New Generation Christian Church v. Rockdale County, Georgia
Filing
50
ORDER AND OPINION granting plaintiffs motion to correct a misnomer 38 and denying defendants motion to amend 41 . The Court further order that New Generation True Holiness Church be joined as plaintiff, and orders that New Generation Christian Ch urch be dismissed as plaintiff. The action proceeds as if New Generation True Holiness Church had originally commenced it. The parties motions for summary judgment ([32, 34]) remain under advisement. Signed by Judge Julie E. Carnes on 3/27/14. (ddm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
NEW GENERATION CHRISTIAN
CHURCH,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO.
v.
1:12-cv-02138-JEC
ROCKDALE COUNTY, GEORGIA,
Defendant.
ORDER & OPINION
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s motion to amend
the pleadings [38] and defendant’s motion to amend the pleadings
[41].
The Court has reviewed the briefs and for the reasons
explained herein GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to amend the pleadings
[38] and DENIES defendant’s motion to amend the pleadings [41].
BACKGROUND
New Generation Christian Church (“plaintiff”) filed suit against
Rockdale
County,
Georgia
(“defendant”)
for
violations
of
the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000cc - 2000cc-5; the Fourteenth Amendment; and the First Amendment.
(See Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 62-140.)
Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s
zoning code has illegally and unconstitutionally compromised its free
religious exercise by, in various ways, preventing plaintiff from
renting real estate for conducting religious services.
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For purposes of the motions under consideration, the full
background of the dispute need not be discussed.
The relevant facts
for each motion are discussed separately.
I.
BACKGROUND PERTINENT TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
This suit was initiated by Michael Lewis (“Lewis”) under the
name “New Generation Christian Church,” the church of which he is
pastor and proprietor.
The complaint alleged that New Generation
Christian Church is incorporated in Georgia.
(Compl. [1] at ¶ 14.)
In its answer, defendant stated that it lacked information as to the
truth of plaintiff’s self-characterization.
(Answer [14] at ¶ 14.)
In the course of discovery, Lewis revealed that his church was not in
fact incorporated under the name “New Generation Christian Church.”
(Lewis Dep. [32-3] at 16-18.)
Instead, he had at one time led a
church incorporated in Georgia as “New Generation True Holiness
Church,” but ceased conducting religious services under that name in
2010, and had since that time been conducting religious services
under the name “New Generation Christian Church.”
(Id.)
Plaintiff contends that “New Generation Christian Church,” the
name under which this action was initiated, is simply the “popular
name” of the church incorporated as “New Generation True Holiness
Church.”
different
(Mot. to Correct Misnomer [38] at ¶ 1.)
entities.
Defendant
differs,
deposition testimony:
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and
Thus, they are not
points
to
Lewis’
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Is the church incorporated?
Yes, it is.
Under what name?
I think it is under New Generation True Holiness
Church.
That’s different from New Generation Christian Church.
Yes.
Q.
A.
....
Q.
Now, as a separate entity New Generation Christian
Church, which is completely yours, is the one that
operates.
A.
Yes.
....
Q.
But it was your intent when you started New Generation
Christian Church to be completely separate from New
Generation True Holiness Church.
A.
Absolutely.
Q.
That’s what you meant when you resigned from –A.
Yes.
(Lewis Dep. [32-3] at 16-18.) Defendant contends that this testimony
supports the view that there are two different churches, not one
church with different names.
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it
was entitled to summary judgment, among other reasons, because “‘New
Generation Christian Church’ is the wrong entity to bring this claim
because it is incorporated under a different name.” (Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J. [34-2] at 2.)
Plaintiff contested this, but then filed its
motion to amend the pleadings to change the name “New Generation
Christian Church” to “New Generation True Holiness Church.” (Pl.’s
Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [36] at 7-10; Pl.’s Mot. to Amend
[38] at 1.)
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II.
BACKGROUND PERTINENT TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION
In February, 2011, plaintiff leased real property located at
3020
NW
(Compl.
Edwards
[1]
at
Drive,
¶
Conyers,
22.)
That
Development District (“MxD”).
