Daker v. Dawes et al
Filing
19
ORDER granting Daker's 12 Motion to Extend Time to Object to Magistrate's 10/29/2013 Report and Recommendation. Daker's Objection 13 is OVERRULED. After de novo review, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court APPROVES AND ADOP TS the Final Report and Recommendation 9 as the Order of the Court. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE because Daker failed to comply with a lawful Court order. See LR 41.3A(2), NDGa. Daker's Motion to Recuse Judge Richard W. Story 11 and Motion to Recuse Magistrate Judge E. Clayton Scofield III 15 are DENIED. Daker's Motion to Reconsider Court's 9/18/2013 Order Denying Plaintiff IFP Status 1 and Supplemental Motion to Reconsider 9/18/2013 Order Denyin g Plaintiff IFP Status 17 are DENIED. Once again, Daker is reminded that this Court's Local Rules prohibit the filing of motions for reconsideration as a matter of routine practice and prohibit altogether the filing of "motions to reconsi der the court's denial of a prior motion for reconsideration." LR 7.2E, NDGa. If Daker nonetheless seeks reconsideration of this Order and/or files any new requests to proceed IFP in this Court, he is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in those motions or requests why this Court should not exercise its "discretion to deny or revoke th[e] privilege [to proceed IFP]..., either retrospectively or prospectively, by looking to 'the number, content, frequency, and disposition of his previous fi lings."" Hurt v. SSA, 544 F.3d 308,310 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Butler v. DOJ, 492 F.3d 440,445 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). In light of Daker's more than seventy prior cases and appeals, it may be appropriate for the Court to now exercise its "more general supervisory authority to manage [its] docket so as to promote[] the interests of justice,"" and to limit the waste of judicial resources by prisoners "'for whom litigation [is] a costless pastime.'" B utler, 492 F.3d at 444-45 (quoting In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989), and Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 208 F.3d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). See also In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180 (1991) (denying IFP status to a frequent filer in an extraordinary writ case and noting that he might be similarly restricted from filing IFP in other cases if he abused the privilege). Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 6/5/2014. (cem)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
IN RE: WASEEM DAKER
CIVIL ACTION NOS.
1:11-CV-1711-RWS
1:11-CV-3580-RWS
1:12-CV-118-RWS
1:12-CV-119-RWS
1:12-CV-1141-RWS
1:12-CV-1319-R WS
1:12-CV-2605-RWS
1: 12-CV-2782-RWS
1: 13-CV-1554-RWS
1: 13-CV-3053-RWS
ORDER
The ten cases listed in the caption are before the Court on more than thirty
motions and objections to Final Reports and Recommendations filed by state inmate,
Waseem Daker. The Court has carefully reviewed and considered each ofDaker's
filings and is now prepared to rule on each ofthem. Because these filings constitute
only a small fraction ofthe more than one thousand submissions Daker has made in
seventy-one civil cases and appeals in the Northern District of Georgia, the Middle
District of Georgia, the Southern District of Georgia, the Central District of
California, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the
United State Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit, see Appendix A, the Court first
summarizes Daker's criminal and litigation history.
I.
Waseem Daker's Criminal and Litigation Historyl
A.
Daker's Criminal Convictions
In 1996, Daker was convicted by a Cobb County jury on two counts of
aggravated stalking. See 11-CV-1711 [14-1] at 3. Daker served two consecutive
five-year terms and was released in 2005. Id.
In 2010, Daker was indicted for malice murder, felony murder (four counts),
burglary with intent to commit aggravated assault, burglary with intent to commit
aggravated stalking, false imprisonment, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and
criminal attempt to commit aggravated stalking. See 12-CV-1141 [1] at 3. Pending
trial, Daker was held without bond. See 12-CV-2605 [1] at 2. After electing to
terminate his court-appointed lawyers and represent himself at trial, Daker was
convicted on all counts. Daker is now serving a life sentence.
In Part I, the CMlECF numbers in brackets refer to docket entries in the
case indicated by the preceding case number, abbreviated in the format "##-CV
####." For example, "11-CV-1711 [14-1] at 3," refers to page number 3 of
CMlECF document 14-1 inDakerv. Warren, No.1 :11-CV-1711-RWS (N.D. Ga.
