Murdock et al v. Cobb County, Georgia et al
Filing
41
ORDER denying Plaintiffs' 25 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 8/22/2013. (cem)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
CAROLYN MURDOCK, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COBB COUNTY, GEORGIA, et
al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:12-CV-01743-RWS
ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Reconsideration [25]. After reviewing the record, the Court enters the
following Order.
Background
This case arises out of a traffic stop and subsequent shooting death of
Matthew Murdock. Plaintiffs subsequently initiated this action, raising federal
and state law claims against the following entity Defendants: (1) Cobb County,
Georgia, (2) the Cobb County Police Department, and (3) the Cobb County
Sheriff’s Office; and the following individual Defendants: (1) Chief John R.
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Houser (“Chief Houser”), individually and in his official capacity as Chief of
Police for Cobb County, Georgia; (2) Sheriff Neil Warren (“Sheriff Warren”),
individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cobb County, Georgia; (3)
Officer Henry, individually and in his official capacity as an officer with the
Cobb County Police Department; (4) Officer Solon, individually and in his
official capacity as an officer with the Cobb County Police Department; and (5)
Sergeant Beasley, individually and in his official capacity as a Sergeant with the
Cobb County Sheriff’s Office. (Am. Compl., Dkt. [1].)
Plaintiffs asserted numerous constitutional and Georgia state-law claims
for relief against Defendants, including claims for violation of due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment and for unreasonable search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Am. Compl., Dkt.
[12] ¶¶ 106-23.)
On May 17, 2013, the Court issued an Order partially granting
Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint [18].
The Court dismissed the claims against the Cobb County Police Department
and Cobb County Sheriff’s Department. (Dkt. [24]) The Court also dismissed
the following: (1) Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims against Sheriff Warren and
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Sergeant Beasley in their official capacities; (2) Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims
against Sheriff Warren and Sergeant Beasley in their individual capacities; (3)
Plaintiffs’ section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim against Officer Solon in
his individual capacity; (4) Plaintiffs’ state law claims against Cobb County,
Sheriff Warren, Chief Houser, Sergeant Beasley, and Officer Solon in their
official capacities; and (5) Plaintiffs’ state law claims against Sheriff Warren,
Chief Houser, Sergeant Beasley, and Officer Solon in their individual
capacities. (Id.)
In their Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs ask the Court “to
reconsider the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims against
Officers Solon and Beasley.” (Dkt. [25]) Plaintiffs argue that the Court based its
judgment “on a narrow (rather than the requisite liberal) reading of the
allegations of the Plaintiffs’ complaint so as to exonerate these officers under
the ‘causal link’ rule discussed in Williams v. Bennet, 689 F.2d 1370, 1384
(11th Cir. 1982).” (Id.)
Discussion
Under the Local Rules of this Court, “[m]otions for reconsideration shall
not be filed as a matter of routine practice[,]” but rather, only when “absolutely
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necessary.” LR 7.2(E), NDGa. Such absolute necessity arises where there is
“(1) newly discovered evidence; (2) an intervening development or change in
controlling law; or (3) a need to correct a clear error of law or fact.” Bryan v.
Murphy, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1258-59 (N.D. Ga. 2003). However, a motion
for reconsideration may not be used “to present the court with arguments
already heard and dismissed or to repackage familiar arguments to test whether
the court will change its mind.” Id. at 1259. Furthermore, “[a] motion for
reconsideration is not an opportunity for the moving party . . . to instruct the
court on how the court ‘could have done it better’ the first time.” Pres.
Endangered Areas of Cobb’s History, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 916
F. Supp. 1557, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff’d, 87 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiffs have not pointed to any newly discovered evidence, nor have
they argued that there has been an intervening development or change in the
controlling law. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that the Court misapplied the
causation standard. According to Plaintiffs, the Williams Court requires an
individualized approach “taking into account the duties, discretion and means of
each defendant.” (Dkt. [24].) Plaintiffs also cite Fundiller v. City of Cooper
City, 777 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1985), in arguing that the Court misapplied the
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causation rule and should not have dismissed the claims “unless it appears
beyond doubt that the [Plaintiffs] can prove no set of facts in support of [their]
claim which would entitle [them] to relief.” (Dkt. [25]) (quoting Fundiller, 777
F.2d at 1439) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Defendants argue that the causation analysis was sound because Plaintiffs
failed to allege enough facts demonstrating that Officer Solon and Sergeant
Beasley proximately caused Murdock’s death. This Court agrees.
The “no set of facts” language comes from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41 (1957), but the United States Supreme Court has dispensed with the rule that
a complaint may only be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when “ ‘it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.’ ” Twombly, 127 U.S. at 561 (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The Supreme Court has
replaced that rule with the “plausibility standard,” which requires factual
allegations to “raise the right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 556.
The plausibility standard “does not[, however,] impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence [supporting the
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claim].” Id. With this standard in mind, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs
have not sufficiently alleged that any officers other than Officer Henry
proximately caused Murdock’s death. As stated in the previous Order [24],
Plaintiffs have failed to allege a sufficient causal connection between
the acts of Officer Solon and Sergeant Beasley and the shooting
death of Murdock. The fact that each of these Defendants was
involved in the traffic stop preceding Murdock’s shooting death (and
Sergeant Beasley in an altercation with Murdock) is insufficient to
establish liability on their parts for Murdock’s death. Moreover,
Plaintiffs allege in only vague and conclusory fashion that Officer
Solon and Sergeant Beasley “possessed the power to prevent” their
“fellow officer’s illegal acts” but “chose not to act” (Am. Compl.,
Dkt. [12] ¶ 27); without any supporting factual detail, this allegation
is insufficient to causally connect Officer Solon or Sergeant Beasley
to Murdock’s death.
Additionally, there are no allegations that “Solon and Beasley conspired with
Henry in his use of force, had a reasonable opportunity to intervene to prevent
the shooting and failed to intervene, or in some other way proximately caused
Henry to shoot Murdock.” (Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Recons., Dkt.
[27] at 3.) The Court thus finds no clear error of law meriting reconsideration.
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Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration
[25] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 22nd
day of August, 2013.
________________________________
RICHARD W. STORY
United States District Judge
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