Georgia
property
is
(“Edwards
zoned
(Id. at ¶ 23.)
as
Property”).
“Mixed-Use
Defendant permits
places of worship to operate in a MxD zone only with a special use
permit.
(Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.)
When plaintiff applied to defendant for
a meter so that heat could be provided to the building, its request
was denied.
(Id. at ¶¶ 28-29.)
Plaintiff alleged in its complaint
that defendant “denied [plaintiff’s] request, citing the Zoning
Code’s three-acre limit on churches: ‘A place of worship shall be
located on a minimum of three acres dedicated solely for the place of
worship or on its own recorded lot of at least three acres in size .
. . .’”
(Id. at ¶ 29)(quoting Rockdale County Code Art. III § 218.-
12(ccc)(2)).
The three-acre rule is distinct and separate from the
MxD special use permit.
In defendant’s answer, it admitted the allegations in paragraph
29 of plaintiff’s complaint.
(Answer [14] at ¶ 29.)
Later, in the
course of discovery, defendant deposed Lewis, who testified that the
meter request was rejected on the basis of “zoning issues,” but that
he “had no idea of the 3 acreage zoning issues or anything at that
point in time.”
(Lewis Dep. [32-3] at 34, 41.)
On this basis,
defendant filed the present motion to amend its answer to paragraph
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29 of the complaint, for “[i]f [defendant] had denied the meter
request
because
of
the
three
acre
requirement,
as
[plaintiff]
alleges, then Pastor Lewis would have known about the requirement
after [plaintiff] vacated the Edwards property.
Because he did not,
there is no factual support for the allegation in paragraph 29.”
(Def.’s Mot. to Amend [41] at 3.)
The amended answer would deny
plaintiff’s factual allegation in paragraph 29, reopening the issue
of the grounds upon which plaintiff was denied a meter.
DISCUSSION
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules allow that, after the period permitting
amendment as a matter of course, “a party may amend its pleading only
with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.
court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
The
FED. R.
CIV. P. 15(a)(2).
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason–-such as
undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of
the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,
futility of amendment, etc.–-the leave sought should, as
the rules require, be ‘freely given.’
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
However, where the
motion
to amend is filed after the deadline of district court’s scheduling
order, Rule 16(b) imposes a further “good cause” requirement on the
party seeking to amend.
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be
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modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”); Sosa v.
Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1419 (11th Cir. 1998)(“If we
considered only Rule 15(a) without regard to Rule 16(b), we would
render scheduling orders meaningless and effectively would read Rule
16(b) and its good cause requirement out of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.”)1
Good cause requires that the party seeking
amendment was diligent.
Sosa, 133 F.3d at 1418 (The good cause
standard “precludes modification [of the scheduling order] unless the
schedule cannot be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the
extension.”)(internal quotation marks omitted).
The Sosa court
looked to both when the information became available to the party
seeking amendment, and how promptly the party sought amendment once
it possessed the information.
Id. at 1419.
Amendments adding claims or defenses and amendments adding or
substituting parties have a further burden.
Once a court determines
that Rule 15(a) and Rule 16(b) are satisfied, it must then decide
whether such amendments “relate back” to the original pleading to be
amended, thereby avoiding any potential expiration of the statute of
limitations
period.
Rule
15(c)
countenances
amendments
that
“change[] the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim
1
After granting a joint motion for an extension of time to
complete discovery, the scheduling order’s deadline was May 7, 2013.
(See Proposed Order [26-1] (approved by minute entry).)
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is asserted,” and permits, if certain requirements are met, such
amendments to relate back to the date of the original pleading.
R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C).
“(I)
received
such
FED.
The requirements are that the opposing party
notice
of
the
action
that
it
will
not
be
prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have
known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a
mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.”
FED. R. CIV. P.
15(c)(1)(C)(I)-(ii).
Rule 15(c) does not, however, specifically address situations
where the moving party seeks to amend its own name.
The Eleventh
Circuit, following other circuits, has held that the “extension of
Rule 15(c)(3) to amendments involving plaintiffs rests on solid
ground.”
Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1132
(11th Cir. 2004).2 See also Makro Capital of Am., Inc. v. UBS AG, 543
F.3d
1254,
1259
(11th
Cir.
2008)(“Though
[Rule
15(c)(1)(C)]
technically references amendments that change the parties against
whom claims are asserted, we have previously applied it to situations
in which new plaintiffs were added.”)
In reaching this conclusion,
the Cliff court cited the advisory committee’s note, which states:
The relation back of amendments changing plaintiffs is not
expressly treated in revised Rule 15(c) since the problem
2
Rule 15(c)(3) is a previous version of Rule 15(c)(1)(C). It
differs only slightly in wording; the differences are not
substantive.
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is generally easier.
Again the chief consideration of
policy is that of the statute of limitations, and the
attitude taken in revised Rule 15(c) toward change of
defendants extends by analogy to amendments changing
plaintiffs.
FED. R. CIV. P. 15 advisory committee’s note to the 1966 Amendment.
The Rule 15(c)(1)(C) requirements of notice and knowledge apply in
situations where the plaintiff seeks to amend to change plaintiffs or
correct a misnomer in the plaintiff’s name.
Makro Capital, 543 F.3d
at 1259-60.
When it comes to joining or substituting new parties, courts
have further obligations and options beyond Rule 15.
Rule 17
addresses the parties’ capacity to sue and be sued, and states that
where the real party in interest has not been named,
[t]he court may not dismiss an action for failure to
prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until,
after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for
the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be
substituted into the action. After ratification, joinder,
or substitution, the action proceeds as if it had been
originally commenced by the real party in interest.
FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(3).
This ratification, joinder, or substitution
of the real party in interest may be accomplished through Rule 19,
which states that “[i]f a person has not been joined as required, the
court must order that the person be made a party.”
FED. R. CIV. P.
19(a)(2); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (“On motion or on its own, the
court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.”)
“Rule
19 and Rule 21 . . . provide wide discretion for the District Court
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to order joinder of parties, but that joinder must be accomplished
with the requirements of due process in mind.”
Moore v. Knowles, 482
F.2d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1973)(discussing older version of the
Federal Rules.)3
II.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
Defendant contends that plaintiff has not shown good cause as to
why it was unable to correct the error in its name prior to the close
of discovery, and thus that Rule 16(b) is not satisfied.
Defendant
further contends that filing suit as New Generation Christian Church
could not “have put [defendant] on notice of the name of a legal
entity that [p]laintiff is now attempting to claim.”
[42] at 5-6.)
(Def.’s Resp.
In support, defendant provides the results of an
internet search for “New Generation” on the Georgia Secretary of
State’s website.
(See Begnaud Aff. [42-1] at ¶ 2.)
The search
produced 111 results, including numerous religious entities.
(Id.)
Because of this, defendant believes that even if plaintiff has
satisfied the Rule 16(b) good cause requirement, it has not satisfied
the Rule 15(c) requirement that defendant “received such notice of
the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the
merits.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(I).
3
Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to
October 1, 1981 are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.
Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.
1981).
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In plaintiff’s motion to amend, it did not address the good
cause requirement of Rule 16(b).
After defendant raised that issue
in its response, plaintiff’s reply brief argued that the requirement
was met because defendant “has known at all times throughout this
lawsuit which church is at issue, and would not be prejudiced by the
amendment.” (Pl.’s Reply [48] at 5.) Further, “[p]laintiff promptly
moved to correct the misnomer as soon as the mistake was brought to
[its] attention.”
(Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff does not address the
central issue, which is the fact that the information about its
corporate name was certainly available to it all along.
It would
have taken only minimal diligence to have corrected this error before
the scheduling order’s deadline, or indeed even before filing the
case. It thus seems that, at best, plaintiff has satisfied only part
of the good cause requirement of Rule 16(b), in promptly seeking to
correct the misnomer after defendant brought it to plaintiff’s
attention.
Although an amendment such as this would normally fall
well within the liberal standards of Rule 15(a), the Eleventh Circuit
is quite clear that, where the scheduling order’s deadline has
passed, Rule 16(b) must be satisfied before the court may consider
Rule 15(a).