2011). Unless explicitly noted, the case numbers refer to cases filed in the
Northern District of Georgia.
1
2
B.
Daker's Pro Se Litigation History
Beginning in 1999-while he was serving sentences for aggravated
stalking-Daker began filing numerous civil rights complaints and habeas corpus
petitions in this Court and others. See Appendix A. After Daker was released from
prison in 2005, there was a brief hiatus in his filings. See id. However, in 2010,
when Daker was arrested and held on murder and related charges, he again began to
file numerous civil rights and habeas actions. See id.
As noted above, Daker has initiated or been involved in seventy-one civil cases
and appeals in the Northern District of Georgia, the Middle District of Georgia, the
Southern District of Georgia, the Central District ofCalifornia, the Eleventh Circuit,
and the Ninth Circuit through June 4, 2014. See id.
Despite the volume of his litigation, Daker has won virtually nothing. Insofar
as appears from the dockets in each of his cases, Daker has been awarded just $2 in
monetary damages. See 00-CV-1065 [90].2 Indeed, since then, the only additional
relief of any sort that Daker appears to have ultimately been awarded in any case was
2 The costs awarded to Daker in that case-approximately $710, see OO-CV
1065 [90]-have been dwarfed by the costs awarded against him in other cases, see,
e.g., 03-CV-2481 [299] (awarding $1474 in costs to defendants); 03-CV-2526
[127] (awarding costs to defendants).
3
short-lived injunctive relief with respect to "weekly Ta'lim services." See 01-CV
3257 [280] (reciting the history ofthat case in which all ofOaker's other claims had
been dismissed or denied and injunctive relief had expired).
In the cases that Oaker has filed since 2001, he appears to have won no
ultimate relief. Rather, it appears that all of his claims have been: (1) dismissed
voluntarily, see, e.g., 02-CV-1361 [41]; (2) dismissed involuntarily, see, e.g., 06-CV
54 [23]; (3) denied on summary judgment, see, e.g., 03-CV-2526 [126]; or (4) in the
one additional instance he reached a jury, rejected, see, e.g., 03-CV-2481 [293].
Oaker's appeals have been similarly fruitless, with those that have been fully
adjudicated generally having ended in dismissal either (1) because the circuit court
deemed them frivolous, see, e.g., In re Daker, No. 11-11937 (11th Cir.); In reDaker,
No. 12-12072 (l1th Cir.); In re Daker, No. 12-14369 (lith Cir.); Daker v. Warren,
13-11630 (lIth Cir.); or (2) for want of prosecution, see, e.g., In re Daker, No. 12
12073 (lIth Cir.); Georgia v. Daker, No. 12-12519 (lith Cir.); Daker v. Comm'r,
No. 13-13398 (lith Cir.)
c.
Daker and 28 U.S.C. § 1915('->: "Three Strikes"
In light ofDaker's litigation history, the Eleventh Circuit "has determined that
the 'three strikes' provision of the Prison Litigation Refonn Act of 1995[, codified
4
at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)], is applicable to" him. See, e.g., Letter dated May 29,2014,
in Daker v. Comm 'r, No. 14-12139 (l1th Cir. 2014); Letter dated April 18, 2014, in
Daker'v. Comm'r, No. 14-11571 (11th Cir. 2014) (same). This determination
followed the entry of a Final Report and Recommendation in this Court
recommending that Daker be determined to have accumulated "three strikes," see 13
CV-3053 [5] at 1-2 (listing six strikes), and a finding by the Middle District of
Georgia that Daker had accumulated three or more strikes, see Daker v. Owens, No.
5: 12-CV-459-CAR (M.D. Ga. Mar. 21,2014) [134].
Consequently, in any new case where Daker does not adequately allege that he
is "under imminent danger of serious physical injury," 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), "the
proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss the complaint without prejudice
when it denies ... leave to proceed in forma pauperis." Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d
1234, 1236 (11 th Cir. 2002). Daker "cannot simply pay the filing fee after being
denied in forma pauperis status. He must pay the filing fee at the time he initiates
suit." Id. (emphasis in original).
