Godwin v. Wellstar Health Systems, Inc.
Filing
48
OPINION AND ORDER granting Defendant's 30 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge William S. Duffey, Jr on 3/27/2014. (anc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
MARY GODWIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
1:12-cv-3752-WSD
WELLSTAR HEALTH
SYSTEM, INC.,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [30].
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Procedural History
On October 26, 2012, Plaintiff Mary Godwin (“Plaintiff”) filed this
employment discrimination action against her former employer Defendant
WellStar Health Systems, Inc. (“Defendant” or “WellStar”). In her Complaint,
Plaintiff asserts four causes of action: that Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s
employment because of her age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”) (Count I); that Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s
employment in retaliation for Plaintiff’s complaints about age discrimination, in
violation of the ADEA (Count II); that Defendant failed to accommodate
Plaintiff’s disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
(Count III); and that Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment in retaliation for
Plaintiff’s complaints about the failure to accommodate her disability, in violation
of the ADA (Count IV). On July 29, 2013, Defendant filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims.
B.
Relevant Factual Background1
Plaintiff was born in August 1948. (Resp. SUMF [42] ¶ 5.) She began
working for WellStar, a system of hospitals and other healthcare facilities, in May
1999, as an order puller in Defendant’s Distribution Center. (Id. ¶ 4; SAMF [43]
¶¶ 2–3.) By 2003, Plaintiff had been promoted to the position of Buyer, first in
WellStar’s Distribution Center and later in WellStar’s Purchasing Department.
(Resp. SUMF [42] ¶¶ 10–11, 20; SAMF [43] ¶¶ 3–4.) As a Buyer, Plaintiff’s
1
These facts are taken from the following statements of facts submitted in
accordance with Local Civil Rule 56.1: Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts [30-2] (“SUMF”), Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s SUMF [42]
(“Resp. SUMF”), Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Material Facts [43]
(“SAMF”), and Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s SAMF [47] (“Resp. SAMF”).
Where a party disputed a factual assertion contained in a statement of facts, the
Court also considered the specific exhibits cited in support of the assertion. See
LR 56.1(B)(3), NDGa (providing that the court deems a party’s SUMF citation as
supportive of the asserted fact “unless the respondent specifically informs the court
to the contrary in the response”).
2
duties included processing orders, with outside vendors, for goods made by various
departments within WellStar’s enterprise. (See Resp. SUMF [42] ¶¶ 13–14.)
In March 2009, WellStar hired Tony Trupiano (“Trupiano”) as its Vice
President of Supply Chain. (Id. ¶ 46.) Trupiano’s responsibilities included
overseeing the Purchasing Department. (Id. ¶ 47.) At the time Trupiano joined
WellStar, the Manager of the Purchasing Department, and Plaintiff’s direct
supervisor, was Chris Holihan (“Holihan”). (See id. ¶ 49.) Holihan expressed
concerns to Trupiano regarding Plaintiff’s performance, including errors in
purchase orders. (Id. ¶ 50.)
In September 2009, Holihan conducted an evaluation of Plaintiff in which he
rated Plaintiff’s performance as “below expectations.” (Id. ¶¶ 43–44.) In October
2009, WellStar hired Ken Tifft (“Tifft”) as its Director of Purchasing and
Contracts, a new position reporting to Trupiano, the Vice President of Supply
Chain, and overseeing Holihan, the Purchasing Department Manager. (See id.
¶¶ 56, 58; SAMF [43] ¶ 18.) Tifft reviewed Holihan’s evaluation of Plaintiff.
(Resp. SUMF [42] ¶ 59.) Tifft stated that, while he did not have reason to
disbelieve Holihan’s evaluation, he believed Holihan’s criticisms lacked sufficient
3
documentation. (Id. ¶¶ 60–61.)2 Tifft therefore approved a merit pay raise for
Plaintiff. (Id.)
In October 2009, Holihan left WellStar, and Tifft assumed temporary dayto-day management over the Purchasing Department. (Id. ¶¶ 57–58; SAMF [43]
¶ 19.) In March 2010, Tifft conducted an evaluation of Plaintiff in which he rated
Plaintiff’s performance as “below expectations.” (Resp. SUMF [42] ¶¶ 62, 64.)3
In April 2010, WellStar hired Cherise Brown (“Brown”) as the Manager of
the Purchasing Department, and Brown became Plaintiff’s direct supervisor. (Id.
¶ 76.) In July 2010, Brown and Tifft jointly conducted an evaluation of Plaintiff in
which they rated Plaintiff’s performance as “below expectations.” (Id. ¶¶ 80–82,
84.)