See Sosa, 133 F.3d at 1419.
However, as discussed, the Court has other options under the
Federal Rules for adding or substituting parties.
It may exercise
its discretion under Rules 19 and 21 to join New Generation True
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Holiness Church and drop New Generation Christian Church.
elects to do so.
The Court
The Court notes that the record in this case
indicates that defendants clearly were aware, protestations to the
contrary aside, of the entity it was dealing with during these
proceedings.
Albeit for slightly different reasons, it GRANTS
plaintiff’s motion to amend and ORDERS New Generation True Holiness
Church to be joined as a new plaintiff, and ORDERS New Generation
Christian Church to be dismissed as plaintiff.4
III. DEFENDANT’S MOTION
Defendant, like plaintiff, must satisfy the Rule 16(b) good
cause requirement before it may be permitted to amend its pleadings
pursuant to Rule 15.
To show good cause under Rule 16(b), the party
seeking to amend must show that it was diligent in seeking the
information that is the subject of the amendment.
Defendant takes
the opposite approach, stating that “[a]t the time [defendant] filed
its answer, it took [plaintiff] at its word that the request [for the
meter] was denied on account of the three acre requirement.” (Def.’s
4
This raises an issue not addressed by either party in their
briefs. Although plaintiff now seeks to proceed as “New Generation
True Holiness Church,” rather than “New Generation Christian Church,”
it is not clear that the newly-named plaintiff suffered the injuries
alleged in plaintiff’s complaint. In his deposition, Lewis sometimes
characterizes the difference as simply one of names, but elsewhere
insists that they are distinct entities separated by doctrinal
differences. (See Lewis Dep. [32-3] at 16-18.) This issue, however,
is beyond the scope of the present Order.
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Mot. to Amend [41] at 2-3.)
Defendant provides no explanation for
why it took plaintiff’s complaint at its word, rather than doing its
own investigation of the facts.
The reason for denying the meter to
plaintiff was, almost certainly, information available to defendant
at the time that it submitted its answer.
If it was not available,
defendant had the duty to state that it lacked that information,
rather than accepting plaintiff’s statement of fact.
See FED. R. CIV.
P. 8(b)(5) (“A party that lacks knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief about the truth of an allegation must so state, and
the statement has the effect of a denial.”)5
Defendant has provided no showing of its diligence, only its
lack of diligence. This cannot satisfy the good cause requirement of
Rule 16(b).
More importantly, plaintiff would unfairly suffer
prejudice if this amendment were allowed.
As plaintiff correctly
notes, it was the defendant, not plaintiff, who solely held knowledge
of the true reason why defendant denied the requested property meter.
When defendant’s Answer admitted that defendant denied the meter
because of the three-acre requirement, plaintiff understandably
structured its litigation strategy and discovery requests under the
5
Defendant does not suggest that it might have answered
paragraph 29 of the complaint differently if plaintiff had filed this
action under the name “New Generation True Holiness Church” rather
than “New Generation Christian Church.” Indeed, defendant’s excuse–that it did not investigate the facts–-would seem to preclude that
argument.
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assumption
contrary,
that
defendant
defendant
did
admitted
not
that
contest
this
this
was
its
fact.
To
reason.
the
Were
defendant permitted to now take back that admission, discovery would
have to be reopened and summary judgment motions would have to be
rebriefed:
all
to
the
great
detriment
of
plaintiff.
Given
defendant’s lack of diligence, this prejudice should not be visited
on plaintiff.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendant’s motion to amend [41].
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to correct a misnomer [38]
and DENIES defendant’s motion to amend [41].
ORDERS
that
plaintiff,
New
and
Generation
ORDERS
DISMISSED as plaintiff.
that
True
New
Holiness
The Court further
Church
Generation
be
JOINED
as
Christian
Church
be
The action proceeds as if New Generation
True Holiness Church had originally commenced it.
The parties’
motions for summary judgment ([32, 34]) remain under advisement.
SO ORDERED, this 27th day of March, 2014.
/s/ Julie E. Carnes
JULIE E. CARNES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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