D.
Daker's "Indi2ence"
Furthermore, it has become clear over time that Daker is not entitled in any
event to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") because he is not indigent. Rather, it
5
appears that Daker has repeatedly abused the judicial process by filing IFP affidavits
that conceal and/or misstate his true assets and income.
Gwinnett County tax records indicate that Daker owns a home that has a
market value ofover $398,000 and that, despite his incarceration, Daker has remained
current on tax payments, including through a payment of$6,084.36 on September 14,
2013.
See
http://gwinnetttaxcommissioner .manatron.com/Tabsl
ViewPayYourTaxeslAccountDetaillBilIDetail.aspx?p=R7056%20404&
a=3323 7 684&b=21949900&y=20 13# (last viewed June 4,2014 ) (attached as Exhibit
B). Despite Daker's recent unsubstantiated protestations that his house is now worth
less than its $345,000 mortgage-a debt he self-reported, but has not documented-,3
Daker has plainly found it worthwhile to maintain his ownership ofthat home. And,
despite his claim of indigence, Daker has plainly found the income or assets with
which to make timely tax payments.
Moreover, Daker has acknowledged that he has permitted family members to
live in his house while he is incarcerated. See, e.g., 1O-CV-2084 [2] ("The following
persons live in my house: my father, Anas Daker, my mother, Amal Daker, and my
Daker did not claim that his home was worth less than he had paid for it
in 2009 until this Court denied one of his requests for IFP status in light of the
$50,000 in home equity that he had disclosed. See, e.g., 12-CV-2782 [7] at 2.
3
6
brother, Jameh Daker.")
Whether those family members are paying rent or other
consideration or whether their residence in the house simply precludes Daker from
generating income from paying renters, there is plainly a substantial income stream
associated with the house that Daker is either not disclosing or voluntarily electing
to forego in order to claim indigence.
Furthennore, other substantial assets that Daker has disclosed in past IFP
affidavits, including, for example, "a car that is paid off in full," ll-CV-1401 [2] at
2, have vanished without explanation from Daker' s subsequent disclosures ofassets,
even as he continues to claim that he has "had no income" since January 10, 2010,
Daker v. Motokwa, No. 14-55653 (9th Cir. 2014) [IFP Affidavit filed on May 19,
2014, Item 11]. And Daker has stated that he granted a power of attorney to a relative
to handle his financial affairs outside of prison so that "said infonnation" would not
be subject to "monitoring" by prison officials, 12-CV-119 [3], without ever disclosing
the nature of and value of the assets that he is permitting others to manage on his
behalf.
As noted above, this infonnation, which has been revealed only in bits and
pieces over time, unmistakably indicates that Daker has abused the judicial process
7
by filing IFP affidavits that conceal and/or misstate his real assets and income.
Consequently, Daker is not eligible to proceed IFP.
E.
Daker's Motions for Reconsideration
Daker has also abused the judicial process through the repeated filing of
motions for reconsideration. Despite having been advised often that this Court's
Local Rules provide that "[m]otions for reconsideration shall not be filed as a matter
ofroutine practice," LR 7.2E, NDGa., Daker nonetheless has done so and continues
to do so in many cases. See Appendix A. In support of his post-judgment motions,
Daker will frequently file multiple "supplemental" pleadings. See, e.g., ll-CV-1711
[38,39,42,43,44]. These post-judgment motions have served only to unnecessarily
prolong litigation in this Court, and many appear to have been filed, in whole or in
part, to extend Daker's time to prepare and file appeals.
F.
Daker's Motions to Recuse
All ofDaker's cases in this Court have been assigned to the undersigned, save
for one transferred to the Honorable Amy T otenberg when she was first appointed to
serve in the Northern District. See Appendix A. For more than a decade, from 1999
through 2011, Daker raised no objection to these case assignments. In 2011,
however, Daker began to file what have since become routine motions to recuse. See
8
10-CV-3815 [20]. Indeed, Daker now frequently files multiple motions to recuse in
the same case. See, e.g., id. [20, 27, 43, 68].