In September 2010, Brown placed Plaintiff on a 90-day “performance
improvement plan” (“PIP”). (Id. ¶¶ 85–86; SAMF [43] ¶ 28.) The PIP identified
several deficiencies in Plaintiff’s performance, including making errors on
2
Plaintiff purports to dispute the fact that Tifft did not disbelieve Holihan’s review
because, in April 2010, Tifft wrote in an email that Plaintiff was “meeting
expectations.” (Resp. SUMF [42] ¶ 60.) Tifft’s April 2010 email does not show
Tifft’s beliefs in October 2009.
3
In April 2010, the month after the March 2010 evaluation, Tifft determined that
Plaintiff was meeting expectations, and he approved a substantial pay raise for
Plaintiff to bring her pay in line with that of other Buyers in the Purchasing
Department. (Resp. SUMF [42] ¶¶ 71–74.)
4
purchase orders. (Resp. SUMF [42] ¶ 86.) Brown presented Plaintiff with formal
follow-ups to the PIP after 30 and 60 days. (Id. ¶¶ 88–91.) In these follow-ups,
Brown noted improvements in some areas and continued concerns in others. (Id.)4
In January or February 2011, Brown conducted an evaluation of Plaintiff in
which she rated Plaintiff as not meeting expectations. (Id. ¶ 93.) In late February
2011, Brown placed Plaintiff on a second 90-day PIP. (Id. ¶ 94.) This PIP
identified deficiencies similar to those in the earlier PIP, including errors on
purchase orders. (Id. ¶ 95.)
On February 25, 2011, Plaintiff presented Brown with a note from her
physician stating that, “[b]ecause of rheumatoid arthritis, [Plaintiff] should not
remain seated/sedentary for more than one hour continuously.” (Id. ¶ 97.)
Plaintiff explained to Brown that she needed to move around every hour. (Id.
¶ 99.) Brown responded by telling Plaintiff that she needed to remain “visible” in
the Purchasing Department. (Id. ¶ 101.)5 The Purchasing Department was
sufficiently large to allow Plaintiff to walk. (Id. ¶ 105.)
4
Brown did not provide a follow-up after 90 days because she decided to wait until
Plaintiff’s mid-year evaluation. (Resp. SUMF [42] ¶ 92.)
5
Plaintiff asserts that Brown told her that she needed to obtain Brown’s permission
before leaving her desk and before using the restroom. (SAMF [43] ¶ 70.)
Plaintiff also asserts that there were occasions when Brown denied Plaintiff
permission to leave her desk or to use the restroom. (Id. ¶ 73; Resp. SUMF [42]
5
In March 2011, Plaintiff complained to WellStar’s Human Resources
Department that Brown had made “ageist” comments to her and that Brown was
not accommodating her need to walk.6 (SAMF [43] ¶ 86.)
On May 4, 2011, Brown gave Plaintiff a 60-day follow-up to the second PIP,
which noted continued performance deficiencies. (Resp. SUMF [42] ¶¶ 114–15.)
On the same day, Plaintiff requested a meeting with WellStar’s Human Resources
Department to discuss her earlier complaints about Brown. (SAMF [43] ¶¶ 95–
97.) On May 9, 2011, the Human Resources Department interviewed Plaintiff,
who reported on Brown’s alleged “ageist” comments and failure to accommodate
Plaintiff’s arthritis. (Id. ¶¶ 102–03.)7
¶ 102.) The record does not show that Brown ever denied Plaintiff permission to
walk at least once per hour.
6
At some point after becoming Manager of the Purchasing Department, Brown
allegedly made numerous comments to Plaintiff that Plaintiff characterizes as
“ageist.” These comments, most of which Defendant disputes were made, include:
Brown stating that Plaintiff was not “mentally capable of understanding” Brown
(SAMF [43] ¶ 37); Brown asking Plaintiff her age and then asking, “At your age,
why are you still working?” (id. ¶¶ 39–40); Brown telling Plaintiff that she “should
have made provision for being out of work when she was young” (id. ¶ 42); Brown
telling Plaintiff that, at her age, she should be “home taking care of her husband”
(id. ¶ 43); and Brown stating that it was time for Plaintiff to be “put out to pasture”
(id. ¶ 44).
