’s
arguments in his brief. See, e.g., Harper v. Lawrence County, 592 F.3d 1227, 1232
(11th Cir. 2010). Even if the Court considered Plaintiff’s argument, however,
Plaintiff does not offer any explanation of the “contours” of his proposed
constitutional right, see Lewis, 523 U.S. at 841 n.5, but simply cites two cases:
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), and Riley v. City of Montgomery, 104 F.3d
1247 (11th Cir. 1997). Neither of these cases readily applies to the facts alleged

9

here.
In Napue, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant is denied
Fourteenth Amendment rights when a prosecutor knowingly allows a witness to
testify falsely at trial. 360 U.S. at 269–70. Plaintiff has expressly disclaimed
Defendant’s testimony at the administrative hearing as the basis for his claim, and
Napue thus does not apply or support Plaintiff’s argument.
In Riley, the Eleventh Circuit held that a police officer’s planting of false
evidence at a crime scene “could constitute a violation of Plaintiff’s rights under
the Federal Constitution and, accordingly, could give rise to liability under Section
1983.” 104 F.3d at 1253 (citing Schneider v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir.
1977)). Although not explicit in Riley, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that a
police officer’s planting or fabricating of evidence constitutes malicious
prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d
1000, 1002–03 & n. 4 (11th Cir. 1998). The elements of a malicious prosecution
claim include: “(1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the present
defendant; (2) with malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the
plaintiff accused’s favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused.” Wood
v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881–82 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Uboh, 141 F.3d at 1004).
Plaintiff here does not allege the elements of malicious prosecution. First,

10

Plaintiff was not criminally prosecuted. Although some courts have held that the
tort of malicious prosecution, under state law, may extend to certain administrative
proceedings, see, e.g., Greer v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 1370, 1376 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (applying Illinois law); but see Taylor v. Greiner, 277 S.E.2d 13, 15 (Ga.
1981) (holding that professional licensure proceeding does not give rise to
“malicious use of process” claim), Plaintiff has not cited, and the Court is not
aware of, any authority extending Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution
liability to state investigators giving false information in connection with civil
professional regulatory proceedings.7 Second, even the Court “analogized”

7

This lack of authority is sufficient to show that Defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials who perform
discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities, unless their
conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The parties do not
dispute that all of Defendant’s alleged actions occurred while she was acting
within the scope of her authority as an investigator. See Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194.
Defendant is thus immune “[u]nless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of
violation of clearly established law.” See Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357
(11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir.
2001)) (alteration in original). For a violation to be “clearly established,” the
plaintiff must be able to cite direct legal authority sufficient to have given the
defendant “fair warning” that his treatment of the plaintiff was unconstitutional.
Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1199–1200 (11th Cir. 2007). Because
there is no authority extending constitutional malicious prosecution liability to civil
proceedings, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant here had “fair warning” of
a constitutional violation.

11

Plaintiff’s administrative proceeding to a criminal prosecution, Plaintiff has not
alleged that the proceeding terminated in his favor.8 See Uboh, 141 F.3d at 1004
(explaining that a malicious prosecution claim requires a showing that the
underlying prosecution terminated in plaintiff’s favor to “prevent[] parallel
litigation over the issues of probable cause and guilt and the possible creation of
conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transactions” (citing
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994))). Plaintiff’s allegations are thus not
sufficient to state a claim for malicious prosecution for falsifying evidence.9
III.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Merry Cagle’s Motion to

Dismiss [4] is GRANTED. This is action is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Merry Cagle’s Motion to
Stay [5] is DENIED AS MOOT.

8

The Court notes that evidence submitted by Defendant, and not disputed by
Plaintiff, conclusively establishes that the administrative proceeding resulted in a
ruling adverse to Plaintiff.
9

Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, the Court does not reach Defendant’s arguments
regarding the statute of limitations.

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SO ORDERED this 13th day of March, 2013.

________________________________
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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