Although in each subsequent motion to recuse, Daker sometimes adds
additional, unsubstantiated accusations, his core "bias" and "conspiracy" claims
remain the same.
Both this Court and the Eleventh Circuit have thoroughly
considered Daker's motions and concluded that recusal is not warranted, as "judicial
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for bias." Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555 (l994). Nor is recusal required where "the judge acquired
knowledge of relevant facts through prior judicial proceedings." Order dated Oct.
9,2012, in Georgia v. Daker, No. 12-12519 (lIth Cir. Oct. 9,2012) (citing Christo
v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1334 (lIth Cir. 2000) (considering Daker's arguments
under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455). And, "[a] charge of partiality must be
supported by some factual basis . . .. Recusal cannot be based on unsupported,
irrational, or highly tenuous speculation." United States v. Cerceda, 188 F.3d 1291,
1293 (lIth Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in
original). Daker's motions to recuse do not meet those standards. 4
Further discussion of the reasons the Court has declined to recuse can be
found in the Orders addressing Daker's motions to recuse, including 12-CV-572
[4, 7], 12-CV-119 [10], and 12-CV-118 [10]. That discussion is not repeated here.
4
9
II.
Pendin2 Motions and Objections5
With that background in mind, the Court now turns to the ten cases listed in the
caption and Daker's many pending filings in them.
1.
No. 1:11-CV-1711
Daker has filed a "Motion for Service of Order Denying Certificate of
Appealability and Denying In Forma Pauperis Status on Appeal; Motion to Extend
Time to File Notice of Appeal" [54]. That motion is DENIED.
The docket reflects that the February 28,2014 Order that Daker claims never
to have received was mailed to him at the address he had provided to this Court and
that it was not returned as undeliverable. See [Unnmbrd Dkt. Entry dated Feb. 28,
2014]. Daker's motion indicates that he learned no later than March 4, 2014, that the
February 28 Order had been entered.
[54] at 1. This was well within the 30-day
appeal period. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(I)(A). No extensionofthe appeal period was
warranted. See id. (a)( 5). Indeed, Daker later filed a notice ofappeal in this case that
he dated March 30, 2014. [55].
In Part II, the CMlECF numbers in brackets refer to docket entries in the
case identified in the numbered paragraph.
5
10
2.
No.l:11-CV-3580
Daker's "Motion for Service ofOrder Denying Certificate ofAppealability and
Denying In Forma Pauperis Status on Appeal; Motion to Extend Time to File Notice
of Appeal" [50] is DENIED for the reasons set forth in the discussion above with
respect to the identical motion in 11-CV-1711.
3.
No. 1:12-CV-118
Daker's "Motion to Reconsider Court's 1116/14 Order" [32] and "Supplemental
Motion to Reconsider Court's 1/16/14 Order" [42] are DENIED. First, the Court's
January 16 Order denied Daker's previous Rule 59(e) Motions to Vacate, and this
Court's Local Rules prohibit motions to reconsider motions to reconsider. See LR
7.2E, NDGa. Second, the footnote in the January 16 Order that Daker demands be
reconsidered and vacated deals with Daker' s "strikes" in prior cases and appeals. As
discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit, this Court, and the Middle District ofGeorgia
have all concluded that Daker has accumulated more than three "strikes." Third,
there are only two grounds for granting a motion for reconsideration under Federal
Rule ofCivil Procedure 59(e): '''newly discovered evidence or manifest errors oflaw
or fact.'"
Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (l1th Cir. 2009) (quoting In re
Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (lIth Cir. 1999)). Here, Daker has neither presented
11
any new evidence, nor identified any manifest error. Rather, Daker is simply seeking
to "relitigate old matters, raise argument, or present evidence that could have been
raised prior to the entry of judgment," none of which is a basis for relief in a Rule
59(e) motion. Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village o/Wellington, Fla. 408 F.3d 757, 763
(11 th Cir. 2005).