7
Brown was aware that Plaintiff had lodged her complaints with Human Resources
and that Plaintiff was meeting with Human Resources on May 9, 2011. (SAMF
[43] ¶ 104.) On the same day as the meeting, Brown drafted a document
6
Beginning in June 2011, while Trifft was on medical leave, Brown had
weekly meetings with Trupiano to discuss the performance of the employees in the
Purchasing Department. (Resp. SUMF [42] ¶ 167.) During one of these meetings,
Brown recommended to Trupiano that Plaintiff be fired because of Plaintiff’s
continued performance issues. (Id. ¶ 168.) Brown gave Trupiano several recent
purchase orders completed by Plaintiff that contained errors. (Id. ¶ 174; SAMF
[43] ¶ 137.)
Trupiano reviewed the purchase orders supplied by Brown and determined
that Plaintiff’s errors were occurring at an “unacceptable frequency.” (Resp.
SUMF [42] ¶ 174.) Trupiano testified that, based on his review of the purchase
orders, earlier complaints he had received about Plaintiff from Holihan and Trifft,
and his knowledge that Plaintiff had been given earlier warnings about her
performance before making the errors on the exemplar purchasing orders, he
decided to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. (Id. ¶ 175.) On June 22, 2011,
Plaintiff was fired from WellStar in a meeting with Trupiano, Brown, and a Human
Resources employee. (Id. ¶ 193.)
recommending Plaintiff’s termination. (Id. ¶ 106.) The record does not show that
Brown ever transmitted this document to anyone.
7
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Parties “asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support that assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for
purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. Herzog v. Castle Rock
Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999). Once the moving party has met this
burden, the non-movant must demonstrate that summary judgment is inappropriate
by designating specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Graham v. State
Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). Non-moving parties
“need not present evidence in a form necessary for admission at trial; however,
[they] may not merely rest on [their] pleadings.” Id.
The Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the party
8
opposing the motion and must draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant, but
only “to the extent supportable by the record.” Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d
1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8
(2007)). “[C]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing
of inferences from the facts are the function of the jury . . . .” Graham, 193 F.3d at
1282. “If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must
deny the motion and proceed to trial.” Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1246. But, “[w]here
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party,” summary judgment for the moving party is proper. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
B.
Analysis
1.
Counts I, II, and IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint
The ADEA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee
“because of” age or “because” an employee has complained about age
discrimination. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (d). The ADA prohibits an employer
from discriminating against an employee “because” the employee has complained
about a failure to reasonably accommodate the employee’s disability. See 42
U.S.C. § 12203(a). In Counts I, II, and IV of her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant violated these provisions by firing her because of her age and because
9
she had previously complained about her supervisor Brown’s acts of age
discrimination and failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s rheumatoid arthritis.
Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Counts I, II, and
IV because the decision to fire Plaintiff was made by Trupiano, who did not harbor
any illegal animus toward Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not dispute that Trupiano lacked
a discriminatory animus or that Trupiano made the formal firing decision. Plaintiff
argues that Defendant is liable because Trupiano acted merely as the “cat’s paw”
of Plaintiff’s direct supervisor Brown, who Plaintiff contends did harbor
discriminatory animus toward Plaintiff.
Under the subordinate bias, or “cat’s paw,” theory of liability in employment
discrimination cases, the illegal animus of a supervisor who was not the decision
maker with respect to an adverse employment action may nevertheless be imputed
to the employer. Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1335 n.6 (11th Cir. 2013).
For the theory to apply in ADEA cases and ADA retaliation cases, the biased
supervisor’s animus must be “a ‘but-for’ cause of, or a determinative influence
on,” the employer’s ultimate decision. Id. at 1337.8 This requires a showing that
8
The parties do not dispute that the same “but-for” causation standard applies to
both ADEA claims and ADA retaliation claims. The Court agrees. In Sims, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the “but-for” standard applies in ADEA discrimination
claims because the statute prohibits discrimination “because of” an employee’s
age. See 704 F.3d at 1335–36. Both the ADEA and ADA retaliation provisions
10
the decision maker merely “rubberstamped” the biased supervisor’s
recommendation, applying the adverse action without any independent
investigation. See Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir.
1999); see also Simmons v. Sykes Enters., Inc., 647 F.3d 943, 950 (10th Cir.
2011), cited with approval in Sims, 704 F.3d at 1336.
In this case, Brown recommended to Trupiano that Plaintiff be fired. Brown
told Trupiano that the basis for her recommendation was that Plaintiff continued to
make errors on purchasing orders. Brown provided Trupiano with exemplar
purchasing orders showing Plaintiff’s alleged errors. Trupiano testified that he
personally reviewed the exemplar purchasing orders and determined that Plaintiff’s
errors were “occurring at an unacceptable frequency.” Trupiano further testified
that, based on his review of the purchasing orders, the fact that Plaintiff had been
given earlier warnings about her performance before making the errors on the
exemplar purchasing orders, and his knowledge concerning earlier complaints
include similar “because” language. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (“It shall be unlawful
for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because such
individual . . . has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section . . . .”
