Cain v. Almeco USA, Inc. et al

Filing 84

ORDER granting 72 Motion for Attorney Fees in the amount of $173,300.50. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 5/23/2014. (ss)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
KELLY CAIN
on behalf of herself and all similarly
situated individuals,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 1:12-CV-3296-TWT

ALMECO USA, INC.,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This is an FLSA overtime case. It is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s Motion
for Attorney’s Fees [Doc. 72]. To determine the amount of fees due, courts use the
lodestar approach and multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a
reasonable hourly rate.1 When considering what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate,
the court may consider the following factors: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee in the community; (6) whether the fee

1

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1983).

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is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
(8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and
the ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar
cases.2 That a plaintiff succeeds in only a limited way does not strip her of
prevailing-party status, but the degree of her success is “the most critical factor in
determining the reasonableness of a fee award.”3 There is a “strong presumption” that
the lodestar reflects a reasonable sum the attorneys deserve.4 If the Court finds that
the number of hours claimed is unreasonably high, the Court may either conduct an
hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the hours using an across-the-board cut.5 When
the number of compensable hours and the hourly rate are reasonable, a downward
adjustment to the lodestar is merited only if the prevailing party was partially
successful in its efforts.6

2

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).

3

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) (quotation marks omitted); see also
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436.
4

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S.
546, 565–66 (1986).
5

Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 783 (11th Cir. 1994).

6

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1150 (11th
Cir. 1993).
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In this case, the Defendant objects to the reasonableness of both the number of
hours expended and the hourly rates requested. I agree that the hours included by the
Plaintiff for filing a motion for summary judgment should be deducted in calculating
the lodestar amount. Given the wide disparity in the deposition testimony as to the
nature of the Plaintiff’s duties, filing a motion for summary judgment was an act of
complete futility. Otherwise, I think that the hours claimed were reasonably necessary
to prosecute this case to a jury verdict. The Plaintiff had the burden of proof; the fact
that defense counsel billed substantially fewer hours to defend the case is not
remarkable. Considering the Johnson factors – in particular, the experience,
reputation, and the ability of the attorneys and the “undesirability” of the case – and
the Lee Parks Declaration, I think that the hourly rates requested are reasonable. This
results in a lodestar amount of $173,300.50 ($193,121.50 minus $19,821.00).
Applying established Eleventh Circuit law, a downward adjustment to the
lodestar is merited only if the prevailing party was partially successful in its efforts.
Here, the Plaintiff prevailed on her only claim and persuaded the jury that the FLSA
violation was wilful. It is true that she was awarded only about one-third of the
damages that she claimed. But that is not remarkable in a case where an FLSA
plaintiff has to reconstruct her hours. And it is true that the lodestar amount is more
than ten times that of her actual and statutory damages. But that is not remarkable in

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an individual FLSA case seeking overtime. Accordingly, I decline to reduce the
lodestar amount for limited success on the merits of the claim. Therefore, the
Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees [Doc. 72] is GRANTED in the amount of
$173,300.50.
SO ORDERED, this 23 day of May, 2014.

/s/Thomas W. Thrash
THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge

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