Daker's "Request for Permission to Proceed In Forma Pauperis" on appeal
[38] and "Request for Permission to Proceed In Forma Pauperis" on appeal [40] are
DENIED because he is ineligible to proceed IFP in new appeals now that he has
accumulated more than three strikes, unless he can show that he is "under imminent
danger of serious physical harm," which he has not attempted to do in this case, and
because, as discussed above, it does not appear that Daker is actually indigent.
4.
No.l:12-CV-119
Daker's "Motion to Reconsider Court's 1116/14 Order" [32], "Request for
Permission to Proceed In Forma Pauperis" on appeal [37], and "Request for
Permission to Proceed In Forma Pauperis" on appeal [38], and "Supplemental
Motion to Reconsider Court's 1/16/2014 Order" [40] are DENIED for the reasons set
forth above in the discussion of the identical motions filed in 12-CV-118.
12
5.
No. 1:12-CV-1141
Daker's "Motion for Service ofOrder Denying Certificate ofAppealability and
Denying In Forma Pauperis Status on Appeal; Motion to Extend Time to File Notice
of Appeal" [39] is DENIED for the reasons set forth above in the discussion of the
identical motion filed in ll-CV-1711.
6.
No.l:12-CV-1319
Daker's "Motion for Service ofOrder Denying Certificate ofAppealability and
Denying In Forma Pauperis Status on Appeal; Motion to Extend Time to File Notice
of Appeal" [34] is DENIED for the reasons set forth in the discussion above with
respect to ll-CV-1711.
7.
No. 1:12-CV-2605
Daker's "Motion for Service ofOrder Denying Certificate ofAppealabilty and
Denying In Forma Pauperis Status on Appeal; Motion to Extend Time to File Notice
of Appeal" [34] is DENIED for the reasons set forth in the discussion above with
respect to ll-CV-1 711.
8.
No.l:12-CV-2782
Daker's "Motion to Extend Time to Object to Magistrate's October 29,2013
Report and Recommendation" [12] is GRANTED.
13
Daker's "Objection" [13] is OVERRULED.
After de novo review, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court APPROVES AND
ADOPTS the Final Report and Recommendation [9] as the Order of the Court.
Daker's "Motion to Recuse Judge Richard W. Story" [11] and "Motion to
Recuse Magistrate Judge E. Clayton Scofield III" [15] are DENIED. As discussed
above, Daker has repeatedly sought recusal ofthe undersigned and Magistrate Judge
Scofield. This Court and the Eleventh Circuit have thoroughly considered those
motions and denied them for the reasons set forth above. Daker's latest motions add
nothing that would alter the conclusion that recusal is not warranted.
Daker's "Motion to Reconsider Court's 9118/2013 Order Denying PlaintiffIFP
Status" [16] and "Supplemental Motion to Reconsider 9118/13 Order Denying
PlaintiffIFP Status" [17] are DENIED. As discussed above, it is c1earthat Daker has
repeatedly misrepresented his financial status and that he is not indigent.
9.
No.l:13-CV-1554
Daker's "Motion to Reconsider and Vacate Order Denying Motions 3,4,5,6"
[9] is DENIED.
14
Daker's "Motion to Extend Time to Pay Filing Fee" [10] is GRANTED. The
Court notes, however, that the filing fee was not forthcoming from Daker by the date
he proposed to pay it. No further extensions of time are warranted.
Daker's "Second Motion to Recuse Judge Richard W. Story" [11] and "Motion
to Recuse Magistrate Judge E. Clayton Scofield III" [13] are DENIED.
Daker's "Motion to Reconsider Magistrate's 10/31113 Order Denying In Forma
Pauperis Status" [14] and "Supplemental Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.
Daker's "Objection to Magistrate's 10/31/13 Report & Recommendation" [12]
and "Supplemental Obj ection to Magistrate's 10/31/13 Report and Recommendation"
[15] are OVERRULED.
After de novo review, see 28 U. S.C. § 636(b)( 1), the Court APPROVES AND
ADOPTS the Final Report and Recommendation [7] as the Order of the Court.