(emphasis added)); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (“No person shall discriminate against
any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made
unlawful by this chapter . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Univ. of Tex. Sw. v.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013) (holding that the use of “because” in Title
VII’s retaliation provision creates a “but-for” causation standard in Title VII
retaliation claims).
11
about Plaintiff, he decided to terminate Plaintiff’s employment.9
The record does not support that Trupiano merely “rubberstamped” Brown’s
recommendation. He personally reviewed the exemplar purchasing orders and
independently determined that the errors shown in them were “unacceptable.”10
Trupiano determined that the errors, in conjunction with his personal knowledge of
Plaintiff’s prior performance issues, were sufficient to warrant Plaintiff’s
termination. See Simmons, 647 F.3d at 950 (“[W]here a violation of company
policy was reported through channels independent from the biased supervisor, or
the undisputed evidence in the record supports the employer’s assertion that it fired
the employee for its own unbiased reasons that were sufficient in themselves to
justify termination, the plaintiff’s age may very well have been in play—and could
even bear some direct relationship to the termination if, for instance, the biased
9
Trupiano testified that his decision was based on these factors. Although
Trupiano stated that he considered whether to terminate Plaintiff because of
Brown’s recommendation, Trupiano did not testify, and the record does not
otherwise show, that Brown’s recommendation was a factor in the decision itself.
10
Plaintiff argues that Trupiano’s review of the purchasing orders was not
“independent” because Brown provided Trupiano with the purchasing orders.
Plaintiff, however, does not dispute the authenticity of the orders, or that they
contained the errors alleged, and Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence to show
that Trupiano did not independently determine that the errors were “unacceptable.”
See Simmons, 647 F.3d at 950 (explaining that cat’s paw liability would attach if
the decision maker relied on false reports of employee misconduct).
12
supervisor participated in the investigation or recommended termination—but age
was not a determinative cause of the employer’s final decision.”)11 The record
does not support that Trupiano was the “cat’s paw” of Brown, and Defendant is
entitled to summary judgment on Counts I, II, and IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
2.
Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint
The ADA generally requires an employer to make “reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an . . . employee.” 42 U.S.C
§ 12112(b)(5)(A). In Count III of her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
violated this provision because Brown failed to accommodate Plaintiff’s
rheumatoid arthritis. Plaintiff specifically alleges that Brown denied her
permission to stand and walk once per hour. Defendant disputes that Brown
denied Plaintiff permission to stand and walk once per hour.
The record shows that Plaintiff made her request for accommodation by
presenting to Brown a note from Plaintiff’s physician stating that, due to
11
Plaintiff argues that Trupiano did not compare Plaintiff’s errors to those of other
employees in the Purchasing Department. Plaintiff does not cite, and the Court is
not aware of, any authority requiring such a comparison. Plaintiff concedes that
Trupiano did not have an illegal animus toward her, and the record supports that
Trupiano believed Plaintiff’s errors, in conjunction with Plaintiff’s prior work
history, were sufficient to fire Plaintiff.
13
rheumatoid arthritis, Plaintiff should not remain seated for more than one hour.
Plaintiff explained to Brown that her condition required her to move once per hour.
In response to Plaintiff’s request, Brown responded that Plaintiff needed to remain
“visible” within the Purchasing Department.12
Plaintiff argues that Brown required Plaintiff to seek Brown’s permission
before getting up from her desk and that Brown occasionally denied Plaintiff’s
requests to get up. The record does not contain any evidence, however, that Brown
ever denied Plaintiff permission to walk at least once per hour, or otherwise
prevented Plaintiff from walking at least once per hour—the accommodation
requested by Plaintiff and at issue in this case.13 The record thus does not support
that Plaintiff was denied an accommodation, and Defendant is entitled to summary
judgment on Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
12
There is no dispute that the Purchasing Department is large enough to
accommodate Plaintiff’s walks.
13
Plaintiff also argues that Brown occasionally denied Plaintiff permission to use
the restroom. Use of the restroom, however, was not an accommodation requested
by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has not argued here that unfettered use of the restroom
was necessary to accommodate Plaintiff’s rheumatoid arthritis. See, e.g., Jones v.
Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2012) (“An accommodation
request must be sufficiently direct and specific, and it must explain how the
accommodation is linked to plaintiff’s disability.”)
14
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [30] is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED this 27th day of March, 2014.
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?