10.
No.1:13-CV-3053
Daker's "Motion to Extend Time to Object to Magistrate's 12/30/13 Report and
Recommendation" [7] is GRANTED.
Daker's "Motion to Recuse Judge Richard W. Story" [8], "Second Motion to
Recuse Judge Richard W. Story" [9], and "Motion to Recuse Magistrate Judge
Scofield [sic] E. Clayton Scofield, III" [10] are DENIED.
15
Daker's "Objection to Magistrate's 12/30/13 Report & Recommendation" [11]
and "Supplemental Objection to Magistrate's December 30, 2013 Report and
Recommendation" [12] are OVERRULED. Indeed, it appears that the Final R&R
undercounts the total number of "strikes" that Daker has accumulated in light of
Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731 (llth Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). In that case, the Eleventh Circuit instructed
district courts that (l) "[a] claim that fails to allege the requisite exhaustion of
remedies is tantamount to one that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted" and counts as a strike, and (2) "dismissal based on a petitioner's abuse ofthe
judicial process is precisely the type of strike that Congress envisioned/' including
dismissals for want of prosecution. fd. Moreover, "[p]laintiffs are bound by the
judgments in their prior cases, and may not dispute their merits in order to challenge
a 'three-strikes' determination." Casey v. Scott, 493 F. App'x 1000, 1001 (l1th Cir.
2012). It is abundantly clear that Daker has accumulated three or more "strikes."
After de novo review, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court APPROVES AND
ADOPTS the Final Report and Recommendation [5] as the Order of the Court.
16
III.
Further Proceedin2s.
Once again, Daker is reminded that this Court's Local Rules prohibit the filing
of motions for reconsideration as a matter ofroutine practice and prohibit altogether
the filing of "motions to reconsider the court's denial of a prior motion for
reconsideration." LR 7.2E, NDGa.
If Daker nonetheless seeks reconsideration of this Order and/or files any new
requests to proceed IFP in this Court, he is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in
those motions or requests why this Court should not exercise its "discretion to deny
or revoke th[e] privilege [to proceed IFP] ... , either retrospectively or prospectively,
by looking to 'the number, content, frequency, and disposition of his previous
filings.'" Hurt v. SSA, 544 F.3d 308,310 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Butler v. DOJ,
492 F.3d 440,445 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
In light of Daker's more than seventy prior cases and appeals, it may be
appropriate for the Court to now exercise its "more general supervisory authority to
manage [its] docket so as to promote[] the interests ofjustice,'" and to limit the waste
of judicial resources by prisoners "'for whom litigation [is] a costless pastime.'"
Butler, 492 F.3d at 444-45 (quoting In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989), and
Ibrahim v. District ofColumbia, 208 F.3d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). See also In
17
re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180 (1991) (denying IFP status to a frequent filer in an
extraordinary writ case and noting that he might be similarly restricted from filing IFP
in other cases if he abused the privilege).
SO ORDERED, this.5!:.. day of June, 2014.
United States District Ju ge
18
APPENDIX A
Filing Fee Paid
Docket Number
Caption
r-~
Rule
Total
59/611
Dodl!rlding_
-~-
~-~
-~
- -..
on appeal
denied· See Georgia v. Daker, No. 12-12519
on appeal
on appeal
on appeal
~-
18 Yes
17 Yes
13
-.--~
on appeal
f-
f-
APPENDIX A
--
Rule
59/60
Total
CaptIon
Docket Number
Filing Fee PaId
~ofActlon _
Docket type
Entries ~s Result on Appeal
PrIncipal FInal Outcome
Cases Opened In the MIddle District of Georgia (through June 3,2014)
---
1 Azlyz v, Tremble
1983 - dvil rights
Int~rventlon
5:04-CV-337
1983 - civil rights
dismissed (voluntarily)
3 Daker v. Donald
--
5:03-CV-412
2 Oaker v, Donald
S:04-CV-392
1983 - dvil rIghts
dismissed (voluntarily)
4 Oaker v, GOGC
5:0S-CV-205
1983 - dvil rights
dIsmIssed (voluntarily!
SOaker v. Owens
6 Oaker v, Humphrey
S:12-CV-459
5:12-CV-461 .
7 Daker v, Head
S:14-CV-138
IFP denied
-----
IFP denied
request denied
---
107 Yes
------
-
. denied - See Daker v,Tremble, No, 05-11696 &
voluntarily dismissed - See Daker v, Tremble, No,
OS-13697
-~~-
45
. 29
-~
-~ r---
160
dismissed pursuant to Section 1915(g)
1983 - civil rights
2241- habeas
dismissed
1983 - civil rights
dismissed pursuant to Section 1915(g}
Yes
12 Yes
dismissed -ill Daker v, Comm'r, No, 13-13398 &
Daker v, Camm'r, No, 14-11571; see alsQ Oaker v,
Comm'r, No, 14-12139
7 Yes
--
Cases Opened In the Southern DIstrict of Georgia (through June 3, 20141
11Daker v, Head
16:14-CV-47
I
cert
denle(
r-
-
-
-
1983 - civil rights
pending
2
1331- diversity
dismissed with prejudice (frivolous/malicious)
9 Yes
Cases Opened in the Central District of California (through June 3, 2014)
11Daker v, Mokwa
12: 14-CV-395
IF? denied
1
1
Appeals and Original Actions Opened in the Eleventh Circuit (through June 3,2014)
1 Daker v. Warren
10-15028
IFP denied
2
3
4
5
In
In
In
In
re:
re:
re:
re:
Daker
Daker
Daker
Daker
on appeal
f-
dismissed
dismissed as fivolous
mandamus petition dismissed as frivolous
Yes
Yes
dismissed for want of prosecution
dismissed (voluntarily)
--
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
11-11937
12-12072
12-12073
IFP denied
IF? denied
IFP denied
12-12074
IFP denied
12-12519
12-12820
IF!' denied
IF? denied
12-13644
9 In re: Oaker
Daker v. Warren
12-14369
13-11630
11 Daker v, Comm'r
12 Daker v, Warren
13-13398
dismissed for want of prosecution
13-14446
pending
13 Daker v, Robinson
14 Daker v, Dawes
13-14873
13-14878
pending (consolidated wIth 13-14878)
pending (consolidated with 13-14873)
13-15932 - - -
13-15936
13-15938
6 Georgia v. Daker
7 Daker v, Warren
8 Daker v, Sheriff
r--w
15 Daker v. Warren
Oaker Y. Warren
~ Daker y, Warren
17
dismissed for want of prosecution
dIsmissed
Yes
IFP denied
dismissed
Yes
IFP denIed
mandamus petition dismissed as frivolous
dismissed as frivolous
--
18 Daker v, Sheriff
13-15939
19 Daker v. Unnamed
20 Daker v, Sheriff
13-15941
pendIng
21 Daker v,
22 Daker v.
-
23 Daker v.
24 Daker v.
Robinson
Dawes
Comm'r
Comm'r
14-10096
'_.
14-10779
14-10780
14-11571
14-12139
f-
f-
pending
pending
pending
pending
~~~~~-
Yes
-
--
--
pending
dismissed
dismissed
dismissed for want of prosecution
pending
"three strikes" noted
"three strikes" noted
--
j----.
Appeals Flied In the Ninth Circuit (through June 3, 2014)
1 Daker v. Mokwa
114-55653
IF? denied
pendi~ ____
-
- . .. ..
~~-
-~~-
_.. _......
_
-
http://gwinnettasses sor.manatron. comJIWantTo!PropertyGlS Search/Pro...
Jperty Detail
Tax Assessor's Office
j want To ...
Tax Assessor
Property Detail
Go Back
Comparable Sales
Property Report
Property ID
Alternate ID
DAKER WASEEM
1888 AUSllNS POINTE DR
LAWRENCEVILLE GA 30043-3952
R7056404
... _"_." ......,, ....
33237684
Address
1888 AUSllNS POINTE DR
Property Class
Residential SFR
Neighborhood
7326
Deed Acres
0.4400
Value History
Year
2014
2013
2012
2011
Reason
Notice of
Current
Assessment
Notice of
Current
Assessment
Notice of
Current
Assessment
Notice of
Current
Assessment
2010
2009
2007
2006
Bid Added,
Updated or
Razed
New Parcel
Land Val
$70,000
$70,000
$70,000
$92,000
Imp Val
$328.100
$328,100
$328,100
$470,600
Total Appr
$398,100
$398,100
$398,100
Land Assd
$28,000
$28,000
Land Use
$0
$0
$28,000
......._
$0
lmpAssd
$131,240
Total Assd
$159,240
$82,800
$0
$82,800
$398,100
$33,120
...
$0
""''''--''''''
$131,240
$159,240
$0
$159,240
$33,120
Transfer History
. Book . Page
Vacant Land Sale Price
Date
Owner
Grantee
Deed
49774 852
10126/2009 '
WELLS FARGO BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATIO
DAKER WASEEM
WD
!:!!
No
$394,900
49517 . 886
51512009
CH.l>.RLES MARIE MICHELLE
WELLS FARGO BANK NAllONAL
ASSOCIAllO
WD
NG
No
$277,533
BAINBRlDGE HOMES LLC
CH.l>.RLES MARIE MICHELLE
WD
QY..
No
. $579,429 •
TULLIS DEVELOPMENTS INC
BAINBRIDGE HOMES LLC
No
$926,100 .
47039
259 • 911812006
43219. 242
1213112005
.-.-,..-.-.-, ..
-~~---.-.---
Floor Areas
'Story
Exterior Features
Attribute
Detoil
Type
2 Story Conventional
Single family
Gable-Hip
Comp sh 240-250#
Forced hot air
Central air
2.0
OccllJlancy
Roof Structure
Roof Cover
Heating
flJC
Stories
Iperty Detail
http://gwinnettassessoLmanatroRcomlrwantTo/PropertyGISSearchfPro...
1
1
1.5
1.5
2
Address
1888 AUSTINS POINTE DR
Type
2
4
Bathrooms
Bathrooms (Ha!!)
Feature
Feature
Exterior \Nail
Interior Flooring
Exterior \Nail
Interior Flooring
Exterior \Nail
Interior Flooring
Fireplace
Fireplace
Brick
Base Allowance
Brick
Base Allowance
Brick
Base Allowance
Col1\lentional
Grade
B
Year Built
2005
Value
$328,100
Improvements do not exist for this account.
Land Type
Acres
Eff. Frontage
Eff. Depth
R01 • Primary Site
Primary Use
0.44
o
o
Legal Description
Line
Description
L6 BAAUSTINS POINTE
Terms Of Use Privacy Statement Copyright 2014 by Gwinnett County Assessor's OffICe
Detail
http://gyviunetttaxconnnissioner.manatroncomlTabs/ViewPayYourTaxe...
Tax Account
Parcel ID
Property Type
Real
R7056404
Status
Active
Vrr.n<>rrv
Mailing Address:
DAKER WASEEM
1888 AUSTINS POINTE DR
LAWRENCEVILLE, GA 30043-3952
Tax District
COUNTY Unincorporated
Situs:
18 88 AUSTlNS POINTE DR
legal Description
l6 BA AUSTINS POINTE
Tax Values
Class Codes
101-Residential SFR
----.~--~--~----------------
Assessed Value
$159,240.00
Assessments
Savings
Operation
Sub Total
Bond
Net Tax
Savings
Net Tax
Savings
School Taxes
Sub Total
Special Assessment
Tax Installment Information
Period
Bill Number
INST 1
21949900
Tax Year
.-....._...... i··· ......···-·
2013
Total Due:
Payment History
Bill Number
Receipt Number
Last Paid
21949900_ _ _.c..._._._.____._._. __.__. __.,.___________-'.__•..__._-'_"-__._ __.__.. _.....____...___...__........__.__
613.51479
9/14/2013
_ _ _.. _ _
_
.
_
2013
L_ _ _ _ _._____ ._._____
~
Tax Year
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